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How should the law regulate religious influence motivating gifts? Should criminal fraud laws 
apply to religious representations? When do religious officials take advantage of adherents in 
making a financial gain? These are challenging questions that this thesis sets out to assess. The 
focus is upon the regulation of religious fraud and religious undue influence in English law. 
Commentators on religious fraud have left significant questions unanswered concerning how 
such conduct can be regulated by s2 of the Fraud Act 2006, fraud by false representation. One 
of the objectives of this thesis is to justify why it is possible to litigate religious representations 
alleged to be false, even if juries are prohibited from testing the falsity of religious beliefs by 
the jurisprudence on Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The second objective of this thesis is to illustrate the problems with how courts determine when 
religious influence, an inevitable part of any religious experience, becomes undue in equitable 
settings. Fundamental differences exist between religious and nonreligious contexts that are 
not explicitly recognised by courts in finding that religious defendants have taken advantage 
of an adherent’s trust in presumed cases of undue influence.  
Based on this analysis, the thesis engages with a third objective and develops a rationale 
explaining when defendants should be convicted for religious fraud under s2 FA06 and found 
liable for religious undue influence in presumed undue influence cases. Normative discussions 
on autonomy and exploitation are examined. This thesis provides reasons why courts should 
take account of the features of religious relationships and religious motivations for gifts in 
cases. The rationale reduces the concern identified that decisions in both areas of law are 
unprincipled and give rise to religious bias. In turn, the thesis describes how religious influence 
should be regulated by English courts in a way that ensures more consistent regulation of gifts 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Between 2005-2020 Tony, a young god-fearing father and married churchgoer of Faith 
Allegiance, a fictitious evangelical religious group that views the Bible as the ultimate form of 
authority, gave 20% of his wages each month and 100% of his bonuses to the church. Tony 
believes that the payments made to the church will guarantee he reaches heaven when he 
eventually dies. He was assured of this by Elizabeth, the minister of the Faith Allegiance church 
he has attended since 2005. Elizabeth told Tony that the gifts are used for the upkeep of the 
church and to help with the Faith Allegiance’s activities. In 2020, Tony sadly caught COVID 
and began self-isolating away from his wife and daughter. He became extremely worried about 
his deteriorating condition and the possibility of his family also contracting COVID. He 
reached out to Elizabeth for advice and comfort. Elizabeth, concerned for Tony’s health, 
requested that they discuss his situation through Zoom. During their chat, Elizabeth suggested 
that Tony should make a gift to the church to show his devotion to God, who would 
subsequently rid Tony of COVID. Tony believed Elizabeth and immediately gifted £5,000 to 
the church. One-week later Tony’s symptoms grew more severe and he was rushed to a hospital 
for treatment. Tony was hospitalised for three weeks. After this time, he made a full recovery 
and was able to move back into his family home.  
 
Two months later, Tony becomes extremely distrustful of Elizabeth after his experience with 
COVID and began to question his faith and relationship with Elizabeth over the years. After 
deciding that Elizabeth has lied to him to financially benefit the church through a difficult 
period where attendance was prohibited by the government, Tony abandons his faith. 
Tony wants his financial contributions between 2005-2020 back from the church, as he has 
now been made redundant by the recruitment agency he works for. Tony has since been unable 
 18 
to meet his mortgage payments. Gemma, Tony’s wife, is a full-time caregiver for her ill father 
and is only able to make nominal contributions to the family’s bills. Tony has not been able to 
find another job because of record levels of unemployment and is consequently fearful that he 
will fall into further financial difficulties in the short-term, which will impact greatly his and 
his family’s life.  
 
Religious gifts made in similar contexts are common in many faiths and will often be used for 
a variety of purposes. For example, to help fund religious organisations and places of worship, 
to support evangelical practices and to contribute to the charitable practices of religions. 
Funding religions through gifts made by adherents is likely to be seen by most as an 
uncontroversial practice and one that is not explicitly prohibited by English law.  
 
The fictitious scenario involving Tony raises questions about whether he can challenge the 
legality of the gifts motivated by religious faith since 2005.1 I have outlined an example of an 
adherent who had donated large sums of their property to a religious institution because of a 
long-term relationship of influence and trust with a religious leader, who later changes their 
mind on the reasons for their gifts. The change of mind is caused by a growing distrust of 
religious officials, like Elizabeth, and because of a change of financial circumstances that were 
not and could not have realistically been anticipated at the time any of the gifts were made. In 
such circumstances, donors, like Tony, may feel that they have been induced to make some or 
all of the gifts because of lies, or consider that they have been taken advantage of by religious 
 
1 Evidence exists that other religious groups have been making similar religious claims. For example, “By faith 
you can be saved from the Coronavirus pandemic by covering yourself with the Divine Plague Protection Oil and 
wearing the Scarlet Yarn on your body” see National Secular Society, ‘Charity regulator to look into sale of 
coronavirus ‘protection kits’ 02/04/20 <https://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2020/04/charity-regulator-to-look-
into-sale-of-coronavirus-protection-kits> Accessed August 2020. For similar religious promises of curing COVID 
using snake-oil in the US see Canopy Forum on the Interactions of Law and Religion, Shlomo C. Pill, ‘Selling 
Religious Cures and Other First Amendment Pitfalls in the Age of Coronavirus,’ March 2020 
<https://canopyforum.org/2020/03/16/selling-religious-cures-and-other-first-amendment-pitfalls-in-the-age-of-
coronavirus-by-shlomo-pill/> Accessed August 2020. 
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officials seeking to gain financial capital, either to benefit themselves or their religious 
practices. However, changes to Tony’s position and feelings on the motives for the gifts may 
or may not be justified. This depends on the nature of the religious official’s influence and 
whether laws determine that the conduct is an inevitable part of the religious experience of the 
relevant faith or reaches a level that it is characterised as unlawful. This requires courts to 
consider whether Tony’s gifts to Faith Allegiance are of his own free-will? Is Elizabeth’s 
conduct sincerely based on her religious beliefs? Are the answers to each of the questions 
different at any time during Tony’s and Elizabeth’s fifteen-year relationship? 
 
This thesis engages with religious beliefs and other influential religious factors motivating 
adherents to enter into financial transactions2 to better understand how religious influence 
should be regulated by English laws.3 I address how religious fraud and religious undue 
influence should be regulated by courts in England by exploring criminal fraud laws and the 
civil law doctrine of undue influence in equitable settings. To achieve this, I explore the most 
pressing challenge of regulating religious influence by considering primary and secondary 
sources relating to religious fraud and religious undue influence. After identifying the doctrinal, 
theoretical, and rights-based challenges, I develop a rationale to better establish when courts 
should consider that adherents have voluntarily entered into financial transactions in religious 
contexts. This rationale will be proven to give greater legitimacy to decisions on defendant 
liability and the remedies awarded to claimants. 
 
 
2 My analysis of financial transactions is limited to inter vivos gifts and donations made to religious officials and 
institutions motivated by religious faith. 
3 I discuss legally recognised religions, spiritual groups and their beliefs, which feature in the case law 
examined. I presume that similar beliefs considered and applied to similar decisions would also be categorised 
legally as religious by English courts. 
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My thesis is split into two parts: in part I, before engaging with the English understandings of 
both legal wrongs, I review how US courts have litigated religious fraud cases and also, how 
Australian and US courts have regulated religious undue influence in chapter 2. The courts in 
both jurisdictions have experienced both types of cases more frequently in contemporary 
settings than English courts.4 The judicial reasoning of the judgments examined offers detailed 
discussions of the difficulties of determining when religious influence becomes unlawful. I use 
comparative law to identify common challenges experienced in the US and Australia that have, 
or at some point, will likely be similarly experienced by English courts. Additionally, I explore 
potential comparative lessons from the US and Australia that could benefit how English law 
could regulate both legal wrongs. 
 
My selection of the two jurisdictions as comparators for English understandings of criminal 
laws and equitable doctrines is not unusual. Commentators assessing the impact of criminal 
laws on religion and religious beliefs have often considered the US as an appropriate 
comparative jurisdiction.5 The US criminal fraud laws discussed here are different from the 
English FA06 offences, but the laws share enough similarities for it to count as a suitable 
jurisdiction to consider the common challenges of regulating religious fraud, and the possible 
means of addressing those challenges. Similarly, comparisons between English and Australian 
understandings of equitable principles and the laws on trusts are common. In much of the 
common law commentary on undue influence there is a great focus on leading English cases.6 
Further, English civil law commentators have examined US understandings of undue influence 
 
4 I do not consider the Australian experience of regulating religious fraud. Such cases are rare in Australian legal 
territories.  
5 See Matthew Gibson, ‘Rastafari and Cannabis: Framing a Criminal Law Exemption,’ (2010) Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal, 12(3), 324-344 & Peter Edge, ‘Religious drug use in England, South Africa and the United States of 
America,’ (2006), Religion & Human Rights, 1(2), 165–177. 
6 In particular, Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145, see Pauline Ridge, 'The Equitable Doctrine of Undue 
Influence Considered in the Context of Spiritual Influence and Religious Faith: Allcard v Skinner Revisited in 
Australia,' (2003) University of New South Wales Law Journal, 26(1), 66-89 & Simone Degelling, ‘Undue 
Influence and the Spiritual Economy,’ in Kit Barker et al, Private Law and Power, (Hart Publishing 2017). 
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to determine whether lessons should be adopted from this comparative jurisdiction.7 
Appropriate comparisons are possible because the jurisdictions share similar understandings 
on undue influence and similar social norms on general gift-giving, religious gift-giving and 
family provisions law.8  
 
More specifically, there are clear reasons why the US is a suitable comparative jurisdiction for 
understanding religious fraud regulation, beyond the instrumental reason that it is an English-
speaking country. The US Supreme Court has decided the leading religious fraud case globally, 
United States v Ballard [1944]9 (hereinafter Ballard), which concerned religious 
representations communicated through the mail. The reasoning of the US Supreme Court has 
been followed in federal and state cases involving allegations of religious fraud in criminal and 
civil contexts. I discuss how courts have subsequently interpreted the judgment and the issues 
that have been recognised by other US courts, as a result of doing so. I also provide an overview 
of the suggestions from US commentators on how courts could seek to address these challenges 
and introduce some of the concerns about adopting such approaches in practice. This analysis 
offers important insights into the complexity of regulating religious fraud using criminal laws. 
 
I subsequently explore the reasoning of the leading judgments on religious undue influence 
found in Australia and the US. Extending my civil analysis to Australian law is significant. 
Between 2000-2005, five cases of religious undue influence reached the Supreme Courts of 
Australian legal states.10 The reasoning contained in these judgments is detailed and considers 
the complexities of determining religious influence from undue influence. Moreover, the 
 
7 See William Swadling, ‘Undue Influence: Lessons from America,’ in Charles Mitchell & William Swadling, 
The Restatement Third: Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: Critical and Comparative Essays, (OUP 2013). 
8 See, pages 63-67. 
9 322 U.S. (1944). 
10 See n 151. 
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Australian cases have been examined by a number of scholars who have generated a detailed 
body of commentary on the challenges of regulating gifts motivated by religious faith. In 
particular, I expand upon Pauline Ridge’s leading work in the common law world on how 
Australian courts have decided cases and what questions remain from those important 
judgments.11 The US also contributes to understandings of how religious undue influence is 
regulated. Recently, US commentators have also generated detailed commentary on 
contemporary religious undue influence cases, which I engage with. Based on this comparative 
analysis, I demonstrate how both jurisdictions have and continue to share a similarly 
challenging experience of regulating religious undue influence through the test for presumed 
undue influence, as it stands in each jurisdiction. I list the prevalent complexities of regulating 
religious undue influence before explaining the potential limit of insightful comparative 
lessons from both jurisdictions that could be used to otherwise enrich the English 
understanding of presumed undue influence in my later analysis. 
 
Departing from the comparative analysis, I move on to illustrate how similar legal challenges 
are experienced in England under the current understandings of the most relevant laws for 
regulating religious fraud and religious undue. In chapter 3, I firstly consider s2 of the Fraud 
Act 2006 (hereinafter FA06), fraud by false representation. This is the broadest offence 
contained in the FA0612 and the offence most likely to regulate religious representations 
resulting in financial gains. Elizabeth’s claim that God will rid Tony of COVID in exchange 
for a gift is an example of a representation that could foreseeably be litigated under s2 FA06. 
 
11 Pauline Ridge (n 6); ‘Moral Duty, Religious Faith and the Regulation of Testation,' (2005) University of South 
Wales Law Journal, 28(3), 720-739; ‘Negotiating the sacred in law: Regulation of Gifts Motivated by Religious 
Faith,’ in Elizabeth Burns Coleman et al, Negotiating the Sacred: Blasphemy and Sacrilege in a Multicultural 
Society, (ANU Press 2006); ‘Legal and Ethical Matters Relevant to the Receipt of Financial Benefits by Ministers 
of Religion and Churches,’ (2003) Griffith Law Review, 12; ‘McCulloch v Fern,’ (2002)  Journal of Contract 
Law, 18, 13. 
12 David Ormerod, 'The Fraud Act 2006-Criminalising Lying?' (2007) Criminal Law Review, 196. 
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Religious cases of this nature are rare in contemporary settings. In the most significant case, 
Thomas Phillips v Thomas Monsoon [2014]13 (hereinafter Phillips), a Magistrates court 
dismissed a claim that the tenants of the Church of the Latter Days Saints were fraudulent on 
the grounds that it was nonjusticiable and amounted to vexatious litigation.  
 
Religious fraud regulation is not new to the laws of England.14 Regulation preventing the use 
of unworldly contexts to unlawfully acquire financial capital has existed for centuries.15 Yet 
despite the considerable value of global religious fraud,16 and growth in global scholarship,17 
religious fraud is yet to be viewed again as an area of real legal concern in contemporary 
settings in England. Domestic fraud agencies do not discuss religious fraud at all.18 This 
omission is, however, surprising given that media coverage on alleged instances of religious 
fraud is now common.19  
 
13 Unreported March 20, 2014 (MC). 
14 St John A. Robilliard, Religion and Law: Religious Liberty in Modern English Law, (Manchester University 
Press 1984), 119; also see Ronald C. Finucane, Miracles, Pilgrims: Popular Beliefs in Medieval England, 
(Palgrave 1977). 
15 Vagrancy Act 1851 and the Fraudulent Mediums Act 1951; for greater detail on these Acts see Robilliard 
(1984), 118-119 & Peter Edge, 'Determining Religion in English Courts,' (2012) Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion, 1(2), 402-423. 
16 In 2014 the ACFE estimated that of the £3.7 trillion global estimated costs of fraud, 2.9% was caused through 
religious and charitable fraud, ACFE, ‘Report to the Nations on Occupation Fraud and Abuse 2014,’ 
<http://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf>, page 27. Accessed May 2020. 
17 In the US see Marjorie Heins, 'Other People's Faiths: The Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of 
Religious Fraud,' (1981) Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 9(1), 15; Jonathan Turley, ‘Laying Hands on 
Religious Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO to Fraudulent Religious Solicitation,' (1988) William and Mary Law 
Review, 29(3), 441-500; Caleb Mason, ‘What is Truth? Setting the Bounds of Justiciability in Religiously-
Inflected Fact Disputes,' (2010) Journal of Law and Religion, 1, 91–139; Nicholas Barborak, 'Saving the World, 
One Cadillac at a Time: What Can Be Done When a Religious or Charitable Organization Commits Solicitation 
Fraud,' (2000) Akron Law Review, 33(4), 577-610; Sean Senn, 'The Prosecution of Religious Fraud,'  (1990) 
Florida State University Law Review, 17(2), 325-352. Religious fraud research has been conducted in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong by Jianlin Chen, see ‘Regulating Religious Fraud in Taiwan and Hong Kong: A Comparative 
Study on the Convergences and Deviations in the Understanding of Religious Freedom,’ (2019), Chinese Journal 
of Comparative Law, 7(1), 150-189;  ‘Joyous Buddha, Holy Father, and Dragon God Desiring Sex: A Case Study 
of Rape by Religious Fraud in Taiwan,’ (2018) National Taiwan University Law Review, 13(2), 183-237; ‘Hong 
Kong’s Chinese Temples Ordinance: A Cautionary Case Study of Discriminatory and Misguided Regulation of 
Religious Fraud,’ (2018) Journal Of Law And Religion, 33, 421-446. 
18 Only clairvoyance scams have been examined, see Amanda van Eck Duymaer van Twist, Minority Religions 
and Fraud: In Good Faith, (Routledge, 2nd Edition, 2016), 4. 
19  For example, BBC World Service, Your Question of Faith, ‘How do Religious Frauds and Imposters?’ 17 Apr 
2000 < https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/p0344sp1> Accessed June 2020; Damien Gayle, ‘Met police examine 
fraud allegations at Space Nation church,’ Wed 13 Nov 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2019/nov/13/met-police-examine-fraud-allegations-spac-nation-church> Accessed June 2020; BBC News, 
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Religious fraud litigation based on s2 FA06 raises complex theological and legal questions for 
English courts; most notably, when should religious beliefs and representations surrounding 
gifts be classified as fraudulent by the law? Should the law enter into a debate so heavily 
grounded in theology? I discuss why it is unlikely and undesirable that defendants should 
invariably be exempt from the offence where the representations alleged to be fraudulent are 
motivated by religious faith. 
 
After outlining the reasons why religious fraud should be viewed as a real concern for English 
courts, I analyse the most troubling aspects of religious fraud regulation in light of the US 
experience. This analysis involves intertwined considerations of criminal law doctrine, 
procedure and human rights protections. These challenges are produced by the actus reus and 
mens rea requirements for s2 FA06. Some of the regulatory challenges and questions discussed 
apply uniquely to religious contexts. Other challenges examined are general criminal doctrinal 
ones that are compounded when considered in religious contexts. There are two primary 
challenges for the effective regulation of religious fraud. Firstly, whether religious beliefs 
featured in cases can be tested for falsity, and if courts are allowed to do so, how can 
conventional methods test different types of religious beliefs? I term this the “falsity testing 
challenge.” Secondly, I question what role should the sincerity of the defendant’s religious 
beliefs have in cases? I call this the “sincerity testing challenge.” I also review several other 
areas of concern generated by the wording of s2 FA06. This extends to the difficulties of 
determining a defendant’s knowledge of unworldly and religious matters, how dishonesty 
assessments might be overly critical of defendants from less established faiths, and whether 
group sincerity is relevant to cases involving multiple defendants within religious structures. 
 
‘Coronavirus: London church investigated over 'protection' oil,’ 2 April 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-london-52136588> Accessed June 2020. 
 25 
My analysis of s2 FA06 in religious contexts reveals the significance and worrying nature of 
the challenges facing English courts in regulating religious fraud. I submit that the suggestions 
of how these challenges can be addressed using the alternative approaches proposed by the US 
commentators mentioned should not be transplanted into English criminal fraud laws because 
of the religious freedom concerns identified. I demonstrate that without further developments 
to the understandings of the actus reus and mens rea of s2 FA06 by the courts or Parliament, 
defendants are presented with multiple opportunities to escape liability by explaining their 
conduct through religious pretexts. Judicial determinations that representations are religious 
and cannot be tested for falsity could result in abuses of religious categorisation by both 
dishonest adherents and racketeers using religion as a cloak to mask their true intentions of 
making a profit. I conclude that significant developments in case law or through legislative 
reform are needed to ensure s2 FA06 does not overregulate or underregulate religious 
representations that result in gains of property. This applies most forcefully to the falsity testing 
challenge; particularly where religious beliefs are incapable of testing for truthfulness by 
conventional legal methods. However, I argue that the sincerity challenge would also benefit 
from further legal analysis by courts. 
 
In chapter 4, I consider the equitable doctrine of undue influence in religious contexts. I discuss 
how courts have determined when religious influence becomes undue in presumed undue 
influence cases. Other than being a civil law doctrine, religious undue influence has a different 
foundational understanding in contemporary English law compared to the criminal regulation 
of religious fraud.20 Religious and spiritual undue influence cases were common in the 
 
20 Suspicions that religious influence is highly influential on motivations for both inter vivos gifts and testamentary 
dispositions has a long historical pedigree in England and Wales. This suspicion goes as far back as transfers of 
land regulated by Mortmain Statutes, for general commentary see Jeffrey G. Sherman, ‘Can Religious Influence 
ever be “Undue” Influence?’ (2008) Brooklyn Law Review, 73(2), 581-598. 
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nineteenth century. The leading case from this period, Allcard v Skinner (1887)21 (hereinafter 
Allcard), remains relevant to doctrinal discussions in English courts and is still cited in leading 
contemporary nonreligious undue influence cases.22 Similarly, civil law scholars have 
discussed Allcard principally to consider and assess the doctrine’s correct rationale.23  
 
Since that period religious undue influence cases have been less common in England until 
recently when English courts witnessed a small resurgence in claims.24 Despite the religious 
pedigree of the doctrine, there are several worrying areas commented on in historical and 
contemporary cases that risk courts continuing to produce unprincipled decisions on defendant 
liability in hard cases. This view is evidenced in my examination of both religious, spiritual 
and general presumed undue influence cases. My analysis builds on the extensive work of 
Ridge, who makes important comparisons between English and Australian cases. Some of the 
challenges investigated apply uniquely to religious undue influence cases because of the nature 
of religious relationships. I also demonstrate how the doctrine suffers from general doctrinal 
challenges relating to the operation of presumptions and the rebuttal stage that are compounded 
in religious cases. I claim that the challenges are the result of an overarching challenge that I 
call the “grounding principle problem.” I discuss how the doctrine’s rationale is not sharply 
defined or consistently applied by courts and explain why this treatment of the rationale is 
significant in religious undue influence cases. 
 
 
21 See n 6. 
22 Most notably, Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180 (HL) and Royal Bank of Scotland plc 
v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44; [2001] 3 W.L.R. 1021. 
23 See Peter Birks & Chin Nyuk Yin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmane, 
Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, (Clarendon Press 1997); Rick Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Exploitation: 
From Unfair Advantage to Transactional Neglect’ (2005) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 25(1), 65-96 and 
Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Vindicating the Relationships of Influence’ (2006) Current Legal 
Problems, 59(1), 231-266. 
24 Catt v Church of Scientology Religious Education College Inc (2001) C.P. Rep 41, Azaz v Denton [2009] 
EWHC 1759 (QB); [2009] 7 WLUK 568, Curtis v Curtis [2011] EWCA 1602; [2011] 11 WLUK 381 & Kliers 
v Schmerler [2018] EWHC 1350 (Ch); [2018] 4 WLUK 571. 
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As a result of this analysis, I assert that English courts possess too much discretion when 
making distinctions between religious influence and undue influence, which should be of 
concern to any religious organisations receiving gifts motivated by religious faith. I contend 
that the religious nature of the party’s relationship and the donor’s religious beliefs motivating 
gifts may not be taken seriously by courts because of objective conceptions of what constitutes 
valid reasons for gift-giving. I demonstrate that there is a real potential that suspicious or 
unusual religious beliefs motivating gifts are wrongly treated as evidence of undue influence 
by courts. I also discuss how the doctrinal test causes large gifts to religious institutions, or 
individuals of any background, to be categorised as suspect and subject to a presumption of 
influence. I argue that this sort of reasoning creates significant disadvantages for religious 
defendants when rebutting presumptions of influence. 
 
I close my doctrinal analysis of the English understanding of equitable undue influence in 
religious contexts by addressing why the understandings of undue influence found in the US 
and Australia should not be directly transplanted into English law. I consider that the 
understandings of the doctrine held in both jurisdictions are unable to offer a sufficiently 
principled and justified means of addressing the challenges examined in an appropriate way. 
The three jurisdictions share too many common challenges for this to be a suitable approach. 
Instead, based on my domestic doctrinal and comparative analysis, I argue that a new rationale 
must be developed to address the grounding principle problem, which explicitly takes account 
of religious factors in cases. This is developed in part II of the thesis. 
 
Before that stage of my thesis, I identify several overlaps between the two legal wrongs, despite 
the obvious differences in legal contexts. In chapter 5, I demonstrate how my combined 
analysis of both legal wrongs reveals that regulating religious influence poses multiple hybrid 
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challenges. These challenges relate to the understandings of the rationales for s2 FA06 and 
presumed undue influence, the use of undefined principles in judicial reasoning and the 
limitations of subjective concepts. I reaffirm that the overarching problem of regulating 
religious influence using criminal fraud laws and civil undue influence is the degree of 
discretion held by judges and juries in deciding claims, and the lack of clear understanding of 
the fundamental principles relevant to both legal wrongs. This discussion concludes part I and 
sets out the fundamental considerations of regulating religious influence through both legal 
wrongs. 
 
In part II, I take a jurisprudential turn and develop a principled response to the challenges 
identified in part I. This response is designed to avoid the risks of underregulating and 
overregulating religious conduct that shapes an adherent’s reasons for gifts in the ways 
examined. In chapter 6, I begin my development of such a response by focusing exclusively on 
the rationales seeking to theorise presumed undue influence and set aside my criminal fraud 
analysis. I discuss the three most frequently discussed, and arguably leading rationales:25 Birk’s 
and Chin’s impaired will account;26 Bigwood’s wrongdoing as exploitation account;27 and 
Chen Wishart’s hybrid account of relational autonomy, which is grounded in a Perfectionist 
framework.28 I argue that neither of the accounts adequately addresses the claimant sided, 
defendant sided, and both claimant sided and defendant sided challenges of regulating religious 
undue influence identified in the civil sections of part I. The layered approach of my critique 
demonstrates that the general weakness of the restitution scholarship is a failure to give 
 
25 Public policy could also be considered as in see generally Graham Ferris, ‘Why is the Law of Undue Influence 
so Hard to Understand and Apply?’ in Elizabeth Cooke, Modern Studies in Property Law- Volume 4, (Hart 
Publishing 2007). It has however not been considered, as the account offers the least likely means of addressing 
challenges pervading the doctrine and has gained less traction in discussions on the correct rationale.  
26 See Birks & Chin (n 23). 
27 Rick Bigwood, “Undue Influence: ‘Impaired Consent’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?” (1996) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 16(3), 503-515 & Bigwood (n 23), 65-96. 
28 Adapted from Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) in Chen-Wishart (n 23), 231-266. 
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sufficient attention to hard cases of religious undue influence that would, in turn, benefit the 
justifications for deciding easier cases of undue influence. I consequently demonstrate that the 
failure of each rationale exists at both a normative and practical level. 
 
Despite my strong critique of the three rationales, I consider that in part each helps to explain 
an inherent part of what constitutes undue influence in religious contexts. I subsequently use 
the critique of the rationales to develop my own rationale termed the “integrative rationale of 
autonomy and exploitation” in chapter 7. I first explain how this applies to presumed undue 
influence and then to s2 FA06. Through my rationale I advance more detailed conceptions of 
impaired will, exploitation, and relational autonomy. I contend that this combination of 
principles changes how the offences would be regulated by English courts, which would lead 
to more principled decisions on liability, if it were accepted. 
 
I adopt Gerald Dworkin’s conceptions of personal autonomy for the first limb of my rationale, 
which is claimant-sided. I include two conceptions of autonomy advanced by Dworkin, even 
though Dworkin later rejected his first account. I explain why the critique of that account is not 
as applicable to this context. This explanation of autonomy is a new addition to the rationale 
debates. Using the understandings of autonomy, I explain that a donor’s autonomy can be 
infringed in two ways. Firstly, their autonomy is infringed where the donor’s first-order and 
second-order preferences are not aligned at the time the gift is made. I define this as 
“incongruence between reasons.” Alternatively, a donor’s autonomy is infringed where their 
reflections are hindered. I term this “reflection thwarting.” 
 
I embed this understanding of personal autonomy within a Perfectionist framework described 
by Joseph Raz. My usage of this framework elaborates on my analysis of Chen-Wishart’s 
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rationale. Incorporating this additional understanding of autonomy helps to sets limits to what 
conduct should be characterised as valuable and autonomous by court in gift-giving settings. It 
is particularly important to the religious focus of my analysis, which touches on rules obedience 
and poverty, as it helps to guard against determinations made by courts that those rules accepted 
by adherents are characterised as restrictions on their autonomy. 
 
The second limb of my rationale, which is defendant-sided, is inspired by Joel Feinberg’s 
leading account of interpersonal exploitation in criminal law theory. I consider Feinberg’s rich 
analysis of criminal exploitation29 and focus on exploitation resulting in financial harm or 
conduct that was intended to cause financial harm.30 This understanding of exploitation has not 
been considered in the rationale debates discussed or in detail by commentators concerning s2 
FA06 litigation. Nevertheless, I demonstrate why this conception of exploitation is a justifiable 
aspect of my rationale that provides an appropriate definition for the term in cases of presumed 
undue influence and s2 FA06. 
 
Exploitation establishes when infringements of autonomy become violations of autonomy that 
justify criminal or civil liability. Where this alignment occurs in civil contexts, a gift has been 
unduly influenced, and where it is proven in criminal contexts, a s2 FA06 offence is committed 
if the other statutory requirements are also fulfilled. My usage of exploitation sets another limit 
to what conduct should be characterised as undue influence and fraud by false representation 
in religious contexts. 
 
 
29 Set out in Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 3: Harm to Self, (OUP 1989). 
30 Ibid, 176. 
 31 
More broadly, my rationale has a wider focus on temporality, as the constituent elements of 
religious influence and relationships can vary greatly between parties over time. In the criminal 
context, temporality features in assessments of whether the defendant satisfies all elements of 
the actus reus and mens rea of s2 FA06. In the civil context, temporality and causation are less 
commonly found in discussions concerning undue influence. No real commentary exists on 
how temporality can or should be understood in the doctrinal test for presumed undue 
influence. Instead, temporality is treated more as an implicit factor in equitable understandings 
of the doctrine in England and Australia that I argue has not been given sufficient recognition. 
Temporality analysis does, however, feature in some US religious cases. It is treated as a 
relevant factor by judges concerning when presumptions of influence arise and whether one 
can be rebutted by defendants. I consider this reasoning and explain how my rationale engages 
with changes in religious influence and relationships, and why it is sometimes necessary to 
consider severing gifts from presumptions of influence when such changes have occurred. 
 
Overall, I claim that the combination of normative principles in my rationale, set within a 
temporally nuanced Perfectionist framework, provides greater doctrinal clarity for what 
constitutes unlawful religious influence. It does so by explaining what conduct should be 
captured by both legal wrongs, and also, what factors are relevant to the decisions of courts. 
Consequently, my rationale is better placed to establish when courts should determine that 
individuals have voluntarily entered into financial transactions in religious and general 
contexts. Accordingly, my rationale gives greater legitimacy to judicial reasoning and 
decisions on liability by reducing the discretion afforded to judges and juries through 
advancing principled ways of addressing many of the challenges of regulating religiously 
motivated conduct in both areas of law. Therefore, I demonstrate how my rationale guards 
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against the sorts of concerns mentioned in part I, even if judges and juries deciding cases lack 
any degree of religious literacy on the party’s religious beliefs. 
 
My thesis makes several contributions to legal knowledge on how religious influence should 
be regulated and more generally, to the existing doctrinal understandings of both legal wrongs 
evaluated. I outline the main challenges of regulating religious fraud and advance 
understandings of how religious representations alleged to be fraudulent should be litigated 
using s2 FA06. I describe some potential means of how courts of Parliament could confirm 
how the falsity testing challenge should be addressed in religious cases based on the US 
regulatory experience. In doing so, I highlight areas of law that are fertile ground for future 
analysis in this context and general human rights jurisprudence. 
 
My focus on the equitable understanding of undue influence also creates similar contributions 
to equity and restitution scholarship. By deciding how hard cases of religious undue influence 
should be decided, I contribute to understandings of the doctrine more generally and explain 
how courts should interpret the concepts of impaired will and exploitation in presumed undue 
influence cases of any nature. Consequently, I further understandings on how specific doctrinal 
issues should be addressed by courts. My rationale also contributes to the rationale debates by 
reaffirming why monist rationales offer inadequate explanations of when influence becomes 
undue. 
 
I now begin my substantive analysis of the comparative and domestic regulatory approaches 
for determining liability for religious fraud and religious undue influence, and the challenges 
of doing so in part I. I continue to describe the main and secondary contributions to legal 




Chapter 2: A Comparative Analysis of Religious Fraud and Undue Influence 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I first examine the US experience of religious fraud regulation. I focus 
predominantly on the US Supreme Court decision in Ballard. This decision is the starting point 
of any discussion of religious fraud;31 it has said more about the issues that concern religious 
freedom and sincerity of beliefs in the US than any other case.32 I discuss the reasoning of the 
majority and dissenting US Supreme Court Justices and consider how this reasoning has been 
applied in subsequent decisions. I also outline the main concerns about the decision and the 
alternative approaches argued by commentators to create more effective regulation of religious 
representations. Such discussions will be relevant to my examination of how courts would 
prosecute religiously motivated representations using s2 FA06 in chapter 3. 
 
I subsequently review the Australian and US experience of religious undue influence regulation 
by discussing the leading cases within each jurisdiction. This analysis reveals a number of 
challenges in determining when religious influence becomes undue that are either common or 
unique to each jurisdiction. The challenges are split into three categories: the characteristics of 
the parties, the “gift,” and the review process conducted by courts in both jurisdictions. My 
analysis also offers some insights into the means of addressing the challenges that are 
 
31 Heins (n 17), 158. 
32 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and The Constitution: Volume 1: Free Exercise and Fairness, (Princeton University 
Press 2006), 110 
 34 
subsequently relevant to my discussion in chapter 4 of the English experience of regulating 
religious influence through the civil doctrine of undue influence. 
 
 
1.1. Religious fraud regulation in the US 
 
Religious fraud has been a problematic area of legal regulation in the US for over a century.33 
Since the early twentieth century, there has been a steady stream of cases under federal law, 
mainly relating to the offence of mail fraud.34 Cases have consistently posed challenging 
questions for courts about how claims should be prosecuted and how far courts should take 
account of religious liberty protections. Religious liberty protections under the First 
Amendment of the US Constitution have been significant in cases relating to untestable 
religious representations and the potential for religious exemptions to generally applicable 
criminal laws. Religious fraud prosecutions are, however, rare35 and claims have been less 
frequent since the turn of the twenty-first century. This development does not mean that 
religious fraud is not regularly committed throughout US states. Depending on how religious 
fraud is defined,36 there is a vast amount of quantitative data and reports suggesting that such 
 
33 Post v. United States, 135 F. I (5th Cir. 1905). and United States v. White, 150 F. 378 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906). 
34 For example, see McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922) (spiritualism); State v. Handzik, 
410 Ill. 295, 102 N.E.2d 340 (1951) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952) (faith healing); United States v. Ballard 
322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944); United States v. Carruthers 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1946) 
(religious fraud); Jeffers v. United States, 392 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1968) (religious fraud); United States v. Rasheed, 
663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981) (Scientology); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 
(D. Mass. 1982) (Scientology); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 57 Or. App. 203, 229, 644 P.2d 577, 594 
(Ct. App. 1982) (Scientology); United States v. Gering 716 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1983) (religious fraud); & U.S. v. 
Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991) (religious fraud).  
35 Senn (n 17), 327, ft 10. 
36 Religious fraud can just mean secular fraud offences committed in religious contexts. For instance, misuse of 
solicited funds for different means than promised, tax fraud, skimming religious accounts, and fraudulent expense 
claims. 
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conduct is extremely prevalent in US states.37 The US is also factored into the global trend of 
fraud, which is increasingly committed in religious contexts.38  
 
 
1.1.1. The US Legal Context 
 
Religious fraud regulation in the US generally touches on two categories of laws. Firstly, 
federal laws, which are “Supreme law[s] of the land.”39 State laws are not discussed in the 
following analysis in any real detail due to the volume of laws and legal differences between 
states.40 However, this choice does not weaken the analysis that follows. The analysis 
conducted on US regulation of religious fraud provides a solid foundation for comparisons that 
have also been adopted by senior courts in other common law jurisdictions prosecuting 
instances of alleged religious fraud.41 Moreover, the cases examined below have received the 
 
37 Carol S. Peters, ‘More Than Just Good Deeds: Fraud Within Religious Organizations,’ (2015) A Capstone 
Project Submitted to the Faculty of Utica College in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Economic Crime Management, 2 <https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1728329488.html?FMT=AI?> 
Accessed October 2018. Other sources support this conclusion, although the validity of these resources used is 
open to question see Walter Pavlo, “Fraud Thriving in U.S. Churches, But You Wouldn't Know It,” 18 November 
2013, Forbes <https://forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2013/11/18/fraud-thriving-in-u-s-churches-but-you-wouldnt-
knowit/#7d688ec277bf> Accessed October 2018. 
38 Peters (n 37), 3-4 cites the International Bulletin of Missionary Research (2015) which stated that fraud against 
religious institutions will amount to $50,000,000,000 by mid-2015. It also estimated that by 2025 this number 
will jump to $100,000,000,000 a year. However, Peters rightly notes that other researchers have concluded that 
these estimates are not accurate due to underreporting by religious institutions (see Pavlo, (n 37)). Additionally, 
it is mentioned that the estimates do not take into account fraud committed at non-Christian religious 
organizations, 3-4. This estimate seems to ignore the ACFE estimate of the global cost of religious fraud of $3.5 
trillion in 2011, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, ‘Report to The Nations on Occupational Fraud and 
Abuse: Global Fraud Study 2012, 4 <http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2012-
report-tonations. 
pdf> Accessed October 2018. The amount of money that is acquired through fraudulent religious practices each 
year seems more likely to be larger.  
39 John M. Scheb, An Introduction to the American Legal System, (Cengage Learning 2002), 74. 
40 I do not consider civil areas of law that have been considered to offer suitable means of regulating religious 
representations that result in financial gains. For example, contractual claims for breach of promise and tortious 
claims of intentional infliction emotional distress. For commentary on the potential of these sorts claims 
involving allegations of religious fraud see Barborak (n 17). 
41 See the Canadian case of Church of Scientology and The Queen (No. 6), Re, 1987 CanLII 122 (ON CA), where 
the court discusses the appellant counsel’s case in favour of not E-meters used by Scientologists capable of 
committing fraud. This included: Ballard (n 9), 6; Founding Church of Scientology of Washington v. United States 
(1969), 409 F. 2d 1146, (Scientology and fraud); Christofferson (n 33), 18. (Scientology and fraud); and Van 
Schaick (n 33), 22 (Scientology and religious fraud). Australian courts have adopted a similar comparative 
 36 
most commentary from scholars focusing on the legal challenges of regulating religious fraud 
in the common law and civil law world. 
 
Secondly, the First Amendment to the US Constitution is commonly examined in religious 
fraud cases. This provision is key to the main themes of this chapter as it proscribes rights on 
religious freedom42 applicable to all US states through the Fourteenth Amendment.43 The First 
Amendment can be used to strike down federal laws,44 executive action,45 and State laws,46 if 
a law is an impermissible burden on religious liberty rights. The religious rights provided by 
the First Amendment are twofold: Congress or wider governmental institutions shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion. This is known as the “Establishment Clause.”47 
Secondly, the First Amendment protects the free exercise of religious liberty,48 which is termed 
the “Free Exercise Clause.”49 This clause allows individuals to believe in any religious 
ideologies they choose to and mandates that individuals cannot be forced to believe in one 
particular religion by the state.50 Additionally, the Free Exercise Clause protects the right of 
individuals to manifest their religious beliefs, which can result in exceptions being granted to 
laws where beliefs are incompatible with generally applicable laws.  
 
 
approach; In Church of New Faith v. Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (1983), 154 C.L.R. 120 (H. C. of Australia), 
Mason A.C.J. referred to Ballard twice about whether religious beliefs could be tested for falsity, [13] & [23]. 
42 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
43 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
44 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137 (1803). 
45 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 17 L.Ed 459 (1862). 
46 Fletcher v. Peck, 19 U.S. 87, 3 L.Ed 162 (1810). 
47 Scheb (n 39), 88; it is not assessed in this chapter, but the test applied by courts to determine if federal law or 
executive action has violated this right, they follow a three-part stage developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602 (1971). 
48 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
49 Scheb (n 39), 88. 
50 Cantwell (n 43) & Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S.488 (1961).  
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The Free Exercise Clause may be limited by legal states under certain conditions.51 The test 
for what conditions must be proven by national and state institutions has developed 
considerably over the decades of jurisprudence.52 Federal and state courts must assess three 
steps before lawfully restricting the religious liberty of individuals: 
 
a) Proof that Free Exercise of Religion has been infringed.53 This requires that the alleged 
religious conduct restricted must be legally classified as religious.54 Appellants must also show 
that their religious beliefs are sincerely held.55 Once an infringement is found courts must 
assess whether the infringement is constitutionally permissible;56  
 
B) States must show a compelling interest57 by offering a reasoned justification for restricting 
conduct, for example, providing public education to all children.58 The free exercise of religion 
is a fundamental right.59 Accordingly, states must show that the exercise of the right creates a 
grave and immediate danger to the interest specified.60 The burden is on the individual to 
demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the state's action and the interest 




52 For example, B) was included after Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Yet it was not applied consistently 
in subsequent cases, see William P. Marshall, ‘Smith, Ballard, and the Religious Inquiry Exception to the Criminal 
Law,’ (2011) Texas Tech Law Review, 44, 243-244, in particular ft 37. 
53 For further detail see, W. John Thomas, ‘Preventing Non-Profit Profiteering: Regulating Religious Cult 
Employment Practices,’ (1981) Arizona Law Review, 23(3), 1013-1016. 
54 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). 
55 United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1968). 
56 Ibid, 1015-1016. 
57 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963), also see Thomas (n 53), 1016-1020, ft 20. 
58 The State has adopted this as a compelling interest against an Amish claim that compulsory schooling until the 
age of sixteen years old violated the free exercise of their religious rights, Yoder (n 54). 
59 Ibid 
60 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
61 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1979). 
62 Yoder (n 54). 
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C) States must subsequently show that there are no other less restrictive means by which they 
could pursue the compelling interest.63  If states fail to do this, the legislation or action 
challenged is held unconstitutional by courts. In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940),64 a statute 
requiring religious groups to obtain a certificate before soliciting religious contributions was 
found unconstitutional because it was not the least restrictive alternative means available to 
effectuate the state's interest. Courts should only examine alternatives that are equally or 
substantially as effective.65 
 
The free exercise of religious rights is important to the understanding of Ballard now 
examined, subsequent cases discussed, as well as the comments made on those cases by 
scholars considered below. 
 
 
1.1.2. Challenges and comparative lessons on religious fraud regulation  
 
This section discusses the eminent US Supreme Court decision in Ballard. The detailed judicial 
reasoning of the Supreme Courts establishes how US courts have regulated instances of 
religious fraud and outlines the alternative ways US laws could regulate this conduct. I also 
discuss cases decided subsequently, which reveals how the Supreme Court in Ballard did not 
address all of the challenges relevant to the effective regulation of religious fraud. Accordingly, 




63 Ibid, also see Thomas (n 53), 1020-1022, ft 20. 
64 310 U.S. 296,306-07. 
65 Ibid, 1021. 
 39 
1.1.3. United States v. Ballard (1944)66 
 
Guy and Edna Ballard founded a religion called the “I Am” movement in 1930. The group 
publicly claimed to further individual self-fulfillment and personal success. Guy saw himself 
as a divine messenger of St. Germaine who could heal ailments and diseases (a power that was 
also allegedly shared by his wife and son). His powers were demonstrated to adherents in 
exchange for payment. Guy informed his followers that he had been in direct contact with Jesus 
and would pass on Jesus’s teachings in his practices. Guy’s beliefs were communicated using 
mail-order literature and personal meetings. These representations formed the basis of an 
allegation against the family for mail fraud.67  
 
Eventually, the case was heard by the US Supreme Court after an appeal was made against the 
decision of the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, which held that Guy’s beliefs could be 
tested for falsity by juries and that Guy was guilty of mail fraud. Justice Douglas gave the 
majority opinion of the Supreme Court, which is well-known for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
judgment strictly enforced the First Amendment jurisprudence principle that courts and juries 
should not determine or suggest that a defendant’s religious beliefs are false. Justice Douglas 
stated, "[f]reedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief. . . embraces the right 
to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers 
of the orthodox faiths.”68 For the majority of the Justices, it did not matter that Guy’s beliefs 
were unusual or even impossible, the First Amendment afforded “…the widest possible 
 
66 See n 9. 
67 This is regulated as a federal crime and requires a) intention, b) a "scheme or artifice to defraud" or the obtaining 
of property by fraud and, c) a mail or wire communication, see U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 63 § 1343 
68 Ballard (n 9), [86] (Justice Douglas). 
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toleration of conflicting views.”69 It was held that if jury members were to decide the falsity of 
Guy’s religious beliefs they would “…enter a forbidden domain.”70 
 
Secondly, Justice Douglas discussed how liability in religious fraud claims should be 
determined to prevent undue violations of the defendant’s religious liberty rights protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause. The majority of the Supreme Court decided that the liability of 
religious defendants for mail fraud should be determined by juries. Consequently, the religious 
context in which the representations occur was held to provide an insufficiently strong 
justification for the creation of a religious exception to the offence. The majority of the 
Supreme Court discussed how juries could assess the sincerity of Guy’s religious beliefs to 
determine whether he should be convicted for mail fraud. Each juror would subsequently be 
allowed to subjectively determine whether they considered that Guy genuinely believed that 
his representations were true.  
 
The Supreme Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit to be tried 
after reversing that court’s decision on the falsity analysis. There, Guy was found to have acted 
insincerely, and consequently convicted for mail fraud by a jury. In contrast, if the jurors had 
found him sincere, he would not have been found guilty and would have been allowed to carry 
on the religious practices of the I AM movement. 
 
The Supreme Court decision firmly established that judges and juries are prohibited from 
testing the falsity of religious beliefs at trial. In cases considering state and federal fraud laws, 





First Amendment, prohibits prosecutions and juries from determining whether the alleged 
fraudulent religious representations featured in cases are false. Accordingly, state or private 
litigants do not need to prove this element of fraud offences. The majority of the Supreme Court 
agreed with the trial court’s reasoning that this decision makes it harder for victims to prove 
that they were defrauded.71  
 
In the Supreme Court’s judgment, the majority and dissenting Justices had different 
perspectives on how religious fraud should be adjudicated. In the leading opinion, Justice 
Douglas was primarily concerned with the First Amendment protections. Justice Douglas 
submitted that the falsity of the defendant’s beliefs should not be examined by juries;72 judges 
should be sensitive to the religious contexts of religious fraud claims and not assess whether 
the defendant’s beliefs are religiously grounded or not.73 This reasoning is labelled the 
“religious reservation” approach,74 which is based on the view that: 
“Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that 
they could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether those teachings 
contained false representations. The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life 
after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could be 
sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed 
would be left of religious freedom.”75  
 
Justice Douglas subsequently added, 
 
71 Ibid, 87. 
72 Ibid, 88. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Jonathan Weiss, ‘Privilege, Posture and Protection Religion in the Law,’ (1964) Yale Law Journal, 73, 597. 
75 Ballard (n 9), at 87. 
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 “The religious views espoused by the respondents might seem incredible, if not 
preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged 
with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any 
sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.”76 
 
Chief Justice Stone offered an alternative approach in a separate opinion, despite concluding 
that the verdict reached was correct. Justice Roberts and Justice Frankfurter also agreed with 
this reasoning, defined as the “clearly culpable theory.”77 This reasoning combines two 
approaches found in the earlier decisions before the case reached the Supreme Court. Firstly, 
the “deceitful defendant approach” of the trial court was considered78 on the basis that jurors 
should be permitted to decide whether the defendant “honestly and in good faith” believed his 
representations.79 The jury could only find Guy guilty if he did not believe in those beliefs.80 
The trial court made it clear to the jury that religion could not come into this case81 and their 
focus must be on whether the representations were used to deceive others to gain financially.82  
 
Secondly, the three Justices adopted the “factual fraud approach” from the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit.83 Judge Denman, writing for the majority of the Court 
of Appeal, submitted that showing the truth of religious representations was a strong form of 
evidence that should not have been taken away from the defendants by the trial court.84 That 
decision was deemed “an obvious denial of the freedom of religion of the First Amendment."85 
 
76 Ibid. 
77 Weiss (n 74), 597-598. 
78 Court of Appeal ruling, Ballard v. United States 138 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1943), 38. 
79 Weiss (n 74), 597-598. 
80 Ballard (n 78), 38. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Weiss (n 74), 596. 
83 Ibid, 597-598. 
84 Ballard (n 78). 
85 Ibid, at 546. 
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The factual fraud approach looks at the mischief a statute was created to prevent. It does not 
look at the motives of defendants, but the falsity of the religious representations made.86 The 
Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit subsequently treated the claim as analogous to any non-
religious fraud claim,87 and applied the statutory wording of the federal mail fraud offence in 
a literal way. The “clearly culpable theory,” implies that representations can be separated from 
their religious context and objectively judged by juries.88 The main question in this approach 
is whether the defendant has fraudulent intent, not whether there is a religious context.89 
Accordingly, religious contexts do not provide an alternative lens to assess representations.  
 
Justice Jackson held a more diverging view about the challenges of testing the falsity and 
sincerity of religious beliefs, which is termed the “hands off approach.”90 Justice Jackson 
declared, "I would dismiss the indictment and have done with this business of judicially 
examining other people's faith.”91 The dissent is particularly detailed and touches on more of 
the challenges of how courts may seek to regulate religious fraud. Interestingly, Justice Jackson 
began his dissenting opinion by asserting that the teachings of the Ballard’s were “…nothing 
but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth.”92 Justice Jackson subsequently qualified this 
statement by submitting, “But that does not dispose of the constitutional question whether 
misrepresentation of religious experience or belief is prosecutable; it rather emphasizes the 
danger of such prosecutions.”93 Justice Jackson considered that religious fraud is the price to 
pay for religious freedom provided by the Free Exercise Clause on the grounds that,  
 
86 Weiss (n 74), 596. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid, 598. 
89 Ballard (n 9), 90. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid, 92. 
93 Ibid. 
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“There appear to be persons- let us hope not many who find refreshment and courage 
in the teachings of the "I Am" cult. If the members of the sect get comfort from the celestial 
guidance of their "Saint Germain," however doubtful it seems to me, it is hard to say that they 
do not get what they pay for.”94 
 
The dissenting opinion went further than the religious reservation approach and submitted that 
neither the falsity nor sincerity of a defendant’s religious beliefs should be assessed by courts95 
because: 
"I do not see how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations 
as to what is believable. The most convincing proof that one believes his statements is to show 
that they have been true in his experience. Likewise, that one knowingly falsified is best proved 
by showing that what he said happened never did happen. How can the Government prove 
these persons knew something to be false which cannot be proven false? If we try religious 
sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the very considerations 
which in common experience provide its most reliable answer.”96  
Justice Jackson argued against the separation of representations from religious contexts and 
against the decision of the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, and the other Supreme Court 
Justices that religion did not impact on the legal issues.97  
 
Justice Jackson also discussed whether juror and judicial assessments of sincerity were ever 
relevant: 
“I do not know what degree of skepticism or disbelief in a religious representation 
amounts to actionable fraud… Some who profess belief in the Bible read literally what others 
 
94 Ibid, 94. 
95 Ibid, 92-94. 
96 Ibid, 92-93. 
97 Weiss (n 74), 599. 
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read as allegory or metaphor, as they read Aesop's fables… It is hard in matters so mystical to 
say how literally one is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches and even more difficult to say 
how far it is reliance upon a teacher's literal belief which induces followers to give him 
money.”98… “When does less than full belief in a professed credo become actionable fraud if 
one is soliciting-gifts or legacies? Such inquiries may discomfort orthodox as well as 
unconventional religious teachers, for even the most regular of them are sometimes accused of 
taking their orthodoxy with a grain of salt.”99 
 
Overall, the Supreme Court decision established that US courts are prohibited from assessing 
the truth of religious beliefs in the context of fraud prosecutions. This decision was followed 
in several subsequent federal and state cases, some of which are discussed in the following 
section.100 More generally, the decision gives considerable respect to religious liberty 
protections proscribed by the First Amendment. However, the Supreme Court sidestepped 
other important questions raised by the prosecution and the previous Ballard decisions.101 
Significantly, the Justices failed to decide the crucial issue of the place of sincerity in religious 
fraud adjudication.102 Ballard did not invent the “good faith” or sincerity-based approach for 
prosecuting instances of religiously motivated mail fraud.103 However, such cases were 
uncommon and many of those cases failed to engage with issues concerning the constitutional 
protection of religious beliefs in fraudulent practices, or whether those beliefs should be tested 
for falsity.104 Years later, these issues were placed squarely into Free Exercise jurisprudence in 
Ballard and were not adequately addressed by the Supreme Court. 
 
98 Ballard (n 9), 93-94. 
99 Ibid, 95. 
100 Caruthers (n 33), 518; The Founding Church of Scientology (n 40), 1161-1162; Rasheed (n 33), 4; Van Schaick 
(n 33), 1140. 
101 Ballard (n 9), 88. 
102 Heins (n 17), 163. 
103 A fact which many commentators overlook. See for example, White Crane v. United States 259 Fed. 480 (9th 
Cir. 1919). 
104 See the cases before 1944 listed in n 33. 
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1.1.4. Judicial reception of Ballard 
 
Religious fraud cases have been uncommon since Ballard.105 Consequently, US courts have 
had little occasion to consider the application of a Free Exercise Clause defence.106 Cases that 
have followed Ballard considered that the Supreme Court expressly allowed the defendant’s 
sincerity to be tested.107 Courts that allowed this assumed that when the Supreme Court 
declared that the trial court decided correctly on the falsity question, it also endorsed the trial 
court’s “good faith” approach to adjudicating religious fraud. Shortly after the decision, some 
courts recognised that Ballard avoided the issue.108 The distinction between testing falsity 
(which was prohibited) and sincerity was restated in United States v. Rasheed (1981).109  
 
Ballard left two other categories of concerns unaddressed. The first relates to how do courts 
determine whether defendants are making representations that are part of religious doctrines to 
trigger the Ballard immunity?110 Subsequent cases later addressed this oversight. In The 
Founding Church of Scientology of Washington D.C. v. United States (1969),111 the United 
States Court of Appeals for The District of Columbia Circuit had to determine whether 
religious literature promoting the benefits of E-meters was religious or secular.112 A distinction 
was necessary to determine whether the representations could be tested for falsity. Judge 
Wright, writing for the majority, found that the representations were religious.113 This 
 
105 For example, Caruthers (n 33). 
106 Stated by Judge Gillette in Christofferson (n 33), 599. 
107 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961), 609 (Justice Brennan) & People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 726, 
394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964). Similarly, a number of scholars also fell into this trap. For instance, 
Richard Morgan, The Supreme Court and Religion, (Macmillan Publishing 1972), 150 & Lawrence Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law, (Foundation Press 1978), 859, cited by Heins (n 17), 163, ft 44. 
108 Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 256 (1977) & Christofferson (n 33). 
109 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981). The correct approach has since been recognised by most commentators, see 
Heins (n 17), 158 & Weiss (n 74), 595. 
110 Heins (n 17), 158 & Weiss (n 74), 595. 
111 See n 40. 
112 Ibid, 1158-1159. 
113 Ibid, 1161. 
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judgment goes one step further than the Supreme Court decision in Ballard and decided that 
before engaging with the controversial debate over falsity or sincerity testing, courts must first 
determine whether the alleged fraudulent beliefs stem from religious doctrines or are secular 
claims.114 Despite this development, the court failed to develop a principled means of 
determining the religiosity of representations that could later be applied by courts. 
 
The omission of both Ballard and The Founding Church links to the second question left 
unanswered by Ballard; how can courts establish whether the context in which the relevant 
religious representation is made is secular or religious?115 In Christofferson v. Church of 
Scientology (1982), the Oregon Court of Appeals considered a number of representations made 
by Scientologists regarding the health benefits of using E-meters alleged to have been used to 
fraudulently solicit funds. The Court of Appeals ruled that only purely religious items and 
representations are excluded from falsity examinations. This conclusion was justified on the 
remanded Court of Appeal decision in The Founding Church.116 The impact of the decision 
had very little impact on the federal regulation of religious fraud because it examined state law 
and not federal laws. In The Founding Church, the court held that when courts determine 
whether the First Amendment offers protection to defendants in religious fraud cases they must 
establish: 1) that defendants represent a legally recognised religion; 2) the beliefs alleged to be 
fraudulent form part of religious doctrine; and, 3) even if the former two are satisfied, the 
religious representations cannot have been made for an entirely secular purpose.117  
 
In Christofferson, the Court of Appeals concluded, 
 
114 The reasoning reflects step a) of the Free Exercise Clause test listed on page 14. 
115 Heins (n 17), 158. 
116 United States v. Article or Device, Etc., 333 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.D.C. 1971). Ibid, 599-600. 
117 Ibid, 602. 
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“There are certainly ideas which may only be classified as religious. Statements 
regarding the nature of a supreme being, the value of prayer and worship are such statements. 
There are also, however, statements which are religious only because those espousing them 
make them for a religious purpose. The statements which are alleged by plaintiff to be 
misrepresentations in this case are not of the type which must always and in every context be 
considered religious as a matter of law.”118  
However, this reasoning cannot persuasively address this challenge in the way the court 
intended to, given the state context of the decision and the operation of precedent. 
Consequently, the second challenge remains open to debate in fraud contexts. 
 
 
1.1.5. Academic reception of Ballard 
 
The interpretation of Ballard in cases like Founding Church and Christofferson that religious 
fraud should be prosecuted using neutral criminal laws has received support.119 If falsity cannot 
be tested, sincerity testing is seen to present the only viable way religious fraud can be 
appropriately adjudicated according to one commentator.120 Sincerity testing carried out 
correctly by courts does not violate religious conduct or beliefs,121 so long as it is not allowed 
to merge with falsity testing.122 Courts have noted how this task is a very sensitive 
undertaking123 that warrants extreme caution.124  
 
 
118 Christofferson (n 33), 244. 
119 Senn (n 17), 325. 
120 Ibid, 335. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, 337. 
123 Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), cited by 
ibid, 337, ft 64. 
124 Jeffers (n 33), cited ibid, ft 65. 
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Multiple factors are put forward to establish how courts can appropriately assess the 
defendant’s sincerity. These are: 1) defendants act inconsistently with beliefs; 2) the adverse 
consequences of beliefs are accepted by defendants; 3) representations have ulterior purposes; 
4) the size and history of the religious organisation defendants are part of; 5) the extent of any 
parallel between the challenged beliefs and traditional beliefs; 6) the defendant’s devotion to 
the faith; 7) statements and testimony; 8) whether the challenged tenet is part of an organised 
faith to which the defendant belongs to; 9) coexistence of secular fraud; 10) reference to case 
law and; 11) evidence of concealment. These factors should be considered collectively where 
appropriate.125 As discussed above, the sincerity-based approach has been followed in all 
religious fraud cases since Ballard but in a less structured manner on a case-by-case basis. 
 
For some scholars, however, cases decided after Ballard did not effectively deal with the main 
challenges of regulating religious fraud. Ballard has been criticised for failing to grant religious 
exemptions to defendants facing charges relating to alleged fraudulent religious conduct.126 
Religious exemptions are viewed as a more suitable way of protecting the defendant’s religious 
liberty rights by circumventing falsity testing.127 Exemptions would be granted where a 
defendant represents religious doctrine and their conduct, alleged to be fraudulent, occurs in 
religious contexts.128 Even though the difficulty of determining whether the context of the 
conduct is religious or secular is recognised,129 exemptions are still recognised as the most 
suitable way of adjudicating religious fraud. It is submitted that this approach offers a more 
effective means of balancing the state’s interests with the religious interests of individuals 
under the Free Exercise Clause. On this reasoning, it is claimed that Justice Jackson’s opinion 
 
125 Senn (n 17), 342. 
126 Heins (n 17), 189-197. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid, 189-197. 
129 Ibid, 194-195. 
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should have persuaded the majority of the Supreme Court in Ballard to reach the opposite 
verdict.130 It is accepted that by rejecting the sincerity-based approach, religious fraudsters may 
illegitimately rely on an exemption to evade liability. 131 However, it is argued that this is a 
small price to pay for establishing that religious falsity is non-justiciable.132  
 
Other commentators consider that the falsity and sincerity of the defendant’s beliefs motivating 
their representations should be tested by courts. The modern statement of the boundaries of 
justiciability of religious disputes under the Free Exercise Clause is set by Ballard133 and this 
is described as the “crudest [of] formulations.”134 Justice Douglas’ ruling has been interpreted 
to include a blanket ban on religious beliefs similar to those practiced by the Ballards.135 
Consequently, it is argued that the Ballard ruling applies to other cases regardless of how 
straightforwardly falsifiable the beliefs of the defendant are because Justice Douglas failed to 
legally define what count as religious beliefs in alleged fraud contexts.136 Ignoring the 
justifications offered by the Supreme Court decision, namely Justice Jackson, and other 
commentators, it is submitted that courts can effectively and justifiably test religious beliefs 
for falsity.137 Those who object to this conclusion are considered wrong and at odds with both 
the practical requirements of ordinary adjudication and contemporary theological accounts of 
the epistemic status of religious beliefs.138 Courts should distinguish between religious beliefs 
held by religious institutions and individuals with religiously-infected beliefs. An example of 
 
130 Ibid, 165. 
131 Ibid, 189. 
132 Ibid, 189. 
133 This is not entirely correct. There are more two other areas of justiciability within Free Exercise jurisprudence. 
Firstly, the government is forbidden from independent interpretation of religious texts or tenets in a way that 
provides an authoritative statement on how they should apply. Secondly, the government may not inquire into or 
review any internal decisionmaking or governance of religious institutions, see Scott C. Idleman, ‘Tort Liability, 
Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection,’ (2000) Indiana Law Journal, 75(1)(14), 221-223. 
134 Mason (n 17), 93. 
135 Ibid, 95. 
136 Ibid, 95. 
137 Ibid, 92. 
138 Ibid, 92-93. 
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the former category is a minister requesting donations from adherents to pray for them to reduce 
their time in purgatory. The latter category is a belief with a religious dimension that may not 
form part of religious doctrine. For example, a defendant who alleges to have killed someone 
because they thought they were the devil, and their faith prescribed the action. This distinction 
seeks to avoid detailed jurisprudential and theological debates about the former category of 
beliefs139 and whether the context surrounding beliefs is secular or religious.140  
 
On this reasoning, it is argued that courts should adopt the “non-overlapping magisterial 
model,”141 which is premised on the idea that distinctions can be made between fact and value. 
Facts that can be tested by scientific methods should be tested for falsity by courts regardless 
of whether it is linked to religious doctrine.142 On the other hand, judges should not declare 
something as false that cannot be proven to be false.143 At times fact and value overlap and 
when this occurs, the Free Exercise epistemological problem applies and prohibits courts from 
ruling on falsity.144 Additionally, where evidence is indifferent to whether beliefs are justiciable 





The US experience of regulating religious fraud has been far from straight forward. US courts 
have faced significant problems in regulating religious representations that result in financial 
 
139 Ibid, 99. 
140 Ibid, 99-100. 
141 Ibid, 93. 
142 Ibid, 118. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid, 118-119. 
145 Ibid, 119. 
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gains. Courts have been required to address complex questions relating to theology, 
constitutional law, criminal law and procedure. Ballard left some of these questions 
unanswered, which were examined more effectively in later jurisprudence. Accordingly, for a 
case that has allegedly said more about religious liberty than any other case in US history,146 
Ballard is underdeveloped and is arguably a more limited decision in practice. Ballard offered 
one clear rule for courts seeking to regulate religious fraud through the federal offence of mail 
fraud, but very little in terms of the stare decisis for lower courts to follow. Moreover, 
controversy still exists over what is the most appropriate way of regulating religious fraud 
using criminal laws.  
 
The US experience is indicative of the considerable legal challenges facing other courts 
regulating religious fraudulent conduct using criminal laws. This experience also offers some 
lessons that can potentially inspire how English criminal fraud laws should prosecute instances 
of religious fraud. In chapter 3, I discuss how this analysis informs how s2 FA06 should 
regulate fraudulent religious representation.  
 
 
2. Religious undue influence regulation in Australia and the US 
 
In this section, I consider how Australian and US courts have decided religious undue influence 
cases. I explain the tests for undue influence in both jurisdictions and engage with the reasoning 
of Australian and US jurisprudence. I consider several common and unique challenges in both 
jurisdictions that are experienced in contemporary settings. I also identify comparative lessons 
 
146 Greenawalt (n 32), 110. 
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Australia is a common law jurisdiction that developed out of the English Common law 
tradition.147 It operates at federal and state levels across five legal territories.148 Federal laws 
are contained in the Constitution of Australia and are invoked to strike down incompatible state 
laws. The Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights, but some states, like Victoria, have 
human rights charters.149 A provision on religious liberty does, however, feature in the 
Constitution under s116. This provision essentially mirrors the wording of the Establishment 
Clause contained in the US First Amendment.150 It is, however, of less significance to the 
understandings of religious undue influence examined below. 
 
Historically, Australian legal states have faced very few cases of religious undue influence. In 
contrast, there has been a rise in cases in the twenty-first century, which have said a great deal 
about the uniquely complicated treatment of religious cases. Other than the US, no other 
jurisdiction has generated as much commentary on religious undue influence in the common 
law world. In the last twenty-five years, five cases have been decided by the Supreme Courts 
 
147 Dana Zartner, Courts, Codes and Customs, (OUP 2014), 71. 
148 These are New South Wales, Queensland, West Australia, South Australia, and Victoria. 
149 Victoria Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006. 
150 For commentary on this provision and the subtle ways it is different from the First Amendment see, Luke Beck, 
Religious Freedom and the Australian Constitution: Origins and Future, (Routledge 2018), chapter 7. 
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of different legal states.151 Decisions demonstrate how courts have applied the doctrine in a 
general manner to regulate the legitimacy of gifts given to religious figures or institutions. The 
challenges experienced by courts in hard cases of religious undue influence remain largely 
unaddressed by courts and commentators, which has inspired commentary from scholars.152 
Religious undue influence is, therefore, an area of increasing importance practically and 
doctrinally in Australia. 
 
Comparing the different treatment of presumed undue influence cases is more straightforward 
than the analysis of US fraud laws, even though Australia is also a federal legal system. The 
doctrine forms part of the common law for each state and was transplanted into Australian law 
based on the English understanding.153 English jurisprudence is still cited by Australian courts 
to develop understandings and support the reasons given by judges for decisions.154 
Accordingly, each state has applied the doctrine in a similar way since its incorporation into 
Australian law in combination with a range of High Court of Australia precedents.155  
 
The doctrine of undue influence is applied in both equity and probate. Johnson v Buttress 
[1936]156 is the leading Australian authority on the doctrine. There Latham CJ set out the 
equitable test for presumed undue influence, 
 
151 New South Wales and Queensland, see Quek v Beggs (1990) 5 BPR 11, 761; Illuzzi v Christian Outreach 
Centre (1997) Q ConvR 54-490; McCulloch v Fern NSWSC 406 (Unreported, Palmer J, 28 May 2001); Hartigan 
v International Society for Krishna Inc [2002] NSWSC 810 (Unreported, Bryson J, 6 September 2002); Khan v 
Khan [2004] NSWSC 1189. 
152 Degeling (n 6). 
153 Robyn Honey, ‘Divergence in the English and Australia Law of Undue influence: Vacillation or Variance?’ 
in Andrew Robertson & Michael Tilbury, Divergences in Private Law (Routledge 2016), 271. 
154 For example, Thorne v Kenny [2017 HCA 49, [30]-[37] (Kiefel CJ) citing Etridge (No 2) (n 22) amongst other 
cases. Additionally, Allcard (n 6) is considered a leading authority on undue influence by state and federal courts, 
see Ridge (n 6), 72. 
155 Notably, Johnson v Buttress [1936] HCA 41; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio [1983] HCA 14 & 
more recently, Thorne (n 154). 
156 See n 155. 
 55 
“Where certain special relations exist, undue influence is presumed in the case of such 
gifts. These relations include those of parent and child, guardian and ward, trustee and cestui 
que trust, solicitor and client, physician and patient and cases of religious influence... Wherever 
the relation between the parties is such that the donee is in position to exercise dominion over 
the donee by reason of trust and confidence reposed in the donee.”157  
 
Claimants must also show that a gift cannot be explained by “ordinary motives”158 or “is not 
readily explicable by the relationship of the parties”159 for a presumption of influence to arise. 
The presumption can be rebutted by defendants showing that gifts are “voluntary and a well-
understood act of the mind” of donors.160 The test is considered to be based on the free will of 
donors.161 In my analysis conducted below, I focus solely on presumed undue influence cases. 
 
The test for actual undue influence considered in probate was also laid down in Buttress,162 and 
consists of four elements. The defendant must have the capacity to influence the claimant; 
influence must have been exercised by the defendant; the influence must have been undue and; 
it must result in the claimant entering into the transaction.163 All elements must be proven for 






157 Ibid, 119. 
158 Thorne (n 154), [34] (Kiefel CJ) citing Allcard (n 6), 185 (Lindley LJ). 
159 Ibid, citing Etridge (No 2) (n 22) [21] (Lord Nicholls). 
160 Johnson (n 155), 123 (Latham CJ) quoting Eldon L.C. in Huguenin v Basely (1807) 14 Ves. 273; 33 E.R. 526. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid, 134. 





The US has a rich body of primary and secondary legal sources on the doctrine of undue 
influence developed over decades of adjudication.165 The doctrine has recently been a 
significant focus for courts and scholars due to a rise in elder abuse.166 Decisions and 
commentary on religious undue influence are generally infrequent,167 but have proven an area 
of legal concern for the last decade.168 Accordingly, religious and nonreligious case law has 
been examined and criticised recently. Both judges and commentators are generally dissatisfied 
with how the doctrine is applied in practice; it is claimed it often leads to unprincipled 
outcomes.169 Some US commentators have gone so far as to say that undue influence “is one 
of the most bothersome concepts” in all law.170  
 
Originally, for a claimant to show undue influence they needed to prove that  they experienced 
some form of “fraud” or “coercion.”171 Gradually, this strict approach softened during the 
 
165 Ronald J. Scalise, 'Undue Influence and The Law of Wills: A Comparative Analysis,' (2008) Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law, 48, 41-106. 
166 Ibid, 41; Karl Spivack, 'Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be Abolished,' (2010) 
Kansas Law Review, 58, 246; David Horton, ‘The Uneasy Case for California’s “Care Custodian” Statute,’ (2008) 
Chapman Law Review, 12(1)(3), 47-69; Mary Quinn et al, Undue Influence: Definitions and Applications, A 
Project Supported By The Borchard Foundation Center On Law And Aging, Final Report, March 2010, 1-145  
<http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/UndueInfluence.pdf> Accessed November 2019. 
167 See Law Magazine and Review, ‘Undue Influence,’ (1873) a Monthly Journal of Jurisprudence for Both 
Branches of the Legal Profession at Home and Abroad, 2(8), 742-749; Charles Z. Lincoln, Civil Law and the 
Church, (The Abingdon Press 1916), 657-689; Briscoe Baldwin Clark, New York Law of Contracts: Volume 1, 
(Edward Thompson Company 1922) chapter VII, A. J. White Hutton, ‘Undue Influence and Fraud in Pennsylvania 
Wills,’ (1948) Dickson Law Review, 53, 12-28 & C.S. Patrinelis, Undue Influence in Nontestamentary Gift to 
Clergymen, Spiritual Adviser, or Church,’ (1950) American Law Reports, 14, 2d 649, 657. 
168 See Jeffrey J. Sherman, 'Can Religious Influence Ever Be Undue Influence,' (2008) Brooklyn Law Review, 
73(2), 579-644; John B. Jarboe, 'Undue Influence & Gifts to Religious Organization,' (2017) Catholic Lawyer, 
35(3), 271-282. For older commentary see A.P. Wrosch, 'Undue influence, Involuntary Servitude and 
Brainwashing: A More Consistent Interests-Based Approach,' (1992) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 25(2), 
499-55. 
169 In 2009, the Superior Court of California motivated by the lack of a definition of undue influence in the 
California Probate Code funded a study to develop an appropriate definition. Recommendations were not 
accepted. For the full report see Quinn et al (n 166). This also applies to most leading casebooks, Spivack (n 166), 
264. 
170 Robert H. Sitkoff & Jesse Dukeminier, Wills, Trusts, And Estates, (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 10th 
Edition, 2005), 281. 
171 Scalise (n 165), 51-52. 
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twentieth century and was replaced by an approach based on the “free will” of donors, and 
whether it had been overpowered and subjected to the will of another.172 The donor’s will must 
be overpowered by another in a way that is incapable of being resisted, which causes donors 
to make a transfer they would have not done if they were free to act according to their own 
wishes.173 Circumstantial evidence also became a way of demonstrating undue influence.174  
 
States developed individual approaches to the doctrine out of these developments. The 
common elements of undue influence now examined in state courts are: “(1) the influencer had 
disposition or motive to exercise it; (2) the influencer had the opportunity to exercise the 
influence; (3) the influencer did in fact exercise the influence, and (4) the testamentary 
disposition at issue was a result of the undue influence.”175 This approach is controversial;176 
many critics consider that it is unhelpful, “almost totally meaningless,” and contain elements 
that “beg the question.”177  
 
The doctrine was later contained in several state statutes, mainly relating to testamentary 
dispositions.178 Statutes typically describe the test for undue influence and establish what 
factors should be considered by judges, which varies across states. Additional legislation and 
precedents guide courts on what aspects indicate undue influence. In the context of gift-giving, 
undue influence is more frequently invoked in probate and is the main way wills are 
 
172 Ibid, 53; also see Spivak (n 166), 262. 
173 R.L. Anand, Law of Undue Influence, Fraud and Duress (1957), 341, cited in Spivack (n 166), 262. 
174 Scalise (n 165), 53. 
175 The American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) Of Prop (2003)., § 8.3 cmt. e. These elements are considered 
the main doctrinal aspects by scholars interpreting State decisions, Scalise (n 165), 55. 
176 Many critics, including courts, consider that it is unhelpful, “almost totally meaningless,” and contain 
elements that “beg the question” see Succession of Reeves, 704 So.2d 252, 259 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997) cited by 
Scalise (n 165), 55, ft 100. 
177 Succession of Reeves (N 176) cited by ibid, 55, ft 100. 
178 For example, the California Probate Code §6104 (2010). 
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challenged.179 Consequently, many decisions and commentary consider challenges in probate 
contexts180 and much of the following commentary on the US experience is based on undue 
influence as it is understood in probate contexts.181  
 
The lack of clear doctrinal definitions in state Probate Codes182 led to a significant nationwide 
development in 2003. The American Law Institute183 published The Restatement (Third) Of 
Property, Wills & Other Donative Transfers. This was a twenty-year project designed to update 
the law of succession. The Restatement provides an overview of how the doctrine operates in 
probate settings. It is not binding on state courts but is typically considered alongside state 
laws, and often has a persuasive role on probate tests and legislative reform in states.184 
 
Most US states apply a presumption of undue influence in probate.185 Some states follow a 
one-stage approach that determines if the parties were in a “confidential relationship.”186 The 
relationship must be proven by claimants challenging the will. If it is proven, the burden shifts 
to defendants who can try to rebut the claim. The relationships covered in states vary, but 
typically consist of some form of fiduciary duty. The Restatement covers three types of 
 
179 Eunice L. Ross & Thomas J. Reed, Will Contests, (2d ed. 1999), § 7.21 at 7-109 cited by Scalise (N 165), 99, 
ft 11. 
180 This is one factor of the doctrine that is at odds with Australian and English understandings of undue 
influence. 
181 Regulation in states, like Ontario, indicates that courts seek to keep the test for undue influence for inter vivos 
gifts strictly separate from the test in probate. Contrast the trial judgment in Seguin v Pears 2016 CarswellOnt 
17438, 272 A.C.W.S. (3d) 673 (merging both tests in a probate claim) with Court of Appeal decision keeping the 
tests separate, 2018 CarswellOnt 5617, 2018 ONCA 355. The US approach to equitable undue influence is 
therefore very similar to other jurisdictions conceptions. However, this does not prevent appropriate subsequent 
analysis on the issues of adjudicating equitable claims of presumed undue influence in chapter 4. 
182 Quinn et al (n 166), 9, although some codes have partial definitions. 
183 It is “the leading independent organization in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify, 
modernize, and improve the law…” ALI, ‘About ALI,’ < https://www.ali.org/about-ali/> Accessed June 2019. 
184 For discussion see Clifton B. Kruse, Jr, ‘Reformation of Wills: The Implication of Restatement (Third) of 
Property (Donative Transfers) on Flawed but Unambiguous Testaments, (2000) ACTEC Notes, 25(4), 323-324; 
Lawrence W. Waggoner, ‘Class Gifts under the Restatement (Third) of Property,’(2007)  Ohio Northern 
University Law Review, 33(3), 993-1012 & Lawrence W. Waggoner, ‘How the ALI's Restatement Third of 
Property Is Influencing the Law of Trusts and Estates,’ (2015) Brooklyn Law Review, 80(3), 1019-1028. 
185 This is another key distinction between Australian and English understandings. 
186 Sitkogg & Dukeminier (n 170), 282-284; for a range of states adopting this model see Spivack (n 166), 263. 
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confidential relationships: (a) fiduciary, (b) reliant, and (c) dominant-subservient.187 An 
example of (b) is a relationship between spiritual advisors and parishioners.188 The presumption 
does not arise because the donee is a religious minister but because the minister also holds a 
fiduciary duty towards parishioners, “which, if used for the benefit of the donee, will result in 
the exercise of an influence not possessed by the ordinary person, and sufficient, according to 
the ordinary experience of mankind, to overcome the will of the donor."189  
 
Other states adopt a two-stage approach190 following the approach of the Restatement. This 
approach requires “suspicious circumstances” to surround the creation and execution of 
testamentary dispositions and evidence of a confidential relationship.191 The Restatement 
describes what suspicious circumstances cover, for example, the physical and mental state of 
the donor; whether independent advice was received before the testamentary disposition was 
created, and whether a reasonable person would regard the transaction as unfair.192  
 
A second ground also exists where a will is made by a testator of a weakened mental state in 
some US states.193 Naturally, this basis of claims overlaps with incapacity claims and so both 
claims are regularly brought jointly. Courts use factors such as age and frailty in determining 
whether the donor was “susceptible” to undue influence, and for some courts, this can act as a 




187 Restatement (Third) Of Prop (2003)., § 8.3. cmt. g. 
188 See Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568 (Ill. 1908) & In re Hartlerode's Will, 148 N.W. 774, 777 (Mich. 1914). 
189 Patrinelis (n 167), 657, cited in Worsch (2017), 507, ft 65. 
190 Sitkogg & Dukeminier (n 170), 288-289; for states following this model see Spivack (n 166), 263. 
191 Restatement (Third) Of Prop (2003)., § 8.3. cmt. g. 
192 Ibid, § 8.3. cmt. h. 
193 Scalise (n 165), 57. 
194 Citing In re Estate of Hamm, 227 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Wis. 1975)., ibid, 57, ft 112. 
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2.2. Why is religious undue influence regulation so problematic? 
 
This section identifies the common challenges and potential lessons on regulating religious 
undue influence in both Australia and the US. I consider both jurisdictions together to 
demonstrate the widespread nature of the challenges assessed. Three categories of issues are 
examined, the characteristics of parties, the donor’s motivations for making gifts, and the 
review processes of courts. This analysis demonstrates the extent of problems in hard cases of 
religious undue influence and with the test for presumed undue influence, more generally. Only 
the most compelling of these uniquely religious and religiously compounded doctrinal 
challenges are assessed. 
 
 
2.2.1. Characteristics of donors and donees  
 
The donor’s religious fervour  
 
Australian courts have generally failed to consider the significance of religious fervour 
motivating gifts, and how it could alter the assessment of whether a gift has been unduly 
influenced in presumed undue influence claims. This is most explicitly demonstrated in 
Hartigan,195 where the claimant, a follower of Hare Krishna, gifted her family home worth 
$87,0000 to the founders of a Hare Krishna community. The transaction was overseen by the 
defendant’s agents, who were not members of the community. The defendants were found to 
have unduly influenced the claimant’s gift because it was not a fully voluntary decision even 
 
195 See n 151. 
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though the court found no signs of pressure exerted on the claimant or impropriety from the 
defendants.  
 
The claimant’s impulsive nature and reasons for the gifts were not deemed significant by the 
court. The court did not pay much attention to the fact that before gifting her property, the 
claimant was originally told by the defendants that she was not spiritually ready to give large 
monetary gifts and that the value of the property gift was not in line with the spiritual 
understanding of “giving” set out in the community’s religious literature. Instead, the court 
focussed on two facts in finding undue influence, firstly the highly improvident nature of the 
transaction, which would negatively impact on her family,196 and secondly, that the legal 
advisors to the transactions, the agents, had been selected by the defendants and so were not 
sufficiently independent to the defendants.197 The court did not establish that the defendant 
deceived the claimant or demonstrate how the claimant’s will was impaired.  
 
Interestingly, the court also held that the gift could not be explained by ordinary motives,198 
which is a surprising conclusion. Ordinary people regularly have intense feelings for certain 
ideologies and institutions. This is an uncontroversial statement and is one that applies equally 
to religious beliefs and organisations, as well as non-religious beliefs and organisations. 
Accordingly, the correctness of the judgment is questionable because it failed to account for 
the donor’s religious fervour in any real sense. 
 
Distinguishing between religious fervour and enthusiasm that has been taken advantage of is a 
difficult task in practice. However, it is an important exercise to carry out in religious undue 
 
196 Ibid, [36] (Bryson J). 
197 Ibid, [88]-[89]. 
198 Ibid, [36]. 
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influence cases. A similar case to Hartigan may occur where a minister regularly states that a 
parishioner does need not make a gift to the religious institution. A donor may ignore these 
statements and gift property on the basis that their interpretation of their faith requires it. Based 
on the reasoning in Hartigan, Australian courts seem unlikely to give much weight to religious 
fervour and other facts suggesting the gift would have been made regardless of the defendant’s 
conduct because of the donor’s state of mind at the time. Hartigan demonstrates that there are 
few safeguards in place to prevent Australian courts from straining facts in this manner, which 
may confuse religious fervour motivating gifts for undue influence. Consequently, where the 
undue nature of the influence is less clear in religious cases, decisions may wrongly focus on 
the less relevant factors, rather than the donor’s enthusiasm to make gifts in order to reach what 
the court sees as a just result. 
 
US courts have on occasion made efforts to distinguish between religious fervour and unduly 
influencing conduct in cases.199 In Held v Florida Conference Association of Seventh Day 
Adventists (1940),200 a testator left all of his wealth to two defendants who were religious 
leaders in the Florida Conference Association of Seventh Day Adventists by will. During a 
period of ill-health, he amended his will leaving most of his property to the defendants while 
living in a hospital run by Seventh Day Adventists. The testamentary dispositions received by 
the defendants were challenged on the grounds of presumed undue influence. The court 
considered that the testator was peculiar and likely to be viewed by many as a “religious 
fanatic.”201 Nevertheless, the court held that despite the donor's religious fanaticism and 
susceptibility to influence in a time of bad health, the donor had not been unduly influenced 
and had acted on their own free will when amending his will. This approach of the court, which 
 
199 Good v. Zook, 88 N.W. 376, 378 (Iowa 1901), 665-66, see Jarboe (n 168), 278, ft 64. 
200 193 So. 828 (Fla. 1940). Example from Jarboe (n 168), 281. 
201 Ibid, 648 (Mr Justice Burford). 
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evaluated the donor’s religious enthusiasm, helps to establish that undue influence can be 
interpreted in a more nuanced that considers whether gifts are simply motivated by religious 
enthusiasm or if this enthusiasm is subsequently taken advantage of by defendants.  
 
 
2.2.2. The “gift” 
 
Religious gifts made against social norms 
 
In the Australian experience of regulating religious undue influence, the “ordinary motives” 
part of the presumed undue influence test has been criticised on the grounds that,202  
“…measuring the improvidence of the transaction according to society's norms ('the 
ordinary motives on which ordinary men act') has serious consequences for transactions 
motivated by religious faith because such transactions are often intended to contradict such 
norms. Gross improvidence in secular terms may be the primary attraction and motivation for 
a gift to a religious institution or individual. Many religions espouse poverty as a means to 
spiritual growth. Some Christians, for example, hone their faith by 'trusting in the Lord' rather 
than in financial security...”203 
 
The court’s reasoning in Hartigan is an example of where this conflict has occurred.204 Bryson 
J considered that giving a family home to the defendants was highly improvident and failed the 
ordinary motives because the gift left the young donor’s family homeless. The claimant 
believed when making the gift that she was furthering her own spiritual growth. As mentioned 
 
202 Ridge (n 6), 83-85. 
203 Ibid, 83-84. 
204 Ibid, 85. 
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above, improvidence assisted the court in finding that the gift had been unduly influenced. It 
has been observed that this part of the decision in Hartigan is consistent with the understanding 
of improvidence discussed in other decisions.205 The court viewed the claimant’s religious 
beliefs as highly unusual without giving much weight to the claimant’s independent religious 
reasons for making the gift.  
 
It has subsequently been argued that the ordinary motives test can discriminate between 
religious groups of different sizes and social acceptability because what counts as ordinary 
motives may include mainstream religious practices but not those of minority religions.206 
Accordingly, presumptions of influence could apply more readily to gifts to the latter sorts of 
groups because of the unusual practices of the group or the donor’s reasons for the gifts. This 
critique suggests that judicial assessments of objective or alleged normal conceptions of gift-
giving should be re-examined to prevent potential differences in treatment on what constitutes 
ordinary motives between religious groups. For example, courts could give greater focus to the 
particular contexts of gifts and the donor’s religious motivations. 
 
In the US, two diverging viewpoints exist on how gifts going against social norms should be 
assessed by courts. Neither view specifically looks at gifts motivated by religious faith, but 
each view signals a larger problem created by the doctrine that is more likely to be experienced 
in religious claims. The first perspective considers that the doctrine is never applied in a 
vacuum and the social norms of the time inevitably reflect what gifts are considered 
acceptable.207 The policies and norms that have influenced interpretations of the doctrine have 
changed in the US during the previous decades. At one time, charitable bequests were given a 
 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid, 84. 
207 Spivack (n 166), 276-283. 
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great deal of importance and could easily trump the claims of the donor’s family members in 
undue influence claims.208 Applying this to religious gifts, courts may satisfy tests for undue 
influence tests more easily where detailed legislation exists on family provisions legislation 
within states, or courts generally give weight to norms of inheritance.209 The influence of the 
social norm to provide for one’s own family has been considered to be so strong in undue 
influence claims that it cannot protect testamentary freedom, which prevents the doctrine from 
operating legitimately.210 Similarly, US jurisprudence generally indicates that provision for 
family members is viewed as natural and normal, whereas testamentary dispositions made to 
associates or new acquittances are unnatural.211 Accordingly, US norms on inheritance may 
unjustly override religiously motivated gifts. I consider how this often trumps a donor’s 
autonomous wishes to deal with their property as they see fit below.212 
 
There is a second view on how social norms can impact on a court’s assessment of when 
influence becomes undue. The US interpretation of the doctrine offers a great deal of discretion 
to judges depending on the test applied in states. It is claimed that the doctrine is 
“dysfunctional” because judges view facts and conceptions of gift-giving through their own 
ideologies213 and decisions are regularly decided on the grounds of “sheer narrow-mindedness, 
rigid notions of social propriety and outright bigotry.”214 In Re Will of Kauffman (1964)215 
provides evidence of such reasoning. The sexuality of the defendant, the recipient of 
testamentary dispositions of considerable value, was viewed negatively by the court. This 
 
208 This reasoning is found in 1819 inspired by the 1736 English Mortmain Law, see Philadelphia Baptist Ass’n 
v. Hart’s Executors, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819)., cited in Sherman (n 168), 598, ft 118. 
209 Melanie Leslie, ‘Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity and Relational Contract,’ (1999), North 
Carolina Law Review, 77(2)(5), 585. 
210 Ray D. Madoff, ‘Unmasking Undue Influence,’ (1997) Minnesota Law Review, 81, 576–777. 
211 Scalise (n 165), 58. 
212 See pages 81-82. 
213 Spivack (n 166), 276-277. There is further evidence of this analysis of decisions in Jeffrey G. Sherman, ‘Undue 
Influence and the Homosexual Testator,’ (1981) University Pittsburgh Law Review, 42(2), 225-268. 
214 Spivack (n 166), 264-265. 
215 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), an example from, ibid, at 265. 
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altered the court’s assessment of the claimant’s allegations (the testator’s brother) that 
defendant made false accusations about how the testator’s family viewed the testator’s 
relationship with the defendant when he amended his will. The court found the defendant had 
unduly influenced the testamentary dispositions he had received because he was held to have 
dominated the will of the testator, and the allegations made against the family when the will 
was amended were found to be false. However, in practice, the accusations made by the 
defendant seem accurate of how the testator and the defendant were made to feel about their 
relationship by the testator’s family on numerous occasions. It has been argued that the court’s 
judgment is unjust and motivated by “…its distaste for Robert’s [the testator’s] homosexuality, 
and its sympathy for the family’s double injury in being disinherited by a bequest to his male 
lover and the resulting “exposure” of his “unnatural acts” to the public eye.”216  
 
Additionally, in Estate of Lakatosh (1995),217 the court viewed a relationship between a young 
man and elderly woman, that was possibly romantic, as inappropriate, and this altered how the 
court assessed their relationship before finding that the gifts made to the donee had been unduly 
influenced. It is argued that the gifts should have been viewed as “a reasonable statement from 
an elderly woman who had been abandoned by her family and had found someone to help her 
with chores and errands that she could no longer do herself.”218  
 
Both the US and Australian interpretations of the doctrine are unable to guard against the 
conflict of the sorts of social norms mentioned in cases. This conflict is created by the 
subjective understandings of what constitutes ordinary motives, which is left to judges to 
determine on a case-by-case basis. The effect of this degree of subjectivity could be felt more 
 
216 Ibid, 277. 
217 656 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), an example from ibid, 278. 
218 Ibid. 
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forcefully in religious cases, like Hartigan, where the defendant’s religious beliefs do not 
match what the court considers are ordinary or appropriate religious practices. 
 
 
Active and passive exploitation  
 
Commentary on US religious cases, unlike commentary in Australia, has specifically examined 
what role active solicitation has in determining whether gifts and testamentary dispositions 
motivated by religious faith have been unduly influenced. Doveydenas v. The Bible Speaks 
(1989)219 and Whitmire v. Kroelinger (1930)220 are examples of where this assessment has been 
adopted by courts. In Doveydenas, the donor gifted $19,000,000 to a religious group to set up 
a TV channel, help cure the migraines of the donor’s assistant, assist the donor’s general 
wellbeing, and on one occasion, the money was used to help a minister escape from Romania 
where he was allegedly detained. Some gifts were found to have been unduly influenced, and 
others were deemed to have been made by the donor freely. In Whitmire, the executor of the 
donor’s estate sought to recover three monetary gifts totaling $115,000 used to build a church 
and three gifts of property on the grounds of undue influence. The court held that only four of 
the gifts were unduly influenced by the defendant. In both decisions, the courts determined at 
what stage the defendant realised they could take advantage of the donor’s trust and 
subsequently when they did, compared to when the gifts were in line with the beliefs and 
practices of the relevant religion. Distinguishing between gifts actively solicited and those that 
have not provides an insight into how courts could distinguish religious influence from undue 
influence.  
 
219 869 F.2d 628 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 cited by Jarboe (n 168), 277. 
220 42 F.2d 699 (W.D.S.C. 1930), cited by ibid. 
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2.2.3. The review processes of courts 
 
Judicial discretion  
 
A common feature of the challenges of regulating undue influence mentioned above in the 
Australian experience is the extent of the discretion afforded to judges by the presumed undue 
influence test. The discretion is used to determine whether aspects of the test have been 
satisfied in cases. I have shown how these assessments typically involve a significant degree 
of subjective analysis. In Thorne v Kennedy [2017],221 a case decided by the High Court of 
Appeal, there is evidence to bolster the view that there are conflicting views on how undue 
influence cases should be decided, which is only overcome by a judge’s interpretation of the 
doctrine’s grounding principle, and how it applies in practice. The decision was an opportunity 
for the highest court in Australia to consider the operation of the doctrine and the issues that 
have developed in cases. Therefore, in many senses, Thorne is a hard case of undue influence. 
 
The claimant was in a relationship with a wealthy businessman and was asked by the defendant 
to marry him. Before the wedding, the defendant asked a solicitor to draw up a prenuptial 
agreement. The defendant asked the claimant to attend a meeting with the solicitor and to sign 
the agreement. The defendant claimed that the wedding would not go ahead if the claimant did 
not sign it. The solicitor advised the claimant that the agreement provided very little for her 
compared to the defendant’s significant wealth. The claimant later challenged the prenuptial 
agreement on the grounds of undue influence, duress, and unconscionable conduct.  
 
 
221 See n 154. 
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Writing for the majority of the High Court,222 Kiefel CJ found undue influence and submitted 
that undue influence is proven when the will of the donor is impaired, or where a gift is not 
freely and voluntarily made.223 It was held that the defendant’s efforts to pressure the claimant 
need not have been illegitimate or improper at any time.224 Kiefel CJ stated that the assessment 
of the improper nature of pressure should be reserved for duress.225 In deciding whether the 
claimant’s will had been impaired to an appropriate degree, trial judges are not required to 
ascribe weight to factors relevant to cases or consider which are fundamental or subordinate.226 
Assessing the will-power of a person was argued incapable of mathematical precision.227   
 
Gordon J agreed with the majority decision but declared that it was reached in an unprincipled 
way. Gordon J submitted that the defendant’s behaviour amounted to unconscionable conduct, 
not undue influence.228 Gordon J found that the claimant’s will was not impaired.229 Instead, 
the claimant’s will was taken advantage of by the defendant.230 Accordingly, the claimant was 
aware of her conduct but could not “…make a rational judgment to protect her own interests” 
and “In those circumstances, which were evident to and substantially created by Mr Kennedy 
[the defendant], it was unconscionable for Mr Kennedy to procure or accept her assent to the 
agreements.”231  
 
Considering the two opinions of the High Court reveals that judges interpret the doctrine 
differently in practice, even when each judge agreed on the doctrine’s rationale. Consequently, 
 
222 Ibid, Bell J Gageler J Keane J Edelman J concurred with Kiefel J’s reasoning and verdict. 
223 Ibid, [31]-[33]. 
224 Ibid, [30]. 
225 Ibid, [26]. 
226 Ibid, [62].  
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid, [79]. 
229 Ibid, [80]. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid, [81]. 
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undue influence may capture certain kinds of behaviour on one occasion, but not on others. 
This does not mean that judges and courts are fundamentally talking past one another when 
they disagree about whether transactions are unduly influenced, rather, it suggests that courts 
may apply the doctrine differently even with an agreed understanding of the rationale. 
Therefore, judges may struggle to find consistent interpretations in majority decisions in hard 
cases of presumed undue influence. 
 
My conclusion has direct applicability to religious cases and may explain why dubious 
Australian decisions like Hartigan have the same outcome as decisions where undue influence 
appears more probable in easier cases. Moreover, if there is agreement on the operation of the 
doctrine in practice, as in Thorne, the resolution of particular issues may vary greatly because 
of subjective interpretations of what impaired will means, or regarding other elements of the 
test, for example, ordinary motives, as discussed above. Issues like those mentioned arise more 
readily in hard cases of religious claims. Consequently, the risk of unprincipled and subjective 
decisions is increased, especially when courts apply non-religious precedents to religious 
claims and fail to consider the differences in relationships and motivations for gifts that may 
indicate some reduction of free will. However, this does not mean that the donor’s will is 
impaired in any real sense on all occasions. 
 
The extent of judicial discretion afforded to judges by understandings of the doctrine is also a 
common issue in the US experience. This discussion has shaped the doctrine’s application since 
the early twentieth century.232 It is now generally accepted that the doctrine is based on the 
donor’s or testator’s impaired will.233 State courts continue to employ this rationale in 
 
232 See generally Scalise (n 165). 
233 See pages 57-59. 
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decisions.234 Alongside impaired will, public policies have also played some role in deciding 
cases.235 
 
No US state provides an exact definition of undue influence, so cases are decided on certain 
factors on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, judges determine how the doctrine applies with 
little substantive constraints. The predominant criticism relating to the extent of the discretion 
held by judges when applying undue influence tests in the US is an obvious one; it does not 
confirm how forms of influence become undue with any degree of precision.236 Quinn et al 
note that US courts have on occasion gone against traditional understandings of the doctrine.237 
Additionally, Quinn et al identify that legal experts observe disagreements between probate 
judges as to whether undue influence must be intentional.238 Moreover, there is also 
disagreement between judges about what factors render people vulnerable to undue influence, 
or what makes parties weak.239  
 
Based on this insight, there are real practical concerns about the discretion held by judges and 
understandings of the doctrine’s rationale. The US and Australian experiences establish that 
even where the grounding principle problem is decided, judicial discretion on what indicates 
unduly influence and what factors are relevant to claims can still negatively affect decisions 
and risk unprincipled decisions. Consequently, the experiences of both jurisdictions give rise 
to forceful questions over the suitability of a rationale premised on the claimant’s will and 
when it can be proven that it has been sufficiently impaired by a defendant’s conduct.  
 
234 For example, Estate of Mann (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 593 & Estate of Sarabia (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 599. 
235 Spivack (n 166), 299-301. 
236 Quinn et al (n 166), 114. 
237 Ibid. 
238 James E. Spar et al, ‘Assessing Mental Capacity and Susceptibility to Undue Influence Behavioral Sciences 
and the Law,’ (1995) Behavioural Sciences and the Law, 13, 391-403, cited in ibid, 114. 
239 Ibid, 115. 
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Presumptions of religious influence 
 
The level of discretion afforded to judges in claims is also problematic in religious claims 
regarding when courts decide if a presumption of influence applies automatically or if it must 
be proven by claimants. This features in the approaches of both Australian and US courts. For 
instance, Hartigan is described as a unique case where the donor did not have any prior 
religious relationship with the donee but gifted her family home to the defendants.240 The donor 
believed that depriving herself of material wealth would ensure spiritual growth, a belief which 
was based on her readings of Hare Krishna literature. Ridge has argued that Hartigan should 
not have been tried as an undue influence case. From the facts, it is correct to argue that an 
automatic presumption of influence should not have arisen between the parties, at least before 
the gift had been made, as there was no relationship of heightened trust and confidence between 
the parties. Accordingly, an automatic presumption of influence was inappropriate based on 
the facts. Bryson J’s explanation of why a sufficient relationship existed between the parties 
for an automatic presumption to arise stretches the facts too far. The claim should have been 
one of unconscionable conduct since the defendant’s beliefs were a special disability akin to 
an emotional infatuation, and this was knowingly taken advantage of by the defendant’s 
agents.241 Although the choice of claim does not automatically affect the outcome for 
claimants, it prevents awkward interpretations of facts, like in Hartigan.242 By considering the 
relationship of the parties in a more principled way, courts would not need to strain the facts 
like Bryson J did to find that a presumption of influence applied to the party’s relationship.243 
 
 
240 Ridge (n 6), 81. 




The US interpretation of the doctrine does not generally include a special category of 
relationships that presumes influence. As mentioned above, some states consider three types 
of confidential relationships, which do not automatically include the spiritual leader 
relationship.244 A presumption of undue influence can nevertheless arise in relationships 
between religious leaders and adherents where the leader of the religion also holds a fiduciary 
role. The critical question for courts is whether the relationship between the spiritual advisor 
and adherent alone is sufficient or may be treated as such by courts.245 This question deserves 
greater attention. In practice, presumptions of influence are very difficult to rebut,246 especially 
in one-stage test understandings of presumed undue influence. In early religious cases of 
presumed influence, a confidential relationship arose per se in this context.247 In later cases, 
however, courts began to require more than this type of relationship for a presumption to 
arise.248 For example, whether the donor received independent legal advice.249 The per se 
relationship has not been consistently followed by all states.  
 
In scenarios involving automatic presumptions of influence, courts should question how they 
arise in relationships, as well as how they apply over time. In religious relationships where an 
automatic presumption of influence arises where there is also evidence of a fiduciary role, US 
courts have considered the appropriateness of presumptions in long-term relationships 
involving gift-giving. In Whitmire,250 the defendant, the Pastor of a Baptist church, was in 
regular contact with the donor for eight years. Money was given to the defendant during each 
 
244 See page 59. 
245 Jarboe (n 168), 275-277. 
246 Rachel Welden-Smith, ‘A statutory definition of undue influence,’ (2009) Unpublished report prepared for 
the San Francisco Superior Court cited in Quinn et al (n 166), 44. 
247 See Corigani v. Pironi 23 A. 355 (N.J. 1891) (New Jersey) & Ryan v. St. Michaels Roman Catholic Church of 
Whitlemore, 216 N.W. 713 (Iowa 1927), examples taken from Jarboe (n 168), 276. 
248 See Else v. Fremont Methodist Church, 73 N.W.2d 50 (Iowa 1955); Guill v. Wolpert, 218 N.W.2d 224 (Neb. 
1974) (expressly rejecting holding in Corigani); Lindley v. Lindley, 356 P.2d 455 (N.M. 1960); Longenecker v. 
Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church, 50 A. 244 (Pa. 1901)., cited ibid, 277, ft 21. 
249 Ibid, 277. 
250 See n 220. 
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of the years for the reasons mentioned above.251 During this time, the parties mainly 
communicated through letters but also occasionally lived in the same city as one another for 
short periods. 
 
The district judge’s analysis of presumptions of influence that must be proven by claimants 
makes it clear how this sort of presumption, compared to one that applies automatically, can 
take into account changes in relationship and influence. An automatic presumption of influence 
did not apply in Whitmire because the defendant did not hold a fiduciary position in the party’s 
relationship.252 The court consequently considered whether each gift was subject to a 
presumption of influence. A presumption did not apply to the two gifts made at the start of the 
party’s relationship. However, a presumption did apply to the subsequent gifts. The party’s 
relationship had changed at this point, which the court viewed with suspicion. It was found that 
after the donor had spent time living in the same location as the defendant, the defendant had 
taken the opportunity to unduly influence the donor. The gifts of property were also made when 
the health of the donor was in decline. As a result, it was held that the transactions made during 
these dates called for an explanation. The defendant did not convincingly explain the 
lawfulness of the gifts, which were subsequently found to have had been unduly influenced.  
 
The analysis of the district court in Whitmire demonstrates that presumptions of influence that 
must be proven to arise by claimants can operate in a temporally nuanced way. This approach 
helps to establish the appropriateness of presumptions of influence on each occasion a gift has 
been made and whether it is appropriate to sever a gift from a presumption.253 Severance greatly 
reduces the burdens faced by defendants when rebutting such presumptions. 
 
251 See page 68. 
252 The district judge discusses the law relating to presumption of influence in spiritual contexts after finding 
that the gifts were unduly influenced, Whitmire (n 220), 710-712. 
253 This approach is not adopted in Australian jurisprudence on religious undue influence. 
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Presumptions that must be proven by claimants are, therefore, based on a more realistic 
understanding of relationships of influence. In circumstances where presumptions arise 
automatically because of the type of relationship between the parties, courts may not account 
for the inappropriateness of presumptions in long-term relationships. As a result, courts 
subsequently impose an extreme burden on defendants to rebut presumptions, as little evidence 
may exist to show that gifts were an expression of the donor’s true will. Additionally, gifts may 
have been large and out of character for donors. These factors, amongst others that could be 
considered by courts, make it extremely difficult for automatic presumptions to be rebutted.  
 
Furthermore, these concerns could feature more readily in the US states that consider that 
confidential relationships can arise between spiritual leaders and parishioners, even if the donor 
is influenced by third parties acting in the interests of religion.254 US courts have heard claims 
alleging that a minister’s comments in sermons pricked parishioner’s conscience and pressured 
them donating.255 Such cases have generally been unsuccessful.256 Courts have nevertheless 
stated that comments made by religious leaders to congregations may make parishioners more 
susceptible to undue influence.257 However, a presumption of influence may unjustly arise 
automatically in these circumstances despite there not being a sufficient relationship of trust 






254 See Sherman (n 168), 629. 
255 For example, Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405, 421 (D.C. 1992). 
256 Sherman (n 168), 633-636. 
257 Roberts-Douglas (n 255), modified on other grounds and reaffd, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993), at 424. Cited by 
ibid, 631, ft 304. 
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Significance of improvident transactions  
 
In the Australian context, the role of improvidence in religious cases has been questioned.258 
The reason for this concern is that interpretations of improvident transactions could have 
detrimental impact the interests of donees, especially where there is no clear evidence that the 
donor’s will has been impaired. In Hartigan, Bryson J considered that the gift of land did not 
satisfy the “ordinary motive test,” which was the main reason for a finding of undue influence 
as discussed above.259 Ridge questions “… is the logical conclusion from Hartigan that the 
court will never allow a mother with a young family and no other means of support to give 
away her only asset?”260 Although Hartigan is a religious case, understanding the role of 
improvidence is a challenge equally applicable to all types of presumed undue influence claims.  
 
Australian courts have on occasion ignored equitable maxims and undone unwise bargains in 
religious claims. Hartigan is an example where this has happened for the reasoned listed 
above.261 Additionally, the threshold test in presumed undue influence claims can be 
considered an extension of the problem identified by Bradney in how the law treats ‘obdurate 
believers’262 and how family law imposes objective moral standards that do not match up to 
the standards of obdurate believers.263 Subsequently, the believer’s standards are found to be 
unacceptable by courts. Bradney argues that incompatibility is created between the law and the 
believer.264 Such a similarity could also arise in religious undue influence cases in the same 
way. On this basis, religious defendants are more likely to be found liable for undue influence 
 
258 Ridge (n 6), 82-83. 
259 See page 64. 
260 Ridge (n 6), 83. 
261 See page 61. 
262 Ridge (n 6), 84-85. 
263 Anthony Bradney, 'Faced by Faith,' in Peter Oliver et al, Faith in Law: Essays in Legal Theory, (Bloomsbury 
2000), 90, cited in ibid. For example, Roman Catholic adoptions agencies rejecting applications from homosexual 
couples wishing to adopt a child. 
264 Ridge (n 6), 84-85. 
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where gifts cannot be explained by ordinary motives but can be explained by religious motives. 
Therefore, the ordinary motive test seems to be out of date or at least less relevant to claims. It 
has subsequently been argued that the standard set by Australian courts ignores how believers 
frequently gift large sums of money to religious institutions and that the law of undue in 
religious claims has created incompatibility between conceptions of legitimate gift-giving and 
religious gift-giving that may encompass improvidence.265  
 
Similarly, in the US, the doctrine has been criticised in probate contexts for allowing judicial 
disapproval of testamentary plans, especially in relation to conceptions of abnormal or 
uncommon dispositions.266 Consequently, improvidence can include transactions that do not 
accord with the intestate schemes of states. For example, in Murphy v O’Neill (1983),267 the 
court stated, "[t]here is a body of case law which may be cited for the proposition that an 
unexplained, unnatural disposition in a will, when considered with other factors, can give rise 
to the drawing of an inference of undue influence.”268 Accordingly, the US experience also 
contains questionable interpretations of improvidence in non-religious contexts that are 
equally, if not more likely in religious claims.  
 
 
The role of independent advice  
 
In the Australian context, independent advice is typically seen as the leading way presumptions 
of influence can be rebutted.269 Hartigan confirmed that the legal advice received by the 
 
265 Ibid. 84. 
266 Scalise (n 165), 58 quoting Lawrence A. Frolik, ‘The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What's 
Love Got to do with It?’ (1996) University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 57(4), 868. 
267 454 A.2d 248, 249 (R.I. 1983)., see Scalise (n 165), 59. 
268 Ibid, 249, Scalise (n 165), 59. 
269 Ridge (n 6), 67. 
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claimant must be independent of any of the parties to the gift or transaction.270 The suitability 
of independent advice is narrowed further by decisions confirming that legitimate advice need 
not be legal, but need be pragmatic.271 
 
However, it is unclear whether the advice received by claimants must be followed for a 
defendant to show that a presumption of influence is rebutted. Ridge has questioned whether 
some gifts cannot be categorised as lawful where independent advice had been received by a 
donor, but the advice cannot remove a donee’s advantage.272 There are two opposing 
perspectives in Australian jurisprudence on this question. View (I) considers that if the advice 
was given to claimants, but not followed, a presumption of influence can still be rebutted by 
defendants. In Hartigan, Bryson J claimed it is an overstatement that advice is necessary for a 
gift to be valid273 and conceptually there is no need for advice to be received for gifts to be 
legally valid.274  
 
View (II) contends that unless independent advice is followed by claimants, it is almost 
impossible for the presumption of influence to be rebutted by defendants. Meagher et al (the 
leading textbook on equity in Australia) holds the view, “…reliance is to be placed upon the 
presence of advice only if it appears to have had effect upon the donor in forming his 
independent intention; it will be hard to show this if the advice were not followed'."275 This 
approach seems more favoured by the High Court’s judgment in Thorne. The High Court ruled 
that although independent advice was received by the claimant, who was aware of the terms of 
 
270 [83] & [89] (Bryson J). 
271 See Brusewitz v Brown [1923] NZLR 1106 (SC) & Bester v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1970) 3 NSWR 30 
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273 Citing Watkins v. Coombs [1922] HCA 3, 194, (Isaacs J) as evidence of this belief at [31]. 
274 [31]. 
275 Roderick Meagher et al, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, (LexisNexis Australia, 4th edition, 2002), [15]-[135] 
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the prenuptial agreement and strong reasons not to sign it,276 other factors indicated that the 
presumption could not be rebutted by the defendant.  
 
However, it should be questioned why this is a legitimate view on the role of independent 
advice in religious contexts since the advice is less likely to be followed. Improvident 
transactions motivated by religious faith may be the leading reason a donor may ignore legal 
advice.277 Additionally, donors may ignore advice because they believe the advisor does not 
adequately respect their religious motivations. Accordingly, the interpretation of the role of 
independent advice in view (II) may not serve the intended purpose of this factor in claims 
involving altruistic motivations. 
 
A different sort of question concerning the source of the advice is raised in cases where 
religious advisors are called by one party to assist with transactions. In Khan v Khan [2004],278 
an Imam acted as a mediator between the parties seeking to finalise a contract of sale for a 
property. The Imam concluded that the sale had been completed in a previous meeting between 
the parties. One member of the selling party disagreed and declared that the property was worth 
more than what had been offered. The Iman stated that the selling party should accept the 
contract and “…will be reward[ed] in the after-life.”279 Deeds of the sale were not drawn up at 
the time and the buying party subsequently sought specific performance for the alleged 
contract. In response, the selling party alleged that if the contract was binding, it had been 
unduly influenced by the Imam. The New South Wales Supreme Court found that third parties 
could unduly influence a transaction if the two stages of the equitable test were proven. The 
Supreme Court held that the Imam had not unduly influenced the agreement and was only 
 
276 Thorne (n 154), [14] (Kiefel CJ). 
277 Ridge (n 6), 84. 
278 NSWSC 1189. 
279 Ibid, [12] (Barrett J). 
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advising on religious, not legal matters. Instead, the buying party was found to have unduly 
influenced the transaction by asking the Imam to attend the second meeting. The Supreme 
Court submitted that the defendant knew what impact the presence of the Imam would have on 
the selling parties’ sense of religious duty.280  
 
The reasoning of the court in Khan raises a separate question on the role of religious advisors 
in claims and how strict the independent aspect of advice must be. Hartigan and Antov v Bokan 
[2018]281 confirm that legal advisors acting for the defendant in transactions will not always be 
sufficiently independent to rebut the presumption because they may act in the interests of 
defendants. However, in religious contexts, the justification for strict independence is not as 
strong. Advisors may hold single roles as religious advisors or legal advisors but could also 
hold both roles. A US case is instructive to this discussion. In Re Estate Maheras (1995)282 the 
defendant was the advisor to a will leaving the bulk of the testatrix’s estate to the church. Both 
the defendant and testatrix were members of this church. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found 
this fact suspicious and ultimately, that the advisor unduly influenced the testatrix. In a scenario 
where the advisor does not impair the advisee’s free will but is part of the same church, there 
is a question about the independence of the advisor. In these sorts of scenarios, the advisor is 
aware of the religious and legal facts relevant to gifts. It is unclear whether courts in both 
jurisdictions would find this advisor sufficiently independent of the context. Practically, this 
sort of advisor is better placed to advise donors on the nature of transactions; they have a greater 
understanding of the religious motivations for transactions. There is a distinct possibility that 
donors motivated by religious faith are more likely to follow the advice of advisors who hold 
both roles, especially when advisors do not benefit from the planned gifts. Therefore, if a 
 
280 Ibid, [37]. 
281 NSWC 1474, [551]. 
282 1999 OK CIV APP 4, 973 P.2d 345. 
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restrictive approach to the role of independent advice applies in religious claims, the role of 
advice is considered in a way that is at odds with the aim of the factor, that reasoned advice 
should be followed by donors. Accordingly, determining the correct role of independent advice 




Judicial assessments of policies and the impact on donor autonomy  
 
Policies have been used by Australian courts to determine whether gifts have been unduly 
influenced in presumed undue influence claims.283 The role of these policies has been 
questioned in the religious cases.284 In particular, the public policy of providing for one’s own 
family has been subject to criticism in this context.285 Hartigan is an example where the court 
has given more weight to the improvidence of the gift, rather than the donor’s intentions at the 
time of the gift in finding undue influence. Bryson J focused on how the gift of the claimant’s 
property would subsequently impact her children’s lives286 and concluded that gifting the 
family home was “…an entire departure from ordinary behaviour…”287 The usage of the public 
policy is criticised for representing an additional aspect of the ordinary motives test that 
discriminates against certain religious practices, as demonstrated above.288 Moreover, the 
policy could also embody a social perspective of what motherhood should entail that was 
subjectively determined by the court. The use of the public policy was arguably relied on by 
 
283 For example, providing for one’s family and preventing exploitation by religious ministers, Ridge (n 6), 86-
87. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid. The policy is referred to by Bryson J in Hartigan (n 151), [33]. 
286 Hartigan (n 151), [36]. 
287 Ibid. 
288 See pages 63-64. 
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the court in Hartigan to rescind an unwise decision; the court did not determine that the donor’s 
will was sufficiently impaired when the property was gifted. 
 
Similarly, Quek v Beggs (1990)289 provides evidence that policies based on family provisions 
laws relied on by courts to reason decisions can unjustly restrict donor autonomy. The 
defendant, a Baptist minister, received substantial gifts from a congregation member. The 
donor believed that the defendant was a messenger from God, a view which allegedly was also 
sincerely shared by the defendant. The donor did not change her mind about the gifts when she 
was alive. Her will subsequently contained few assets for her family. The daughters of the 
donor brought a claim of undue influence against the defendant, believing that they had been 
unlawfully disinherited. During the time the donor relied on the defendant for support and 
comfort, the claimants were estranged from their mother and did not rely on her to support their 
lifestyles while she was alive. The Court found that the gifts could not be explained by ordinary 
motives and ruled that the gifts received by the defendant had been unduly influenced.  
 
It has been argued that the decision was motivated by the underlying policy of family 
provisions legislation even though the provisions did not apply directly to the claimants;290 it 
is unclear how the donor’s will had been impaired by the defendant and the decision 
acknowledged that the defendant had not exploited the donor.291 Quek consequently 
demonstrates how an autonomy conflict can occur in religious claims between a donor’s wishes 
and family provisions legislation norms. The decision of the court provides evidence that courts 
may prioritise this policy over the wishes of religious donors in an unprincipled way.  
 
 
289 See n 151. 
290 Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW), (Ridge n 6), 87-88. 
291 Ibid, 86. 
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2.3. Conclusions  
 
In both Australia and the US, religious undue influence cases have given rise to a number of 
legal challenges and questions concerning just and principled regulation. The analysis 
conducted in this chapter bolsters my view that religious undue influence cases are hard cases 
to decide. Both jurisdictions demonstrate unique religious challenges of regulating religious 
influence, as well as how general doctrinal challenges are compounded in religious settings. I 
later demonstrate how these challenges also feature in religious undue influence cases decided 
by English courts in chapter 4. There, I also argue that the insights generated by my analysis 
in this chapter offer insufficient means to address many of the common challenges of 
determining when religious influence becomes undue. I propose a more wide-reaching and 
principled response in chapter 7.  
 
The challenges of regulating both legal wrongs in religious contexts examined have worryingly 
received much less attention in English cases and commentary than in Australia and the US. 
My focus now shifts to consider the challenges of regulating religious fraud through English 
criminal laws, before moving on to address the challenges of determining religious undue 













In 2014 a Magistrates Court heard allegations relating to religious fraud under the Fraud Act 
2006.292 A former adherent of the LDS Church claimed that the President of the Church made 
false representations motivated by religious beliefs and practices in order to receive money 
through annual tithes. Judge Riddle held that a court was an inappropriate forum for claims of 
this nature.293 The case was subsequently dismissed on the basis that the allegations made 
against the Church’s President were non-justiciable. Judge Riddle found that the private 
prosecution merely amounted to an expression of the alleged victim’s distaste for the 
defendant’s faith and beliefs.294  
 
Phillips is still the most significant contemporary case within England and Wales concerning 
criminally litigated religious fraud, even though it was unreported. The decision immediately 
suggests an overarching problem with this area of law, which is worryingly gaining little 
academic attention in domestic settings;295 should defendants alleged to have committed 
criminal fraud evade liability because of the religious context of representations? A religious 
exemption to a generally applicable criminal law is unlikely to be a justified response for the 
various ways in which religious fraud may occur, as discussed in my introduction.296 To answer 
this question English courts must determine how to assess the liability of alleged religious 
 
292 See n 13. For brief commentary see Frank Cranmer, 'Thomas Phillips v Thomas Monson: Westminster 
Magistrates' Ct: DJ Riddle, Chief Magistrate, 20 March 2014 Private prosecution – doctrine – Fraud Act 2006,' 
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295 See van Twist (n 18); Steven Greenfield et al, 'From Beyond the Grave: The Legal Regulation of Mediumship,' 
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fraudsters, and in turn, consider how to overcome the challenges that arise during that 
assessment. This analysis is greatly under-discussed domestically and involves complex areas 
of criminal law and human rights concerns.  
 
Without a thorough investigation into the issues of regulating religious fraud identified below, 
victims and defendants of s2 FA06, fraud by false representation, are likely to experience 
several adverse consequences. By allowing defendants to evade liability, defendants can 
continue their fraudulent religious practices under the guise of a religious cloak. Regulation 
could also over-criminalise religious conduct, undermining the aims of criminal fraud laws, 
and unjustly infringe the religious freedom protections laid out in the European Convention of 
Human Rights set out in Article 9, which has been incorporated into English law through the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter HRA).  
 
This chapter highlights the most forceful challenges that English courts will face in regulating 
religious representations using s2 FA06. This analysis has a wide remit, as each challenge 
identified is likely to apply equally to any religious beliefs and practices. The issues identified, 
therefore, have direct and widespread relevance to many of the ways religious institutions raise 
financial capital in England. 
 
I assess the challenges produced by the actus reus and mens rea requirement of s2 FA06. This 
offence is the broadest offence of the FA06, and the one most commonly charged.297 
Accordingly, the offence is likely to be the most relevant to religious fraud cases. Both the 
actus reus and mens rea of the offence raise unique challenges for courts deciding the liability 
of defendants in religious fraud cases. There are also general doctrinal challenges with the 
 
297 Ormerod (n 12), 196. 
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offence that are compounded in the religious contexts considered. The challenges are identified 
by considering doctrinal and procedural factors, and human rights obligations under Article 9 
ECHR, which English courts are required to follow. Many of the challenges discussed were 
also identified in the US experience of religious fraud regulation mentioned in chapter 2. I 
explain why the US official and alternative approaches to the regulation of religious fraud 
should not be transplanted into English law without further elaboration by judges or Parliament 
on how the most significant challenges examined should be addressed.  
 
I subsequently explore how these challenges could be approached by either of these legal 
institutions in chapter 7. I do not completely address the falsity testing challenge mentioned 
below. In less obvious instances of abuse of religious capital, the problem is an insurmountable 
challenge relating to theology and the truth of religions, an area of knowledge that the law is 
generally uncomfortable in engaging with. The problem also has potentially significant 
ramifications for the influence of religion on law, in particular to religious accommodation 
claims. Accordingly, in chapter 7, I provide a rationale for the offence, which could later take 
account of how the falsity challenge is eventually addressed by English courts or Parliament. 
 
 
3.1. s2 FA06 and religious fraud: actus reus challenges 
 
s2 FA06 prohibits false representations;298 a representation is characterised as false if it is 
untrue, misleading,299 or might be either.300 The representation must also be made 







cause loss to another or expose another to a risk of loss.302 For example, a person who sells a 
painting stating that it is a real Picasso painting when they know it is not would be guilty of the 
offence. In this section, I discuss the actus reus requirements of the offence and illustrate what 
challenges are caused by the requirements of falsity relating to religious representations. 
 
 
3.1.1. Proving the falsity of religious representations 
 
The most complex challenge that English courts will inevitably face in religiously based s2 
FA06 cases, stems from the actus reus conduct elements that defendants must communicate a 
false representation.303 As already outlined, a representation is false if it is untrue, 
misleading,304 and the defendant knows this, or that the representation might be either.305 
Representations can relate to the quality or providence of an item, as well as the defendant’s 
state of mind306 or another person.307 Courts have not encountered any real difficulties with 
how juries determine whether representations are false or misleading in the case law. However, 
this will not be true for the falsity requirement assessed in religious fraud cases based on 
miraculous claims. In a different legal context, English courts have held that is it inappropriate 
to determine whether religious beliefs are untrue. In R v Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment and others ex parte Williamson [2005] (hereinafter ex parte Williamson),308 a 
House of Lords majority (now the Supreme Court), declared that the correct approach in 








308 UKHL 15; [2005] 2 W.L.R. 590. 
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to determine if the belief is sincerely held by the claimant, rather than if the belief is false.309 
This ruling established a continuing precedent for how courts determine the genuineness of 
religious beliefs in all areas of law.310  
 
Williamson raises two concerns specific to religious fraud regulation where the defendant’s 
allegedly fraudulent conduct stems from the manifestation of a legally recognised religious 
belief. Firstly, should defendants evade liability because the conduct alleged to be fraudulent 
is connected to a religious belief, and so cannot be tested for falsity by courts?311 Alternatively, 
are courts justified with proceeding to test the falsity of the defendant’s religious beliefs, and 
thereby most likely violating Article 9 ECHR and overruling domestic precedent,312 to ensure 
those who are not genuinely acting upon religious motivations can be prosecuted? This second 
question is essentially unique to the context of religious fraud.313  
 
Courts are likely to declare that certain categories of beliefs should be tested by juries in s2 
FA06 cases. English courts have traditionally been reluctant to grant religious exemptions to 
criminal laws.314 Consequently, the “hands off” approach proposed by Justice Jackson in 
Ballard is unlikely to be accepted by English courts.315 More specifically, it is a particularly 
 
309 Ibid, [22] (Lord Nicholls). 
310 It has since been followed in R v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, ex p Begum [2006] 
UKHL 15; [2007] 1 A.C. 100 [21] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill), R. (on the application of Watkins-Singh) v 
Aberdare Girls' High School Governors [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin); [2008] A.C.D. 88 [58] (Mr. Justice 
Selber) & Mba v Merton LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 1562; [2014] W.L.R. 1501 [13] (Lord Justice Maurice Kay). 
311 This chapter does not assess how courts will determine whether a belief is genuinely a religious belief and the 
problems this may pose for beliefs involved in religious fraud claims. That is a challenge for courts that will 
feature in the criminal and civil analysis of this thesis. It will, therefore, be treated as an overarching issue of this 
thesis and will be examined in a preceding chapter concerning how religion and religious belief is defined by 
courts in England and Wales. Instead, this chapter addresses the more significant challenges facing courts after 
they have determined that a belief is a religious one. 
312 This could lead to a declaration of incompatibility under s4 HRA since the s2 FA06 could not consequently be 
read in line with ECtHR jurisprudence under s3 HRA. 
313 This question may also have wider relevance to alleged fraudulent conduct in homeopathy cases that are not 
discussed in this thesis. 
314 See Edge (n 5), 170-172. 
315 See pages 43-44. 
 89 
unacceptable response for egregious cases of abuse of religious categorisation where there is 
clear evidence that a defendant does not believe in the representations and intends to make 
dishonest representations for financial gain. Racketeers should not receive the protection of the 
ruling in ex parte Williamson in the sorts of circumstances discussed. Representations made in 
these sorts of circumstances would foreseeably be captured by s2 FA06 because the defendant 
misrepresents the state of their mind to adherents.316  
 
However, in scenarios where there is no evidence of racketeering or lies, it is less clear how 
courts can prosecute religious representations alleged to be false by victims. Beliefs capable of 
testing could include “God will make you rich,” and “religious slot machines are biofeedback 
devices if you know how to use them correctly.”317 These beliefs relate less to unworldly 
matters and could in practice be tested for falsity by considering how donations are used in 
Get-Rich-Quick-Schemes or through the experiences of adherents. In contrast, courts could 
rule that beliefs relating to the afterlife, such as “You will go to heaven” and “I will reduce 
your time in purgatory” that require payments for religious officials to pray for adherents, 
cannot be proven false due to their unworldly nature. Testing the falsity of these beliefs using 
conventional methods risks unduly violating the defendant’s Article 9(2) ECHR qualified right 




317 Tolly Burkan, Extreme Spirituality: Radical Journeys for the Inward Bound, (Beyond Words 2001), 42-43 
whether this is believed by Burkan is questionable; Burkan charges up thousands of dollars to attend his 
workshops typically entitled ‘Unlimited Wealth’ which seek to demonstrate with religious references how slot 
machines can be influenced by conscious thoughts, see ‘Tolly Burkan's Casino Seminar on Inside Edition,’ 
Published on 26 Feb 2009 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=300&v=jlU_GLDhNkQ> Accessed 
January 2018. What this does reveal is that others may share this view which is significant for the future regulation 
of RF in England and Wales.  
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Consequently, further questions are raised about whether all religious beliefs can and should 
be tested for falsity in s2 FA06 cases.318 It is extremely unlikely that all beliefs will be 
considered justiciable since this is likely to violate the defendant’s Article 9(1) ECHR right to 
belief. Accordingly, the “clearly culpable” theory followed by Chief Justice Stone and Justices 
Roberts and Frankfurter in Ballard is very unlikely to be followed by English courts.319 
Therefore, how should courts determine which beliefs are suitable for falsity testing? This is a 
challenging exercise that may result in accusations that the assessments of courts lack neutrality 
or are based on an alleged bias against particular religions. There is a real possibility of 
inconsistent treatment between some religions and more historical and widespread religions. 
Courts must be sensitive to the fact that certain religions, like Scientology, are structured on a 
belief system more capable of falsification. This includes beliefs on the ability to cure diseases 
and how the earth was created. Courts may subsequently determine that only certain categories 
of beliefs more capable of falsification should be tested for falsity in religious s2 FA06 cases. 
In turn, there is a real chance that courts would be accused of discriminatory treatment between 
religions in cases through Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR.320 Courts may, 
nevertheless, be considered justified in doing so where there is clear evidence that false 
representations have been communicated by defendants to make financial gains. Such evidence 
is far from guaranteed, however. Accordingly, this discrimination concern could prove very 




318 This has also been questioned in relation to claims made by mediums that could be determined as false, see 
Greenfield et al (n 295), 110.  
319 See pages 42-43. 
320 This seems a high probability since such claims have been raised in the ECtHR involving the criminality of 
religious drug use, see Alida Maria Fränklin-Beentjes and Ceflu-Luz Da Floresta v Netherlands (2014), 
(Application no. 28167/07). 
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A third challenge raised by the actus reus relates to what methods could be used by courts to 
test the falsity of religious beliefs? Foreseeably, testing would involve a range of responses for 
different types of beliefs, depending on whether the content of beliefs concerns the supernatural 
or ecclesiastical history, for example. Courts may call for expert evidence;321 ask for 
demonstrations of alleged powers; call witnesses to attest or disprove powers;322 or examine 
ecclesiastical and historical records.323 The Legislature could draw up legislation stating what 
areas of religious claims are justiciable.324 Alternatively, judges could enforce the correct 
completion of the allegedly deemed fraudulent representation, rather than testing the 
truthfulness of the religious representation. For instance, courts may seek expert evidence on 
what constitutes the ‘proper practice’ of an exorcism and determine whether that approach has 
been followed by defendants.325 If the defendant’s practice does not match the correct 
approach, the defendant’s conduct could satisfy the falsity element of the actus reus.  
 
However, each of these approaches has evidential weaknesses specific to claims of the 
supernatural, and some approaches are even more prejudicial than probative. Many of the 
approaches listed raise concerns about evidential rules of admissibility, reliability, and the 
competency of witnesses, as well as the effectiveness and appropriateness of expert scientific 
evidence in supernatural claims.326 Additionally, the denial of some of the approaches may 
give rise to claims that the defendant’s Article 9(2) ECHR right is violated. A challenge could 
 
321  See The Founding Church of Scientology (n 40), at 86-87, where doctors were called to question whether E-
meters used by Scientologists during auditing did generate health benefits; The Archbishop of Westminster was 
called to provide evidence on religious beliefs in Re A [2001] Fam. 417 (CA); [2001] 2 WLR 480. Professors 
have also been called to give evidence on religious beliefs, see Ghai v Newcastle City Council [2009] EWHC 
978 (Admin); [2009] 5 WLUK 175. 
322  This has been used to disprove allegations of fraudulent representations involving radionics, see case 
commentary of Philips v De la Warr Times, July 19, 1960, in Christmas Humphrey, Both Sides of the Circle: The 
Autobiography of Christmas Humphreys, (Allen & Unwin 1978), 204. 
323  A possible suggestion in Edge (n 15), 37. 
324  Ibid, 32. 
325 Example is taken from, ibid. 
326 Heins (n 17), 168. For example, there is no tried and tested legal method for contacting the dead so such 
supernatural representations could not be proven to be false, see Greenfield et al (n 295), 110. 
 92 
be made where the prohibition is unnecessary and does not pursue a legitimate aim given the 
context the belief was manifested in. 
 
Domestic courts will have to wrestle with this chronology of complex questions to determine 
whether the actus reus of s2 FA06 can ever be satisfied in religious cases where there is no 
clear evidence of falsely held beliefs. Such considerations are not as problematic or common 
in non-religious cases, even though they may be relevant to cases involving homeopathic 
promises or mediums.327 Courts are unlikely to find these sorts of cases non-justiciable due to 
the absence of religion. Accordingly, greater weight should be placed on resolving the 
challenges in religious contexts, which may, in turn, assist the regulation of other fraud cases.  
 
Addressing the actus reus challenges is an extremely important task to establish how English 
courts should regulate religious fraud. s2 FA06 is the broadest offence under the FA06 and the 
most likely fraud offence that religious fraudsters will be charged with.328 Therefore, 
disingenuous religious defendants could abuse religious categorisation if the truth of 
representations cannot be tested or effectively tested by courts. The same also applies where 
there is no clear evidence that defendants do not believe their representations. Parliament or 
the courts will eventually be required to determine if the US approach should be followed in 
English law,329 that prosecutions depend on the defendant’s sincerity, or whether religious s2 
FA06 should not be tried because of justiciability concerns.  
 
As mentioned above, it seems unlikely that English courts would consistently create 
exemptions for all s2 FA06 claims involving religious contexts. A sincerity-based approach 
 
327 See Greenfield et al (n 295). 
328 Ormerod (n 12), 196. 
329 See pages 88-94. 
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was the predominant focus of courts in previous legislation dealing with fraudulent spiritual 
practices.330 In civil fraud contexts, it has been argued that sincerity is an obvious approach for 
regulating fraudulent religious practices.331 Accordingly, it seems likely that courts would 
focus exclusively on the mens rea of the offence to determine whether defendants should be 
prosecuted for fraud where it cannot be proven that the defendant knew their representations 
were false. Therefore, the “religious reservation” approach of the majority decision in Ballard 
is likely to be followed by English courts.332 I now consider the specific challenges raised by 
the mens rea of s2 FA06 in religious cases and explain the important role the mens rea is likely 
to have in these cases. 
 
 
3.2. s2 FA06 and religious fraud: mens rea challenges  
 
The mens rea of s2 FA06 has three fault elements: intention to cause a loss or gain;333 
knowledge that representations are false, misleading, or might be either;334 and dishonesty.335 
The first element is unproblematic in religious fraud cases, which invariably involve payments 
of property exchanged for religious promises that benefit victims or their family and friends. 
The defendant’s intention to make a loss or gain property is established by the circumstances 
of exchanges, or the religious practices manifested by defendants relating to payments. The 




330 For instance, The Fraudulent Medium Act 1951, see Edge (n 15), 398. 
331 Concerning the regulation of providing religious good and services, see ibid. 





3.2.1. Proving defendant knowledge on religious matters 
 
Courts will experience difficulties when determining if defendants knew their representations 
were untrue or misleading. This problem is most apparent when claims are based on untrue 
representations; how will courts determine defendants knew that a religious representation 
relating to unworldly claims is untrue? Justice Jackson raised this very question in Ballard.336 
If courts are prevented from determining whether defendants knew their religious beliefs are 
untrue, courts cannot subsequently establish when defendants satisfy part of the knowledge 
requirement of the mens rea, unless the defendant misrepresents the state of their mind. 
Accordingly, racketeers are presented with another opportunity to escape liability if the 
challenge is left unaddressed. 
 
The knowledge problem is a compounded doctrinal challenge, as it is uncertain how Parliament 
intended knowledge to be interpreted in the FA06. The FA06 and the Law Commission Report 
published before the introduction of the FA06 makes no useful reference to what the term 
‘knew’ or ‘knowledge’ means. The Post-Legislative Scrutiny Report on the FA06 does not 
refer to either term. The concepts of ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ are also generally overlooked by 
criminal law theorists.337 There is little commentary on the concept of knowledge concerning 
the FA06 in leading textbooks. For example, both Ormerod338 and Herring339 briefly examine 
the term in this context by mentioning the reasoning in R v Augunas [2013].340 There, Lord 
Justice McCombe confirmed that the test for knowledge is subjectively decided based on the 
 
336 See page 24. 
337 Stephen Shute, 'Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law,' in Stephen Shute and Andrew Simester, Criminal 
Law Theory: Doctrine of the General Part, (OUP 2002), 171. 
338 David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith, Hogan, & Ormerod's Criminal Law, (OUP, 15th Edition, 2018), 1019. 
339 See Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, (OUP, 18th Edition, 2018), 552. 
340 EWCA Crim 2046; [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. 17. 
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defendant’s perspective;341 it is not defined objectively by reference to whether the defendant 
‘ought’ to have known or appreciated something might be.342 It was also confirmed that it is 
not enough for the defendant to have reasonable suspicion.343 However, if a defendant shuts 
their eyes to obvious doubts, this can amount to knowledge.344 Accordingly, knowledge 
extends to wilful blindness under s2(2)(b) FA06. Lastly, Lord Justice McCombe ruled that 
judges should stick as close as possible to the words in the statute, as elaboration will rarely 
assist when a trial judge is summing up to the jury.345 
 
In nonreligious cases, the knowledge requirement of the mens rea is typically uncontroversial. 
A defendant will generally know that they are using their credit card or have been given 
permission by another to pay for goods at a shop. Knowledge of whose card is being used can 
be easily established by prosecutions. Further, even in a more complicated factual scenario, the 
requirement of proving knowledge of an untruth is not problematic. Consider A, who states 
that their diet and exercise plans prevent aging. Courts can look at this statement to see what 
evidence is relied on to show the causative effect and result. If there is no evidence to support 
the representation, A will most likely satisfy the mens rea. The representation is false, and A 
seems to know it is untrue. A may argue that they did not know that the representation was 
untrue, and they truly believed it was true. However, the effect of the representation on 
individuals is something that could be tested by A personally, and by courts. Circumstantial 
evidence or expert evidence can be relied on in such cases. Even if A seems to genuinely 
believe in the effects of the plans, if A has not tested the possible curative effect, or found any 
 




345 Ibid [19]; this obiter statement is interesting considering the lack of case law on the FA06 offences and limited 
judicial dicta on the statute’s language. This section will assess the validity of this statement prospectively. 
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support from another source in order to gain financially, A satisfies the mens rea because they 
know that the representation might be untrue, or at least misleading. 
 
A fictitious religious scenario demonstrates the difference between the assessments that courts 
could adopt for religious fraud cases. B, a religious official, submits they will use religious 
articles alongside regular prayer to cure A’s cancer if they are paid for doing so. Here, both the 
result and causative element of B’s conduct appeals to extra-temporal circumstances. 
Consequently, courts may not be able to prove the statement is false, as in Ballard, for example. 
Without clear evidence, such as witness testimony that B admitted they were lying to adherents, 
or proof that B had treated several adherents beforehand without success, B cannot be proven 
legally to know that the representation was untrue. Therefore, B would not satisfy one element 
of the mens rea, and subsequently, would not be found guilty of s2 FA06. As a result, religious 
defendants can escape liability through the mens rea. Foreseeably, B might satisfy the mens 
rea if the representation is misleading, but once again proving this might be evidentially 
challenging, and less likely in religious cases relating to miraculous representations. 
 
Defendants can also satisfy the mens rea if they know that representations might be either 
untrue or misleading.346 Accordingly, this requirement suggests that Parliament considered it 
a real possibility that defendants may escape liability when knowledge of falsity could not be 
proven by prosecutions. The wording of the fault element raises concerns of a different nature, 
relating to the defendant’s religious freedom. A defendant may claim that this requirement 
combined with the other conduct and fault elements of s2 FA06 unduly infringes their Article 
9(2) ECHR right to manifest their religious beliefs. For instance, a belief alleged to be 




be an illegitimate task for a court to perform. Even if this was allowed, this seems a very broad 
mens rea requirement to limit the range of religious conduct considered non-fraudulent. 
Religion is considered as a ‘cornerstone of society’ by most liberal democracies and the 
ECtHR.347 Further, strong normative foundations justify special treatment for religion in certain 
legal contexts.348 From the perspective of the criminal law, and the view of religious liberty 
and human rights, criminal sanctions should be regarded as a last resort.349 Consequently, it is 
unjust for such an important right to be trumped by the mere possibility of fraudulent conduct 
where there is no real evidence that the defendant knew that their representation was untrue.  
 
I have argued that there is a clear problem with the knowledge requirement of s2 FA06 that is 
compounded in religious fraud scenarios. To summarise, the lack of understanding of the term 
risks providing defendants with the opportunity to evade liability, where courts are unable to 
establish that defendants know their religious representations are untrue. Furthermore, courts 
may over-criminalise religious conduct by convicting defendants for representations that they 
know might be untrue. Failing to address the knowledge challenges will have serious 
consequences for the effectiveness of s2 FA06 in regulating religious fraud, especially if 
English courts decide that the mens rea should determine the liability of defendants because 





347 Kokkinakis v Greece [1994] (App No. 14307/88), [31]; also see the extra-judicial opinion of the current 
President of the European Court of Human Rights, Nicholas Bratza, ‘Freedom of Religion Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights,’ (2012) Ecclesiastical Law Journal, 14(2), 256-271. 
348 For example, dignity, autonomy and equality, see Lucy Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination 
and the Workplace, (Hart Publishing 2008), 36-40. 
349 Piet Ein van Kempen, ‘Freedom of Religion and Criminal Law: A Legal Appraisal,’ in Johannes A. van der 
Ven and Hans-Georg Ziebertz, Tensions Within and Between Religions and Human Rights, (BRILL 2008), 63. 
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3.2.2. Dishonesty and juror bias 
 
The dishonesty element of the mens rea for s2 FA06 will also present a challenge where judges 
find it necessary to instruct juries on what dishonesty means under the FA06.350 The challenge 
now explained, therefore, only applies to scenarios where a dishonesty direction is given.351 
Such a direction is likely to be common in religious fraud cases because of the other 
complexities of prosecuting these sorts of cases. Consequently, judges will want to safeguard 
their decisions by giving directions to reduce the possibility of an appeal based on inaccurate 
dishonesty directions. Accordingly, the dishonesty problem will be experienced more 
frequently in religious fraud cases than in nonreligious ones.  
 
My concern about the nature of dishonesty assessments and directions is generated by the 
amendments to the dishonesty test made in 2017.352 Originally, in criminal cases the 
defendant’s dishonesty was assessed through the Ghosh test proposed in R v Ghosh [1982].353 
A two-limbed test was employed to identify whether defendants acted dishonestly and satisfied 
the mens rea of theft offences. Lord Lane LJ laid set out the test as follows, 
"In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting 
dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary standards of 
reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those 
standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by those 
standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that 
 
350 It is not always necessary, see R v Price (1989) 90 Cr. App. R. 409, 411. 
351 Directions are rarely given, see Karl Laird, ‘Dishonesty: Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd (t/a Crockfords 
Club),’ (2018) Criminal Law Review, 5, 396. 
352 See ibid & Graham Virgo, 'Cheating and dishonesty,' (2018) Cambridge Law Journal, 71(1), 20-22. 
353 Q.B. 1053; [1982] 3 W.L.R. 110 it clarified the position of dishonesty testing specified in R v Feely [1973] 
Q.B. 530; [1973] 2 W.L.R. 201. For commentary on this see Edward Phillips et al, The Law Relating to Theft, 
(Cavendish 2001), 24-26. 
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what he was doing was by those standards dishonest… where the actions are obviously 
dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will be obvious that the 
defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly.”354 
 
The term ‘dishonesty’ was considered more appropriate than ‘fraudulent,’ on that basis that it 
was more likely to be understood by juries.355 Jury decisions on dishonesty were initially 
considered more appropriate than judicially determined ones in R v Feely [1973].356 Juries 
consist of ‘ordinary decent people,’ and were considered better suited to judging whether 
conduct is dishonest.357 It was argued this provided a safeguard for defendants because judicial 
assessments of dishonesty may not match ordinary and reasonable standards.358 
 
The Ghosh test has since been reformulated by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos 
Ltd [2017] (hereinafter Ivey),359 a civil case involving professional gambler sued by the 
defendant casino for not paying his winnings. The defendant argued that the claimant had 
cheated. The Supreme Court focused on understandings of cheating and dishonesty in 
gambling settings. The significant parts of the decision are obiter comments made by Lord 
Hughes on the criminal understanding of dishonest set by the Ghosh test, which were affirmed 
by four other Lords. Lord Hughes submitted that the subjective limb of the Ghosh test did not 
suitably represent the state of the law.360 The limb was criticised for having serious problems 
on six grounds, namely that the test is puzzling and too difficult to apply for juries, and that it 
 
354 Ibid, [E]-[G], 1064. 
355 The Law Commission, ‘Conspiracy to Defraud,’ (1987) Working Paper No. 104, [12.19]-[12.20]. 
356 See n 353. 
357 Ibid, [H] 537. 
358  Ibid, [A] 538. 
359 UKSC 67 (SC); [2018] A.C. 391. Noted in Virgo (n 353), 20-22 & Matthew Dyson and Paul Jarvis, ‘Poison 
Ivey or herbal tea leaf?’ (2018) Law Quarterly Review, 134, 200-203. 
360 Ivey, (n 359) [74]. 
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has the unintended effect that the more warped the defendant’s standards of honesty are, the 
less likely they will be found to be dishonest.361 Lord Hughes concluded: 
“The test of dishonesty is as set out by Lord Nicholls in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v 
Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 and by Lord Hoffmann in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust 
International Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1476… When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding 
tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or 
belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often 
in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional 
requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. 
When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the 
question of whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact finder 
by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that 
the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.”362 
 
The civil test still consists of subjective and objective considerations but determines dishonesty 
on the grounds of objective ordinary and reasonable standards. The ruling of DPP v Patterson 
[2017]363 confirms that the test for criminal dishonesty is now set by Ivey, not Ghosh.364 In 
Ivey, the Supreme Court did not refer to dishonesty in the FA06, but it is certain that the Ivey 
 
361 The other four grounds are: (1) It was based on the premise that it was necessary to give proper effect to the 
principle that dishonesty, and especially criminal responsibility for it, must depend on the actual state of mind of 
the defendant, whereas the rule is not necessary to preserve this principle. (2) It has led to an unprincipled 
divergence between the test for dishonesty in criminal proceedings and the test of the same concept when it arises 
in the context of a civil action. (3) It represented a significant departure from the pre-Theft Act 1968 law when 
there is no indication that such a change had been intended. (4) Moreover, it was not compelled by an authority. 
Although the pre-Ghosh cases were in a state of some entanglement, the better view is that the preponderance of 
authority favoured the simpler rule that, once the defendant’s state of knowledge and belief has been established, 
whether that state of mind was dishonest or not is to be determined by the application of the standards of the 
ordinary honest person, represented in a criminal case by the collective judgment of jurors or justices.” Ibid, [57]; 
whether these are justified, and forceful arguments have been disputed in Virgo (n 352), 20-22 & Dyson and Jarvis 
(n 350), 200-203. 
362 Ivey (n 359), [74]. 
363 EWHC 2820 (Admin); [2017] 11 WLUK 46. 
364 Ivey is now considered the test for criminal dishonesty in Archbold, see James Richardson, Archbold 2018: 
Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, (Sweet & Maxwell 2018), section 21-6. 
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test now applies to fraud offences, which erases the strict separation between criminal and civil 
conceptions of dishonesty.365  
 
The new development in dishonesty understandings can detrimentally impact religious fraud 
cases when defendants are convicted by juries. One reason why the new development is 
problematic relates to whether an objective standard based on “ordinary and reasonable 
standards” is a justified way of assessing whether conduct is dishonest. There is a suggestion 
that dishonesty cannot truly be objectively defined in a way that develops a shared definition 
of the term between more than one individual. A long-term critic of Ghosh and objective 
standards of dishonesty states, 
“[The Ghosh test] implies the existence of a relevant community norm. In so doing 
it glosses over differences of age, class and cultural background which combine to give the 
character of fiction to the idea of a generally shared sense of the boundary between honesty 
and dishonesty…”366 
This criticism of the Ghosh test also applies to the Ivey test. Accordingly, when judges now 
give dishonesty directions, they ask jurors to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was 
dishonest. Jurors can appeal to their subjective conceptions of what dishonesty means. Each 
juror is likely to hold a different conception of what dishonest conduct is characterised as and 




365 Ibid, reason (2). 
366 Edward Griew, ‘Dishonesty: The Objections to Feely and Ghosh,’ [1985] Criminal Law Review, 431, 344. 
 102 
A degree of knowledge may be required for jurors to get near the specified objective 
‘reasonable’ standard laid out in Ivey. This concern was originally raised in relation to liability 
for theft involving intricate financial activities, but it also applies to the current analysis: 
“It is neither reasonable nor rational to expect ordinary people to judge as ‘dishonest’ 
or ‘not dishonest’ conduct of which, for want of relevant experience, they cannot appreciate 
the contextual flavour… [it may be] that ordinary people have no standards in relation to the 
conduct in question.”367 
 
Judges cannot guarantee that an ordinary and reasonable conception of dishonesty can be 
determined by juries. This stands generally for one reason, the subjectivity of the definition. It 
also stands for a reason specific to religious fraud cases, namely the varying degrees of 
knowledge and understanding of the relevant religious beliefs held by jurors. Jurors may not 
have been exposed to particular religions before trials. The short period and the environment 
in which they have to consider it may subsequently impact on verdicts. Moreover, jurors may 
not be able to understand the subjective influence that religion can have on adherent’s daily 
life. Consequently, jurors may consider that defendants have preyed on vulnerable adherents, 
rather than viewing adherents as autonomous and willing participants in religious experiences. 
Additionally, jurors may not consider the defendant as genuine in relation to particular types 
of representation, regardless of the specific facts of cases. Therefore, if a case arose and the 
actus reus could be established, the appropriateness and content of a direction should not be 
considered trivial, or analogous to general s2 FA06 cases. Failing to do so, risks jurors 
undermining the safeguard offered by dishonesty testing. 
 
 
367 Ibid, 345. 
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Sociological research demonstrates that fringe religions categorised under some other label 
than religious like New Religious Movements or cults (which have typically featured in the US 
religious fraud claims) are perceived negatively by society and face widespread scepticism. 
Barker, a leading sociologist focussing on religion, considers that negative impressions created 
by opponents to NRMs have been a concern for scholars since 1970 in England.368 Sociologists 
have appeared in courts as expert witnesses in an effort to mediate between opponents and New 
Religious Movements members in cases.369 It is argued that prejudicial views still pervade 
English society; the terms ‘cult’ and ‘sect’ have decidedly negative overtones,370 often resulting 
in sensationalised images of these groups.371 Barkers considers that the labels: 
“…can be to suggest that it is [the relevant group] a dangerous pseudo-religion with 
satanic overtones which is likely to be involved in financial rackets and political intrigue, to 
indulge in unnatural sexual practices, to abuse its women and children, and to use irresistible 
and irreversible brainwashing techniques in order to exploit its recruits. Furthermore, it is 
implied, it may well resort to violence, perform various criminal activities and, possibly, 
persuade its members to commit mass suicide.”372  
Media coverage of such movements has been influential to how such groups are defined.373 
 
Similar prejudicial treatment is also experienced by more accepted religions in courtroom 
settings. In a 2016 experiment, quantitative data proved that the religion of victims and 
defendants to crimes influences whether parties are treated more favourably or less favourably 
by religious jurors.374 The data was collected in the US using three hundred and forty mock 
 
368 Eileen Barker, ‘The Not-So-New Religious Movements: Changes in ‘The Cult Scene’ Over the Past Forty 
Years,’ (2014) Temenos- Nordic Journal of Comparative Religion, 50(2), 251. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Ibid, 236. 
371 Ibid, 247. 
372 Ibid, 237. 
373 Ibid. 
374 Casey Magyarics, ‘The Effect of Victim Religion on Juror Perceptions of Hate Crimes,’ (2016) Thesis and 
Dissertations—Psychology, 87. 
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Christian jurors, who were asked to assess the liability of defendants for hate crimes. The 
defendants were Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or Atheist. The study showed that Jewish or 
Muslim defendants faced a higher conviction rate,375 and both groups were found to be more 
blameworthy and untrustworthy by the mock jurors.376 In contrast, Christian and Atheist 
victims were found to be more blameworthy and experienced less sympathy by the mock jurors 
than Jewish, or Muslim victims.377  
 
In the criminal context of religious fraud, this study connotes that defendants from particular 
religious backgrounds face a real possibility of prejudicial treatment by jurors. In turn, this 
increases the likelihood that defendants are considered to have acted unusually and are more 
blameworthy for their actions.378 In the study, this was true regardless of whether the 
defendant’s religious beliefs motivated the alleged criminal conduct. Individuals with a similar 
disposition to participants in the study could conceivably make up some part of juries due to 
the random selection of juries in England. This feature of controversial litigation may be more 
prominent in England than in other jurisdictions since jurors cannot be excluded from the jury 
for having strong religious convictions, which occurs in other jurisdictions.379 
 
Further evidence to support the submission that religion is an influential factor in convictions 
stems from the treatment of Atheists in the study. Atheists were considered less likely to be 
involved in religiously motivated hate crime and received the lowest percentage of guilty 
 
375 Ibid, 41-42. 
376 Ibid, 34. 
377 Christians favour the “in-group,’ ibid, 42 & Atheists scored lowest in all assessments, ibid, 43; for all 
quantitative results see, ibid, 34. 
378 This is corroborated by a range of psychological studies listed in Monica Miller and Jonathan Maskaly, ‘The 
relationship Between Mock Juror’s Religious Characteristics and Their Verdicts and Sentencing Decisions,’ 
(2014) Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 6(3), 188-189. 
379 For example, in the US where attorneys may use preemptory challenges before the start of jury trials to dismiss 
potential jurors who might favour the opposition, see United States v. DeJesus (2003) 378 FED.Appx. 112; more 
generally, see ibid, 188. 
 105 
verdicts.380 Accordingly, non-religious defendants may experience more favourable treatment 
from jurors compared to religious defendants. The problem identified here is, therefore, more 
likely to be experienced by religious defendants. 
 
Some may argue that the study has limited application for principled reasons. Attitudes towards 
the same religious faiths may not be represented to the same degree in England. Similarly, 
attitudes may not be as intense for other crimes committed in religious circumstances. 
Moreover, some may argue that not all jurors will be religious, and so the results of the study 
cannot apply to non-religious jurors. Nevertheless, the study discussed suggests that religious 
defendants from any religion,381 especially ones not practiced by jurors, will face real barriers 
to proving honest conduct, and subsequently avoiding convictions in jury trials. Indeed, this 
hypothesis has supporting evidence in contexts involving non-religious jurors.382 Therefore, in 
a country, like England, that is predominantly Christian, this is a worrying prospect for 
defendants in religious fraud cases involving non-Christian religions. 
 
In practice, the Ivey dishonesty test will allow negative perceptions and value judgments to 
infiltrate dishonesty testing because it eliminates the need for jurors to decide if the defendant 
considered that their conduct was dishonest compared to ordinary and reasonable standards. 
Accordingly, there are no principled and enforceable means to guard against these sorts of 
biases and prejudices in cases. This criticism would have also applied to the Ghosh test but 
 
380 Magyarics (n 374), 43. 
381 However, experiments using video evidence of domestic abuse of a female Muslim actor, abused by a male 
Muslim and the same actor as a female Anglo-Australian abused by an Anglo-Australian man suggest that 
religious contexts may reduce the perceived severity of the crime, see Krista De Castella et al, ‘Retribution or 
restoration? Anglo-Australian’s views towards domestic violence involving Muslim and Anglo-Australian 
victims and offenders,’ (2011) Psychology, Crime & Law, 17(5), 403-420; more generally see, James Richardson 
& Francois Bellanger, Legal Cases, New Religious Movements and Minority Faiths, (Routledge 2016), 254-255. 
382 Multiple studies have found that jurors can be biased against religious defendants, see Monica Miller et al, 
‘The Effects of Deliberations and Religious Identity on Mock Jurors’ Verdicts,’ (2009) Group Processes & 
Intergroup Relations, 14(4), 517–519. 
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applies more forcefully to the Ivey test because of the differences in tests. The possibility of 
bias follows logically, especially in religious contexts, where it is more likely to influence 
decision making. Jurors are likely to hold their own conceptions of what counts as religious. 
Some jurors may agree with the likes of Edgar Allan Poe that “All Religion, My Friend, Is 
Simply Evolved Out of Chicanery, Fear, Greed, Imagination and Poetry.”383 Others may 
consider that no religion is inevitably fraudulent, but some instances of the offence are more 
likely within certain religions. Therefore, conceptions of dishonest religious conduct could be 
more forceful than someone cheating a Bookmaker out of money, for example.384 
 
Jurors are also likely to have their conception of exploitation and vulnerability, which is likely 
to be discussed by prosecutions. Both considerations could become particularly developed and 
inflamed during each juror’s determination of dishonesty because of their views on the facts. 
Jurors may ‘gang up’ on certain religious practices that they consider illegitimate and do not 
match up to their religious practices or their conceptions of what religious practices should 
consist of. The objective test now ultimately centres on majoritarian conceptions of dishonesty. 
 
This concern has academic support from a leading criminal law scholar writing before Ivey was 
decided. Horder asserts that in a multicultural society with widely different degrees of wealth, 
like England and Wales, those who are perceived as poor or make up a minority community, 
may have their conduct characterised as dishonest by relatively wealthy people and members 
of the majority community.385 It is also noted that dishonesty testing may give rise to an element 
 
383 John Alexander Joyce, Edgar Allan Poe, (F.T. Neely Company, 1901), 107-108. 
384 Ardent and passionate responses by jury members are not limited to religious contexts exclusively. Similar 
perspectives could foreseeably be witnessed in cases involving elderly people being defrauded. 
385 Jeremy Hoarder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law, (OUP, 9th Edition, 2018), 404. 
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of hypocrisy; members of business communities are prone to practices within that sector, which 
outsiders may more broadly consider to be dishonest,386 but are widely practiced in that field.  
 
Individual conceptions of dishonest may be greatly altered depending on the context in which 
the allegedly fraudulent behaviour occurs. Specifically, a religious context could conceivably 
alter the way jury members define dishonesty. High intakes of donations explicitly asked for 
by ministers to help God’s work could theoretically mirror many of the requests made by 
charities to help those institution’s charitable activities. However, jurors may consider that the 
conduct of the religious defendant does not compute with their conception of religion,387 
making them more likely to consider the defendant’s conduct as dishonest.  
 
Contexts involving minority religious communities may also impact on the members of the 
jury’s perceptions of the legitimacy of certain religious practices. It is conceivable that jurors, 
who form part of majority communities may consider that certain religious claims featured in 
a s2 FA06 case are preposterous, or even abhorrent. This is foreseeable where religious 
defendants face allegations for promising to heal diseases in exchange for property, or that the 
defendant is related to religious deities. Majority views on dishonest conduct are never 
guaranteed to match up to the views of a minority community standard. Accordingly, recent 
statements made by the Court of Appeal in Wingate v Solicitors Regulatory Authority [2018],388 
that the dishonesty test is premised on accommodating values of our multicultural society,389 
should offer very little comfort for defendants in religious fraud cases. It is especially true 
 
386 Ibid. The Court of Appeal has realised this possibility, see R v Hayes [2015] EWCA Crim 1944; [2018] C.R. 
1 App. R. 10 [32] (Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd CJ). 
387 Some religions do not consider giving money as a legitimate part of religious life, see Edge (n 15) citing Lucy 
Jones, quoted at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7354089.stm (accessed 29 April 2009). See further Jeremy 
Carrette and Richard King, Selling spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion, (Routledge 2004), 6, ft 8. 
388  EWCA Civ 366; [2018] W.L.R. 3969 [93]. 
389 Ibid, [93] (Lord Justice Rupert Jackson). 
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where the defendant forms part of a minority religious community. Accordingly, the main 
beneficiaries of the new test are likely to be city traders, not multicultural groups. 
 
More generally, the Ivey test also leaves certain questions unanswered that could affect the 
ability of defendants to show they acted honestly in religious fraud cases. In the subjective part 
of the Ivey test, what facts of the relationship can be considered? Additionally, how far is the 
defendant’s subjective knowledge relevant in dishonesty analysis? For instance, what if the 
defendant intended to pay the victim back? What if the defendant made it explicitly clear that 
money would be required in exchange for religious promises before a trusting relationship 
developed? What if no other followers of the same religion have brought similar claims? In the 
Ghosh test, such considerations were relevant to the subjective limb but not the objective limb. 
It is now questionable whether the removal of the subjective limb after Ivey has shifted such 
awareness on the defendant’s part into the objective analysis, or whether it is just circumstantial 
evidence unconnected to dishonesty analysis.390 In Ivey, the Supreme Court did not consider 
this point and so it is uncertain whether courts will continue to consider such facts. 
Accordingly, commentators and courts are in flux over what the subjective requirement can 
add to the dishonesty assessment without further judicial guidance. Consequently, juries lack 
adequate guidance to inform their already difficult task of determining whether defendants 
have acted dishonestly.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, judges may go too far and wrongly inform juries what should 
not be considered when determining dishonest conduct. After the Court of Appeal decision of 
R v Hayes [2015]391 commentators were concerned about the content of Ghosh directions given 
 
390 Dyson and Jarvis (n 359), 203-205. 
391 See n 386. 
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by judges. The appeal was premised on several grounds, most significantly, how the judge 
directed the jury to assess the dishonesty of the defendant’s conduct. The judge stated what 
facts could not be considered under the objective limb, that the objective standard could not 
incorporate the conduct of people in the same industry as the defendant. The main concern of 
this decision was that the Court of Appeal did not disapprove of the direction which departed 
from the standard Ghosh direction.392 It was consequently argued that the decision gives rise 
to the possibility that similar directions can usurp the function of jurors to determine what 
ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people are.393 In formulating the requisite standard 
for dishonesty, judges may wrongly influence jurors394 who  could be “placed in a 
straightjacket, devoid of the very latitude that they have hitherto been expected to exercise.”395  
 
The extent of the problem following the Ivey test remains uncertain. Nevertheless, it could 
legitimately be argued that the test offers no safeguard from judges making a direction similar 
to the one in Hayes. This could greatly impact religious fraud claims, where a defendant might 
be prevented from showing evidence to suggest their conduct was objectively honest. In Hayes, 
the tribunal judge was considered justified in saying that the sharp practice of the defendant, 
which was generally practised by fellow members of the same sector, could not be revealed to 
suggest that the defendant was acting objectively honestly. Such a modified direction could 
foreseeably be given under the Ivey test for religious cases. Consequently, defendants may be 
prevented from showing evidence of what features as part of their religion, and possibly what 
other religions practice, to suggest that they should not be found to have acted dishonestly.  
 
 
392 Nicholas Dent and Aine Kervick, 'Ghosh: a change in direction?' (2016) Criminal Law Review, 8, 556. 
393 Ibid. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid, 557. 
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My concern seems even more likely in religious fraud cases, especially those involving 
minority religions for the reasons already mentioned. Judges are likely, but not guaranteed, to 
fear that jurors may consciously or unconsciously determine what a legitimate religious 
practice should be on their own convictions, rather than accepting the judge’s categorisation 
inspired by Article 9 ECHR and domestic jurisprudence. To guard against this possibility, 
judges risk giving more detailed directions and limiting what considerations can be taken into 
account by jurors. The concern, which may have had little justification after Hayes, still seems 
apt under Ivey and more forceful in religious fraud contexts. 
 
The analysis in this section is not definitive and will not apply universally to all religious fraud 
cases. It will only be proven on a case-by-case basis. Juries may not get as far as a dishonesty 
direction in certain cases if the actus reus cannot be proven, or that the defendant knew that 
their representation was false, or misleading. However, the new dishonesty test distinctly 
allows for the possibility that juror bias will influence decisions more readily than the previous 
dishonesty test set by Ghost. Consequently, it also raises strong objections from the perspective 
of the rule of law. A dishonesty analysis that consists of an objective element increases the risk 
that different courts will reach different verdicts based on similar facts and leave room for the 
consideration of irrelevant factors by jurors.396 Although, this statement is qualified by noting 
that it cannot be supported by any evidence,397 it seems theoretically possible for inconsistent 
decisions to be made more frequently in religious cases for the reasons listed. Undoubtedly 
jurors are more likely to feel comfortable and familiar when assessing religious practices that 
are more apparent in the collective consciousness of English society or that have received 
 
396 Hoarder (n 385), 405. 
397 Ibid. 
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public acceptance like Christian or Sikh practices, compared to religions who have historically 
been viewed negatively or with scepticism, like Satanism or Thelema.398 
 
Ultimately, the new dishonesty test creates a greater likelihood that outcomes in cases might 
not always be just; honest and sincere individuals may be found dishonest and subsequently 
guilty. Under the new dishonesty test “… a person’s deeply held conviction in their own 
honesty cannot insulate them from being considered dishonest by wider society or indeed in 
the eyes of the law.”399 In contrast, intentionally dishonest individuals may avoid liability, 
either because their conduct is deemed an honest action of a majority practice, which faces less 
prejudice generally, or because the circumstances of the representation convince the jury of 
honesty. The difference in treatment should be a real concern for the Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court now that religious fraud cases are beginning to be brought under the FA06, 
even though such cases are rare. The issue is of paramount importance to ensuring that just 
outcomes are consistently achieved. 
 
 
3.2.3. Religious defendants and sincerity of beliefs 
 
In the US, religious fraud cases are decided based on the dishonesty question, namely whether 
defendants sincerely believe in the religious representations communicated to victims, as 
outlined in chapter 2.400 The approach set by Ballard is specifically focused on sincerity testing 
 
398 The founder of this religion, Aleister Crowley was once described by the British press as the “the most evil 
man in the world,” InfoFreedomFighter ‘SATANIST Aleister Crowley ~ The Most Wicked Man In The 
World~Great Documentary,’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jsm6WI5i7p0> between minutes 2.18- 2.22, 
14 Aug 2013. First aired on BBC TV on 19 February 2002. Accessed June 2018. 
399 Matt Hall and Tom Smith, 'The Disappearing Ghosh Test,' (2017) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly, 181(42), 
756. 
400 See section 1.2. 
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rather than dishonesty,401 although the two concepts overlap. To determine how religious 
representations should be prosecuted using s2 FA06, English courts are likely to examine how 
courts in other jurisdictions, like the US, have examined the defendant’s sincerity, in an attempt 
to avoid juror or judicial bias influencing convictions. It seems likely that English courts will 
adopt a similar approach to the US for assessing the mens rea of s2 FA06. The aspect of the 
Ivey dishonesty test asks juries to look at the genuineness of beliefs motivating the defendant’s 
conduct.402 Explicit analysis of a defendant’s sincerity would help to distinguish between 
fraudsters and religious officials subject to vexatious litigation because of suspicions held by 
aggrieved former believers and nonbelievers. However, the sincerity-based approach could 
also prove problematic in practice.403 Jurors and judges may wrongly determine that 
representations are based on insincerely held religious beliefs.404 On the other hand, such an 
approach may allow defendants pretending to hold sincere religious beliefs to escape 
liability.405 Both possibilities raise concerns that defendants may abuse religious freedom 
protections or courts may unlawfully restrict the religious freedom rights of defendants. 
 
Before any specific religious fraud analysis is made, it is important to explain why sincerity 
testing is different from dishonesty testing. There are differences in context between how both 
concepts are considered and in the outcomes of negative findings. Sincerity testing determines 
if defendants believe in the religion they allege to practice. Whereas dishonesty testing 
establishes whether the defendant’s conduct suggests they lied or misinformed victims. 
Accordingly, defendants can be found insincere and dishonest. In other jurisdictions, proof of 
 
401 Ibid. 
402 Ivey (359) [74] (Lord Hughes). 
403 See Justice Jackson’s comments in Ballard on pages 43-45. 
404 Heins (n 17), 186. 
405 Ibid. 
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sincerity in criminal litigation prevents defendants from being found dishonest.406 However, in 
current domestic law, religious defendants could conceivably be found both sincere and 
dishonest. An English court may decide that a defendant who believes in their conduct by 
subjective standards nevertheless acted dishonestly according to the objective standard set out 
in Ivey. Lack of sincerity may, therefore, be sufficient for liability for s2 FA06 but will not 
always be adequate for liability. The jurisprudence of ECtHR does not specify that genuine 
religious beliefs cannot be considered dishonest in criminal contexts. The semantic distinction 
between the two concepts demonstrates why sincerity is an important separate consideration to 
dishonesty testing in religious contexts.  
 
Sincerity is very likely to contribute instrumentally to a court’s assessment of the fault elements 
considered in s2 FA06, especially for dishonesty testing under Ivey. Regulatory approaches 
based on the defendant’s sincerity have featured in domestic jurisprudence on criminal liability 
in religious cases since 1875.407 This approach was favoured over falsity testing in deception 
cases featuring miraculous claims because “Such a subject would be a very improper one for 
argument and decision in a court of law.”408 Farmer v Hill [1948]409 demonstrates that English 
criminal laws have decided similar criminal cases based on the sincerity of the defendant’s 
beliefs, rather than questioning the falsity of those beliefs. Lord Justice-General noted that 
liability for pretending to profess to tell fortunes under the Vagrancy Act 1824 was initially 
 
406 For instance, in Ballard, the USSC decided that if the defendant was found sincere in religious fraud cases, 
then they could not be criminally liable. 
407 Although not all cases favoured this approach in a range of astrology fraud cases, consider Penny v Hanson 
[1887] 18 Q.B.D. 478, per Denman J, “It is absurd to suggest that this man could have believed in his ability to 
"predict the fortunes of another by knowing the hour and place of his birth and the aspect of the stars at such time. 
We do not live in times when any sane man believes in such a power,” 480. Accordingly, subsequent chapters 
will consider the role, and the possible influence of old case law supporting a sincerity-based approach, as well 
as dissenting judicial dicta mentioned in miraculous claims that feature in deception-based cases. 
408 See Monck v Hilton (1887) 2 Ex. D. 268, 275 (Cleasby B). The case related to a Spiritualist who conducted 
seances and told fortunes in exchange for money. The defendant was tried for s4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824. 
409 J.C. 4. 
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determined through the sincerity of the defendant’s supernatural claims and beliefs.410 Despite 
being decided by a Scottish court, this judgment shows a preference for sincerity testing over 
falsity testing when English criminal laws have applied to miraculous cases. Lord Justice 
General also stated that English courts only began favouring a falsity-based test in more 
modern cases after Stonehouse v Masson [1921].411 In that decision, the court interpreted s4 of 
the Vagrancy Act 1824 to apply malum prohibitum, meaning that the conduct was unlawful 
because it was considered to be by statute.412 This applied regardless of the defendant’s 
sincerity and a lack of intent to deceive, so long as conduct fell under the wording of s4.413  
 
The distinction between the appropriateness of falsity and sincerity testing was also considered 
by English courts in civil religious claims in the past. In R v Downes (1875),414 the defendant, 
a member of the ‘Peculiar People,’ believed that medical aid was a sin and not as effective as 
spiritual aid. The defendant failed to take their child to a hospital when they fell sick and prayed 
for the child to get better. The illness eventually killed the child, and the defendant was found 
guilty of manslaughter for failing to call a doctor who could treat the illness. Lord Coleridge 
did not consider the defendant’s religious motives in relation to intention but rather focused on 
the sincerity of the beliefs and whether they were honestly held by the defendant.415 The 
defendant was found to be sincere but had intentionally, not maliciously, disobeyed the law by 
relying on their beliefs. If it had not been for the wording of the statute, the other judges agreed 
 
410 Ibid, 8-9. 
411 2 K.B. 818. 
412 Farmer (n 409), 8-9; this is evidenced by the obiter dicta statements of Darling J in Davis v Curry [1918] 1 
K.B. 109, 116-117. 
413 Farmer (n 409), 8-9; the decision in Stonehouse can be summarised by the opinion of Avory J, “The result is 
that it was not necessary for the magistrate in this case to inquire whether or not the appellants believed in this 
kind of “fantastic imagination,’” Stonehouse (n 411), 823. The majority decided that this case was one of the 
narrow ranges of criminal offences where mens rea (no need to prove an intention to deprive) need not be proven, 
823 (Lawrence J) 
414 13 Cox CC 111. 
415 Ibid, 25-28. 
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with Lord Coleridge that the case would have been much more difficult to decide because of 
the defendant’s beliefs.416 
 
The sincerity-based approach to determining the genuineness of beliefs was similarly adopted 
in nineteenth century civil law spiritual claims.417 Although there are differences between civil 
and criminal regulatory frameworks, the frequency to which sincerity was examined in these 
cases suggests the approach can work in both areas of law. This conclusion is reinforced by 
two other considerations. Firstly, the modern approach in criminal law theory and court 
judgments is premised on subjectivity, rather than objective reasonableness standards.418  
 
Secondly, contemporary cases involving questions on the genuineness of religious beliefs 
considered in the context of religious exemptions to generally applicable laws adopt a sincerity-
based approach. In ex parte Williamson,419 Lord Nicholls endorsed a Canadian Supreme Court 
ruling which adopted a sincerity-based approach that essentially replicates the Supreme Court 
ruling in Ballard.420 Lord Nicholls stated: 
“When the genuineness of a claimant's professed belief is an issue in the proceedings 
the court will inquire into and decide this issue as a question of fact. This is a limited inquiry. 
The court is concerned to ensure an assertion of religious belief is made in good faith: ‘neither 
fictitious, nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice', to adopt the felicitous phrase of Iacobucci 
J in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem (2004) 
241 DLR (4th) 1, 27.”421  
 
416 Ibid, 30 (Bramwell, B.& Mellor J.). 
417 Morris v Associated Newspapers (1932) The Times, April 1932 & Phillips v De La Warr (1960) The Times, 
July 1960, cited Edge (n 15), ft 26. 
418 Edge (n 15), 32. 
419 See n 308. 
420 Interestingly, the sincerity analysis conducted in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem (2004) 241 DLR (4th) 1, 27 
has been endorsed by the ECtHR in Eweida v United Kingdom (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) (2013) 57 E.H.R.R. 8, [42]. 
421 Ex parte Williamson (n 308) [22]. 
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In the same decision, Lady Hale declared, “The court's concern is with what the belief is, 
whether it is sincerely held, and whether it qualifies for protection under the Convention.”422 
Lord Walker also cited the Employment Division v Smith (1990),423 a US Supreme Court 
decision, which examined sincerity and the ‘good-faith’ test424 in a concurring opinion.425 
Accordingly, it seems very likely that sincerity testing will be incorporated into dishonesty 
assessments in religious s2 FA06 cases. Litigation would, therefore, follow the “religious 
reservation approach” of the majority decision in Ballard.426 
 
However, as discussed in chapter 2, US courts and commentators have questioned the 
appropriateness of a sincerity-based approach in religious fraud and exemption cases.427 
Domestic courts should reassess whether it is an appropriate approach in s2 FA06 cases for two 
reasons. Firstly, there is no real contemporary assessment of sincerity in religious fraud cases 
under ECHR428 or HRA. Consequently, it is uncertain how sincerity testing in religious fraud 
claims would fare under both pieces of human rights legislation.  
 
Secondly, there is significant disagreement between commentators about the use of sincerity 
tests generally and in this specific context, as discussed in chapter 2.429 This debate suggests 
that the approach does not necessarily provide the most principled means of determining the 
genuineness of religious beliefs in religious fraud cases and whether a defendant satisfies the 
mens rea elements of s2 FA06. For instance, as mentioned, the subjectivity of what amounts to 
sincerity can lead to adverse consequences; for example, defendants can try their luck with the 
 
422 Ibid, [76]. 
423 494 U.S. 872. 
424 Ibid, 14 (Justice Scalia) & 25 (Justice O’Connor). 
425 Ex parte Williamson (n 308) [57]. 
426 See pages 41-42. 
427 See pages 48-51. 
428 Bernadette Meyler, 'Commerce in Religion,' (2009) Notre Dame Law Review, 84(2)(9), 890. 
429 429 See pages 48-51. 
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jury430 and sincerity testing may reveal inarticulate defendants, rather than insincere ones.431 
Defendants may be considered insincere because of juror bias, rather than the evidence 
advanced by counsels for victims. Further, the approach may allow defendants to determine 
their religious freedom protections against criminal laws by using a religious cloak to dodge 
liability.432 More problematically, sincerity testing can easily give rise to falsity testing by 
jurors.433 Such a possibility will have greater force if English courts decide that the religious 
beliefs involved in cases should not be tested for falsity and the only the mens rea requirements 
should be assessed. 
 
The controversy surrounding sincerity testing in religious accommodation claims has not gone 
unnoticed in ECtHR jurisprudence. Sincerity testing is regarded as a live and practical concern 
for the European study of law and religion.434 In particular, Su declares that judges and 
commentators must go beyond an uncritical embrace of the approach; sincerity poses 
considerable challenges for courts that cannot always be overcome such as those just listed.435  
 
The problems of determining a defendant’s sincerity apply more readily to dishonesty 
assessments considered in religious s2 FA06 cases than in other areas of law and religion. The 
offence may wrongly punish defendants where their genuine beliefs are considered insincere 
and dishonestly acted on by jurors. The possible negative consequences of sincerity testing are 
felt more strongly in religious fraud contexts compared to decisions where a religious 
exemption is not granted to neutrally applicable laws. The latter sort of decision only impairs 
 
430 A possibility considered in Heins (n 17), 182. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Anna Su 'Judging Religious Sincerity' (2016) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 5(1), 30. 
433 See Justice Jackson’s comments on the difficulties of separating falsity and sincerity testing in Ballard on 
pages 43-45. 
434 Su (2016), 30. 
435 Ibid. 
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the appellant’s ability to manifest their beliefs in particular environments. In contrast, a 
conviction for s2 FA06 can lead to imprisonment of up to ten years, which would significantly 
restrict a religious defendant’s general and religious liberty. Therefore, a nuanced analysis of 
dishonesty and how sincerity-test would apply is necessary to ensure that religiously sincere 
defendants are not wrongly punished for their beliefs and religiously insincere defendants are 
rightfully convicted. 
 
Ivey makes it clear that the genuineness of a defendant’s beliefs should be considered in 
dishonesty assessments in criminal cases. Consequently, English courts must address the 
considerations discussed and consider the possible consequences of how the mens rea of s2 
FA06 could be interpreted in religious fraud cases given the concerns about sincerity testing. 
In particular, courts must be sensitive to assessments to prevent sincerity testing from turning 
into falsity testing. In turn, this exercise would also help to maintain levels of religious 
toleration on how religious institutions receive property from adherents436 and prevent 
defendants from using religious practices as a pretext and a sign of sincerity to escape liability.  
 
 
3.2.4. Group sincerity  
 
My analysis of the challenges posed by religious fraud regulation has so far focused on 
individual defendant’s liability for s2 FA06 cases. There is, however, a broader concern about 
how English courts will regulate religious fraud perpetrated by multiple parties or religious 
organisations that have legal personality. I now identify how the hierarchies of religious groups 
 
436 The ECtHR expects pluralist liberal democracies to foster religious toleration as much as possible, see Serif v. 
Greece, no. 38178/97, §53 ECHR 199-IX. 
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and institutions make it more difficult for courts to effectively identify the extent of fraudulent 
funding schemes based on false religious representations. Here I question what role group 
sincerity could have in determining liability in s2 FA06 cases. 
 
Multiple religious defendants involved in religious fraud cases may further complicate 
sincerity assessments adopted by courts in s2 FA06 claims. If senior religious figures, ministers 
and congregation members of the same religion are jointly charged for false religious 
representations intending to make a gain or cause a loss to another, it should be questioned 
whether courts would look to determine each defendant’s sincerity and liability separately, or 
would seek to determine aggregative sincerity and liability? Foreseeably, an aggregative 
approach would be implemented to test the genuineness of the group as a whole, which would 
help courts to assess the mens rea elements of dishonesty and intention. Such an approach 
would mirror what has been described as a “sociological strategy” for determining what is 
religious by courts when considering what a religious community sees as religious.437 
 
If this approach were adopted as part of dishonesty assessments for s2 FA06 in religious cases 
involving multiple defendants, several questions are raised: how can group sincerity be 
effectively tested? Must all defendants have the same degree of belief, or will official 
representatives and employees of religious institutions be expected to demonstrate greater 
sincerity? Moreover, will parties, characterised as less than full believers be treated as insincere 
by juries,438 and does this have implications on the other defendants? In adopting a sociological 
strategy, decisions may fall outside the trend in ECtHR jurisprudence which considers religion 
 
437 See Edge (n 15), 416-418 citing Ghai (n 310) [117] (Justice Cranton), Azmi v Kirkless Metropolitan Borough 
Council [2007] UKEAT/009/07; [2007] IRLR 484 & Eweida v British Airways plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80; 
[2010] 2 WLUK 376 as evidence where this approach has been adopted by courts. 
438 This question about the degree of sincerity was raised also by Justice Jackson in Ballard, see pages 43-45. 
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that religion is subjectively determined, and possibly even a solitary practice.439 Accordingly, 
courts who advise jurors to take this approach to determine the defendant’s dishonesty may be 
subject to criticisms that they are not taking their interpretive obligation under s3 HRA 
seriously.  
 
The notion of group sincerity is not, however, unique to religious fraud contexts. This approach 
is also foreseeably relevant for addressing the liability of secular organisations. For example, 
determining the group sincerity of defendants from an organisation could be looked at for sales 
assistants in high street shops promoting electrical items as “the best on the market for battery 
life.” All employees may be expected to recite the representation to customers in branches 
nationwide. Employees may be aware that this sales pitch is incorrect or misleading. 
Alternatively, employees may not care whether the product is even fit for purpose and recite 
the representation in sales pitches to meet their sales targets. In theory, the employees reciting 
this sort of false claim could be subject to a s2 FA06 claim and possibly considered insincere 
and dishonest according to objective standards by jurors if the representation is not considered 
a mere trade puff. 
 
Nonetheless, the notion of group sincerity presents greater complications in religious contexts. 
Differences exist between secular and religious contexts that demonstrates why group sincerity 
testing poses a more acute problem for religious contexts and why some believers could be 
found insincere, and subsequently guilty, without acting on fraudulent intentions in any real 
sense. Firstly, adherents may not actively choose to join or participate in religious practices. 
Participation may be expected of the individuals by their religious parents440 and the 
 
439 See Edge (n 15), 419-420 & Su (n 432), 29-30. 
440 John A. Saliba and Gordon Melton, Understanding New Religious Movements, (Rowman Altamira 2003), 81.  
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community they are part of. As a result, individuals may be pressured to attend and participate 
in religious events without truly believing in the beliefs fearful that a less than full believer will 
be shunned or excommunicated. Furthermore, individuals may fear that their family will be 
subjected to the same treatment. Religious shunning or pressuring can have particularly serious 
consequences.441 For example, Scientologists traditionally promoted the ‘fair game’ doctrine, 
whereby individuals who left the religion or were ex-communicated could be deprived of 
property or injured by any means by other Scientologists.442 In less extreme instances, 
adherents may be stigmatised and chastised by their community. 
 
Secondly, adherents may take a more agnostic approach to their faith. Adherents may consider 
that not all of a particular religion’s beliefs make sense to them or apply to them as they do to 
others. But regardless of those considerations, they do not want to risk the consequences of not 
believing at all, or of not belonging to the religion.443 An individual may conceivably adopt 
this position through fear that if they do not, they will be punished in the afterlife for a complete 
lack of faith. 
 
Thirdly, religion is often a subjective practice, and some adherents may legitimately interpret 
the same beliefs differently to other adherents.444 In turn, both an internal (members of the 
same faith) and external (members of the jury) examination of the defendant’s beliefs may 
suggest insincerity. This seems likely if one or a number of the defendants holds a particularly 
 
441 For further commentary on religious shunning and ex-communication in contemporary US cases and 
scholarship see John Witte et al, Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Religious Perspectives, 
Volume 1, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996), 219-233. 
442 See Wallerstein v. Church of Scientology, 212 Cal. App 3rd; 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1989). 
443 Many individuals in contemporary society “believe without belonging” meaning that they do not attend 
religious places of worship or event, but still take comfort from perceiving themselves as belonging to a particular 
religion, see Gracie Davie, The Sociology of Religion: A Critical Agenda, (Sage, 1st edition, 2007), 138-141. 
444 Begum (n 310) [21] (Lord Bingham) & Mark Freedland and Lucy Vickers, ‘Religious expression in the 
Workplace in the United Kingdom,’ (2009) Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, 30(3), 597. 
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loose interpretation of the fundamental beliefs of a religion involved in allegations of false 
representations that have resulted in large financial gains.  
 
Lastly, individuals may join a religion largely for social reasons to overcome a feeling of 
alienation from society445 and not because they consider the beliefs have an intrinsic value for 
their spiritual wellbeing. One possible explanation for this is that the individual enjoys the 
communal aspects of a religion and attends religious events to speak with like-minded people 
sharing the same moral norms as them. In such scenarios, defendants are manifesting religious 
beliefs primarily for community reasons to feel part of the group, not for true religious reasons. 
Additionally, in the same way described above, these individuals may not believe in the 
religious beliefs and representations, but it is questionable whether they act insincerely in a 
strong sense even when their conduct results in a religious institution receiving donations.  
 
The concerns over such defendants being found guilty of s2 FA06 are intensified if sincerity 
testing becomes the main way religious s2 FA06 claims are decided. As discussed, this could 
involve an aggregative assessment of sincerity as a principled means of establishing dishonesty 
in religious cases. However, this raises several difficulties for courts in regard to how religious 
communities influence adherents and how this impacts their sincerity and subsequent liability. 
Failingly to take account of the differences between the sorts of adherents described here 
increases the likelihood that genuine and honest adherents will not be considered to match up 
to the sincerity and honesty threshold conceived of by juries that could apply more harshly to 
certain religions. Consequently, defendants could be punished for their perspective on their 
faith and what it requires of them, rather than truly dishonest or fraudulent intentions. The  
 
 
445 Saliba and Melton (n 440), 81. 
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challenges mentioned here, therefore, compound the challenges of examining the sincerity of 





This chapter demonstrates that English courts face a number of hurdles to regulating criminal 
religious fraud cases in a principled way. Under the current understandings of s2 FA06, 
questions were raised about how courts can establish a defendant’s liability while giving 
adequate respect to their religious freedom rights. These cases are, therefore, hard cases to 
decide. Regulation of the offence presents unanticipated challenges for the FA06 and reinforces 
the weaknesses of the doctrinal and precedential understandings developed by criminal courts. 
Moreover, I have identified how English courts face unique challenges in regulating religious 
fraud. I explained how the actus reus and mens rea requirements of s2 FA06 may allow 
religious defendants to evade liability, or in contrast produce wrongful convictions. 
Consequently, decisions in cases could be unprincipled and unjust without further 
developments in legal knowledge. Engaging specifically with the religious aspects of cases 
would benefit understandings of s2 FA06 and contribute to debates on sincerity testing in 
broader areas of human rights jurisprudence. I discuss how English courts or Parliament could 
engage with these challenges in chapter 7. I show that claims involving more obvious abuses 
of religious capital resulting in financial gains can be regulated in a principled way through my 









Undue influence claims arising from religious contexts have occurred for centuries in 
England.446 Despite this, the common law doctrine does not effectively address how courts can 
determine when religious influence becomes undue. The doctrinal tests applied by courts fail 
to provide adequate guidelines and a means of considering relevant factors to decide hard cases 
of religious undue influence. In judicial assessments of actual and presumed undue influence 
in equity (the main focus of the following civil law analysis), and actual undue influence in 
probate, courts are afforded a great deal of discretion to determine when the inevitable religious 
influence of an adherent’s religious experience becomes unlawful. Consequently, the doctrinal 
tests, in particular the test for presumed undue influence, risk judicial misunderstandings, and 
the devaluing of religious practices featured in cases. On this basis, cases have been decided in 
an unprincipled way over the years. This conclusion will continue to apply under the current 
understandings of the law concerning presumed undue influence. 
 
This chapter firstly discusses how the test for presumed undue influence can produce 
unprincipled decisions on defendant liability, and secondly, explains why the challenges 
examined are practically and normatively important considerations that have typically been 
overlooked by most commentators on the doctrine, including the Law Commission. I begin by 
setting out the relevant tests for how undue influence applies in equity and probate. I 
subsequently identify a number of categories of challenges that establish why courts may find 
 
446 The earliest reported case is Norton v Relly (1764) Eden 368; 28 ER 908. The doctrinal distinction between 
actual and presumed undue influence was established in Allcard (n 6), 183. 
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that any religious influence is undue in contexts involving inter vivos gifts due to the discretion 
afforded to judges set by the doctrinal test for presumed undue influence. Some of these 
challenges stem from Ridge’s analysis of religious undue influence in Australian and English 
jurisprudence. Other challenges are new to discussions of religious undue influence that have 
not featured in judicial reasoning or scholarly commentary. The challenges now discussed 
apply most directly to hard cases of religious presumed undue influence, but they also apply to 
other presumed undue influence cases of any nature in a less troubling way.   
 
I argue that decisions made on the basis of the test for presumed undue influence risk religious 
institutions being wrongly stripped of gifts, even where they have spent the money on 
furthering religious causes previously agreed upon by the parties. Decisions may also create 
discriminatory treatment between religious practices of certain religions, which are deemed to 
take advantage of donors, and consequently, found unlawful by courts when similar practices 
of other religions are not. As a result, the current understanding of presumed undue influence 
should be reassessed and developed to produce more principled decisions in religious cases. 
 
Ultimately, this chapter sets the agenda for the discussion that follows in chapters 6 and 7. In 
those chapters I consider what doctrinal and normative options are available to address the 
common challenges of regulating religious undue influence. The analysis conducted in the later 
chapters elaborates on the specific context of religious undue influence and on understandings 






4.1. The doctrine of undue influence 
 
Undue influence is a common law doctrine of long historical pedigree in England. It has been 
described as an elusive concept,447 that no court has ever tried to define.448 The doctrine can 
only be defined by appealing to judicial dicta, rather than clear legal rules or principles. 
Accordingly, as a legal doctrine, undue influence has little substantive shape and offers very 
little guidance for judges as to how it should be understood and interpreted in cases. I now 
explain how the doctrine is considered in equitable cases relating to inter vivos gifts and 
contracts, and in probate cases concerning testamentary dispositions.  
 
 
4.1.1. The equitable understanding of undue influence 
 
In equity, undue influence is used to challenge inter vivos gifts and contracts under two separate 
categories of influence, actual or presumed undue influence. Often cases involve both claims, 
but only one category of influence can be proven. Whether the undue influence is actual or 
presumed is a question of fact, dependant on the circumstances of cases.449 In Etridge (No 2), 
Lord Nicholls described actual undue influence as: 
“…an equitable wrong committed by the dominant party against the other which makes 
it unconscionable for the dominant party to enforce his legal rights against the other. It is 
typically some express conduct overbearing the other party's will… Actual undue influence 
does not depend upon some preexisting relationship between the two parties though it is most 
 
447 Rick Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts, (OUP 2003), 378. 
448 Allcard (n 6), 183, (Lindley J). 
449 Etridge (No.2) (n 22) [13] (Lord Nicholls). 
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commonly associated with and derives from such a relationship. He who alleges actual undue 
influence must prove it.”450 
An example of this conduct involving religious relationships is evident in Morley v Loughan 
[1891].451 The defendant, a clergy member of the Plymouth Brethren, received numerous gifts 
from the claimant to use at the defendant’s disposal. At a later time, the claimant became unwell 
and the defendant became their unofficial carer. Part of their carer role was to look after the 
claimant’s finances. The defendant made similar payments to the previous gifts given by the 
claimant to his bank account, until at one point when the claimant changed their mind on the 
character of the defendant and asked for the gifts to be returned. The claimant argued that he 
had been unduly influenced by the defendant. Wright J considered that during the period of ill-
health the claimant was extremely weak, which had made his preexisting mental and physical 
difficulties worse. The claimant was considered to be “morbidly retarded”452 at this time. A 
number of factors were examined by the court, including the claimant’s health, the fact that the 
defendant received blank cheques and could write any amount of money on them, and that they 
had tried to prevent friends from seeing the claimant and later giving evidence in court.453 The 
defendant was consequently found to have had actually unduly influenced the gifts.454 
 
Religious undue influence cases have and continue to be made more frequently on the grounds 
of presumed undue influence,455 an expression of undue influence based on different principles. 
 
450 Ibid, [103] (Lord Hobhouse). 
451 Ch 736. 
452 Ibid, 752. 
453 Ibid, 754-757. 
454 Ibid, 756. 
455 Only one claim has successfully proven actual undue influence, see ibid. All other cases have argued 
presumed undue influence given the automatic of presumption of influence that applies in religious and spiritual 
contexts, see Nottidge v Prince (1860) 2 Giff. 245, Allcard (n 6); Cocks v Manners (1871) LR 12 Eq 574, 581, 
Chennells v Bruce (1939) 55 TLR 422, Tufton v Sperni [1952] 2 TLR 516, Catt (n 24), Hollis v Rolfe [2008] 
EWHC 1747; [2008] 7 WLUK 681, Curtis (n 24) & Kliers (n 24). For spiritual cases see Lyon v Home (1868) 
LR 6 Eq 655; Roche v Sherrington [1982] 1 W.L.R. 599 & Nel v Keane [2003] EWHC 190 (unreported) & Azaz 
(n 4). 
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Courts look for: 1) that a relationship of trust and confidence existed between the claimant and 
defendant and; 2) that the transaction calls for an explanation where it cannot be explained by 
ordinary motives.456 
 
If 1) is proven to exist by claimants, it is established that some level of influence existed within 
that relationship and a factual presumption of influence applies. The law has always been wary 
of certain kinds of relationships involving degrees of influence, which led to the introduction 
of automatic presumed categories of influence in select relationships. For example, between 
beneficiaries to trustees;457 between patients to medical advisers;458 and most relevantly, 
between adherents to religious or spiritual advisers.459 Where one of these presumed 
relationships of influence exists, a presumption of influence arises automatically. If a 
presumption of either nature applies, claimants establish that the transactions may have been 
influenced. Consequently, the defendant must explain why their influence was not undue under 
requirement 2). 
 
The court is then directed to see whether the transaction ‘calls for an explanation.’ Requirement 
2) is inspired by Allcard, where Lindley J first made a distinction within the doctrine between 
small and large gifts made to defendants. Where “the gift is so large as not to be reasonably 
accounted for on the ground of friendship, charity, or other ordinary motives on which ordinary 
men act,”460 undue influence is considered subsequently more likely. Accordingly, when gifts 
 
456 Etridge (No 2) (n 22), [22]-[24], (Lord Nicholls). 
457 Law Commission, Consultation Paper 231, Making a Will (2017), [7.40]. 
458 Ibid. 
459 Allcard (n 6); the relationship between a priest and his penitent was one where undue influence would be 
presumed even before Allcard, see Erlanger v The New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218 [1230] 
(Lord Penzance) & Parfitt v Lawless (1869-72) [468] (Lord Penzance). 
460 Allcard (n 6), 185. 
 129 
or contracts can be explained by ordinary motives there can be no undue influence, for instance, 
when the gift is a birthday or Christmas gift.461 
 
To discharge a presumption of influence, courts must be satisfied “that the donor was acting 
independently of any influence from the defendant and with full appreciation of what he[/she] 
was doing.”462 This is a different question from that raised under requirement 2).463 Instead, 
this requires evidence that the transacting party acted with “full, free and informed thought” 
when completing the transaction.464 Where this is shown the transaction is treated as having 
not been unduly influenced by defendants. The most common way for defendants to rebut the 
presumption of influence is to show that the transacting party received independent advice 
before completing the transaction.465 Etridge (No 2) decided that whether the presumption is 
rebutted is a question of fact determined on the evidence heard.466 If the presumption is not 
rebutted, the gift is voidable and can be set aside by claimants,467 which is the most common 
outcome in cases. 
 
Allcard is the leading example of a religious case of presumed undue influence. Both the facts 
and judgments are important to the following analysis of the doctrine and to later chapters on 
what should constitute religious undue influence in English law. In Allcard, the claimant held 
multiple positions in a religious sisterhood between 1868 and 1879. From 1871 the claimant 
donated large sums of money and railway stocks to the defendant, who led the sisterhood. The 
claimant’s money was used to further religious practices, agreed to by both parties and the 
 
461 Etridge (No.2) (n 22) [24] (Lord Nicholls). 
462 Inche Noriah v Sheik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127, 135 (Lord Hailsham L.C.). 
463 Law Commission Consultation Paper (n 457), [7.48]. 
464 Zamet v Hyman [1961] 1 WLR 1442, the phrase is frequently repeated by Lord Evershed at 1444, 1446 & 
1450. 
465 Law Commission Consultation Paper (n 457), [7.49]. 
466 Etridge (No2) (n 22) [20] (Lord Nicholls). 
467 Law Commission Consultation Paper (n 457), [7.30]. 
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railway stock was held onto by the defendant. A considerable amount of money was given 
between 1871-1874 when the claimant was a professed member. This position required her to 
take vows of obedience and poverty. The claimant subsequently renounced her beliefs and left 
the sisterhood in 1879 to join the Church of Rome. In 1885, the claimant sought to recover all 
of the gifted property totalling £10,171 on the grounds of undue influence. 
 
At first instance, the Court of Chancery examined six gifts of money made to the defendant 
after 1871 and until 1876, valued at £8,500. The claimant did not seek to recover the other gifts 
made, some of which were of considerable amount.468 Kekewich J decided that the gifts had 
not been procured by undue influence. Much focus was placed on the gifts made in September 
1871 in reaching this conclusion.469 Kekewich J considered the timing of the gifts alongside 
the state of the relationship between the parties at those stages in time.470 The most significant 
stage in the party’s relationship was found to be when the claimant initially became aware of 
the sisterhood and their vows. At this stage, the claimant had received advice from her brother, 
who was a barrister. It was held that this fact indicated that the claimant had acted without 
undue influence and had made the gifts on the basis of “intelligent intention” and external 
advice.471 The possibility that there had been changes in influence when each of the gifts was 
made was not considered at first instance. Additionally, Kekewich J did not explicitly mention 
a distinction between presumed and actual undue influence. Accordingly, the relationship was 
not subject to a presumption of influence in a strict sense. 
 
The appeal judgment decided by the Court of Chancery was limited to two gifts of railway 
stock given to the defendant in 1874. The Court of Appeal judgment created the first distinction 
 
468 Allcard (n 6), 175. 
469 Ibid, 167-168. 
470 Also highlighted by Bowen L.J. in the appeal judgment, ibid, 191. 
471 Ibid, 167. 
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in categories of influence. The Court of Chancery noted that there were two categories of undue 
influence, one that gave rise to a presumption of influence, and one now known as actual undue 
influence.472 A presumption of influence was held to have arisen in the party’s relationship 
because of the religious circumstances.473 However, it is unclear precisely at what point the 
presumption of influence arose, as little time was spent on this part of the judgment.474 It seems 
to have arisen either when the claimant first held the associate position in 1868, or as a postulant 
in 1870. The presumption of influence was subsequently applied to all gifts, although the court 
was limited to assessing the legality of railway stock gifts by nature of the appeal. 
 
Cotton L.J. submitted that courts could interfere in presumed undue influence cases because of 
public policy and not on the basis of any wrongful act committed by defendants.475 Lindley J 
confirmed that no pressure had been put on the claimant when entering into, or subsequently 
living at the sisterhood to make the gifts.476 The court found it significant that the claimant had 
not received independent legal advice before making the gifts of railway stocks and held that 
the defendant could not rebut the presumption of influence. Relief was, however, denied due 
to the time lapse between the claimant leaving the sisterhood and bringing the claim.477 
 
The main challenges in Allcard related to how can religious influence be distinguished from 
undue influence? Is it necessary to receive legal advice before gifting large sums of property 
for such gifts to be legally valid? Did it matter that the defendant did not pressure the claimant 
into making the gifts? When should a presumption of influence apply in religious relationships? 
 
472 Ibid, 171-172. 
473 Ibid, 171. 
474 Lindley L.J. explains the test for both classes of undue influence and interpretations of factors examined in 
cases without considering the real nature of presumed undue influence, see ibid, 181-183. 
475 Ibid, 171. 
476 Ibid, 178. 
477 Ibid, 172 (Cotton L.J.) 
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I discuss these and other similar challenges below I after considering the understanding of 
undue influence in probate. 
 
 
4.1.2. The probate understanding of undue influence 
In probate undue influence is used to challenge testamentary dispositions. Claims are typically 
brought by family members, other beneficiaries to wills, or those who would benefit from the 
will in a successful challenge. In this context, it is only possible to plead actual undue influence, 
which bears a significantly higher evidential standard than the equitable test for actual undue 
influence. The particulars of the test must be proven by claimants for the claim to succeed.478 
There are no other differences between the two understandings of actual undue influence. If 
the challenge is successful, the will, or a relevant section of it, is declared void and subsequently 
has no effect.479  
 
The leading authority describing the test for actual undue influence in probate is Edwards v 
Edwards [2007]:480  
“… Whether undue influence has procured the execution of a will is therefore a 
question of fact…In this context undue influence means influence exercised either by coercion, 
in the sense that the testator’s will must be overborne, or by fraud; Coercion is pressure that 
overpowers the volition without convincing the testator’s judgment. It is to be distinguished 
 
478 Ibid; this may change if the Government decides to follow the responses heard by the Law Commission, which 
will be published sometime in 2020. A consultation report was published by the Law Commission suggesting 
ways in which the two areas of law may be brought in line with one another. The Law Commission mentioned a 
statutory and flexible scheme for introducing presumed undue influence into probate. For the moment, however, 
not much more can be said about this possibility, see Law Commission Consultation Paper (n 457), 149. 
479 See ibid, [7.31]. 
480 EWHC 1119 (Ch); [2007] 5 WLUK 72. Followed in Cowderoy v Cranfield [2011] EWHC 1616 (Ch); [2011] 
6 WLUK 592 & Schomberg v Taylor [2013] EWHC 2269 (Ch); [2013] 1 WLUK 200. It is also endorsed as the 
main test for explaining actual undue influence in probate by the Law Commission Consultation Paper (n 457), 
[7.55]-[7.53]. 
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from mere persuasion, appeals to ties of affection or pity for future destitution, all of which are 
legitimate. Pressure which causes a testator to succumb for the sake of a quiet life, if carried to 
an extent that overbears the testator’s free judgment discretion or wishes, is enough to amount 
to coercion in this sense; the physical and mental strength of the testator are relevant factors in 
determining how much pressure is necessary in order to overbear the will... A “drip drip” 
approach may be highly effective in sapping the will…The question, in the end, is whether in 
making his dispositions, the testator has acted as a free agent.”481 
 
Actual undue influence is not discussed further in this thesis at any real length.482 Most of the 
challenges of regulating religious undue influence arise in equitable claims of presumed undue 
influence since probate cases of this nature are much rarer.483 Therefore, presumed undue 
influence is an area of far greater legal concern. 
 
 
4.2. What makes religious influence ‘undue’? 
 
Legal scholars continue to discuss and debate undue influence cases like Allcard.484 The 
discussion remains constant despite a reduction in cases of religious undue influence. In 2017, 
the doctrine was the focus of a Law Commission consultation paper. The Law Commission 
hinted at the great complexity of establishing undue influence in religious claims. The Law 
Commission noted that examination of the particular relationships between adherents and 
 
481 Edwards (n 480) [47]. 
482 Although I discuss actual undue influence and coercion in chapter 7 where I set out the dualist rationale’s 
conception of exploitation, see pages 255-256* 
483 See Parfitt v Lawrence [1872] LR 2 P and D 462 where actual undue influence was not found. 
484 See Richard Hedlund, 'Undue influence and the religious cases that shaped the law,' (2016) Oxford Journal of 
Law and Religion, 5(2), 298-318; Charlotte Smith, ‘Allcard v Skinner Revisited: Historical Perspectives on Undue 
Influence’ in Elisabeth Cooke, Modern Studies in Property Law, Volume 3, (2005 Hart Publishing), Chen-Wishart 
(n 23); Ferris (n 25); and the work of Ridge (n 6 and n 11). 
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religious or spiritual advisors could develop understandings of the doctrine, more generally.485 
The report also requested consultation on the possibility of the creation of a new statutory 
approach to presumed undue influence in probate, and whether this would give rise to a 
presumption of influence over a testator’s gift to spiritual advisors.486 Accordingly, the report 
demonstrates that religious undue influence is an area of concern for the Law Commission 
under the modern interpretation of the doctrine. At the time of writing, the report has not been 
published. 
 
The complexities of regulating religious undue influence have been most notably examined by 
Ridge, who is the definitive reference point in this area of law across the common law world. 
Ridge’s work offers considerable insight into what challenges arise in religious undue influence 
cases in England, as well as Australia, which I have already examined in chapter 2. Ridge’s 
work demonstrates that undue influence has a continuing role in regulating gifts made to 
religious groups and institutions, domestically and in other common law jurisdictions.487 In this 
section, I assess some of the challenges mentioned by Ridge in greater detail by considering 
more recent English jurisprudence. Additionally, I discuss some new contributions to civil law 
commentary on religious undue influence. Overall, this section demonstrates the fundamental 
challenges of regulating religious undue influence in England. In doing so, I illustrate why the 
Law Commission was correct to consider this as an area of legal concern for parties involved 





485 Law Commission Consultation Paper (n 457), [7.115]. 
486 Consultation question 38, ibid, [7.129]. 
487 A similar response has been called for in Hedlund (n 483), 317. 
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4.2.1. The grounding principle problem 
 
In chapter 2, I argued that the main challenge for correctly identifying when religious influence 
becomes undue through a principled means is determining what the correct grounding principle 
of presumed undue influence is and how well it can be defined.488 I contend that the same 
conclusion applies to the English understanding of the test in equitable and probate settings.489 
Commentators are split into four diverging perspectives on what the correct rationale for undue 
influence is. One view suggest that the doctrine is premised on ‘impaired will’ (claimant-sided 
accounts) and that the doctrine applies where claimant lose a sufficient degree of autonomy in 
transactions.490 Other commentators consider the doctrine is based on ‘unconscionability’ 
(defendant-sided accounts),491 and claim that transactions are unduly influenced by a 
defendant’s wrongful conduct. A third view proposes that the doctrine is grounded on public 
policy grounds,492 and seeks to address transactions that go against relevant policies such as 
protecting the vulnerable from victimisation.493 Lastly, some commentators combining the 
impaired will and unconscionability approaches494 submit that transactions caused by the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct, which causes another party to enter into a transaction without 
their full consent should be set aside for undue influence. 
 
 
488 See pages 69-71. 
489 Understanding the correct rationale is viewed by other commentators as a suitable way of addressing the 
challenges of regulating religious influence, see Ridge (n 6), 73-75. 
490 Birks and Chin (n 23) & Niersmans v Pesticcio [2004] EWCA Civ 372; [2004] 4 WLUK 62 [20] (Mummery 
J). 
491 Nelson Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing, (Sweet & Maxwell 2012). Some 
judges state that wrongdoing is not required, see Niersmans (n 490) [20] (Mummery J). 
492 Ferris (n 25). 
493 NatWest Bank v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 705 (Lord Scarman). 
494 Chen-Wishart (n 23). 
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The House of Lords decision in Etridge (No 2), which resulted in a restatement of the doctrine, 
failed to effectively clarify the doctrine’s rationale in a suitable way.495 To be clear, the House 
of Lords did not intend to set out a structured definition of what constitutes either actual or 
presumed undue influence. Lord Nicholls described presumed undue influence by stating, 
“The means used is regarded as an exercise of improper or "undue" influence, and hence 
unacceptable, whenever the consent thus procured ought not fairly to be treated as the 
expression of a person's free will. It is impossible to be more precise or definitive. The 
circumstances in which one person acquires influence over another, and the manner in which 
influence may be exercised, vary too widely to permit of any more specific criterion.”496 
 
However, the Lords did not stick to focusing on the free will of claimants, most likely because 
of the lack of any real definition on the concept, but also referred to the defendant’s wrongdoing 
in separate judgments. Lord Scott stated “The transaction will not be "wrongful" unless it was 
procured by undue influence. Its "wrongful" character is a conclusion, not a tool by which to 
detect the presence of undue influence.”497 In contrast, Lord Hobhouse referred to the need to 
protect individuals from “oppression” and “exploitation”,498 mentioning  that  equitable wrongs 
“…may be an overt wrong, such as oppression; or it may be the failure to perform an equitable 
duty, such as a failure by one in whom trust and confidence is reposed not to abuse that trust 
by failing to deal fairly with her and have proper regard to her interests.”499 These obiter 
comments signal that overt acts of wrongdoing by defendants may play some role in judicial 
reasoning in judgments alongside the analysis of the claimant’s consent. 
 
495 Edwin C. Mujih, 'Over ten years after Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No.2): Is the Law 
on Undue Influence in Guarantee Cases Any Clearer?' (2013) International Company and Commercial Law 
Review, 24(2), 61. 
496 Etridge (No 2) (n 22) [7]. 
497 Ibid, [155]. 
498 Ibid, [98]. 
499 Ibid, [107]. 
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The uncertainty and discretional consideration of either of the four perspectives, or a 
combination of them, by courts is significant to religious undue influence cases. By confirming 
the correct grounding principle of the doctrine and limiting how it should be interpreted, courts 
are better placed to identify the appropriate threshold of when religious influence becomes 
undue in presumed undue influence cases. This would also confirm what evidence indicates a 
sufficient degree of impaired will to determine when unlawful influence occurs500 or whether 
courts should also look for a particular type of wrongful conduct. 
 
Moreover, settling the grounding principle of the doctrine would develop a means to address 
related challenges unique to religious influence contexts discussed in the rest of this chapter. 
As a consequence of deciding the doctrine’s proper foundation, judges would have a greater 
potential to apply the doctrine in a more principled and consistent way in religious cases. I 
explain in chapter 7 why my rationale is capable of doing this, after considering the rationales 
mentioned at the start of this section in chapter 6. There I explain why these rationales are 
unable to provide justified responses to the unique religious challenges and general doctrinal 
chapters identified here. I subsequently demonstrate that Lord Nicholls was wrong to consider 








500 This already occurs on a discretionary and subjective basis, consider Laurence v Poorah [2008] UKPC 21 [20] 
(Lord Walker of Gestinthorpe). 
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Understanding the role of vulnerability policies in religious undue influence cases 
 
It has already been mentioned that some commentators consider that the doctrine is based on 
policy considerations.501 Historically, policies guided courts on how to decide cases of religious 
undue influence502 but such policies are also considered in other sorts of contemporary cases.503 
The use of policies by courts intensifies my concern about how the grounding principle 
problem of presumed undue influence should be understood generally.504 I now consider how 
policies endorsed by courts in religious undue influence cases can result in biased or 
unprincipled reasoning determinations of liability. The uncertainty over how policies should 
be used in religious cases, combined with the general unstructured and subjective nature of 
policies, risks unprincipled decisions on defendant liability. I agree that policies employed by 
courts in religious undue influence cases are neither conclusive nor sufficient to determine 
decisions.505 I now argue why relying on policies to decide cases is both practically and 
normatively inappropriate. 
 
The policy most heavily relied on by English courts in deciding early cases of religious undue 
influence related to the vulnerability of adherents.506 Courts sought to protect persons from 
exploitation in the practice of their religious and spiritual beliefs. In Norton v Relly (1764),507 
the defendant was described as an individual who “…preys upon his deluded hearers and robs 
them under the mask of religion.”508 The defendant was found guilty of unduly influencing the 
 
501 Ferris (n 25), 7 ft 42. 
502 Ibid. 
503 See for example the reference to the public policy of preventing the potential abuse of certain confidential 
relationships mentioned by Lord Scott in Etridge (No 2) (n 22), [158]. 
504 Including, do certain policies form the basis of the doctrine, or rather merely feature in judicial assessments? 
What weight are policies given by judges when deciding cases, and are they compatible with other rationales 
suggested to form the basis of the doctrine? 
505 Ridge (n 6), 86. 
506 Ibid, referring to Norton (n 445), Nottidge (n 445), Lyon (n 455) & Morley (n 455). 
507 See n 455. 
508 Ibid, 909 (Lord Chancellor). Example from Ridge (n 6), 86. 
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claimant’s gifts. A similar tone of the reasoning was applied in most historical religious undue 
influence cases.509 During the late nineteenth century courts began to find genuine ministers 
were also capable of manipulating their position to gain financially.510 In Nottidge v Prince 
(1860),511 Sir John Stuart V-C approved of the French law prohibiting all gifts by a penitent to 
his confessor or the confessor's religious community.512 Moreover, in Allcard, Lindley LJ 
stated that religious influence is the most powerful influence of all, and because of this power 
is often subtlety administered, a presumption of influence should apply as a matter of public 
policy to protect vulnerable adherents.513  
 
In these cases, English courts viewed exploitation in its general sense. The continued use of 
exploitation in this way in decisions is potentially problematic for religious undue influence 
cases. This understanding of exploitation does not provide an adequate definition or guidelines 
to help separate religious influence from undue influence. Some factual circumstances may 
suggest a severe degree of exploitation that rightfully result in findings of actual undue 
influence. However, these sorts of cases are rare. Presumed cases of undue influence based on 
subtle religious influence have been much more common. As a result, these cases require courts 
to take a more nuanced approach to the role the policies in judicial reasoning. Without doing 
so, courts may fail to see that the defendant’s conduct represents what is expected in that 
religion, which has been freely consented to by adherents, and is thus not exploitative. 
 
The use of exploitation policies may also hide a judge’s conscious or unconscious religious 
prejudices. Such a possibility is made more likely if the correct grounding principle is not 
 
509 The only exception is Parfitt (n 455). The court did not find evidence of actual influence in equity, for 
commentary see Ridge (2007) (n 6). 
510 Ridge (n 6), 86. 
511 See n 5. 
512 Ibid, 113. 
513 Allcard (n 6), 183. 
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expanded on by courts. In Norton, the court justified intervention on grounds of public policy 
and utility. However, in the judgment the Lord Chancellor frequently expressed his views on 
the practices of the defendant who was a Methodist preacher: “Men who go about in the 
Apostles' language, and creep into people's dwellings, deluding weak women: men who go 
about and diffuse their rant and warm enthusiastic notions, to the destruction not only of the 
temporal concerns of many of the subjects of this realm, but to the endangering their eternal 
welfare.”514 Additionally, in Allcard, Kekewich J submitted, “I have endeavoured, to the best 
of my ability, to treat this as a question of law, regardless of feelings which might otherwise 
sway the judgment...”515 Smith has rightly suggested that judges who explicitly attempt to 
avoid bias by saying they have in the context of justifying intervention usually suggests a real 
probability of bias.516 This view can be corroborated by comments made by Kekewich J in the 
Church Times during the trial that suggest he considered the defendant’s behaviour immoral.517 
 
Accordingly, my argument that an exploitation policy may allow judicial bias to sway decisions 
has a grounding in historical religious undue influence cases. The discretional nature of the 
doctrine and usage of policies risks bias influencing decisions, although, it is more likely to 
now occur in less obvious ways. Similar language used by judges in the historical cases would 
not be allowed under domestic human rights obligations. Nevertheless, the subjective nature 
of the policy and the doctrine’s equally subjective framework does not guard against 
unconscious religious bias negatively impacting on how a defendant’s liability is assessed.  
 
Wider commentary supports the idea that unconscious religious bias may feature in undue 
influence cases. For instance, judges typically appeal to what amounts to Christian rhetoric to 
 
514 Norton (n 455), 908-909. 
515 Allcard (n 6), 168. 
516 Smith (n 484), 136. 
517 Ibid. 
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explain community standards in undue influence claims.518 There is also commentary 
indicating that judges may use their personal views on religion to determine what is 
religious.519 There are clears dangers to this approach since judges may not be familiar with 
the religion in question and rather than taking account of differences between religions may 
homogenise religions.520 Accordingly, a judge’s perspective on the acceptability of religious 
practices and what constitutes an unlawful degree of victimisation may only match up to 
Christian standards. Such a perspective may exclude other religious perspectives of smaller 
religious communities that do not fit those standards. Consequently, this sort of conduct is more 
likely to be found to have unduly influenced gifts. 
 
Another concern on the use of the term exploitation in judicial reasoning arises because of its 
subjective nature, which has not been limited by a definition in this area of law. As a result, 
courts may lower the threshold for what it considers exploitative conduct to amount to in order 
to capture certain religious practices viewed as disagreeable or wrongly connected to religious 
worship. The subjectivity problem is compounded in religious contexts where judges view the 
practices of adherents as perverse and influential. In such instances, the threshold of unlawful 
conduct could be lowered to an unjustifiable standard capturing conduct that is not wrongfully 
exploitative or conduct where the donor’s loss of will is so minimal that it could hardly be 
considered an illegitimate loss of autonomy. Without greater clarification on the grounding 
principle, it seems that the doctrine cannot prevent these misunderstandings of exploitation 
from being made in practice. As a result of the degree of subjectivity afforded by the policy, 
and the potential for judges to lack literacy on religious practices, it seems that defendants are 
unlikely to retain gifts where this policy is considered. 
 
518 Ridge (n 6), 83-84. 
519 Edge (n 12), 404-405. 
520 Ibid. 
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The doctrine does not provide a clear understanding of the threshold between acceptable 
conduct, sharp practice and exploitation. Therefore, the usage of exploitation policies in cases 
does not capture the complex normative nature of exploitation endorsed by scholars as a 
principled means of justifying legal intervention.521 For instance, courts have not sought to 
distinguish between passive and active instances of exploitation considered in legal theory 
literature, which could help to determine unlawful conduct in cases.522 Arguably, there is some 
distinction between exploitation in the understandings of actual and presumed undue influence, 
but the tests for each category of influence do not explicitly consider exploitation. In the context 
of religious influence, passive relationships of exploitation would constitute morally wrongful 
conduct not considered by that individual as wrongful, possibly because they believe it is a 
necessary practice of their religion. Active exploitation is morally wrongful conduct intended 
by an individual to make a gain. In light of certain factors, passive exploitation can suggest that 
the degree of influence is insufficient to amount to undue influence. Alternatively, it may 
suggest a lower degree of culpability that should be considered by courts in remedying the 
claimants’ loss. Omitting to make these kinds of distinction when the exploitation policy is 
considered by courts intensifies my concern that courts are unable to principally and justly 
decide when religious influence is exploitative and undue.  
 
The argument developed in this section reaffirms why the grounding principle problem should 
be suitably addressed in order for religious undue influence to be justly regulated. By resolving 
the problem, judges will be better informed on how to decide when religious influence becomes 
 
521 See Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 4: Harmless Wrongdoing, (OUP 1988). For 
more recent criminal fraud commentary, see Jennifer Collins 'Exploitation of Persons and the Limits of the 
Criminal Law,' (2017) Criminal Law Review, 3, 169-186. 
522 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others, (OUP 1983), 204-205 & 
Bigwood (n 447), 132-140. 
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undue. Courts will also have a better understanding of how the exploitation policy should be 
interpreted to decide cases. 
 
 
4.2.2. Religious literacy of judges 
 
The level of discretion afforded to judges in deciding presumed undue influence cases raises 
another category of challenges concerning the religious literacy of judges. I now question 
whether judges really examine the subjective value of the religious beliefs held by parties and 
treat the religious contexts of claims with adequate respect when applying the test presumed 
for undue influence. 
 
 
Uncertainty over the role of independent advice  
 
The role of independent advice in presumed undue influence cases creates concerns about 
judicial religious literacy. Generally, it is not clear whether advice is always sufficient to rebut 
presumptions of influence.523 It is important to know the role of advice to establish when 
religious undue influence arises; advice concerning the unworldliness and improvidence of 
gifts may simply confirm the donor's intention,524 rather than causing the donor to reflect on 
their motivations for gifts. Two views were identified in the Australian experience on the 
function of advice in cases.525 These views also apply to the English understanding of presumed 
undue influence. View (I) considers that if the advice was given to donors, but not followed, a 
 




presumption of influence can still be rebutted by defendants.526 View (2) contends that unless 
advice is followed by donors, it is almost impossible for the presumption to be rebutted by 
defendants.527 Recent English general and religious undue influence cases do not confirm 
which view is the correct interpretation. Advice was not received by the claimants in Roche v 
Sherrington [1982]528 and Catt v Church of Scientology Religious Education College Inc 
[2000],529 which were decided on procedural aspects of law, rather than on this substantive 
issue. Similarly, the role of advice in presumed undue influence cases was not discussed in 
Azaz v Denton [2009].530 
 
The discretion held by judges to decide what role of independent advice should have on a case-
by-case basis could negatively affect presumed religious undue influence cases. If adherents 
are unlikely to accept legal advice on gifts, which seems likely in many religious scenarios, 
legal advice is unlikely to have any impact on transactions. In such circumstances, it will be 
very hard for defendants to rebut presumptions of influence. Accordingly, defendants will have 
to produce some other form of evidence to rebut presumptions of influence. Yet other evidence 
may not exist or lack the same ability to show that donors acted autonomously when gifting 
property. Religious defendants may consequently be placed in a more disadvantaged position 
because of a judge’s interpretation of what role advice has. Consequently, cases may be decided 
in an unprincipled way if view (2) is more regularly adopted by courts; absence of advice or 
ignored advice does not automatically indicate reduced autonomy. Furthermore, judges would 
overlook the religious reasons for not following any legal advice. This approach fails to 
appreciate why evidence of such advice should be treated differently compared to non-religious 
 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid, 77. 
528 See n 24 
529 Ibid. No reference is made to any independent advice heard by the donor. 
530 Ibid. 
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cases. A religiously motivated donor will have a specific worldview that may not match up to 
the views of legal advisors. The donor’s religion may even promote distrust of non-believers, 
especially concerning financial matters. Whereas non-religious donors are unlikely to share 
this predisposition. Although they may think advisors are untrustworthy, their perception of 
the advice is likely to make them consider it more thoroughly. Advice is, therefore, more likely 
to affect the decisions of these donors by making them question the efficacy of transactions. If 
judges treat both claims similarly, judges fail to see the differences in how advice is viewed 
and internalised by both the two types of donors. The result of this failure means judges may 
place too much weight on the evidence that advice was not received by donors. Consequently, 
this increases the risk that religious defendants will be found to have unduly influenced 
transactions where advice is ignored or not received, even though the influence may not strictly 
be undue because the donor’s will has not been impaired. 
 
The role of independent advice may only prove to be a limited challenge in religious cases, as 
not all donors will receive independent advice before making gifts. However, reported religious 
and spiritual cases have included legal advice.531 The issue could, therefore, undermine the 
legitimacy of the presumed undue influence test in religious cases where donors receive advice 
before claiming they were unduly influenced. 
 
 
Understanding the significance of improvidence of religiously motivated gifts 
 
Judicial literacy on religious matter can also affect the threshold question of when religious 
influence becomes undue in cases involving improvident transactions. Religious and legal 
 
531 See Lyon (n 455) and Azaz (n 24). 
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conceptions of gift-giving and the motivations for gifts may not match up in practice. The 
discretion afforded to judges by the presumed undue influence test may mean judges ignore 
how religious conceptions of gift-giving change a donor’s conception of legitimate gift-giving. 
The test risks courts finding religious defendants guilty of unduly influencing gifts, largely on 
the basis that they received a large sum of money, rather than identifying behaviour that 
signifies undue influence.  
 
The improvidence of transactions is a necessary consideration of the threshold question of 
whether gifts should be subject to a presumption of influence because they cannot be explained 
by ordinary motives.532 At one level, the threshold test makes sense; readily explicable 
transactions are unlikely to have resulted from undue influence, and thus, the presumption 
would be unrealistic.533 The doctrine is not intended to apply to commonplace gifts, such as 
Christmas or birthday gifts.534 On the other hand, the law as restated in Etridge (No 2), may be 
entirely incompatible with religious or charitable conceptions of gift-giving. I now build on 
Ridge’s analysis of Australian cases discussed in chapter 2, which demonstrated how 
improvidence and conceptions of “ordinary motives” give rise to differences in what 
constitutes ordinary motives in the particular contexts of gifts.535 
 
It not clear whether improvidence is enough for a transaction to be set aside by English law.536 
Ridge states that the only real indication of an answer is found in Re Brocklehurst's Estate 
 
532 Originally, the threshold consideration arose in Allcard (n 6). Lindley LJ made a distinction between small and 
large gifts. If the gift was large, and could not be explained by ordinary motives, this suggested a greater likelihood 
that the transaction was unduly influenced, page 185. This test later became the manifest disadvantage test in 
Morgan (n 493), 705 [A], (Lord Clyde). After Etridge (No 2) (n 22), the manifest disadvantage test was abolished. 
The threshold test now only plays an evidential role and is included within the second limb of the current test for 
presumed undue influence, see Muhji (n 495), 64. This is however disputed by some as mentioned by Muhji at 
57-58. 
533 Ridge (n 6), 83. 
534 Etridge (No.2) (n 6) [24] (Lord Nicholls). 
535 See pages 63-67. 
536 Ridge (n 6), 83. 
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(1978).537 The Court of Appeal held that a very generous gift of shooting rights over the donor’s 
property could not be set aside solely because it was improvident where no other evidence of 
unduly influencing was found.538 Subsequent decisions have considered the role of 
improvidence briefly in non-religious claims arising from carer relationships. In Langton v 
Langton [1995],539 Charles QC was concerned about an extremely improvident transaction, 
where the testator essentially placed his assets and future in the hands of the defendants.540 
Charles QC asserted in an obiter comment, 
“…that the rationale of the jurisdiction—the justice of protecting those in need of ready 
money or a similar benefit from their own folly at the hands of third parties who, being in a 
position to provide such a benefit, are in a position to take advantage of the needy—applies to 
a bargain but “does not apply to a gift, which is a different type of disposition and one where 
the donor is not by definition seeking a return.”541 
This judgment was considered in Evans v Lloyd [2013].542 Judge Keyser QC disagreed with 
the separation effect of gifts and bargains and reached the opposite conclusion.543 This 
comparison reveals that recent cases attempting to address the role of improvidence in undue 
influence cases are yet to determine the exact role it plays or what weight the factor can have. 
 
The possible incompatibility between religious and legal conceptions of gift-giving created by 
a lack of judicial literacy on the party’s religious practices could lead to two consequences in 
presumed undue influence cases. Firstly, the incompatibility may unfairly disadvantage 
defendants when rebutting presumptions of influence. Judges may consider that the value of 
 
537 1 Ch 14. 
538 Ibid, Lord Denning dissented on this line of reasoning. Cited in Ridge (n 6), 83. 
539 2 FLR 890. 
540 Ibid, 905. 
541 Ibid, 908. 
542 EWHC 1725 (Ch); [2013] 6 WLUK 637. 
543 Ibid, [52]. 
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the property gifted cannot be explained by ordinary motives without taking into account 
religious viewpoints associated with religiously motivated gift-giving. Judicial scrutiny is, in 
fact, likely to be much stricter where the donor holds strong religious beliefs or where religious 
practices are viewed as particularly severe by judges.544 As mentioned in chapter 2, the 
threshold test of what constitutes ordinary motives can be considered an extension of the 
problem identified by Bradney in how the law treats “obdurate believers.”545 Religious 
defendants are more likely to be found guilty of presumed undue influence where gifts cannot 
be explained by ordinary motives but can be explained by religious motives, which have given 
less weight by courts. 
 
Secondly, the threshold test can discriminate between the size and social acceptability of 
religions.546 Judging from the jurisprudence on religious undue influence, it cannot be said with 
any degree of certainty that there has been discrimination between faiths in domestic cases. It 
seems that all religions involved in cases have had a similarly bad experience. Nevertheless, it 
could be argued that as the reported cases relate to religions which at the time were deemed 
controversial or new to English society, there has been a degree of bias in the type of cases 
heard by courts.  
 
Past ill-treatment in religious cases may not need to be proven to support this argument, rather 
bias may still be present judicial reasoning because of the religious circumstances surrounding 
gifts. I mentioned above how there are problems with judicial fact-finding on newer religions 
and the possible role that bias has in how judges determine what is legally recognised as 
 
544 Ridge (n 6), 84. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Ridge (n 6), 84-85. 
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religious.547 Consequently, analysis of what counts as religious conduct creates a greater 
possibility that courts will wrongly find that religious influence is undue. 
 
The two consequences examined are a real possibility in cases. The ordinary motives test does 
not indicate how courts should assess the social acceptability of religious practices concerning 
gifts. Worryingly, the test gives judges considerable discretion to decide cases according to 
their views on what counts as ordinary motives in light of precedents on what constitutes 
religious and nonreligious undue influence. 
 
 
Anomalous cases of non-benefitting donees 
 
Gaining a personal benefit from gifts usually, but not inevitably, suggests a greater likelihood 
that donors have been exploited by donees. In many instances, the donee’s gain will be the 
leading motivation for their unduly influencing conduct. In most religious and spiritual undue 
influence cases defendants financially benefit from their conduct. However, in cases like 
Allcard, the defendant did not. Four of the six gifts were spent on charitable purposes that the 
claimant agreed to, and two gifts of railway stock were held by the defendant on behalf of the 
sisterhood.548 Accordingly, in Allcard, only third parties benefitted from the gifts. The 
defendant would have been found to have unduly influenced the two gifts of railway stock if 
the claim had been brought sooner, however. 
 
 
547 See pages 141-142. 
548 Allcard (n 6), 170, (Cotton LJ). 
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Cases where defendants do not directly benefit present a unique problem that arises from the 
benevolent circumstances of religious undue influence cases. In religious contexts, the motive 
of defendants who does not benefit from the gifts may be different from the motives of non-
religious defendants. Gifts motivated by religious faith may be given to support the functioning 
of religious institutions. In Allcard, the need for gifts was promoted by the defendant for 
spiritual development and to further the sisterhood’s religious and charitable causes that the 
claimant agreed with at the time of the gifts. Accordingly, it can be questioned whether the 
defendant’s conduct warranted the possibility of equitable intervention.549 Undue influence is 
less likely in these contexts compared to contexts where a defendant directly benefits or does 
not care about the claimant’s motives for transactions. It is, however, unclear whether courts 
give weight to a lack of benefit where there is a sincere religiously grounded relationship held 
between the parties. Leading contemporary presumed undue influence cases have all involved 
defendants directly benefitted from their unduly influencing conduct.550 
 
Understanding the possible role, a lack of personal benefit could have in judicial reasoning is 
significant. Equity does not exist to prevent foolish or unwise transactions,551 a maxim that has 
applied by courts for centuries.552 Equity ensures justice is achieved by recompensating those 
who have been unconscionably and fraudulently duped.553 Establishing the significance of a 
lack of benefit in presumed undue influence cases would help to ensure the principles of equity 
 
549 A transaction can be set aside even where there is no wrongdoing by defendants, see Niersman (n 490) [20] 
(Mummery J) and so for present purposes, this may weaken the current argument. However, Mummery J 
specifically mentions this where the recipient of the transaction has benefitted. Accordingly, that ruling can be 
distinguished from the current analysis.  
550 See Etridge (No 2) (n 22) where the defendants persuade the claimants to sign mortgage agreements to gain 
access to loans used for the defendant’s businesses. 
551 John McGhee, Snell’s Equity, (Sweet & Maxwell, 33rd Edition, 2015), chapter 1. 
552 “… for our laws, very unfortunately for the owners, leave them at liberty to dissipate their fortunes as they 
please, to the ruin of themselves and their families… every man may give a part, or all of his fortune to the most 
worthless object in the creation; and this Court never did, nor ever will rescind or annul donations merely because 
they are improvident…” Bridgeman v Green (1757) Wilm 58; 97 ER 22 [60] (Lord Commissioner Wilmot) . 
553 Ibid, [60]-[62]. 
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are appropriately applied. The need to understand the role of a lack of donee benefit is 
compounded in religious contexts because of the grounding principle problem; the role of 
defendant wrongdoing is not clear in practice and may be wrongly considered by courts. 
Greater clarity on both aspects would help to determine when religious influence becomes 
undue when defendants do not benefit from their conduct. In doing so, courts have less 
discretion to determine this question and are more likely to give greater respect to the religious 
practices featured in claims, and to donor autonomy. 
 
 
Just remedies in cases involving non-benefitting donees  
  
The impact of a lack of personal benefit for donees may also be relevant to remedies awarded 
by courts. In particular, what is the just remedy for claimants where the donee has not benefitted 
directly from the unduly influenced transaction? Ridge briefly comments that if a modern case 
arose along similar lines to Allcard, the most likely remedy awarded would be compensation.554 
Equity’s jurisdiction to award damages and compensation has now become widely used,555 
even though the primary remedy remains rescission.556 But what would be the correct quantum 
of compensation given the possible altruistic intentions of both parties? Would this be affected 
by the lack of benefit to the donee or the donor’s enthusiasm? Lastly, are courts likely to take 
these considerations into account when deciding the remedy, given their usual unwillingness 
to take a nuanced approach to religious influence claims in the other ways identified? These 
questions are created both by the wide-ranging discretion afforded to judges by the doctrine 
and the uncertainty of how non-benefitting donees should be treated. 
 
554 Ridge (n 6), 80 ft 68.  
555 The possibility of awarding equitable damages has been put into statutory footing in s50, Senior Courts Act 
1981. 
556 McGhee (n 551), 226. 
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Generally, the aim of equitable relief is that “each party should be returned as near to his 
original position as is now possible” and in attempting to meet this aim “equity as a court of 
conscience will look at all the circumstances and do what fairness requires.”557 Those 
circumstances can include the degree of faith of defendants if they knew that there was a risk 
of undue influence.558 Courts can thus incorporate the lack of benefit to defendants in 
assessments of the correct quantum of compensation or damages. 
 
Yet it is uncertain whether courts would give much weight to this consideration because of the 
nature of the test for presumed undue influence. In Allcard, certain factors were relied on and 
given weight by Cotton LJ when assessing the appropriate remedy if a claim had been brought 
soon, which is problematic. Cotton LJ considered that the claimant had participated in spending 
the funds, and as a result, was entitled to a more limited remedy than if they had not done so. 
However, this approach fails to recognise that the claimant could have been under the influence 
of the sisterhood at that point. This demonstrates that in religious contexts courts may have 
given weight to specific irrelevant factors, rather than focusing on more significant relevant 
ones, for example, a lack of wrongdoing or exploitative conduct. Judicial discretion afforded 
by the presumed undue influence test can, therefore, be problematic for judicial assessments of 
remedies. Accordingly, claimants may be unjustly remedied at the expense of defendants or 
religious institutions. 
 
Unique cases like Allcard raise other difficulties when courts seek to achieve a just remedial 
outcome where donees have not benefitted. Equitable rescission may become only one possible 
remedy in cases amongst a “basket of remedies.”559 Indeed, domestic courts have awarded 
 
557 Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 W.L.R. 129 (CA) [136]-[137] (Nichols V.C.). 
558 McGhee, (n 551), 227. 
559 Ridge (n 6), 80 ft 68. 
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successful claimants rescission560 and compensation,561 and have considered awarding 
damages for a personal injury caused by undue influence.562 Such a development would likely 
create problems for courts protecting defendants who identify with the interests of a religious 
beneficiary, rather than their private interests, where the rescission is impossible and courts 
choose to award compensation, instead.563 It is uncertain from the case law whether this remedy 
is able to accommodate factors such as a delay by claimants in bringing claims, bona fides, and 
irretrievable expenditure.564 More generally, it is unclear whether compensation can be 
awarded where defendants are not under a fiduciary duty because of the type of relationship 
they had with donors.565  
 
Moreover, the uncertainty identified is intensified further by the lack of understanding on the 
actual basis for relief in equity, more generally. The Court of Appeal has asserted that that basis 
for relief is unjust enrichment.566 Significantly, this basis can allow good faith defendants to 
receive a degree of protection from unjust remedies.567 However, controversy exists over 
whether unjust enrichment is the correct basis of relief in equity. The controversy is generated 
by commentators arguing that unjust enrichment cannot consistently ensure just outcomes in 
every case.568 Therefore, the extent to which the defendant’s good faith can be incorporated 
into all equitable remedies considered in undue influence cases is uncertain. 
 
 
560 Curtis (n 24). 
561 Mahoney v Purnell [1996] 3 All E.R. 61. 
562 See Azaz (n2 4) 
563 Ridge (n 6), 80 ft 68. 
564 Ibid. 
565 If there is, compensation can be awarded where the fiduciary duty has been breached, see Mahoney (n 561). 
More generally, commentators suggest that it should be awarded even where there is not a fiduciary duty or 
resulting breach, John Heydon, ‘Equitable Compensation For Undue Influence,’ (1997) Law Quarterly Review, 
113, 9. However, it is also argued that this seems problematic and difficult to justify in some cases where they 
may be no duty, which can be breached, see McGhee (n 551), 228. 
566 Hart v Burbridge [2014] EWCA Civ 992; [2014] 7 WLUK 786 [43] (Vos L.J.). 
567 McGhee (n 551), 227. 
568 Ibid, 227-228, especially ft 253. 
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Taking the two areas of uncertainty identified into account, it is plausible that courts may order 
rescission instead of awarding compensation, which they have complete discretion to do. 
However, rescission does not guarantee a just result for sincere religious defendants. The 
injustice is created by the uncertain current state of the law on remedies, and the discretion it 
affords judges. If there was greater clarity, judges would be more capable of awarding suitable 
remedies where appropriate. Moreover, the lack of clarity over the two factors listed may 
equally create an unjust result for defendants even if full rescission is not ordered by courts. 
The quantum of both could still be disproportionate to the defendant’s conduct. 
 
Further analysis into this area of law is necessary to ensure that rescission is just and that 
defendants are only required to pay damages or compensation for what is fair. If courts do not 
enter into these discussions, they will ignore the potential distinction in culpability between the 
conduct of malevolent defendants and altruistic defendants. Ultimately, this area of law would 
arguably be clearer and easier to apply if, as Ridge notes, the court in Allcard “…were able to 
lay down a strict prophylactic rule, comfortable in the knowledge that the limitations of 
rescission would mitigate harsh outcomes.”569 
 
 
4.2.3. Inappropriate interpretations of presumptions of influence 
 
Historical and contemporary religious undue influence cases suggest that the presumed undue 
influence test has led domestic courts to conflate a donor’s religious fervor with undue 
influence. The test creates the possibility that courts find relationships of sufficient influence 
between the parties where one does not exist in fact. One way this occurs is through the 
 
569 Ridge (n 6), 80, ft 68. 
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conflation of undue influence and unconscionable dealing in decisions where religious fervour 
motivating transactions is found unlawful. As mentioned in chapter 2, Ridge has argued that 
some religious undue influence cases, decided in Australia, should have been assessed as cases 
of unconscionable dealing.570 In these cases, judges have strained the interpretation of 
particular facts to fit within the presumed undue influence framework,571 instead of identifying 
that defendants have taken advantage of the donor’s religious enthusiasm.572 Ridge considers 
that English courts have also done this in cases like Tufton v Sperni [1952].573 A property 
developer was found to have taken advantage of the claimant, a recent convert to Islam, by 
selling the claimant a property on highly disadvantageous terms. The claimant believed that he 
needed to purchase the land to fulfill a religious obligation. The Court of Appeal found that the 
claimant’s enthusiasm for his new faith and beliefs made his decision to enter into the 
transaction “credulous and unbusinesslike.”574 The defendant was subsequently found guilty 
of presumed undue influence.  
 
In Tufton, the transaction was motivated by the claimant’s belief in a religious obligation. 
Consequently, it can be questioned whether it was likely that the claimant would have acted 
more wisely regardless of the defendant’s conduct. Given the force of the obligation that he 
imposed upon himself, it is unlikely that he would have done. Accordingly, Ridge is right to 
contend that the claimant’s religious enthusiasm was taken advantage of by the defendant and 
that there was not a sufficient relationship of influence for a presumption of influence to arise. 
 
 
570 Ibid, 81. For an Australian case see Hartigan (n 151) discussed in chapter 2, pages 71-72. 
571 Ibid, 82. 
572 Ibid. 
573 See n 455. 
574 Ibid, 517 (Morris LJ). 
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A second way that courts fail to account for religious fervour in relationships is through how 
presumptions of influence are understood to operate in religious contexts. In most cases of this 
nature, courts do not consider the party’s entire relationships when finding that a presumption 
of influence applies. Azaz v Denton [2009] is an example of where this has occurred. Azaz, a 
medical doctor, was interested in alternative healing therapies. In 1990, he encountered the 
defendant who told him about her spiritual practices. Later in 1991, Azaz and his wife began a 
yearlong healing course in France. Azaz and his wife later joined the defendant’s healing 
centre. In 1993, Azaz and his wife were advised by a solicitor to think carefully about moving 
to the centre and to consider whether they should give their entire savings (£100,000), to the 
defendant. Azaz replied that he and his wife had thought about it and the advice did not change 
his mind. Azaz started working at the centre in October 1992. Later in 2009, Azaz claimed that 
he was unduly influenced by the defendant on her own behalf, and on behalf of the centre, to 
gift all of his assets. The court reasoned that too much time had passed between Azaz leaving 
the centre and bringing the claim, and subsequently dismissed the case on the grounds of laches.  
 
The court’s assessment of the party’s relationship raises an important question about the 
application of the first limb of the presumed undue influence test. In religious and spiritual 
contexts an automatic presumption of influence applies because of the high degree of 
influence,575 and foreseeably because these relationships involve frequent contact between the 
parties. But was the court correct to find that a sufficient relationship existed between the 
parties in Azaz? Also, should the automatic presumption apply to gifts made over the full course 
of the party’s relationship? The facts do not mention the intimacy or the frequency of the 
contact between the parties before the gifts were made. The facts do, however, indicate that 
Azaz first had contact with the defendant in 1991. Azaz then spent roughly 12 months in France 
 
575 Allcard (n 6), 171. 
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away from the defendant. During that time, it appears he had no real contact with the defendant. 
Also, the claimant did not appear to have much contact with the defendant at the centre when 
he moved there. It is uncertain how long Azaz lived at the centre before making the gifts to the 
defendant. The duration could have been up to four months. Accordingly, it seems that Azaz 
spent little time with the defendant before his stay at the centre and during the period he lived 
there. However, the court did not examine the party’s relationships or how it changed over the 
course of its duration when each of the gifts was made. 
 
Furthermore, the facts do not reveal how the court could find that the defendant had unduly 
influenced each of the gifts to the centre made by Azaz. The court either found that a suitable 
relationship of trust of confidence existed between the two parties, where arguably there does 
not appear to be one, or more likely, the court relied on an automatic presumption of influence 
without examining whether it is justified. Whichever view was adopted by the court, the court 
was eager to find a suitable relationship without much consideration for the facts. The court 
spent a greater amount of time assessing the laches defence raised by the defendant.  
 
However, courts have not always been as willing to find suitable relationships in nonreligious 
claims where claimants are required to prove that one existed. In most scenarios, claimants 
cannot rely on automatic presumptions of influence576 but must prove that a suitable 
relationship of trust and confidence existed between them and defendants. On occasions, courts 
have taken a nuanced approach when assessing a party’s relationships in cases. In Evans v 
Lloyd [2013],577 the claimant alleged that his deceased brother gifted his farm to the defendants, 
his employers, on the basis of undue influence and unconscionability. The donor had lived and 
 
576 For the categories of automatic presumptions of influence see page 129. 
577 See n 442. 
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worked on the farm for sixty-five-year. He inherited this property and later gifted the property 
to the defendants, after which he continued working on the farm. The court dismissed the claim 
on the basis that no undue influence was found. The court reached this decision even though 
the donor had always lived on the farm and did not have much contact with the outside world. 
(Interestingly, the court’s perspective of this fact is at odds with the treatment of the claimant’s 
isolation from the outside world in Allcard.578) Judge Keysler QC submitted: 
“That the relationship between Wynne and the Lloyds was extremely close is beyond 
doubt. So too is the fact that it was characterised by mutual love and trust… It is also true that 
he depended on them for his accommodation, food and transport and, by the age of 70, was not 
equipped to live independently. However, these matters do not in my view establish dependence 
in the relevant sense …579 I agree with Mr Jones's submission that the evidence in the present 
case does not indicate that in a relevant sense Wynne was in a relationship of dependence 
towards the Lloyds, or they had ascendancy over him, or his position vis-à-vis them was 
vulnerable, or he reposed trust and confidence in them in respect of the management of his 
affairs...580 It is for the claimants to prove the factual basis of their case, and I do not find that 
basis established by the evidence. That it is not established is also suggested, first, by the 
improbability that thoroughly decent people created such a relationship of ascendancy over 
Wynne and, second, by a consideration of the reasons for the gift.”581 
 
This reasoning raises another question concerning religious undue influence cases, what is the 
significance of a donor’s religious fervor to relationships of influence? Cases like Evans 
suggests that a donor’s enthusiasm for making gifts is a relevant factor for judges in decisions. 
But as noted above in cases like Tufton and Azaz, the court did not consider the claimant’s 
 
578 Allcard (n 6) 190 (Bowen L.J.). 
579 Evans (n 422), [58]. 
580 Ibid, [59]. 
581 Ibid, [60]. 
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enthusiasm for making gifts to the defendants which were motivated by religious faith. Courts 
usually treat the religious and spiritual contexts as determinative for the presence of undue 
influence. I have already shown how this takes place in limb one of the presumed undue 
influence test when automatic presumptions of influence apply. In the presumed undue 
influence test, there is no specific mention of the role of enthusiasm in relationships of 
influence. Consequently, the donor’s enthusiasm is purely a discretional factor in cases that 
may or may not be considered by courts. Accordingly, the general guidance for courts on how 
presumptions of influence arise in religious contexts affords judges a great deal of latitude in 
establishing a sufficient relationship, regardless of the defendant’s relationship with the donor 
over time. This has led Ridge to question:  
 “…what of those cases where the relationship is not the prime motivation for the weaker 
party's transaction, but rather the reason is their own religious convictions? Is there any need 
for equitable protection, and if so, is undue influence the appropriate doctrine?”582  
 
The justness of intervention in Tufton, Azaz, and other scenarios involving a degree of religious 
or spiritual fervour, is therefore open to scrutiny. In circumstances such as Azaz, a mutual 
relationship that appears to have been motivated by altruistic motives resulted in a large gift. 
This scenario does not seem the correct basis for just equitable intervention, at least for undue 
influence for two reasons. Firstly, the centre owned by the defendant was legally registered as 
a charity. Large gifts made by individuals are not unusual in charitable contexts. In 2015 the 
largest single donation in the UK from an individual given to a charity was £60.75m, the second 
largest was £42.88m.583 Judge Keysler QC, in Evans, echoes this by noting: 
 
582 Ridge (n 6), 81. 
583 Coutts, ‘2016 Report: UNITED KINGDOM, The Number of £1m+ Gifts Increases by 19%,’ 
<http://philanthropy.coutts.com/en/reports/2016/united-kingdom/findings.html> (Accessed May 2018); this 
money may not be gifted on a purely individual level.  The money could have been generated by fundraisers 
hosted by the donator. For present purposes, it nevertheless demonstrates my point. 
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“The fact that the nature of the transactions—a gift of practically all one's property—
is highly unusual does not mean that they cannot be accounted for in terms of normal human 
motivation; it merely illustrates that the circumstances of cases are almost infinitely various 
and that this is an unusual case. I would reject any contention that Lindley LJ's dictum in 
Allcard v Skinner… means that gifts of a certain size or amounting to a certain proportion of a 
person's wealth ipso facto are inexplicable by normal human motives.”584 
Consequently, the considerable size of gifts made to the defendant in Azaz can also be 
explained by ordinary motives. 
 
The second reason to suggest why equitable intervention may not always be justified concerns 
how individuals act and moderate their behaviour in a pluralistic and interconnected society. 
A constant part of life for many is to consciously assess and reflect on personal beliefs and 
judgments. This normally results in changes in values and views. Even if we are not aware of 
this occurring, our environment and circumstances will usually have some impact on our 
decision-making processes. Applying this to Azaz, it seems unjust to allow a claim to be 
brought where the claimant’s enthusiasm for alternative healing existed before meeting the 
defendant, who then subsequently allowed this practice to occur to the intensity to which he 
desired. Moreover, as already noted, there is no mention of impaired consent, exploitation or 
any real relationship of influence between the parties. Consequently. it can be questioned if 
Azaz is actually an example where the claimant’s enthusiasm for the practices reduced and this 
caused him to slowly reassess and change his beliefs on alternative healing. It seems that this 
process occurred extremely slowly since the claim was brought six years after the claimant left 
the centre. Yet, the court omitted to consider whether this was a motivation for the claim. 
 
584 Evans (n 422) [63]. 
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I am not suggesting here that the conduct of the claimants in Tufton and Azaz is the only factor 
contributing to findings of presumed undue influence, and that the defendant is entirely 
innocent (it may be argued that it was merely a sharp practice within commercial spheres585). 
However, there seems to be a legitimate distinction between two kinds of claimants that this 
analysis draws out, which has gone unnoticed or deemed insignificant by courts. Firstly, 
vulnerable or elderly individuals are taken advantage of because of the particular characteristics 
they possess.586 Secondly, an enthusiastic believer devoted to religious, or spiritual practices 
seeking to please either a minister, or deity, who is possibly influenced by the attendance to 
religious institutions, or not actively influenced by other adherents. The latter group is most 
apparent where the donor thinks that their faith imposes upon them a moral obligation to fulfill 
certain transactions, as in Tufton. It is not just for claimants to be able to rely on equity to 
intervene in similar claims in this scenario. The influence is an inevitable consequence of 
following a particular religion, the degree of which will evidently not always be unlawful. 
Additionally, the conduct experienced by adherents in such scenarios is either what they 
believed was expected of them by their faith or what was typical of their religious beliefs. 
 
Resolving how courts may restructure assessments of presumptions of influence and donor 
enthusiasm is important, especially in a modern consumerist society, where individuals have 
widespread access to goods, services and ideologies. Courts should not simply find some form 
of relationship between the parties and rely on automatic presumptions of influence to satisfy 
 
585 Courts have recently drawn a line between undue influence and sharp practice, see Libyan Investment 
Authority v Goldman Sachs International [2016] EWHC 2530 (Ch); [2016] 10 WLUK 301 where Rose J stated 
“Having considered all these factors, I am not satisfied that the relationship that developed between the two 
parties crossed the line from being a strong, cordial business relationship between a buyer and a seller of 
financial services to being the kind of relationship of trust and confidence giving rise to a duty of candour and 
fairness on the part of the bank to its client, [278]. The commercial context of the arrangement could, however, 
have been a significant factor in the case as opposed to a contractual arrangement between Tufton and the 
defendant where it is likely that he had less knowledge of contractual arrangements. 
586 For instance, in the successful claim of Hackett v Crown Prosecution Service [2011] EWHC 1170 (Admin); 
[2011] 5 WLUK 172 where the donor was “deaf, dumb, barely educated and illiterate” [54] (Silber J). 
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the first limb of the test, as considered in chapter 2 in the US experience of regulating undue 
influence.587 Courts should be required to examine the state of the party’s relationship for each 
gift made to see if it was one of sufficient trust and confidence. If courts continue to apply the 
current test without giving greater focus to the nature of religious relationships and the role of 
donor enthusiasm, equitable intervention in presumed religious and spiritual cases of undue 
influence will often be unjust. In practice, courts may merely find in favour of former 





In this chapter, I have discussed the most pressing challenges relating to how religious undue 
influence can be effectively regulated by the test for presumed undue influence. I have shown 
how English law shares common challenges with the regulatory approaches of Australia and 
the US. The main challenge identified in all three jurisdictions was the grounding principle 
problem. The understandings of presumed undue influence discussed do not provide clear 
answers to determine how hard cases of presumed religious undue influence should be decided. 
Instead, courts are left with discretion to decide a defendant’s liability on the basis of a vague 
account of what constitutes impaired consent. I have reinforced my view in this chapter that 
this discretion risks unprincipled reasoning and decisions on liability. In particular, I have 
identified how the English test for presumed undue influence does not require courts to take 
account of religious reasons for gifts or religious community norms on gifting. Instead, the law 
uses policies to determine what constitutes ordinary motives for gift-giving and whether 
presumptions of influence can be rebutted by defendants. 
 
587 See pages 74-76. 
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Changes to the presumed undue influence test must be made by English courts to ensure firstly, 
that the religious contexts of cases are given adequate respect and secondly, that judgments are 
based on defined principles rather than public policies or a judge’s own conception of 



























My analysis of the two different legal wrongs examined in chapters 2, 3 and 4 reveals 
commonalities in the sorts of religiously influential relationships involving gift-giving that 
have been subject to legal challenges. These are: (1) gifts or donations to religious officials are 
unilaterally given by donors; (2) there is a temporal exertion of the victim’s or claimant’s 
autonomy at the time of transactions; (3) victims and claimants agree to participate under 
religious beliefs, rules or lifestyles for a temporal period; (4) the nature of the religious 
relationship between the parties involves some degree of influence exerted by religious 
officials; (5) donors have a free choice to leave religious orders or change their beliefs and; (6) 
donors later realise a detriment or loss of property upon leaving a religious order or changing 
their beliefs. 
 
I now demonstrate that my separate analysis of criminal and civil law oversimplifies some of 
the challenges of regulating gifts motivated by religious faith. I argue that there are challenges 
of greater generalisation in regulating religious influence and multiple common challenges 
feature in both areas of English law considered in religious contexts. (Foreseeably, the common 
challenges identified also have greater application to other areas of law not considered in this 
thesis, including contract,588 tort,589 and wider aspects of property law.590) The following 
discussion selects the most pressing aspects of the common challenges with regulating religious 
 
588 This includes misrepresentation, mistake, duress and the developing usage of good faith in domestic 
jurisprudence (it has not yet been accepted as a fundamental principle of domestic contract law), see Roger 
Brownsword et al, Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context, (Dartmouth 1999). 
589 Namely, the tort of deception, for commentary see Jenny Steele, Tort Law: Cases, Texts and Materials, (OUP 
2017), 98-101. 
590 For example, unconscionable conduct, duress, misrepresentation.  
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fraud and undue influence through English law. I reemphasise that there is a lack of judicial 
understanding of particular elements of offences and the relevance of factors in litigation 
involving either of the legal wrongs. I focus on the grounding principle problem, defendant-
centered and claimant-centered challenges. I examine how courts can effectively identify 
defendants and whether courts take account of changes in religious beliefs and relationships 
motivating gifts to religious institutions or officials. Ultimately, my analysis bolsters my 
argument that the challenges identified risk unprincipled outcomes in both areas of law for 
victims, claimants and defendants. I reaffirm how understandings of the concepts fundamental 
to the operation of s2 FA06 and presumed undue influence must be reassessed for courts to 
justly decide defendant liability in religious cases. 
 
 
5.1. Understanding the grounding principle of both legal wrongs 
 
Determining when religious influence becomes undue or fraudulent has been an overarching 
challenge of my analysis in the previous chapters. Following current understandings of both 
legal wrongs, it is not clear how courts should interpret the wrongs to determine the liability of 
religious defendants. In the civil context, I termed this the grounding principle problem.591 In 
chapters 2 and 4, I discussed the diverging views of scholars on the correct rationale of undue 
influence. I also considered how the impaired will rationale accepted in each of the three 
jurisdictions is vague and does not really assist practical determinations of when influence 
becomes undue.592 The problem has existed in scholarship for many years and remains 
 
591 See pages 135-143. 
592 See chapter 2, pages 68-72 & chapter 4, pages 135-143. 
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disputed.593 I also considered how different policies, such as exploitation and vulnerability are 
relied on by English courts, in particular, to help decide religious and nonreligious cases.594  
 
In Chapter 4, I considered that developing a means of addressing the grounding principle 
problem would have a significant practical impact on how English courts could address the 
legal challenges discussed.595 The necessity of this task was shown by the general inability of 
courts to effectively and consistently address the challenges arising in religious cases. I stated 
that English courts could not address the challenges by simply appealing to judicial reasoning 
on relevant matters found in other precedents. As a result, assessments of liability could be 
moved by judicial attitudes on the defendant’s religious beliefs and practices. A more 
developed rationale for undue influence would help to reduce the degree of discretion afforded 
to judges engaging with factors and determining the outcomes in hard cases of presumed 
religious undue influence.596 In turn, this would also reduce the potential that religious bias can 
unconsciously motivate judgments.  
 
The grounding principle problem is a particularly challenging issue; it concerns aspects of 
doctrinal law and jurisprudential understandings of concepts, such as autonomy and 
exploitation, and their limits. In chapter 2, I highlighted that the US had long since confirmed 
that undue influence is based on the claimant’s free will and whether it had been impaired.597 
Despite the long-time acceptance of this rationale in US law, my analysis identified that 
religious influence still posed considerable questions on how the rationale applies in practice. 
 
593 See pages 136 & 180 n 624. 
594 See pages 82-83. 
595 See pages 135-138. 
596 A similar need was identified and explored with the duty to make restitution for being unjustly enriched, Prince 
Saprai, ‘Unconscionable Enrichment?’ in Robert Chambers et al, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust 
Enrichment, (OUP 2009), 417-436. 
597 See page 57. 
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Many of these challenges were also present in my analysis of Australian and English 
understandings of presumed undue influence. This suggests that even with an allegedly clear 
understanding of the doctrine’s rationale, challenges still arise in religious contexts in regard 
to how courts can effectively determine when religious influence becomes undue. 
Consequently, it is not sufficient to just determine the doctrine’s general rationale to address 
these challenges. A rationale must be developed by focussing specifically on the challenges 
identified in religious contexts. I explore what this would look like in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
The grounding principle problem is also relevant to regulating religious fraud using s2 FA06, 
although it does not feature explicitly within the criminal literature in much detail.598 The 
problem of deciding how far s2 FA06 should be interpreted was explored in chapter 3 
concerning falsity testing, dishonesty assessments and more generally, how courts can 
correctly identify defendants in religious structures.599 The grounding principle problem has 
equal significance to the regulation of all claims of s2 FA06 regardless of whether they are 
religiously grounded.600 Accordingly, providing a means of addressing these challenges would 
provide greater clarity on the scope of the statutory wording and the offence’s justified 
boundaries. Arguably, there is a greater need for this in religious cases because of the religious 
freedom dimension. This feature of religious cases requires that attention is paid to the possible 
violations of Article 9 ECHR, depending on how s2 FA06 is interpreted by courts, and to the 
potential that juror bias may have an influence on convictions. 
 
Theorising both legal wrongs would help to ensure the challenges identified in this thesis can 
be considered and addressed in a principled way by courts. For religious undue influence, this 
 
598 See Collin’s theorisation of s4 FA06 (n 521), 167-184. 
599 See pages 88-123. 
600 Collins has called for more attention to be paid to theorising other s1 FA06 offences, see Jennifer Collins, 
'Fraud by Abuse of Position and Unlicensed Gangmasters,' (2016) Modern Law Review, 79(2), 513-523 & n 51. 
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task is long overdue and is one that courts have had the opportunity to address but have failed 
to do. Accordingly, in light of decisions in the last ten years, and the global growth of cases, 
now is the time to develop a suitable domestic response. In doing so, this will help to reduce 
the possibility that criminal regulation of religious fraud will mirror the problematic historical 
regulation of religious undue influence. 
 
 
5.2. Common defendant centered challenges 
 
A common practical problem posed by regulating both religious fraud and undue influence is 
how English courts can identify defendants from genuine adherents manifesting the same 
religious practices. I call this the ‘identification problem.’ In chapter 3, I considered whether 
group sincerity would be used in s2 FA06 cases to help single out insincere individuals using 
religious beliefs and internal structures to hide fraudulent intentions.601 This discussion pointed 
to the concern that genuine religious believers may be found insincere and that racketeers may 
be found sincere by juries. The mens rea requirements may not limit which religious officials 
or congregation members are susceptible to claims because of the risks of dishonesty 
assessments discussed.602 A jury’s assessment of a defendant’s mental state may not act as an 
effective filter in practice, as was clearly intended by Parliament. Accordingly, genuine and 
honest adherents may be wrongfully convicted of s2 FA06.  
 
In the civil context, the identification challenge was touched on in relation to how automatic 
presumptions operate in religious contexts and how courts take account of a donor’s religious 
 
601 See pages 118-123. 
602 Ibid. 
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enthusiasm for making gifts to religious institutions or officials.603 The law recognises that 
religious influence is particularly strong and might be abused by officials for financial gain604 
and so automatic presumptions of influence are imposed in relationships between religious 
advisors and adherents.605 It is unclear how the equitable understanding of presumed undue 
influence differentiates between direct and indirect sources of influence that give rise to gifts. 
Consequently, it is questionable which parties should be susceptible to single influence claims 
instead of third-party influence claims where one party is aware or should be aware of other 
parties’ unduly influencing conduct and fails to prevent the conduct or to take appropriate steps 
to do so.  
 
The Australian case of Khan is of some assistance to this point. In Khan, an Imam acted as a 
mediator for the parties disputing the contract to sell a property. The claimant did not argue 
that he had unduly influenced the transaction.606 Instead, it was argued that the defendant 
unduly influenced the transfer because they knew what impact the Iman’s attendance would 
have on the claimant. (It is also likely that a claim was not brought against the Imam as they 
did not benefit from the transaction, which suggests, but does not guarantee that the Imam had 
no interest in the property and acted purely on religious motives.) 
 
However, the reasoning of decisions is likely to be different where claims are made against 
multiple religious parties, some of which are acting officials and others are simply adherents 
of the same faith. For example, consider congregation members, who alongside a minister, 
whip adherents into a state of passion viewed by all as a euphoric experience at the time, and 
this causes some adherents to donate large sums of money. Here, the gifts are made to the 
 
603 See pages 98-111. 
604 Allcard (n 6) 183 (Lindley L.J.). 
605 Ibid. 
606 For the facts of the case see page 79. 
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religious minister, but the sources of influence stem from both congregation members and the 
minister. Therefore, who has influenced the donors? Should both parties be treated as 
influencers? Both parties are highly influential on the donor’s reasons for the gifts and could 
foreseeably satisfy a presumption of influence; the minister would do so automatically, and 
certain congregation members could have a suitable relationship of trust and confidence with 
the donors.607 Also, the transactions are spontaneous and large, so they are unlikely to be 
explained by ordinary motives.608 This scenario becomes even more complicated when senior 
religious officials also have a role in promoting the beliefs motivating donations. An automatic 
presumption of influence would also likely apply to religious officials in these circumstances. 
Accordingly, courts would be required to determine if any of the parties could rebut the 
presumption of influence. 
 
The only similar English case of religious undue influence involving multiple parties alleged 
to have unduly influenced a transaction is Kliers v Schmerler & Anor [2018].609 The claimant 
argued that their parents and relatives unduly influenced their decision to sign a mortgage 
agreement. The influence was claimed to have been supported or at least initiated by the Rabbi 
of the claimant’s Hasidic community. The influence was described as patriarchal and 
commonly found in this “dominant community-led culture.”610 The influence experienced by 
the claimant was considered an inherent part of the sect.611 The court held that the claimant’s 
father and other parties had unduly influenced her to consent to the mortgage agreement by 
promoting what the Rabbi believed should be done. Actual undue influence and presumed 
 
607 For the test requirements see page 128. 
608 Ibid. 
609 See n 24. Several other claims were also made. A procedural claim was made on the grounds that witnesses 
should be cross-examined, a claim was made for a debarring order against another defendant (Mordechai), and 
an illegality claim was made against Mr Kliers to explain why he was the sole legal owner. 
610 Ibid, [68] (Mr M H Rosen QC). 
611 Ibid, [92]. 
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undue influence were considered by the court. The judge commented on the degree of pressure 
exerted on the claimant by her father and “others”, which suggests that actual undue influence 
was found. But it is not clear whether the test applied by the court was presumed or actual.  
 
Kliers does not make it clear what other parties, other than the claimant’s parents, unduly 
influenced the claimant. Additionally, the decision does not explain why the Rabbi was not 
also a defendant. The reference to “others” when describing relevant parties seems to cover 
family members, community advisors and religious leaders. Pragmatically, this makes sense 
as these parties were not defendants in the case. However, the court could have made it clearer 
what parties were involved in the unduly influencing conduct in the lead up to the agreement 
and how those parties had or had not influenced the claimant to enter into the agreement. Such 
a discussion would have helped to differentiate between lawful and undue forms of religious 
influence when one party relates the religious advice of other influential parties. This 
determination is also significant to understanding when religious influence becomes undue if 
it is decided that those who unduly influence transactions need not benefit from transactions.612 
 
The equitable test for presumed undue influence ultimately requires greater clarity on how to 
determine undue influence in relationships involving multiple parties that influence a donor’s 
motivations for gifts. Developments to current understandings would help to establish what 
constitutes more direct sources of influence, which in turn would reduce the risk of 





612 Discussed on pages 150-151. 
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5.3. Common claimant centered and defendant centered challenges 
 
Another common challenge of regulating religious fraud and undue influence touches on both 
claimant centered, and defendant centered challenges. The understanding of temporality is 
important to how defendants, claimants, and victims view their conduct over the full course of 
relationships, and how this is accounted for by the relevant laws mentioned. Assessing how 
relationships and influence may change over time is imperative to effectively distinguishing 
between lawful and unlawful religious influence.  
 
More specifically, temporality as a claimant centered focus is relevant to understanding when 
unlawful influence produces a gift; undue influence may motivate some gifts made to 
defendants but not all, especially in religious relationships which typically last for long periods. 
In Allcard, the party’s relationship lasted for eight years and in Azaz the parties were in contact 
for twelve years. During lengthy relationships, the donor’s circumstances are highly relevant. 
At times, donors may rely more on religious communities due to changes in their 
circumstances. Additionally, donors may inherit large sums of money or property, which 
allows them to make gifts to religious institutions and individual officials more frequently at a 
later stage in relationships. On the other hand, at other times, adherents may distance 
themselves from their faith or may fall on hard times and not have the disposable income to 
make the donations they would like to make to religious institutions. Accordingly, what is an 
improvident gift for a donor on one occasion may not be on a different occasion. 
 
Temporal considerations are relevant to other aspects of presumed undue influence cases. For 
instance, in regard to the role of independent advice and how this may alter over time when a 
donor’s circumstances change. Changes may subsequently make gifts more unwise or the 
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promised benefit of the gift may seem less likely. Temporality is also relevant to determinations 
of when undue influence wears off and donors act freely. A greater understanding of how 
changes in influence and relationship affect influence would enable courts to determine 
whether the claimant has left too long between the unduly influencing conduct and bringing a 
claim. Consequently, a greater focus on temporal considerations when addressing the claimant 
centered challenges of regulating religious undue influence would reduce the likelihood that 
the doctrine can be used as a generous returns policy at a later date for gifts motivated by faith. 
 
The temporal focus of my undue influence analysis also touches on defendant centered 
challenges. It is relevant to understanding if defendants must benefit from their unduly 
influencing conduct and whether the benefit must be immediate, or whether it can subsequently 
occur indirectly through how the institution uses gifted property. Additionally, the theme of 
temporality was present in my discussion on the identification problem mentioned above and 
in more detail in chapter 4. Courts need to take account of how influence changes over time 
where presumptions arise automatically in religious contexts. It may be appropriate for certain 
gifts to be severed from presumptions of influence where changes in influence or relationship 
have occurred. This would mean that certain gifts would be challenged for undue influence. 
Alternatively, a claimant could make a claim against another religious party who they had a 
sufficient relationship of influence with and had motivated their gifts. Accordingly, on a better 
understanding of presumed undue influence, it may be more justified for claims to be brought 
against multiple parties, including ministers or fellow adherents, rather than one minister where 
gifts are made over time.  
 
Despite the criminal law’s familiarity with temporality, defendant centered challenges were 
identified in relation to how the mens rea of s2 FA06 applies to religious fraud cases. I 
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mentioned how difficult it will be to prove that defendants know that their religious 
representations are false, misleading, or might be either.613 This examination involves courts 
considering how a defendant’s knowledge may have changed over time. For example, where a 
religious representation promising better health does not come true for one adherent, should 
defendants reveal to other adherents that the representation is false or might be? Similarly, 
should defendants subsequently question and disclaim other representations founded on the 
same beliefs for falsity? Answers to these questions would have a significant impact on the 
actus reus assessment of whether the representations are false or misleading. However, courts 
should be careful about how far they require religious officials and adherents to question the 
truth of their beliefs. Changes in knowledge of religious beliefs and the consequences of 
representations would impact dishonesty and sincerity assessments. Juries may question how 
a minister could honestly believe in their representations when on occasions the representations 
do not come to fruition, which could mean they stray into falsity testing. The jury’s assessment 
of the mens rea requirements is even more troublesome when the representations are alleged 
to be true by some adherents and not by others over time.  
 
My concern about how courts understand temporality and changes in religious influence 
largely stems from the uncertainty about what the correct rationale is for both legal wrongs. In 
the civil context, greater conceptual clarity must be developed to understand the role of 
causation and influence over time. In the criminal context, a greater understanding of 
temporality would affect how courts consider defendant knowledge and determine whether 
they acted dishonesty and sincerely when making religious representations. This could also 
have significant consequences on the actus reus assessment in religious fraud cases, as it would 
 
613 See pages 86-93. 
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open up the possibility of showing that defendants consider that some of their religious 





In this chapter, several common challenges were identified in both areas of law. The purpose 
of this was to consider how widespread and divergent the challenges are and to explain the 
possible implications of them for effective legal regulation of religious influence. The common 
challenges apply across different sub-disciplines of law. The claimant centered, and the 
claimant and defendant centered challenges examined are ripe for analysis due to the numerous 
adverse consequences that could be experienced by defendants, claimants and victims. 
 
It is clear that there is no principled way of addressing these challenges using current laws. 
This is not purely the fault of English courts and Parliament. In the criminal context, there have 
been no reported cases involving religious contexts under the contemporary fraud framework. 
The unreported case of Phillips is unhelpful for assisting the analysis of the challenges 
identified. The dismissal of the case merely reveals how courts are extremely uncomfortable 
with regulating such a controversial area of conduct using the FA06. Similarly, modern 
religious undue influence cases are currently in a lull and those that have been heard by courts 
have produced little reasoning that engages directly with the specific challenges considered in 
this thesis. Without a suitable basis to inform how courts should address these issues, the law 
will continue to produce unprincipled outcomes in religiously grounded cases. Consequently, 
it is clear that doctrinal and remedial clarity must be developed to allow the law in both areas 




Chapter 6: Evaluating Undue Influence Rationales in Religious Contexts 
 
6. Introduction  
 
In this, and the next chapter, I look at how jurisprudential and legal theory scholarship can 
inform the understanding of both legal wrongs examined in this thesis and reduce the effects 
of the legal challenges examined in part I. My use of this methodology is instrumental to the 
overall contribution of this thesis because: 
“Primarily, [legal theory seeks] to clarify the means by which the law expresses and 
attains the resolution of controversy. From which follows the role of illuminating within the 
continuing practice of the law the potential directions which that resolution might take, and 
within the past practice of the law the alternative directions which that resolution might have 
taken.”614 
My use of legal theory addresses each part of this quote, as the methodology enables me to 
satisfy my aim of establishing what should constitute religious undue influence and religious 
fraud, in the hope that regulation in England becomes more legitimate. By considering the 
jurisprudential debates surrounding both areas of law, I establish how the law can be better 
understood in a way that balances the intended aims of the legal wrongs with the variety of 
interests held by defendants, victims and claimants. 
 
 
614 Andrew Halpin, ‘The Methodology of Jurisprudence: Thirty Years off the Point,’ (2006) Canadian Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence, 19(1), 91. 
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I begin my jurisprudential analysis by discussing existing arguments of what constitutes 
presumed undue influence. In the following analysis of this chapter, I do not discuss s2 
FA06.615 I pick up this assessment and apply my rationale to the offence later in chapter 7.616 
The current chapter assesses the different rationales for undue influence developed by leading 
theorists within the field. I focus on the three most frequently discussed, and arguably leading 
rationales:617 Birk’s and Chin’s impaired will account;618 Bigwood’s wrongdoing as 
exploitation account;619 and Chen Wishart’s hybrid account of relational autonomy grounded 
in a Perfectionist framework.620 In each section I outline the rationales and examine the 
commentary of Allcard conducted by each theorist. I then establish how the foundational 
principles of each rationale help to explain certain aspects of judgments yet fail to explain the 
reasoning of courts fully or justify why cases should continue to be decided in a similar way. I 
demonstrate why each of the rationales is unable to address the unique challenges of regulating 
religious undue influence, and the more general compounded challenges of regulating undue 
influence in a principled way. Further, I consider why each of the accounts offers very little 
guidance on how courts can effectively and consistently apply the rationales to religious cases.  
In doing so, I demonstrate how the rationales discussed are unsuitable options for reforming 
the understanding of presumed undue influence in English law. I conclude the chapter by 
submitting that although aspects from each approach are helpful to explaining when religious 
influence becomes undue, the factors considered in each account need to be defined in more 
 
615 In the criminal context, there have been no such attempts of theorising s2 FA06. Accordingly, the intended 
and justified boundaries of the offence have not yet been normatively assessed. The only similar exercise has 
been conducted by Collins who has sought to theorise s4 FA06, abuse of position (n 521 and n 600). 
616 See pages 266-283. 
617 Public policy has also been advanced as a suitable rationale, see generally Ferris (n 25). However, I do not 
consider this rationale. The account offers the least effective means of addressing challenges pervading the 
doctrine given the normative and practices aspects of certain challenges examined. It has also gained much less 
traction in discussions on the correct rationale.  
618 Birks & Chin (n 23). 
619 Bigwood (n 27), 503-515 & Bigwood (n 23), 65-96. 
620 In the Morality of Freedom (OUP 1986) by Chen-Wishart (n 23), 231-266. 
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detail and be set within a different conceptual framework to justifiably decide hard cases of 
religious undue influence. 
 
The insights gained from assessing the ability of each of the rationale to explain when religious 
influence becomes undue forms the foundation of chapter 7. There I construct a more justified 
account of presumed undue influence to explain when influence becomes undue in religious 
contexts. I follow this discussion by applying my rationale to s2 FA06 and explaining how 
English courts should litigate religious representations alleged to be false. 
 
 
6.1. Presumed undue influence: rationales and grounding principles  
 
Debates on the correct rationale of presumed undue influence have proliferated in equity and 
contract scholarship.621 A number of leading civil law scholars have attempted to address the 
conceptual problem of how to decide hard cases of undue influence by advancing different 
fundamental principles to explain how courts should assess cases. These efforts seek to create 
greater doctrinal clarity by providing courts with a principled means for deciding cases.622 
There is a refreshed interest in this important area of scholarship.623 The rationale debate has 
 
621 See Birks & Chin (n 23); Peter Birks, ‘Undue influence as wrongful exploitation,’ (2004) Law Quarterly 
Review, 120, 34-37; Bigwood (n 27); Bigwood (n 447); Bigwood (n 23); Chen-Wishart (2006) &; Ferris (n 25). 
622 Determining a legitimate rationale can also have additional benefits not discussed. For example, an accepted 
rationale would also help to create a crystalline distinction between other vitiating doctrines such as 
unconscionability and duress. Creating such a distinction is however outside the scope of this thesis. The thesis 
has a specific focus on addressing challenges with the doctrine of undue influence in religious contexts and not 
which vitiating doctrines is the most appropriate, or likely to succeed. It is established in the next chapter why 
the rationale developed achieves greater success than those discussed, in determining lawful and unlawful 
religious conduct in the context of gifts and money exchanged for provision of services. In turn, confusion 
between the usage of undue influence and other vitiating doctrines would be reduced. For discussions on such 
confusion see, Roger Kerridge, ‘Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem of the Vulnerable 
Testator,’ (2000) Cambridge Law Journal, 59(2), 310-344 & 'Undue Influence and Testamentary Dispositions: 
A Response,' (2012) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, 2, 129-144. 
623 The impact of which could influence the usage of undue influence in contractual litigation and scholarship 
also. This is however beyond the remit of this thesis. 
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resurfaced in recent restitution scholarship, which is now predominantly focused on the role of 
the defendants’ conduct.624 These approaches reinvigorate what has been termed a “stalemate” 
debate.625 Such disagreement between commentators, combined with a reengagement with this 
complex topic, confirms that the rationale debate is far from settled.  
 
The following section considers three different rationales that have examined religious cases 
of undue influence. I evaluate a claimant-sided account, a defendant-sided one, as well as a 
hybrid approach that combines both points of view. I argue that the rationales fail to account 
for the differences in nature between religious and nonreligious relationships involving gift-
giving and explain why this distinction is important to the success of the rationales. I also 
submit that each of the rationales lacks conceptual clarity due to the limited definitions of 
fundamental principles advanced. 
 
A three-tiered analysis of the different focuses of the rationales also makes it clearer that other 
attempts at formulating a rationale, which adopt a one-dimensional focus of the parties’ 
conduct are as unlikely to succeed in showing when religious influence becomes undue in a 
legitimate way.626 Monist accounts, like the first two discussed below, fail to account for 
important factors typically present in cases, regardless of whether the account is defendant-
sided or claimant-sided.  
 
624 A conception which seems to have lost favor in relevant scholarship since Bigwood made a distinction 
between active and passive exploitation in the context of contract law and undue influence, see Bigwood (n 27), 
508 & (n 447), 132-136. Examples of this approach include Sheehan’s defendant-sided account delves further 
into conceptions of wrongdoing by examining the meta-physical analysis of decision-making and intention 
forming, see Duncan Sheehan, ‘Defendant-sided Unjust Factors,’ (2016) Legal Studies, 36(3), 415–437. 
Additionally, Saprai’s defendant-sided approach introduces a broader notion of what constitutes unlawful 
wrongfulness and exploitation, see Prince Saprai, Contract Law Without Foundations: Toward a Republican 
Theory of Contract Law, (OUP 2019), 113-121. 
625 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 222-223. 
626 Neither seeks to achieve this explicitly, yet in developing their nonreligious focused rationales Allcard is a 
frequent point of reference. They could have entered into these sorts of debates covered in the previous chapters, 
but they omitted to do so.  
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6.1.1. Birks and Chin on impaired will 
 
The idea of a claimant’s will being impaired is often considered in domestic undue influence 
judgments, most notably Etridge (No 2).627 This principle has also been discussed by judges in 
the High Court of Australia since 1937, where it is treated as a significant element in deciding 
cases.628 In the US, the claimant’s impaired will has been confirmed as the definitive rationale 
of undue influence.629 Based on such reasoning, Birks and Chin have advanced an ‘impaired 
will’ rationale for presumed undue influence. This rationale is arguably the definitive reference 
point on autonomy in undue influence contexts.630 It has been the subject of much scholarly 
debate, regardless of whether it has been accepted as the correct rationale,631 endorsed 
alongside other principles in a rationale,632 or rejected entirely for being misplaced.633 
 
Birks and Chin characterise undue influence as a means of relief for transactions where the 
relationship between claimants and defendants impairs the claimant’s capacity to make 
independent decisions.634 The impaired will rationale is ‘claimant-sided’635 or ‘plaintiff-
sided.’636 Following this approach, courts should look at the impact of the relationship of 
influence on donors or promisors and whether their will has been impaired, rather than the 
 
627 See n 22. Lord Nicholls stated, “The means used is regarded as an exercise of improper or 'undue' influence, 
and hence unacceptable, whenever the consent thus procured ought not fairly to be treated as the expression of a 
person's free will” [7]. Similarly, Lord Scott describes how in O’Brien (a surety case) the claimant’s “…will had 
not been overborne…” [162]. 
628 See Johnson (n 155) [119] (Latham J) but note that wrongdoing was also deemed an essential part of proving 
claims by other Justices at [134] (Dixon J). More recently, in Thorne (n 154), the High Court of Australia declared 
that trial judges are required to make evaluative judgments on whether a person lacked will when entering into a 
transaction [43] (Kiefel CJ). The majority considered that assessing the propriety of pressure should be conducted 
in claims of duress, not undue influence [57]. 
629 See page 57. 
630 For example, the rationale is cited in Thorne (n 154) [32] (Kiefel CJ). 
631 Sheehan (n 624). 
632 Chen-Wishart (n 23). 
633 Bigwood (n 27), (n 23) & Enonchong (n 491), para 9.005. 
634 Birks and Chin (n 23), 60. 
635 Bigwood (n 447) 236. 
636 Birks and Chin (n 23), 59. 
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defendant’s specific conduct. The rationale is not concerned with whether the conduct should 
be considered wrongful.637 Consequently, this rationale should not be confused with 
‘defendant-sided’ rationales.638 Birks and Chin argue that instances of wrongdoing or pressure 
involved in transactions should be challenged through duress, not undue influence.639 
 
To determine whether a transaction has been unduly influenced, Birks and Chin specify that 
four stages must be satisfied: a) donors or promisors have a relevant weakness or vulnerability 
such as ill-health or old age; b) some form of relationship existed between donors or promisors 
and defendants when the gift was made; c) donors or promisors are excessively dependent on 
defendants, which includes subtle forms of relational conditions that impair autonomy; d) 
donors or promisors consequently lack the capacity for self-management to an exceptional 
degree, but need not have surrendered their will absolutely.640 The last stage provides the main 
justification for intervention in the rationale. 
 
In elaborating upon this final crucial stage, Birks and Chin discuss the Court of Appeal 
judgment in Tufton v Sperni [1955]641 (already mentioned in chapter 4642). They submit that 
Mason J was wrong to suggest that “overborne will” is required by the doctrine since this 
interpretation is too extreme. Birks and Chin commend the majority judgment, however, for 
rejecting the usage of the term “dominated” in explaining the doctrine on the basis that it “…is 
unreliable, above all because its meaning is unstable… [and] therefore contains the danger, 
repulsed in Tufton, of requiring too absolute a loss of autonomy.”643 In their view “… adults 
 
637 Ibid, 58. 
638 Advanced in Bigwood (n 27) & (n 23). 
639 Birks and Chin (n 23), 60. 
640 Ibid, 67-68. 
641 See n 445. 
642 See page 156. 
643 Birks and Chin (n 23), 69. 
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come under all sorts of different influences, and again they have to be assumed able to cope. 
The law relieves only an extreme loss of autonomy.”644 The threshold of what constitutes undue 
influence in this account is intentionally set at a particularly high level conceptually.  
 
A presumption of influence arises because of a loss of autonomy or “judgmental disability not 
unconscionability.”645 To rebut the presumption defendants must show that at some point 
before the transaction they emancipated donors or promisors from their excessive dependence 
on them.646 It is unclear at what point before the transaction this is necessary or whether this 
only needs to be done once, depending on changes in circumstances. Birks and Chin state that 
emancipation can be achieved but is not necessarily guaranteed through independent advice 
and “information.”647 The latter is vaguely described and seems to amount to other relevant 
facts evaluated by courts on a case-by-case basis. The presumption gives defendants the ability 
to show courts that donors or promisors had been thinking for themselves at all times before 
the transaction.648 It is not clear how exactly defendants would do this simply by showing that 
donors or promisors received advice.  
 
Birks and Chin consider a selective range of domestic and Australian cases to establish why 
their rationale best explains how courts should interpret presumed undue influence.649 This 
examination also explains why the account is strongly focused on claimant-sided justifications 
and why those justifications could not effectively be combined with defendant-sided ones. 
Their analysis extends to religious cases like Tufton, and most importantly, Allcard. They argue 
 
644 Ibid, 87. 
645 Evidence of this cited in ibid, is O'Sullivan v Management and Music Agency Ltd [1985] QB 428, 73-74 ft 22. 
646 Ibid, 70. 
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid, 75. 
649 Cases in England and Wales cited include Goldsworthy v Brickell [1987] 1 Ch 378, 69-72 & Simpson v Simpson 
[1992] 1FLR 601, 71-72. For the Australian cases see Amadio (n 155), 59-60; Stivactas v Michaletos (No 2) Court 
of Appeal of NSW, 31 August 1993, BC930187, 72-73. 
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that relief would have been appropriate in Allcard if the claim had been brought sooner. It is 
stated that the claimant’s autonomy was impaired to an “exceptional degree” before making 
the gifts to the defendant because the claimant agreed to vows of obedience, and also because 
the claimant was prohibited from seeking advice from outside of the sisterhood.650 Birks and 
Chin state it was not enough for the defendant to simply show that there was no wrongdoing, 
or advantage taking when they tried to rebut the presumption of influence that arose 
automatically because of the religious context.651  
 
The focus on Allcard is significant in explaining the rationale of presumed undue influence. 
Analysis of hard cases, where there is no clear indication of inappropriate behaviour, only 
accepted religious practices manifested based on sincerely held religious beliefs, will help to 
clarify what should constitute undue influence in naturally influencing relationships. Allcard 
is viewed by many, including Birks and Chin, as the classical case of undue influence. 
Therefore, if it is argued to be a true case of undue influence, the rationale seeking to explain 
the case must demonstrate why this view is justified. However, as now demonstrated, this 
rationale fails to achieve this.  
 
Chen-Wishart rightfully claims that talk of impaired will or consent within this account is more 
conclusory than explanatory.652 The rationale does not effectively explain when an individual’s 
autonomy has been impaired to an exceptional degree, nor does it seem to have the potential 
of justifiably doing so without wholesale amendments to the four-part test, as I now argue. 
Birks and Chin state that courts should not look for a relationship that has made them an 
 
650 Birks and Chin (n 23), 68. 
651 Ibid, 75. 
652 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 245. 
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“automaton”653 or evidence of “an absolute surrender of one will to another.”654 Beyond this 
understanding of autonomy, the rationale is of reduced practical assistance to courts in hard 
claims of presumed undue influence regarding when a donor’s or promisor’s will was 
sufficiently impaired.  
 
Evidence of some form of defective consent will not always be found in presumed cases and 
this stands for Birk’s and Chin’s discussion of Allcard. The claimant entered into the order of 
nuns knowing what the sisterhood expected of adherents. This included knowledge of the vows 
of poverty and obedience. Before the claimant gifted her assets to the defendant,655 the claimant 
sought advice from her family, including her brother, a barrister, a fact overlooked by Birks 
and Chin. In seeking advice, the claimant must have exercised some degree of autonomy in 
asking for external opinions before making multiple gifts to the defendant. The claimant must 
have considered that her actions could have severe consequences on her future and assets, as 
she sought advice before making the first gift. It seems fair to assume that this advice was 
reflected upon before the gifts were made to the defendant in some way, even if it was minimal 
and had no real effect on the claimant’s motivations for the gifts. Even if this assumption is 
incorrect, asking for external advice, even if not legal, shows that the claimant exercised more 
than a minimal degree of autonomy, even under Birks and Chin’s account. To say they did not 
is rightly characterised as unrealistic and insulting.656 Accordingly, the claimant’s autonomy 
could not have been impaired to an exceptional degree at all points when the gifts were made.  
 
 
653 Birks and Chin (n 23), 69. 
654 Ibid. 
655 Two gifts of railway stock were made at a later stage in the relationship and after the advice was given. For 
the full facts of Allcard (n 6) see pages 130-131. 
656 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 243. 
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The analysis of the claimant’s autonomy may have had a more persuasive effect on the 
consideration of the latter two gifts of railway stock made after the claimant received advice. 
However, Birks and Chin do not make this distinction. But for the claimant’s delay in bringing 
the claim, each of the gifts would have been found to have been unduly influenced because it 
was considered to have occurred at some point in the party’s relationship; causation between 
undue influence and transactions need not be established.657 On this reasoning, the rationale 
does not stick to its conceptually high threshold in determining when autonomy is impaired, 
and Birks and Chin do not explain Allcard as they intend to. If the claimant had brought the 
claim sooner, the rationale would grant relief on “an implicit judgment about the normative 
acceptability of the transaction[s]…”658 not the donor’s impaired will in any real sense. 
 
For this reason, the rationale can be criticised for allowing illegitimate considerations to decide 
a defendant’s liability. The rationale allows reasoning based on legal moralism to determine 
the outcome in hard cases like Allcard. It is especially important to guard against moralistic 
intervention in religious contexts. I have already discussed the problems caused by the 
imputation of objective conceptions of vulnerability and exploitation into the doctrine in my 
analysis of English cases.659 Further, chapter 2 examined the consequences of including 
objective standards of gift-giving in the Australian jurisprudence on gifts motivated by 
religious faith.660 Moralistic standards considered alongside the main principle of this rationale 
creates the possibility that judges would omit to consider why adherents may believe that their 
will is enhanced by following strict religious beliefs and practices.  
 
 
657 Birks and Chin (n 23), 87-88. 
658 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 238. 
659 See pages 82-83. 
660 See pages 63- 64. 
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The rationale can also produce unjustifiable outcomes when applied to the typical sorts of 
religious motivations for making gifts to religious institutions and officials. Crucial distinctions 
should be made in the assessment of facts in religious undue influence cases that are omitted 
by Birks and Chin, which is mainly caused by their usage of the term ‘excessive dependence.’ 
They refer directly to religious contexts stating, “Religious enthusiasm … might be thought to 
be distinct from dependence.”661 This statement hints that the special nature of religious 
relationships has been considered within their account to some extent. However, they stopped 
short of dealing with a deeper understanding of religious motivations and considering why 
‘dependence’ may be an important aspect of determining when dependency should be 
recognised as lawful conduct. In this way, the rationale ignores relational accounts of 
autonomy.662 This seems odd considering that presumed undue influence was termed as 
“relational undue influence”663 by Birks in his seminal work on the law of restitution written 
before the rationale was formulated. Chen-Wishart has been equally critical of this element of 
the rationale, accurately arguing that it is wrong to characterise dependence on others as 
resulting in a loss in autonomy.664 Relationships can enhance a donor’s autonomy, a 
consideration that is largely overlooked by Birks and Chin.665  
 
The differences between nonreligious relationships and religious relationships are also not 
given specific recognition by Birks and Chin. Dependence on religious figures in cases like 
Allcard can often be different from dependence in nonreligious relationships. In the former 
scenarios, dependence is created by authoritative statements generated by, or at least based on, 
 
661 Birks and Chin (n 23), 67. 
662 See for example, Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relationships, (OUP 2012); Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie 
Stoljar, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, (OUP 2000) & 
John Christman, ‘Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves,’ (2004) 
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 117(1), 143-164. 
663 Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, (Clarendon Press 1985), 184. 
664 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 243. 
665 Ibid, 240-242. 
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the interpretation of religious beliefs. Dependence is commonly grounded in a shared belief 
system of religious motivations and practices, where there is typically an equal division of 
autonomy, even if there is some form of hierarchy between positions. Adherents look to 
religious figures for advice on all sorts of matters. Heightened degrees of dependence 
motivated by faith is readily apparent in real-life experiences. Spiritual care is a growing area 
of clinical research due to the demand for it in hospitals and other care institutions.666 There is 
an increased presence of Chaplains in care facilities offering “in-depth spiritual counselling” 
to treat ‘spiritual distress’ experienced by patients diagnosed with cancer.667 It extends to 
helping patients with feelings of hopelessness, existential distress and anger at God.668 
Similarly, research shows that care is sought by individuals suffering from PTSD and those 
recovering from traumatic experiences.669 Additionally, in England, a range of Christian care 
homes are offered by the Pilgrims’ Friends Society.670 The tagline of the organisation is 
“Christians Supporting Older People & shaping the issues that affect them.”671 In reality, 
individuals in need of daily care turn to institutions that reflect their religious views. 
Accordingly, individuals possessing some kind of vulnerability, namely ill-health, regularly 
depend on religion and religious institutions as a means of dealing with difficult situations. 
 
Instances of religious dependence, which are likely to be found to satisfy stage (c) of Birks and 
Chin assessment, does not prima face establish that strong forms of dependence impair an 
individual’s autonomy to an exceptional degree. Dependence on religious figures may enhance 
 
666 See Christina M. Puchalski et al, ‘Interprofessional Spiritual Care in Oncology: A Literature Review,’ (2019) 
ESMO Open, 4(1), <https://esmoopen.bmj.com/content/4/1/e000465.citation-tools> Accessed October 2019. 
667 Ibid, 2. 
668 Ibid, 7-8. There is a vast body of research on the role of and understandings of religiously based pastoral care, 
see generally Carmen Schuhmann and Annelieke Damen, ‘Representing the Good: Pastoral Care in a Secular 
Age,’ (2018) Pastoral Psychology, 67(4), 405–417 & Carrie Doehring, The Practice of Pastoral Care: A 
Postmodern Approach, (Westminster John Knox Press 2015). 
669 Kent Drescher and David W. Foy, ‘When Horror and Loss Intersect: Traumatic Experiences and Traumatic 
Bereavement,’ (2010) Pastoral Psychology, 59(2), 153-157. 
670 https://www.pilgrimsfriend.org.uk/christian-care-homes> Accessed October 2019. 
671 Ibid. 
 188 
an individual’s autonomy, as already mentioned. Dependence could help adherents to reflect 
upon their condition and make decisions that are more consistent with their interests or 
aspirations, both in the short-term and long-term. Such a consideration is also true for 
dependence on individuals susceptible to automatic presumptions of influence,672 for example, 
solicitors, professional trustees and medical advisors. This is not captured by Birks and Chin’s 
definition of excessive dependence. Accordingly, the rationale risks defining natural 
dependence, commonly found in many religious environments, as excessive and subsequently, 
unlawful. Therefore, when applied specifically to religious contexts, there is a genuine chance 
that excessive dependence is construed as having a detrimental impact on autonomy. The 
rationale could then collapse into a three-tiered test in practice and the autonomy analysis- the 
crucial stage in the rationale- could be given an inappropriate degree of scrutiny by courts. 
Accordingly, the rationale offers little to guard against unprincipled judgments on dependence 
in religious cases, whereas in other legal settings such dependence receives great support. 
 
Moreover, the impaired will rationale allows strong forms of paternalistic reasoning to 
determine judgments. Such reasoning is offensive morally, as it overrides the individual’s 
realm of personal autonomy.673 Attempts at preventing harm to an individual by claiming that 
it is for the individual’s own good should rarely constitute a sufficient reason for preventing 
them from acting in contexts where they have no judgmental disability,674 especially in gift-
giving contexts. Paternalism protects individuals from the harmful consequences of their 
conduct, even if their choices are fully informed and voluntary.675 At many points in Allcard, 
the claimant exercises their own will when deciding to make the gifts on different occasions, 
as mentioned. However, following this rationale, that conduct would not be construed as a 
 
672 See page 129. 
673 Feinberg (1983), 27. 
674 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism,’ (1972) The Monist, 56(1), 64. 
675 Ibid. 
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‘true’ choice. The account consequently argues for a decision that is internally inconsistent. If 
autonomy is a fundamental area of concern for Birks and Chin, paternalistic reasoning should 
not be allowed to impact on judgments in the way it does given its great potential to undermine 
the freedom to make gifts that are later regretted by donors, for instance. 
 
Overall, the impaired will rationale fails to alleviate my concerns raised in part I concerning 
the discretion given to judges to decide cases by the presumed undue influence test. Decisions 
based on the rationale could easily give rise to strong forms of legal moralism and paternalism. 
Additionally, Birks and Chin have not considered the temporal nature of cases and the potential 
differences between the nature of religious and general cases of undue influence, which could 
help to determine which gifts are unduly influenced in religious cases.  
 
Despite my strong critique of the rationale, I believe that autonomy, and how it can be violated, 
is a fundamental feature in undue influence cases. I explore more detailed conceptions of 
autonomy in chapter 7 and outline how this principle fits within my rationale. The analysis 
conducted in that chapter provides a more complete explanation of how impaired will should 
be understood in undue influence contexts. 
 
 
6.1.2. Bigwood on wrongdoing as exploitation 
 
The second most commonly discussed rationale for undue influence is ‘defendant-sided.’676 
The leading proponent of this approach is Bigwood, who submits that presumed undue 
 
676 See Bigwood (n 27) & (n 447); Sheehan (n 624) & Saprai (n 625). 
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influence is based on wrongdoing.677 On this understanding, courts should focus on the 
defendant’s misconduct and assess whether it has caused the completion of transactions.678 
Bigwood asserts that all loses of consent experienced by donors or promisors can be unified as 
objectionable forms of advantage taking by defendants.679 This conduct is defined as someone 
who has “…superior information, intellect, judgment, in the monopoly he enjoys with regard 
to a particular resource, or possession of a powerful instrument of violence or a gift.”680 
Bigwood’s rationale explicitly does not seek to make improvident, bad bargains, or regretted 
transactions unlawful.681 Advantage taking is a form of wrongdoing that encompasses two 
forms of exploitation.682 Active exploitation occurs when defendants knowingly disadvantage 
claimants.683 Whereas, passive exploitation is experienced when defendants knowingly or 
having a reason to, stops themselves from taking steps to correct the power imbalance existing 
within relationships.684 Bigwood’s conception of exploitation is slightly narrowed by his 
comments on Birk’s and Chin’s rationale. Bigwood is critical of their usage of “wicked 
exploitation” (which they object to) and argues that this conception of exploitation is too strong 
since it would not cover passive instances of exploitation that warrant legal intervention.685  
 
Determining exploitation begins by assessing whether donors or promisors possess any specific 
vulnerabilities that defendants could have taken advantage of.686 It is unclear how the term 
“specific vulnerabilities” is defined. The only elaboration on what this means in the rationale 
 
677 Bigwood (n 447), 440. In Bigwood (n 27) consider the exploitation rationale in contractual settings and does 
not consider how it applies to actual and presumed undue influence separately. 
678 Bigwood (n 27), 509. 
679 Ibid, 507. 
680 Quoting Anthony Kronman, 'Contract Law and Distributive Justice,' (1980) Yale Law Journal, 89, 480 at ibid, 
508. 
681 Bigwood (n 447), 438. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Bigwood (n 27), 508. 
684 Ibid. 
685 Ibid, 511. 
686 Ibid, 509. 
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is contained in a footnote stating, “…all disabilities relied upon will be such that the vulnerable 
party is seriously unable to preserve her own best interests in the transaction in question.”687 
Bigwood’s later work on undue influence does not clarify what the term means any further. 
 
Exploitation is considered in the context of strict fiduciary duties. These duties are imposed on 
relationships legally presumed to give rise to influence.688 Within these relationships, 
defendants are held to the same rules of loyalty that apply to fiduciaries in other areas of law:689 
fiduciaries must not profit from their relationship with those whom they owe a duty to,690 and 
they must not put themselves in a position where their fiduciary duties and personal interests 
conflict.691 Bigwood argues that relief should be granted where defendants breach either rule 
and this results in financial gains.692 Causation between undue influence and transactions must 
be proven for claims to succeed.693 Fiduciaries duties are breached in the context of undue 
influence where: (a) the circumstances of the transaction show conflict or a substantial 
possibility of conflict between a fiduciary’s personal interests and the interests of whom they 
owe a duty to; or (b) if the transaction indicates to a “reasonable mind” a reason why a fiduciary 
may have used their influence.694 Where (a) or (b) are satisfied a presumption of influence 
arises. Bigwood submits that this is justified since the fiduciary has used their position to gain 
 
687 Ibid, ft 39. 
688 Ibid, 510 & Bigwood (n 23), 440. For example, trustees. 
689 These are strictly enforced by courts even where the fiduciary has benefitted those, they owe duties to, see 
Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL). For further commentary see Tamar Frankel, ‘Watering Down Fiduciary 
Duties,’ in Andrew S. Gold and Paul B. Miller, Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, (OUP 2014). 
690 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch1, [18], (Millet LJ). For general commentary see Robert 
Pearce & Warren Barr, Peace & Stevens’ Trust and Equitable Obligations, (OUP, 7th Edition 2018), 680- 702. 
691 Ibid. 
692 Bigwood (n 447), 440-446. 
693 Ibid, 440. 
694 Ibid, 446. The following critique of Bigwood’s rationale does not touch on reasonableness standards which 
involve objectiveness standards covered in chapters 2 and 4. Although relevant, there are more pressing issues 
that establish why the account fails to capture the essence of religious undue influence cases and is thus an 
incomplete rationale. 
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some form of benefit from those whom they hold duties to,695 regardless of the substantive 
fairness of transactions.696  
 
Bigwood claims that the rebuttal stage of the presumed undue influence test is based on public 
policy.697 It allows the defendant to demonstrate the propriety of both relationships and 
transactions to courts.698 Bigwood does not develop further helpful discussions on the possible 
role of independent advice or particular facts that can assist defendants attempting to rebut 
presumptions of influence. Accordingly, the rationale is unclear about how independent advice 
should be examined by courts. 
 
Bigwood makes some attempt at identifying how the wrongdoing rationale narrows down the 
range of conduct that can unduly influence transactions. This is important to the current 
analysis, as the limitations bleed into the rebuttal stage of the test for presumed undue 
influence.699 Bigwood includes two limitations in an effort to prevent the test from becoming 
overly inclusive. Defendants can show there was no conflict or possibility of conflict between 
the fiduciary’s duty and their personal interests where: (1) the inducement is too remote from 
the context of a fiduciary’s responsibilities owed to others, even if it is strong enough to be 
counted as an inducement (the ‘proximity limitation’); (2) the inducement is too weak to count 
as a determining motive for a fiduciary, even it is sufficiently proximate to their responsibilities 










and need not be jointly satisfied.701 Through showing the presence of either limitation 
defendants are provided with evidence to rebut presumptions of influence. 
 
In his earlier work on the rationale, Bigwood does not engage in any detailed analysis of 
particular undue influence cases, nor are there discussions on religious cases. Commentary is 
limited to judgments which comment that unconscionability and wrongdoing are relevant to 
understandings of undue influence.702 Bigwood omits to consider how his account would 
decide notable cases like Allcard. Such an omission is partly explained by Bigwood’s general 
focus on undue influence in contractual settings. Additionally, given Bigwood’s scholarly 
background in private law, it is unsurprising that there is not a specific focus on the different 
nature of religious undue influence. The omission to discuss Allcard and why relief may have 
been justified is nevertheless surprising, considering it is often described as “the venerable 
classic example of undue influence.”703  
 
Bigwood’s later work deals with this omission and briefly discusses Allcard. He claims that 
the defendant was a fiduciary in the relationship with the claimant.704 Additionally, he touches 
on the role of the ordinary motives test of small and large gifts that remains in domestic 
jurisprudence from the judgment.705 However, he does not explain why Allcard involved 
instances of exploitation or when the conflict between the defendant’s personal and fiduciary 
duties occurred. Accordingly, it is difficult to see how the wrongdoing rationale can 
 
701 Ibid. 
702 For instance, English cases are introduced briefly, see Morgan (n 493), and O'Brien (n 22). Australian cases 
are also discussed Johnson (n 155). 
703 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 235. 
704 Etridge (No 2) (n 22) is the predominant focus of his 2002 article on the rationale. Yet it also fails to apply the 
rationale to the facts of the case in a detailed and structured manner. More simplistically, Bigwood considers that 
a fiduciary relationship could be found in Etridge (No 2) between the plaintiff and the defendant bank, which was 
exploited in order to gain an advantage.  
705 Bigwood (n 447), 448. 
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legitimately explain hard cases of undue influence like Allcard.706 Even if Bigwood developed 
a more complete account explaining how Allcard involved exploitative conduct that unduly 
influenced the claimant’s gifts, the rationale would still be an unjustified account to explain 
decisions in similar religious cases, for the reasons now discussed. 
 
Where religious figures receive money to benefit their religion, either for a specified cause or 
to be used as they see fit, that person will hold a fiduciary duty under the rationale, and it is 
inevitable that they will breach their duty of loyalty owed to adherents. This is demonstrated 
by considering an example. A Sikh gives money to a Gyani (a Sikh scholar) to set up a 
Gurdwara (place of worship) with the intention that both Gyani and Granthi (ceremonial 
leaders) use it for accommodation or a place to eat. Here, the presumption of influence based 
on fiduciary principles would subsequently be raised in the rationale, as the religious figures 
have received a benefit as a result of the positions held. The presumption of influence arises 
regardless of whether donations are typical of the religion or specified by religious beliefs; a 
conflict inevitably arises between the religious interests and the strict duties of loyalty owed 
by fiduciaries.  
 
Foreseeably, the rationale also captures many other instances of religiously motivated gift-
giving. The proximity limitation applies less readily in contexts where gift-giving is an inherent 
part of an adherent’s religious experience, as discussed below.707 This is not de facto 
objectionable, as not all religions are funded in this way. Additionally, not all breaches of 
fiduciary duties in the way conceived of by Bigwood will be legally challenged. However, 
where gifts to religious officials or institutions are motivated by religious faith, there is little to 
 
706 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 237 who describes these as “clean cases.”  
707 For instance, this is part of religious experiences for Muslims and one means of helping to achieve salvation 
upon death, see Mona Moufahim, ‘Religious gift giving: An ethnographic account of a Muslim pilgrimage,’ 
(2013) Marketing Theory, 13(4), 429-430. 
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prevent an aggrieved former adherent from challenging the lawfulness of their gifts at a later 
date. The rationale, therefore, fails to examine the temporal nature of relationships and explain 
why a presumption of influence is always justified in such contexts. Accordingly, the strictness 
of fiduciary duties is overinclusive when applied to religious contexts. 
 
The intended limits set by the ‘proximity limitation’ does not mitigate the rationales over-
inclusive nature, as it is also inappropriate in religious contexts. Many religions involve some 
form of donations, for example, during religious sermons or tithe payments.708 Further, 
donations may be made to achieve greater levels of knowledge.709 Alternatively, adherents may 
donate the entirety of their assets to a religious institution by submitting to vows of poverty, as 
in Allcard. These sorts of donations are likely to be anticipated by most adherents of faiths that 
involve similar forms of donations. New converts may, however, not anticipate such donations, 
yet presumed undue influence would not be relevant to such scenarios. It is unlikely that a 
relationship of any kind exists between those individuals and the religious official. In other 
faiths, mandatory gift-giving or financial commerciality may be treated as an illegitimate 
exercise of religion by adherents of the opinion that “proper religions do not charge.”710 This 
distinction, although crude and broadly generalised, sheds some light on the internal activities 
of religions. Considering a donor’s religious motivations for donations demonstrates that gifts 
are often an inherent part of religious experiences. Accordingly, the ability of claimants to 
bring undue influence claims on the basis of the rationale is very unlikely to be limited by the 
proximity limitation. It should be questioned whether courts could effectively determine 
whether inducements stem from the fiduciary (a religious figure), from religious texts, or from 
 
708 A practice common for Jehovah Witnesses, see generally, Leonard Bupanda, The Tithing Dilemma and the 
Triumphs of Love, (AuthorHouse 2013). 
709 A practice adopted in Scientology, see James R. Lewis, Scientology, (OUP 2009), 190-198. 
710 Edge (n 15), 387-388.  
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the donor’s reflections on what their religion requires of them (as in Hartigan711). 
Consequently, the strict fiduciary-based approach is not diluted to an appropriate degree, as it 
may initially seem to be through the ‘proximity limitation.’  
 
Analysis of proximity is also likely to bleed into the rebuttal stage under the rationale, which 
is a troubling prospect for religious defendants. In practice, religious defendants would likely 
experience real difficulties in providing evidence to rebut a presumption of influence if they 
cannot firstly show a lack of proximity between gifts and the conflict of their fiduciary duties. 
The difficulty is compounded if independent advice has not been received by claimants, even 
if it was suggested by defendants before property was gifted. As mentioned above, it is unclear 
what impact independent advice would have on claims following this rationale. Accordingly, 
religious defendants are disadvantaged compared with scenarios where financial transactions 
to religious figures are not made because of the religious motivations of donors or promisors. 
 
The potential for the rationale to produce unprincipled decisions on liability is made more 
likely by the lack of applicability of the ‘incentive limitation’712 in religious contexts. Fiduciary 
status imposed on religious figures in the way described is unlikely to offer a sufficient 
safeguard against unprincipled findings of undue influence where there has been no 
exploitation. Consider a fiduciary whose personal interests may be furthered by a gift that had 
not been directly caused by them, but not prevented by them. X, a religious official, may have 
heard from Y, an adherent, that Z, another adherent, informed them that they intend to give 
money to X to continue their religious ceremonies. The gift is later made to X. Here, the benefit 
experienced by X is only incidental to the benefit received by the religious institution X is a 
 
711 See page 64. 
712 Bigwood’s conceives of the limitations as assessments that need not be determined jointly for the presumption 
to arise. Accordingly, in this ‘either’ ‘or’ analysis, it is more likely that the presumption will be raised against 
defendants. 
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part of. This benefit is received by X by acting out the religious duties owed to adherents. 
Duties could include advising adherents how they can live righteous lives and ensure a good 
afterlife, and voluntary donations may be required for these services. Accordingly, the benefit 
received by X has only been produced indirectly from X’s fiduciary relationship with Z. If 
there is no disregard for the intended religious purposes motivating similar gifts, for instance, 
evidence exists that X uses gifts for private activities, it is unclear how the motive pursued by 
both parties is anything but religiously motivated. The conduct cannot justifiably be stretched 
to be defined as exploitative. The gifts are intended to benefit the religious institution more 
than X, but X nevertheless benefits, as it helps them to fund their religious practices.   
 
Foreseeably, the rationale would capture this sort of conduct where there is a breach of 
fiduciary duty but no exploitative conduct in many informal religious settings where religious 
officials are directly gifted property by adherents. This analysis demonstrates how, in practice, 
decisions could give rise to judicial reasoning based on legal moralism. I agree that the law is 
morally illegitimate in prohibiting what is considered immoral conduct even where that 
conduct does not cause harm to the acting individual or another.713 In Bigwood’s rationale, 
relief in these sorts of cases could only be based on an implicit view of what constitutes an 
acceptable transaction between a religious fiduciary and adherents in scenarios like those 
mentioned. The presumption of influence, which is based on fiduciary duties is, therefore, 
unjustly overinclusive and the limitations set out by Bigwood do not offer any real safeguards 
against such a presumption arising.  
 
Bigwood may argue that these scenarios are instances of passive exploitation where defendants 
commit some degree of wrongdoing that justifies intervention. However, for this conclusion to 
 
713 Feinberg (n 522), 12. 
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be correct, the definition of exploitation would be interpreted so broadly that it would 
essentially capture any conduct that could incidentally be motivated by a fiduciaries’ personal 
interests. Bigwood seems to anticipate such criticism in his commentary on Lindley J’s 
judgment in Allcard: 
“For the smaller advantage received by the fiduciary, the less motivated he is likely to 
have been to use (hence abuse) his special position of influence over his beneficiary in order 
induce (actively) or receive (passively) the impugned gift. At some point, the incentive is 
reduced to such an extent as to destroy altogether the fiduciary's motive for using his influence 
over his beneficiary, hence rebutting the generalisation upon which the presumption of such 
abuse is founded...”714  
There are problematic aspects of this analysis,715 but only one is relevant to the present 
discussion. In situations of gift-giving motivated by religious faith, motives or incentives 
endorsed by fiduciaries in relationships with adherents are usually based on shared 
understandings of religious beliefs and practices. The motive for asking for, or accepting, gifts 
in religious contexts, as in Allcard, is unlikely to vary in degree, or reach a point in which is it 
so reduced that the defendant’s incentive is destroyed in the way described by Bigwood. 
Accordingly, the rationale is unlikely to provide a clear distinction between exploitative and 
lawful behaviour in religious cases. Consequently, it is arguable that the concept of exploitation 
becomes redundant in assessing liability and the rationale is essentially based on strict fiduciary 
duties to determine when influence becomes undue.  
 
 
714 Bigwood (n 27), 448. 
715 For example, why are only large gifts considered to be susceptible to undue influence? This seems an 
unprincipled distinction that remains from Allcard. It is most easily highlighted by considering someone who 
influences people to give them small sums of money or property but reaches a very wide audience. That person 
could easily obtain the same money as that involved in Allcard. The conduct is the same in the case of small gifts, 
only the total amount is different. All donators could bring a joint claim to seek the proportion of the total they 
paid. 
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Ultimately, when applied to common religious scenarios, Bigwood’s rationale greatly risks 
unprincipled and unjust outcomes for religious defendants. As demonstrated, the fiduciary 
grounding of the rationale may rely on moralistic reasoning to determine when influence 
becomes undue. This conclusion does not, however, mean that exploitation has no place in 
understanding undue influence. The main issue identified with this rationale is the imposition 
of fiduciary duties in contexts involving religious officials. The suitability of a more refined 
understanding of exploitation is explored in chapter 7. 
 
 
6.1.3. Chen-Wishart on Perfectionism, relational autonomy and harm 
 
Chen-Wishart’s dualist rationale is the latest of the three accounts seeking to develop an 
appropriate framework to explain the operation of presumed undue influence. Consequently, it 
has the benefit of building on Birk’s and Chin’s claimant-sided account and Bigwood’s 
defendant-sided account. The combination of claimant-sided and defendant-sided principles is 
explicitly contained in an account based on impaired will and wrongdoing. The two principles 
are set within a Perfectionist account of positive autonomy advanced by Joseph Raz.716 The 
rationale is relational in nature and seeks to take account of the special nature of the 
relationships entered into and enjoyed by individuals.717 It is a welcome addition to the 
rationale debate; Chen-Wishart’s account is deeply rooted in normative literature and offers 
positive lessons for the monist accounts considered in this chapter. 
 
 
716 Based on the theory proposed in Raz (n 28). 
717 Ibid, 155. 
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In the hybrid account claimant autonomy is the fundamental concern,718 which is defined as a 
value that trumps all others.719 For Chen-Wishart, autonomy is not simply viewed as another 
value amongst others that should be respected in law and politics;720 it should be actively 
enhanced and protected.721 Chen-Wishart’s analysis of autonomy concentrates on Raz’s 
conception of positive autonomy advanced in The Morality of Freedom.722 Autonomy is seen 
to flourish in relationships providing guidance and support because they help individuals to 
create their own identity.723 The relational analysis of autonomy conducted by Chen-Wishart 
is a new and positive introduction to the rationale debate.  
 
On this formulation of autonomy, legal states must create and monitor valuable options for 
individuals in their pursuit of the good life.724 By adopting moral value pluralism, the range of 
potentially adequate options worthy of promotion is unspecified.725 A broad margin of 
toleration is considered appropriate in order to determine which options and justifications for 
those options are adequate. The margin of appreciation is intended to protect social forms that 
help to ensure cultures are cultivated and can survive.726 To distinguish between what options 
are valuable and which are repugnant, states must assess whether an option enhances or 
restricts autonomy to an unacceptable degree. For instance, a person who willingly agrees to 
be a slave (often discussed in moral jurisprudence) is an example of a repugnant option that 
should be prohibited by states under this conception of autonomy because it restricts autonomy 
 
718 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 240-242. 
719 Citing John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press 1971) at 239. 
720 Ibid. 
721 Ibid. 
722 Distinct from negative autonomy, which is typically defined as freedom from coercive interferences, Raz (n 
28), 410. 
723 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 242.  
724 Raz (n 28), 412. 
725 See ibid, 381 & 425. 
726 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 248. 
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in an unacceptable way.727 Despite agreeing to the commands of their master in whatever 
context, Raz believes that these individuals do not make autonomous choices since they do not 
act independently and have given away their ability to act autonomously again. On this 
reasoning, if an option hinders an individual’s autonomy in a real and substantive way and 
causes them to act without independence, it is a repugnant option and states should eliminate 
it.728  
 
The analysis of the willing slave example demonstrates why this understanding of autonomy 
is Perfectionist in nature. Raz conceives of the autonomy principle as an ultimate good in his 
account of legitimate political and legal action by appealing to normative reasons to justify this 
position. Raz does not allow room for alternative viewpoints on what other good(s) should set 
limits to that power. Raz’s account is not, however, subject to the same criticisms I have already 
made of legal moralism to the same degree.729 Despite clear overlaps between the two 
traditions, Raz’s Perfectionist conception of autonomy is less susceptible to criticisms that it 
amounts to a strong form of moralism. Raz appeals to reasoned-based moral reasons to justify 
legal intervention, not moral beliefs or feelings of distaste of a given society.730 Further, the 
account advanced by Raz endorses moral pluralism, which promotes that different moral views 
can be held by individuals. This includes the ability of individuals to make choices that others 
may view as poor ones. Accordingly, the threshold of what constitutes good reasons for legal 
intervention is much higher than the accounts of moralism referred to in this chapter.731 Raz’s 
 
727 See generally, Feinberg (n 29), 71-81 & John D. Hodson, ‘Mill, Paternalism, and Slavery,’ (1981) Analysis, 
41(1), 60-62. 
728 Raz (n 28), 411. 
729 Feinberg has argued that legal perfectionism is a form of moralism (n 522), 219 & 277-279.  
730 John Stanton-Ife, "The Limits of Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/law-limits/> section 4. Accessed May 2020. 
731 I discuss this position in more detail on pages 202-203. 
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Perfectionism allows for a greater range of acceptable conduct and reasons for what constitutes 
adequate justifications for that conduct. 
 
Alongside this conception of autonomy, Chen-Wishart also endorses Raz’s specific 
formulation of a Perfectionist harm principle. In the hybrid rationale, the harm warranting legal 
intervention falls into three categories: harm to autonomy enhancing social bonds; harm to 
legal institutions that support voluntary transfers of property, and; harm to an individual’s 
future autonomy.732 The existence of any of these harm justifies intervention in her rationale 
because it prevents defendants from continually exploiting their relationship with donors or 
promisors.733 Chen-Wishart submits that instances of undue influence involve donors or 
promisors who “let their guard down” because of the nature of the relationship with defendants, 
which is then exploited by defendants, causing them to suffer one of the harms.734 The harm 
principle aims to limit the restrictions on individual autonomy imposed by courts.  
 
The limits of the doctrine are also set by the constitutive nature of relationships. Chen-Wishart 
believes that “Going beyond the boundaries [of the relationship] puts [he/she] him [defendants] 
‘off-side’ and tips [he/she] him into the territory of worthless choices which cause harm to an 
autonomy enhancing social form and legal institution, and usually also to the claimant’s future 
autonomy.”735 On this understanding, undue influence can be used by states as a justification 




732 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 248-250. 
733 Ibid, 252. 
734 Ibid, 252-253. 
735 Ibid, 253. 
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Impaired will forms part of this rationale and is assessed in a more nuanced way than in Birks 
and Chin’s account. Chen-Wishart discusses how hard it is to determine whether someone has 
truly consented to a transaction. By adopting Hart’s analysis of consent in contractual 
agreements, a ‘thick’ account of consent is declared more appropriate in an undue influence 
rationale than the ‘thin’ kind set out by Birks and Chin.736 On a thick account, individuals can 
expressly engage in consensual transactions, but can nevertheless be excused from their 
contingent responsibilities.737 Consent is, therefore, relevant to the application of Chen-
Wishart’s rationale at times, but ultimately, not the “be all and end all of transactional 
liability.”738  
 
Chen-Wishart argues that a thick account of consent provides a better way of understanding 
consent in cases like Allcard. It is submitted the claimant must have exercised their autonomy 
when making gifts to the defendant. Chen-Wishart considers that to argue otherwise would be 
inaccurate.739 Consequently, consent is a background factor in this rationale that need not be 
shown to be lacking when the transaction was made. Claims can still be successful where undue 
influence can somehow be inferred by courts based on the circumstances of the party’s 
relationship.740 
 
Wrongdoing also features in Chen-Wishart’s rationale as a corollary of the harmful conduct 
specified. Accordingly, under the positive conception of autonomy considered, violating an 
individual’s future autonomy is both wrongful and harmful. The violation of future autonomy 
subsequently hinders an individual’s ability to pursue what options are valued by them to 
 
736 Ibid, 244-246. 
737 Ibid, 246. 
738 Ibid. 
739 Ibid, 243. 
740 Ibid, 253. 
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varying degrees, depending on the extent of the harm inflicted. Chen-Wishart views this as a 
wrong. At times, the violation will be minimal and at other times, as argued by Chen-Wishart, 
it will be particularly severe. In the rationale, wrongs vary in intensity and it seems that they 
need not be intentionally caused by defendants. The violation of an individual’s autonomy has 
a tangible impact on the person and their interests, which is categorised as a harm. Therefore, 
in this Perfectionist account of autonomy, there is harm where there is a wrong and vice versa.  
 
The principal aim of the rationale is to explain ‘clean cases,’ “where the Court found no 
diminished capacity by the claimant and no wrongdoing by the defendant, but still inferred 
undue influence from the relationship of influence between the parties, and the transaction 
which ‘called for an explanation.’”741 In essence, these are the hard cases I referred throughout 
part I. Following the rationale, defendants are not let “off the moral hook,” even where 
claimants have consented to transactions and the defendant’s conduct cannot be described as 
actively exploitative.742 Chen-Wishart argues that Allcard is an example of this and is incapable 
of proper explanation by either of the monist accounts examined above.743  
 
In attempting to achieve this aim, Chen-Wishart applies her account to the existing doctrinal 
test for presumed undue influence. The first stage of the test, where the transaction “calls for 
an explanation,” is explained to arise because of the abnormality of transactions. The 
abnormality conceived of here occurs in two ways. Firstly, where transactions have a 
significant impact on the claimant’s welfare. The gifts in Allcard are judged to be an example 
of this type of abnormality.744 Chen-Wishart argues that the gifts were “objectively 
 
741 Ibid, 237. 
742 Ibid, 260. 
743 The battle between impaired will and wrongdoing is viewed as a war of “attrition.” This is demonstrated by 
the identification of problems and how both approaches fit with precedents (some of which have been considered) 
and their defective use of language in theory and practice, see ibid, 236-239. 
744 Ibid. 
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inappropriate” because they failed to account for the possibility that the donor may later leave 
the sisterhood, at which point they would subsequently be without any assets.745 The gifts are 
considered to have substantially undermined the claimant’s future autonomy.746 It is also 
argued, that even if the original gifts were not objectionable for this reason, the defendant’s 
refusal to return whatever remained when the claimant left the sisterhood “subverts the relevant 
social norm.”747 Chen-Wishart labels this as objectionable because the defendant’s obligation 
to the claimant was a continuing one that needed to take account of changes in the claimant’s 
beliefs, as well as how this would impact on their relationship.748  
 
Secondly, abnormality exists where the transaction is not normally made in the type of 
relationship between the parties.749 The first stage of the presumed undue influence test requires 
claimants to establish that a transaction ‘calls for an explanation’ “if it entails a disadvantage 
that would ‘have been obvious as such to any independent and reasonable person who 
considered the transaction at the time with knowledge of all the relevant facts.’”750 Allcard did 
not feature in the discussion of this point. Instead, Chen-Wishart considers a nonreligious 
undue influence case to elaborate on what this conception of abnormality covers. In Building 
Society v Dusangh [2000]751 it was submitted, “…guarantees by parents to support loans to 
their children, while improvident for the parents, are regarded as unexceptional and ‘capable 





748 Ibid. This analysis is extended to other cases to justify relief in cases where elderly claimants would not have 
the resources to meet the contingencies of living to an old age. For example, Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 W.L.R. 
129 (CA) & Hammond v Osborn [2002] EWCA Civ 885; [2002] 6 WLUK, ibid ft 110. 
749 Ibid, 254. 
750 Quoting Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 Q.B. 923 (CA); [1989] 2 W.L.R. 
759 [965] (Slade LJ), ibid, 255. 
751 80 P. & C.R. D.20. 
752 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 256. 
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of the abnormality test is, therefore, on the type of relationship held between the parties and 
what is typical or expected conduct in that relationship. 
 
Chen-Wishart explains that defendants can rebut presumptions of influence by showing an 
appropriate explanation for transactions through one of three ways: (I) claimants have an 
acceptable explanation for the transaction, and so defendants have not failed to protect the 
claimant’s welfare. (II) it can be demonstrated that claimants have actively exercised their 
judgment when entering into the transaction and did not simply choose to trust the defendant. 
In this scenario, no relationship of influence is operative, and the defendant owes no obligation 
to claimants to start with. (III) claimants received adequate independent advice and defendants 
have successfully shifted their obligation to the independent adviser, leaving defendants free 
to deal at arm’s-length and self-interestedly with claimants.753 Each of these is considered to 
show that transactions are “the spontaneous act of the donor under circumstances which 
enabled him to exercise an independent will.”754 
 
Despite signs of real promise, the hybrid rationale is overinclusive and subject to similar 
concerns and criticisms aimed at the monist accounts examined earlier. Chen-Wishart has 
misconceived the nature of religious relationships in cases like Allcard at times, even though 
the account is based on an understanding of relational autonomy. I now demonstrate how the 
rationale does not appropriately explain or identify when religious influence becomes undue 
without making objectively lead inferences on defendant conduct. Consequently, Chen-
Wishart does not fully deliver on the promise that this account legitimately explains why 
 
753 Ibid, 261. 
754 Quoting Allcard (n 6), 171 (Lindley J), ibid, 260. 
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defendants in hard cases, or to use her terminology ‘clean cases,’ like Allcard, unduly 
influenced the claimant’s gifts. 
 
One problem with the rationale is that the potential harms suffered by individuals seen to justify 
intervention are construed too broadly. In particular, harm to an individual’s future autonomy 
is a problematic aspect of the harm principle endorsed. Gifts of property will inevitably impact 
on a donor’s future autonomy to some degree. By relinquishing property rights altogether or 
the enjoyment of them, the diversity and amount of assets held by a donor is reduced, at least 
at the point transactions are completed. However, a reduction in assets should not by itself be 
construed as wrongful and harmful simply because it could later negatively affect a donor’s 
interests when their circumstances have changed. Improvidence should not inevitably be seen 
as a wrong. Chen-Wishart’s discussion of Allcard suggests that a reduction in assets is 
potentially a harm in all instances where it could affect the claimant’s future autonomy if the 
reduction is significant. Since undue influence can be inferred and need not be proven in the 
rationale, this seems true even where though there are no signs of exploitation, coercion, or a 
lack of consent in a thick sense, as defined by Chen-Wishart. In Allcard, there was only a 
possibility that the transactions could later harm the donor’s future autonomy because the 
claimant could have foreseeably lived at the sisterhood and obeyed rules of poverty until she 
died. Yet, this fact does not forcefully justify why donees are subject to a continuing obligation 
to set aside a proportion of the money received in case donors later change their religious 
beliefs. Neither should donees be required to return whatever is left of the gifts if the donor 
later decides to change their beliefs.755 Realistically, it is impossible to determine with any 
 
755 The obligation raises additional questions that increase the risk of unjust outcomes. For example, how would 
the donee become aware of this obligation? Also, what proportion is considered suitable, and would this depend 
on how much was given? Could this affect the range of remedies available to claimants? Such questions were not 
considered by Chen-Wishart. 
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degree of precision whether someone will change their religious beliefs or their need for 
additional assets, where they have subsequently fallen on hard times.756  
 
Additionally, donors, like the claimant in Allcard, make gifts to help further their religious and 
spiritual practices at the time, which they genuinely believed in before meeting the donees. 
Accordingly, this aspect of the harm principle fails to consider the temporal nature of undue 
influence and why harm should not be construed over such a long period. Autonomy is a much 
more complicated matter than this, even under this rationale. It is important to assess whether 
the donor’s autonomy has varied over the course of the relationship with defendants given how 
much this can change over time, and how it can impact the motivations for gifts. This analysis 
is especially forceful if as Chen-Wishart argues, individuals must be allowed to pursue their 
conceptions of the good life through the options available to them. 
 
Moreover, the consequences of extremely improvident financial transactions should not 
outweigh the donor’s individual choices, where autonomy is viewed as the ultimate goal of the 
law. Positive autonomy advanced by Raz and adopted by Chen-Wishart endorses moral value 
pluralism. Consequently, individuals must have the ability to make poor choices, where they 
believe at the time of transactions it will enhance their autonomy in some way.757 If that 
individual subsequently changes their mind on the legitimacy of the transaction or the 
 
756 Theories have been proposed on how to determine whether current thoughts will replicate future thinking, see 
Jennifer Morton, ‘Deliberating for Our Far Future Selves,’ (2013) Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 16(4), 809–828. 
However, this aspect of the temporal nature of decision making is unnecessary for the rationale developed in 
chapter 7.  
757 There is wider research on the legitimacy of protecting an individual’s future options. Feinberg, for instance, 
submits that states are not generally justified in limiting an individual’s autonomy because it is viewed as a bad 
choice, or to protect future options for individuals. This is argued to be an illegitimate violation of future autonomy 
at the time the action is being considered by the individual and not retrospectively, see Feinberg (n 29), 67-69. 
Decisions like these can only be prohibited through a soft form of moralistic reasoning where there is also 
exploitation, this is considered to apply to ticket scalping, blackmail and prostitution because of the 
nonexploitation, 81. Focus here is on the financial harm of undue influence and explaining why Chen-Wishart’s 
rationale is not limited to contexts involving exploitation. This is a key distinction between Feinberg’s analysis, 
which explains why moralistic reasoning should not apply equally here. 
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perceived benefits do not come to fruition, that is unfortunate and frustrating for the donor. 
However, the donor accepted this risk when they exercised their autonomy at the time of 
entering into the transaction. If that poor choice does not reach the level where it can be 
considered morally illegitimate and repugnant under the Razian conception of autonomy, their 
autonomy has not truly been wrongfully harmed by entering into the transaction. Repugnant 
options are extreme restrictions of autonomy. For instance, the ‘willing slave’ scenario 
considered above. It is classified as a repugnant option because it is a complete abdication of 
self-governance, rather than a choice that could potentially enhance or reduce autonomy.758 
The threshold of Raz’s conception of autonomy is intentionally set so high to allow for moral 
value pluralism, which is especially important in religious contexts where beliefs and practices 
are often very different, some of which may seem ridiculous to nonbelievers. Extremely 
improvident financial transactions that are later regretted by donors do not reach this threshold.  
 
Harm to one’s future autonomy as explained in Chen-Wishart’s rationale should be abandoned. 
Its inclusion makes it easy for aggrieved former adherents who have donated to religious 
organisations to show that they have wrongfully suffered this type of harm. This makes it 
highly likely that claims will be successful since there is no real practical limit to this type of 
harm, or at least none is specified by Chen-Wishart. As a result, it is unclear how remote or 
insignificant this harm needs to be for claims to fail. The rationale consequently creates an 
exceedingly generous returns policy for donors, which is only limited by the defence of laches 
considered in claims, not by the rationale’s foundational principles.  
 
 
758 For succinct and cogent reasons why slavery agreements are not valid under Liberalist reasoning see Feinberg 
(n 29), 74-81. 
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Chen-Wishart’s focus on positive autonomy should also address when a claimant’s actions are 
understood as autonomous. There are hints of this on occasions, for example, in considering 
evidence that could be used to rebut the presumption, it is submitted “(II) the claimant did 
actively exercise [his/]her judgment in relation to the transaction, rather than simply choosing 
to trust the defendant, so that no relationship of influence was operative and the defendant owes 
her no obligation to start with.”759 Attempts to rebut the presumption of influence need to show 
the transaction was “the spontaneous act of the donor under circumstances which enabled him 
to exercise an independent will”760 and, therefore, they accepted the consequences of future 
deprivation. However, it is difficult to determine when claimants have exercised their 
judgement before making transactions, rather than simply trusting the defendant’s conduct. 
Using consent in the thick sense is overly inclusive. Accordingly, Chen-Wishart does not treat 
claims that gifts are autonomously made and claims that gifts are not autonomous evenly. 
 
It could be argued this objection could be overcome where claimants receive advice, which is 
set out in (II) above. However, what is it about advice that ensures that donors act 
autonomously, even if it is actively sought? The influence could be so strong on donors, 
especially in religious scenarios, that any amount of sound advice would not mean that they 
actively exercise their own judgment. Further detail is needed to determine some form of a 
baseline for understanding autonomy to ensure (II) works effectively at the rebuttal stage. 
 
The understanding of what should be raised in the rebuttal stage also raises other concerns 
about injustice. In practice, the rebuttal stage could become superfluous in some cases, such as 
Allcard. Firstly, it is uncertain how far (I) should be interpreted by courts. In Allcard, an 
 
759 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 261. 
760 Ibid, 259. 
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acceptable explanation of the gift could be advanced; the donor wanted to join the order of 
nuns, and to do so was required to agree to vows of poverty. These facts are unlikely to apply 
just to this specific order of nuns. Other religions have such vows, for example, Catholics are 
regulated by Codes of Canon Law. Those vows are part of the specific religious experiences 
that are legally recognised as religious. The only available basis to reject this as an acceptable 
explanation for the transaction is to argue from the standpoint of moralism that the motivations 
for the gifts are objectively inappropriate. However, this conclusion does not fit into Chen-
Wishart’s Perfectionist account of positive autonomy. The religious rules have to be treated as 
normal motivations for transactions that fit into the “large margin of tolerance” of acceptable 
options for the rationale to stay consistent with the understanding of autonomy and pluralism 
incorporated.761  
 
Similarly, (II) does not apply to cases of religious undue influence since this type of 
relationship automatically raises the presumption and this is not questioned by Chen-Wishart. 
Additionally, (III) specifying the role of independent advice in cases is equally troublesome. It 
specifies that advice must be “adequate” so that defendants shift their obligation to another, 
but little is said about what this may extend to. Chen-Wishart considers that in Allcard, any 
legal advice received after that made by her brother would not have been listened to as it would 
be seen as anti-religious.762 Consequently, it could have been impossible for the defendant to 
rebut the presumption of influence under this understanding of undue influence.763 If advice is 
heard, but not listened to, then it must be true that the defendant still retains a continuing duty 
to care for the welfare of the claimant following the rationale. Accordingly, the defendant 
would not have been free to deal self-interestedly. It seems more likely that these sorts of 
 
761 Ibid, 254. 
762 Chen-Wishart (n 23), 238-239. 
763 Ibid, 260. 
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scenarios create a new phase in the relationship of the potential influence that would need to 
be subsequently rebutted. Where this takes place, and (I) is applied in the manner expressed by 
Chen-Wishart, it seems that defendants are unlikely to ever be able to rebut the presumption of 
influence, regardless of their actual conduct. Undue influence will simply be inferred from 
moralistic understandings of what constitutes reasonable reasons for gift-giving. In turn, this 
enhances the risks of unprincipled outcomes where there is no real loss of autonomy or finding 
of exploitation. 
 
Chen-Wishart’s rationale does not effectively engage with the nature of religious relationships 
and, therefore, cannot explain hard cases of undue influence, like Allcard. The rationale creates 
a real possibility that defendants will be unable to rebut presumptions of influence. If accepted 
in practice, this approach would prove to be a troubling development, as religious cases of 
undue influence have all largely been presumed undue influence cases since the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the normative understanding of the harms advanced by 





I have argued that the three leading, and most frequently discussed rationales for undue 
influence, are inadequate in explaining when religious influence becomes undue. As a result, 
the rationales cannot explain how English courts should regulate religious undue influence in 
a consistently principled way or offer a complete way to address the challenges considered in 
part I. The collective failings of the rationales can be grouped into categories. 
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The main criticism of the rationales relates to the general failure of the authors to consider how 
religious scenarios, which involve specific beliefs and practices, should alter how the test for 
presumed undue influence is applied by courts. This was an important task for each of the 
commentators who use Allcard to explain how the rationales operate in cases. The authors take 
a general approach and seek to justify the relief in Allcard but for the claimant’s delay in 
bringing the claim as if it were a nonreligious undue influence case. Accordingly, both the 
religious nature of the cases and the party’s religious relationships is largely ignored. The 
rationales treat intense religious feelings and instances of devotion as indications of undue 
influence when it motivates adherents to make gifts to religious institutions. Birks and Chin’s 
account specifically fails to consider why dependence on religious figures, including advisors, 
may enhance an adherent’s autonomy even if the dependence is significant. Bigwood’s account 
premised on fiduciary duties and exploitation is arguably overly protective of a donor’s 
interests. The wrongdoing rationale does not acknowledge that the duty to advise and duties of 
loyalty might be stronger in religious relationships in order to protect the short-term and long-
term interests of adherents, or that religious figures will often receive some form of benefit in 
a wide range of scenarios. The limitations described by Bigwood are poorly designed and 
would allow aggrieved former adherents to bring undue influence claims for incidental benefits 
received by officials when a gift is later regretted. Unjustly, the success of that claim seems 
likely following Bigwood’s account. Additionally, Chen-Wishart’s account does not give 
weight to the different sorts of relationships that inevitably involve some form of influence, 
most relevantly religious ones, even though it is described as a relational account. Time is spent 
examining Allcard without determining when the rationale establishes that the gifts were 
unduly influenced by the defendant. Chen-Wishart clearly believed Allcard to involve undue 
influence and reached that conclusion by inferring that undue influence produced the 
transactions. 
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Another difficulty for the rationales in explaining hard cases is the incomplete or overly 
inclusive understandings of each rationale’s fundamental principles. I argued that this created 
a real possibility of overregulation of gifts motivated by religious faith, despite the explicit 
limitations of the rationales. For example, Birks and Chin do not fully discuss what is meant 
by ‘impaired will.’ Instead, the four-limbed test set out to is conclusory rather than explanatory. 
The same is true for the inclusion of the term ‘excessive dependence.’ I discussed how this test 
could regularly produce unprincipled judgments in religious cases. Similarly, Chen-Wishart 
does not define what is meant by autonomy, and when the facts of cases are evidence of 
autonomous choice. Rather than appealing to broader philosophical and legal theory debates 
about autonomy, the analysis sticks to a Perfectionist conception and does not appeal to moral 
evaluations to determine the proscribed limits of autonomy. The rationale, therefore, 
incorporates a theoretical principle without defining fully how it should be applied in practice. 
 
Moreover, I argued that Chen-Wishart’s analysis of what harms should be prevented by the 
doctrine is too broadly construed. Inevitable harm generated by financial transactions, for 
instance, harm to one’s future autonomy should not be treated as a leading reason justifying 
intervention. The harm described provides aggrieved adherents, or adherents that have fallen 
on hard times the opportunity, to claim back gifts without offering a strong justification. 
 
I also established that each rationale endorses moralistic and paternalistic reasoning to help 
decide hard cases. I explained why both forms of reasoning are illegitimate considerations in 
an undue influence rationale. Such reasoning is needed to explain when influence becomes 
undue because of the vagueness of the accounts and the sorts of reasoning adopted by the 
authors. Birks and Chin’s account allows subjective conceptions of impaired will and excessive 
dependence to influence judgments. In turn, this could give rise to both moralistic and 
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paternalistic reasoning. Additionally, Bigwood’s account does not engage much with what 
exploitation consists of and how it applies in cases. The wrongdoing rationale relies more 
heavily on breaches of fiduciary duties. As demonstrated, breaches of those duties are often 
easily satisfied where exploitation cannot be found. The rationale, therefore, makes judgments 
based on moralistic reasoning and not on a clear understanding of exploitation. Lastly, Chen-
Wishart implicitly seeks to guard against both variations of reasoning by allowing moral value 
pluralism in a Perfectionist account of autonomy. However, there are occasions, as highlighted, 
where this Perfectionist analysis is inconsistent with the rationale’s fundamental aims. Findings 
of undue influence can be inferred on the basis of moralistic justifications on what is harmful 
to one’s future autonomy. 
 
A different problem identified with the rationales relates to the limits and justified boundaries 
of the rationales described by the authors. Each of the rationales generally offers an over-
inclusive presumption of influence that would likely produce difficulties for religious 
defendants to rebut. At the conceptual level, Bigwood’s limitations are sound, however, when 
applied to religious contexts, they do not impose any real safeguards for religious officials. 
Religious figures, who would be held to owe fiduciary duties in cases, would be found to breach 
their duty when they receive some form of benefit, even if it is not to be used for their personal 
interests. A presumption of influence inevitably arises in such scenarios. I also argued that the 
limitations, which bleed into the rebuttal stage of cases, have less applicability in religious 
cases. As a result, religious defendants would face great difficulties trying to rebut a 
presumption of influence compared to nonreligious cases where the presumption arises in 
social or professional settings. Chen-Wishart’s rationale is subject to the same sort of criticism. 
I considered above that the three ways the presumption of influence can be rebutted are less 
available to religious defendants because they lack detail explanation and clear reasoning.  
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Lastly, each of the rationales fails to account for how influence changes over time, and why 
the relationships of parties may fluctuate in cases where gifts are made over the course of a 
long-term relationship. For instance, none of the rationales make a distinction between the 
range of gifts given to the defendant in Allcard and the alleged unduly influencing conduct. 
Each rationale freezes the presumption at the time of the first gift and applies it to all subsequent 
gifts. Accordingly, each gift is susceptible to a presumption of influence and none are severed 
from it because the rationales do not seek to question the legitimacy of automatic presumptions 
of influence. 
 
Overall, the rationales have a number of failings that prevent principled determinations of when 
influence legitimately becomes undue in hard cases of religious influence. I have demonstrated 
throughout this chapter that this occurs at both a normative and practical level. Each account 
offers an inordinately generous returns policy allowing former adherents, who later regret their 
decisions to gift property to religious leaders and organisations, to seek relief years later. I 
consider that the financial harm caused by defendants needs some form of a causative link to 
reduce this concern. Further, the breadth of the rationales means that the only real way of 
limiting the success of claims is the defence of laches, which cannot have been the intention of 
the rationales, given the intended limits stated in each account. Consequently, none of the 
rationales offer a suitable option for reforming the understanding of presumed undue influence 
in English law. My conclusions on the ability of the three rationales to decide hard cases 
demonstrates that it is essential for an appropriate rationale to be detailed and normatively 
justified by reference to wider philosophical discussions. Chen-Wishart demonstrated the 
benefits of engaging more widely with such literature but failed to go far enough in describing 
and justifying the hybrid rationale.  
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A new rationale must be developed with a specific focus on religious claims and take account 
of how considerations of religious values and motivations benefit judicial decision making in 
hard cases. In doing so, a rationale could address both the challenges and questions that apply 
uniquely to religious cases, as well as the general doctrinal challenges created by the test for 
presumed undue influence. A new rationale based on this reasoning would benefit the English 
understanding of how the test for presumed undue influence should determine when religious 
























In this chapter, I set out my integrative rationale of autonomy and exploitation for presumed 
under influence and s2 FA06. Based on the insights and lessons outlined in chapter 6, I argue 
that this rationale promotes more principled regulation of both legal wrongs in religious 
contexts. Accordingly, I re-engage with how English courts should interpret s2 FA06 in 
religious cases. Overall, I develop understandings of the existing tests and language associated 
with both legal wrongs to reduce the discretion afforded to judges which improves the 
reasoning of cases, and ultimately, enhances the legitimacy of decisions on defendant liability. 
 
To satisfy this aim and promote a revisionist understanding of both legal wrongs, I do not seek 
to understand the relevant ways in which the wrongs may be understood generally. 
Accordingly, the following analysis is not based on conceptual analysis defined as, 764 “[a]n 
analysis of concepts is an analysis of the ways in which words function in our actual language 
games, which must be based on observation of linguistic practices and prevailing linguistic 
intuitions. Conceptual analysis cannot be revisionist.”765 Instead, I engage with applied 
jurisprudence to determine the correct boundaries of the foundationalist concepts that I argue 
are important to the rationales for both legal wrongs.766 In essence, I demonstrate that certain 
facts in cases show a more foundational basis that undue influence and fraud by false 
 
764 For a general overview of its usage in legal philosophy see Natalie Stoljar, ‘What Do We Want Law to Be? 
Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law,’ in Wil Waluchow et al, Philosophical Foundations of the Nature 
of Law (OUP 2013). 
765 Andrei Marmor ‘Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence)’, in Wil Waluchow et al, Philosophical 
Foundations of the Nature of Law, (OUP 2013), 212. 
766 This type of reduction is metaphysical or constitutive and about the nature of things, rather than about concepts 
and how they are referred to, ibid, 216-217. For wider discussions on methodology in jurisprudence and legal 
theory scholarship see Halpin (n 614), 67-109 & Alex Langlinais and Brien Leiter, ‘The Methodology of Legal 
Philosophy,’ in Herman Cappelemen et al, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, (OUP 2016). 
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representation produce gifts motivated by religious faith. This type of methodology is typically 
used in jurisprudential discussions of “what is law?”767 but there is no clear reason why it 
cannot be used to discuss specific legal doctrines.  
 
The legal theory analysis conducted in this chapter is both descriptive and evaluative. I endorse 
an “indirectly evaluative approach,”768 which is defined as what is valued as important for the 
practice of law, rather than a direct evaluation that upholds what the practice of law values as 
important.769 In wider legal contexts, this approach “…seizes on the ability to provide 
authoritative determination of social relations without recourse to further moral argument as 
the key characteristic.”770 Such reasoning applies in part to the analysis of autonomy, namely, 
a Perfectionist understanding of what courts can legitimately determine are valuable options 
for individuals within a margin of appreciation.  
 
The indirectly evaluative approach combined with a normative approach explains the other 
principles featuring in the rationale.771 The normative approach advances reasons why the 
usage of particular conceptions of autonomy and exploitation are justified in religiously 
motivated gift-giving contexts. The normative approach “…seizes on the deployment of 
normative argument as a key characteristic of the practice.”772 My analysis is “directly 
evaluative”773 because it explains appropriate reasons for justifying intervention in both areas 
 
767  The first real engagement with this question and specific methodology is found in H.L.A 
Hart, The Concept of Law, (OUP, 3rd Edition, 2012), 1-17. The focus is on “general and descriptive” 
jurisprudence, 239-244 described as “descriptive sociology,” xlv. For analysis of this methodology see Julie 
Dickson, Methodology in Jurisprudence,’ (2004) Legal Theory 10 (3), 117-156. 
768 A phrase coined in Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory, (Bloomsbury 2001), 51-70. It is used to refer 
to the methodology of Raz’s work considered below. Also see Dickson (n 767), 117–156.  
769 Halpin (n 614), 78. 
770 Ibid, 85. 
771 Associated with Ronald Dworkin’s writing in Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 1988), see ibid, 78 & Dickson 
(n 767), 122. 
772 Ibid, 85. 
773 Dickson (n 768), 51-54. 
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of law. This methodology incorporates an interpretivist approach that examines the crucial 
differences between individuals and communities and explains why those differences are 
important for understanding the nature of religious influence, and when it becomes unlawful. 
On this combined basis, the rationale limits how far the essential aspects of the rationale can 
be interpreted by courts within a reason-based margin of appreciation.  
 
I propose a new understanding of how a dualist account can address many of the difficulties of 
regulating hard cases of religious undue influence. My rationale illustrates the importance of 
examining the religious relationships between claimants and defendants, and the religious 
motivations for gifts made over time. My integrative rationale examines a claimant’s impaired 
autonomy to see whether it was caused by the defendant’s wrongdoing. The rationale is 
predominantly defendant-sided because it focuses on the causative role of the defendant’s 
influence and wrongdoing. The rationale also includes claimant-sided considerations. The 
combination of normative principles determines whether defendants have exploited a 
claimant’s impaired autonomy in order to make a financial gain. For the reasons specified, it 
is not enough that the claimant’s autonomy was somehow impaired before they made a gift. 
Causation must be established by proving that a defendant caused that impairment and 
subsequently violated the claimant’s autonomy through their exploitative conduct. The 
existence of the claimant’s impaired autonomy and the defendant’s exploitative conduct, which 
produces the gift, provides strong justifications for finding presumed undue influence in cases. 
 
The chapter subsequently discusses how the rationale applies to s2 FA06. I consider how 
autonomy and exploitation can be applied in a similar way in the criminal context in a way that 
offers a better explanation of how the existing statutory language of the offence should be 
interpreted by courts in religious cases. My analysis takes into account the possibility that 
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testing the falsity of religious representations is likely to be banned by courts where there is no 
clear evidence that the defendant misrepresents the state of their mind. In such cases, where 
there is evidence of exploitative conduct and the defendants satisfies the other mens rea 
requirements for s2 FA06, defendants should be found guilty of the offence. I also explain how 
testing the sincerity of religious beliefs should be considered by courts and how it fits into my 
rationale. 
 
Autonomy and exploitation are of equal importance to the functional operation of my rationale. 
The normative understandings advanced below explain how each principle helps to set 
appropriate limits to the rationale and justifies relief in both areas of law. Decisions on liability 
are not made because individuals make poor decisions that were highly improvident for their 
future interests. I consider that individuals often make decisions that do not align with their 
long-term goals or desires. Nevertheless, those decisions will frequently be autonomous 
choices at the time and should be respected by the law in both areas. 
 
Temporality is an explicit consideration in my rationale alongside autonomy and exploitation. 
The influence of time on the law is part of a growing trend in the socio-legal analysis of specific 
areas of law.774 Current scholarship argues that the general omission to consider how time 
affects law and legal institutions is significant.775 This view extends to different areas of legal 
 
774 See generally, Sian Beynon-Jones and Emily Grabham, Law and Time, (Routledge 2018); Emily Grabham, 
Brewing Legal Times: Things, Form, and the Enactment of Law, (University of Toronto Press 2016) & Sofia 
Ranchordás and Yaniv Roznai, Time, Law, and Change: An Interdisciplinary Study, (Hart Publishing 2020). 
775 Beynon-Jones and Grabham (n 774), 1-3. 
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study,776 most relevantly, to criminal law777 and aspects of private and public law relating to 
fraud regulation.778  
 
Law and legal institutions generally conceive of time as transpiring in a linear way.779 
However, concerning conceptions of autonomy and exploitation, this perspective lacks nuance 
as it does not account for relevant temporal factors. I agree that autonomy fluctuates over 
time.780 In presumed undue influence and s2 FA06 cases, courts should be required to consider 
changes to the claimant’s or victim’s autonomy over time. My analysis looks at practical 
reasoning and how individuals internally reflect on their short-term and long-term preferences 
in order to determine their true motivations for action. Accordingly, my rationale contains an 
internal view of temporality, which has principally been missing in the rational debate 
discussed in chapter 6.  
 
Before moving onto the substantive engagement with the key areas of focus of my rationale, it 
is necessary to briefly examine a potential criticism of this approach. A fair criticism 
anticipated at this stage is that the rationale builds upon the existing academic debate discussed 
in chapter 6 and legal theory, which disproportionately considers the appropriate limits of civil 
liability. The discussion of criminal liability for financial transactions in religious contexts is, 
it must be conceded, either absent or cursory in the sources discussed below. However, this is 
a necessary move. By firstly focusing on the more direct application of the rationale to undue 
 
776 In family law contexts see See Ellen Gordon-Bouvier, ‘The Open Future: Analysing the Temporality of 
Autonomy in Family Law,’ (2020) Child and Family Law Quarterly, 32(1). For discussions relating to medical 
law, see Emilie Cloatre, ‘Traditional Medicines, Law, and the (Dis)ordering of Temporalities,’ in Beynon-Jones 
and Grabham (n 774). 
777 See Sinéad Ring, ‘On Delay and Duration: Laws’ Temporal Order in Historical Child Sexual Abuse Cases,’ 
chapter 4 in ibid. 
778 Philip Ashton, ‘Time-Spaces of Adjudication in the U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis,’ in ibid. 
779 Renisa Mawani, ‘Law as Temporality: Colonial Politics and Indian Settlers’ (2014) UC Irvine Law Review, 
4(5), 71-80 & Ring (n 777), 61-65. 
780 Gordon-Bouvier (n 776). 
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influence, I clearly explain my intended understanding of the rationale’s fundamental 
principles, which will more effectively show what I am trying to achieve in this chapter. The 
civil law analysis also has the benefit of building on the failures of the rationales discussed in 
chapter 6, and more detailed judgments discussed in chapters 2 and 4, that is lacking in the 
criminal context. Setting out my analysis in this way makes it clearer how the rationale can 
also theorise s2 FA06 in a way that leads to more appropriate regulation of religious fraud. 
 
 
7.1. The integrative rationale and presumed undue influence  
 
I have argued that each of the three rationales discussed in chapter 6 failed to explain hard cases 
of religious undue influence. The main reason advanced for this was that the rationales failed 
to consider the party’s religious relationships that typically involve different degrees of 
influence and dependence than other relationships of influence. As mentioned, these 
relationships may change in intensity greatly over time and can involve a shared distrust of 
external advice. Additionally, the rationales did not provide strong justifications for deciding 
cases in practice. Despite this conclusion, I noted that the grounding principles of each account 
have degrees of applicability in other cases of undue influence. I submitted that each of the 
rationales inherently captured some of the essence of why certain conduct should be co 
considered unlawful in gift-giving contexts. 
 
In this section, I build on my analysis of the three rationales and narrow down understandings 
of impaired will, autonomy and wrongdoing by considering a wider range of legal and 
philosophical literature. I subsequently use this analysis to demonstrate why my rationale for 
presumed undue influence more suitably explains when relief in religious cases should be 
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granted. The rationale is better able to determine when the defendant’s conduct wrongfully 
impairs the autonomy of donors, which causes gifts to be made in religious contexts. My 
rationale also reduces the potential burdens faced by religious defendants listed in part I that 
arise when they attempt to rebut presumptions of influence. Ultimately, I establish why my 
rationale is capable of combatting my criticisms of the three rationales evaluated in chapter 6. 
 
 
7.1.1. Conceptions of personal autonomy  
 
Autonomy is a highly regarded ideal in moral philosophy,781 politics, social policies,782 and 
law.783 Despite the great importance of the principle in these fields and the frequent discussions 
in scholarly work, it is a concept that cannot be precisely defined in law;784 autonomy can only 
be appropriately characterised.785 Typically, it is argued that at its most basic characterisation, 
autonomy is an ability for self-rule or self-government.786 Some scholars claim that when 
autonomy is used to set limits to the law, it remains vague at best.787 However, these 
commentators fail to give adequate respect to the quality and volume of scholarship seeking to 
pin down the normative foundations of the principle.  
 
 
781 For an overview of the vast array of theories see Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, (CUP 
1988),1-12; John Christman, ‘Constructing the Inner Citadel: Recent Work on the Concept of Autonomy,’ (1988) 
Ethics, 99(1), 109–124. 
782 Dworkin (n 781), 10. 
783 For example, in Chen-Wishart’s account. Also, contractual liability is argued to be premised on autonomy, see 
Conrad D. Johnston, ‘The Idea of Autonomy and The Foundations of Contractual Liability,’ (1983) Law and 
Philosophy, 2(3), 280. 
784 Ibid. 
785 Ibid. 
786 This also covers autonomy as a capacity, a condition, an ideal, and a right see Feinberg (n 29), 27-51. This 
thesis will only focus on the general usage of the term, however.   
787 Thomas May, ‘The Concept of Autonomy,’ (1994), American Philosophy Quarterly, 31(2), 133. 
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There are four leading, and at times, overlapping categories of personal autonomy: I) 
coherentist;788 II) reasons-responsive;789 III) responsiveness-to-reasoning790 and; IV) 
incompatibilists.791 Autonomy theorists endorse this categorisation either explicitly or 
inexplicitly.792 Generally, accounts of autonomy aim to stick to one category, which provides 
a helpful means of grouping accounts. I adopt this categorisation to ease understanding and 
help achieve conceptual clarity on what each category means by autonomous action. 
 
It is a challenging task to decide what category offers an appropriate foundation for an 
understanding of autonomy in a rationale for presumed undue influence. A proper conception 
must take into account and be compatible with forms of authority and other external influences 
that are common and important parts of daily life.793 In the context of this thesis, the most 
important aspect of an individual’s daily lives are their religious beliefs794 and what 
relationships they form as a result of those beliefs.795 I also take account of other areas of 
influence that give rise to individual preferences, including family life and well-being. Giving 
specific focus to these considerations narrows down which account of autonomy enhances the 
 
788 See Laura Waddell Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy,’ (1993) Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 53(3), 599-616 & Dworkin (n 781). 
789 See generally Tomis Kapitan, ‘Autonomy and Manipulated Freedom,’ (2000) Philosophical Perspectives, 
34(14), 81-104 & Marina A.L. Oshana, ‘The Misguided Marriage of Responsibility and Autonomy, (2002) The 
Journal of Ethics, 6(2), 261-280. 
790 John Christman, ‘Autonomy and Personal History,’ (1991) Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21, 1–24. 
791 Peter Van Inwagen, ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism,’ (1975) Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 27(3), 185-199. For general commentary see Alfred 
R. Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-control to Autonomy, (OUP 2001), 211-237. 
792 Sarah Buss and Andrea Westlund, ‘Personal Autonomy,’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/personal-autonomy/> Accessed August 2019, ss 2. 
793 May (n 787), 133. 
794 Religious beliefs are highly influential on what choices are valued by adherents, for example, venture capital 
investments (see Justin Chircorp et al, ‘Does religiosity influence venture capital investment decisions?’ (2020) 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 62, 1-14); and election voting (see Aileen McColgan 'Undue Spiritual Influence: A 
Historical Analysis' (2017) King’s Law Journal, 28(2), 279-308). 
795 Religiosity affects the motivations and constraints on social affiliation, Patty Van Cappellen et al, ‘Religiosity 
and the Motivation for Social Affiliation,’ (2017) Personality and Individual Differences, 113, 24-31. Religious 
test groups were found to change their beliefs on a numeric estimation task to be more in line with their religious 
peers than a control group who were not, see Patty Van Cappellen, ‘Beyond Mere Compliance to Authoritative 
Figures: Religious Priming Increases Conformity to Informational Influence Among Submissive People,’ 
(2011) International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 21(2), 97–105. 
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ability of my rationale to distinguish between lawful and unlawful religiously motivated gifts 
in hard cases. 
 
 
Coherentist accounts of autonomy 
 
A coherentist understanding of autonomy is the most appropriate of the accounts for 
developing what counts as autonomous action in presumed undue influence cases.796 Such 
accounts offer a suitable way of taking account of the nature of religious relationships and how 
religious beliefs alter the motivations for a donor’s actions. Individuals are described as acting 
autonomously when the motivation for action coheres with some mental state that accurately 
represents their point of view on that action at the time.797 Individuals do not act autonomously, 
if when acting, they occupy a point of view from which they repudiate that same action.798 
Coherence-based theories focus on the mental state of individuals as decision-makers and 
practical reasoners. Varying coherentist theories examine the individual’s views on their long-
term and short-term goals,799 their character traits,800 and how higher-order desires move 
individuals to act.801 A wider range of other means of identifying an individual’s specific state 
of mind and reasons for action also exists.802  
 
 
796 Coherentist based accounts such as Frankfurt’s that apply autonomy to moral philosophy have received 
criticism, however, see John Fischer, ‘Responsibility and Autonomy: The Problem of Mission Creep,’ (2012) 
Philosophical Issues, 22(1), 167-179.    
797 Buss and Westlund (n 792), ss 2. 
798 Ibid 
799 Michael Bratman, Structures of Agency: Essays (OUP 2007). 
800 Dworkin (n 781). 
801 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, (CUP 1988), 11-25. These specific theories are 
listed in Buss and Westlund (2018), ss 2. 
802 Buss and Westlund (n 792), ss 2. 
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I focus on Dworkin’s coherentist theory of autonomy.803 His account is arguably the leading 
coherentist conception of autonomy and more broadly, has been described as a seminal account 
of autonomy.804 Dworkin’s understanding of autonomy combines each of the means of 
identifying an individual’s mental state and their reasons for actions just mentioned. Dworkin’s 
theory of autonomy provides the opportunity for a rationale of undue influence to specifically 
take account of the nature of religious relationships, religious enthusiasm, and spontaneous 
gift-giving. 
 
After setting out what this account means in detail below, I argue that this account of autonomy 
more accurately reflects how individuals think about entering into financial transactions, which 
extends to religiously motivated reasons for gifts.805 I then build on Chen-Wishart’s existing 
work on positive autonomy and consider what options the law should not prohibit in this 
context.806 I submit that this joint analysis of autonomy creates a more detailed framework to 
assess cases and offers additional reason-based justifications for intervention. I consequently 
demonstrate how Dworkin’s account can meet the challenge set by other autonomy theorists, 
more generally, that an appropriate conception of autonomy needs to take account of some 
external influences that provide, through stability, predictability, resources that enhance 
autonomy, but yet still retains an ability to accurately identify an individual’s own behaviour.807  
 
 
803 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Autonomy and Behavior Control,’ (1976) The Hastings Center Report, 6(1), 23-28 & 
Dworkin (n 781). 
804 Christman (n 781), 112. It has been subject to much criticism as a conception of autonomy in moral philosophy. 
For example, Christman asserts that this account fails to offer an effective means of identifying a person’s higher 
and lower-order desires are, 113-114. 
805 I argue this at a conceptual level and do not seek to empirically establish this is how individuals enter into 
transactions. Given the legal and philosophical nature of this thesis, I believe this is a justified response to 
determining an appropriate account of autonomy for an undue influence rationale. 
806 See pages 242 & 243-245. 
807 May (n 787), 134. 
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To reinforce why I have chosen a coherentist account for my rationale, I now explain why the 
other three categories of autonomy fail to offer a more suitable understanding of autonomy. 
 
 
Reasons-responsive accounts of autonomy  
 
In a reasons-responsive account of autonomy, individuals act autonomously if their mental 
processes creating their motives consider a wide range of reasons to engage or not engage in 
some action.808 Individuals are required to examine the reasons that do not form part of their 
perspectives or views on choices before acting. The considerations made are, therefore, 
independent of the individual, making this an externalist understanding of autonomy.809 
Accordingly, individuals are not autonomous when they are unresponsive to reasons that justify 
some motives but not others. The individual’s lack of consideration for the reasons to act or 
not subsequently fails to confer legitimacy on their action.810 An inability to be moved by 
reasons may stem from a cognitive disability or a refusal to be moved by reasons.811  
 
I reject a reasons-responsive account for my rationale because it offers an incomplete 
explanation of autonomous action. This category of autonomy requires individuals to act in 
accordance with the reasons for conduct when they are aware of them, and if they act 
 
808 Buss and Westlund (n 792), ss 2. For example, one account within this category is described as “taking 
responsibility” for actions, see John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral 
Responsibility, (CUP 2000), 211-217. Two possible objections to this conception of autonomy, unrelated to this 
context are raised: the account seems to offer incentives for agents not to take responsibility for actions, 217-220; 
secondly, there may be instances of moral responsibility where the individual has failed to take responsibility, 
220-222. It is argued briefly that the account prevents this from occurring, however, 217. For other criticisms of 
the account see Ishtiyaque Haji, ‘On Responsibility, History and Taking Responsibility (Comments on John 
Martin Fischer's Presentation),’ (2000) The Journal of Ethics, 4(4), 392-400. 
809 Externalist accounts of autonomy receive much criticism, see Stefaan E. Cuypers, ‘The Trouble with 




incompatibly, they do not act autonomously.812 Accordingly, the approach cannot take account 
of the reasons why individuals may act incompatibly with the reasons they may have for action 
or inaction. Consider a parent who thinks about leaving all of their wealth to their children in 
their will, even though they are estranged. The parent would rather leave the property to a 
charity of their choosing to benefit more people. After reading about the Supreme Court 
decision in Ilot v Mitson [2017]813 (where, after twenty years of a mother and daughter being 
estranged, the daughter was found to be a reasonable dependent and able to claim a large 
percentage of their mother’s estate) in a newspaper, the parent concludes that there is no point 
in leaving their assets to anyone but their children. The parent thinks that regardless of their 
intention to distribute their property as they wish to after death, their children could claim 
reasonable maintenance if found to be their ‘dependents’ under the relevant legislation.814 The 
parent considers that this is likely. Accordingly, the parent decides to leave their assets to their 
children. In this scenario, the parent’s action is incompatible with their genuine reasons for 
giving. On this understanding of autonomy, the parent is not acting autonomously.  
 
However, this conclusion seems intuitively odd. Parents often act in ways that put the interests 
of others, mainly their children, before their interests and preferences when they do not wish 
to. Parents who act incompatibly with their reasons for acting when giving priority to their 
children’s interests can only be interpreted as lacking autonomy through the paternalistic 
reasoning that the parent does not make a real choice for themselves; they are not moved by 
their real reasons for action. Accordingly, the reason-responsive account misses an additional 
factor that justifiably explains why the parent’s action should not be described as autonomous 
to avoid being charged with the claim that it gives rise to paternalistic reasoning.  
 
812 Ibid. 
813 [2017] UKSC 17; [2018] A.C. 545 
814 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, s 1(1)(c). 
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There are also specific reasons for rejecting this category of autonomy in the context of undue 
influence. Firstly, consider a claimant who receives legal advice before making a gift. The 
advisor may inform the claimant that the gift is very improvident, and they should not comply 
with their religious motivations for the gift. If that reason not to act is ignored by the claimant 
because the reason does not align with their religious motivations, the claimant’s choice to 
enter into the transaction would not be a true or a valid choice under this understanding of 
autonomy. However, as argued in a similar way concerning Birk’s and Chin’s discussion of 
impaired will, this conclusion is insulting and an inaccurate description of the claimant’s 
conduct. Consequently, this account of autonomy fails to consider the relevance of 
incompatible reasons for action that are part of decision-making processes, which are highly 
relevant to religious contexts.  
 
Secondly, the account gives rise to paternalistic reasons for intervention in another way. 
Individuals are offered incentives not to take responsibility for their actions,815 which means 
the doctrine could be used as a returns policy for unprincipled decisions to make gifts. 
Accordingly, my analysis provides compelling reasons why this conception of autonomy is 
unable to guard against the sorts of concerns discussed in chapters 4 and 6. Consequently, such 
accounts provide unhelpful explanations of autonomy for the purposes of developing a 







815 See Fischer and Ravizza (n 808), 217-220. 
 231 
Responsiveness-to-reasoning accounts of autonomy  
 
A responsiveness-to-reasoning account of autonomy816 considers that autonomy is exercised 
when individuals evaluate their possible motives for actions based on their own beliefs and 
desires, and this subsequently provides them with an opportunity to adjust their behaviour, as 
a result of that evaluation.817 The most important part of an individual’s reasoning process is 
deemed to be the evaluation of their own beliefs and desires. This account of autonomy requires 
individuals to distance themselves from their beliefs and desires and to see themselves as 
objective arbitrators of their reasons before deciding whether to act.818 Evaluations enable 
individuals to decide what conduct should follow this reasoning, where that individual holds 
particular beliefs and desires. It is not important that individuals make accurate judgments 
about what action should follow.819 Autonomy is still exercised where individuals hold false 
beliefs on why they should act in particular ways.820  
 
On the face of it, this account looks quite similar to coherentist understandings of autonomy 
briefly mentioned and discussed further below. However, one key distinction between 
responsiveness-to-reasoning and coherentist accounts is that the former involves an additional 
externalist focus.821 The former account accepts that individuals can be mistaken about whether 
they are truly reasoning;822 individuals may not be aware that reflections that cause them to act 
have been influenced, and so those actions are not determined by their reasoning.823 A 
 
816 A leading account is advanced in Christman (n 790). 








responsiveness-to-reasoning account includes an added degree of objectivity needed to 
determine whether individuals have been influenced by another to act. 
 
I do not accept a responsiveness-to-reasoning understanding of autonomy in my rationale for 
presumed undue influence for practical adjudication reasons.824 Applied in practice, this 
account would most likely require individuals to hear advice before gifts are determined as 
independently motivated and lawful. Such action would provide a guarantee that donors have 
sufficiently distanced themselves from their beliefs and desires to an appropriate degree, which 
is indicated by the added degree of objectivity of the account. This account looks a lot like 
view (II) on the role of independent advice in presumed undue influence cases discussed in 
chapters 2825 and 4.826 However, the standard set by the account is too strict and relegates 
respect for independent will for moralistic understandings of appropriate transactions. Such 
reasoning is illegitimate in the context of this thesis as stated in chapter 6,827 as it imposes an 
objective conception of appropriate gift-giving that often will not match up with the religious 
conceptions of obdurate believers. 
 
Moreover, a rationale based on this conception of autonomy fails to consider the importance 
of the actual beliefs held by individuals. Religious beliefs, in particular, will often prevent 
individuals from evaluating other beliefs and desires held in a real way. As stated previously, 
the claimant in Allcard would most likely have treated independent advice as a temptation from 
the devil or not adequately taking account of the religious nature of the gifts.828 Subsequently, 
 
824 There are general criticisms for why such an account should be rejected. This includes Christman’s leading 
account. In Mele (n 791), 271-280 it is argued that it inappropriately focuses on the personal history of individuals. 
In Andrea C. Westlund, ‘Rethinking Relational Autonomy,’ (2009) Hypatia, 24(4), 26-49, it is submitted that 
Christman fails to consider the importance of relational autonomy. 
825 See page 79. 
826 See pages 145-146. 
827 See pages 187 & 199. 
828 See pages 145-146. 
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any advice heard is unlikely to have been accepted by the claimant as helpful, and less likely 
to be followed. Consequently, donors motivated by religious faith may not think it necessary 
to take a step back and evaluate their choices because of how forcefully their beliefs impact 
their motivations for action. Accordingly, this conception of autonomy is unable to address the 
specific religious regulatory challenges posed by the test for presumed undue influence 
examined in part I. 
 
Autonomy understood in this way also contains a degree of circularity when applied to contexts 
of undue influence. Taking a step back to evaluate one’s possible choices in light of one’s 
motives and desires based on advice does not guarantee that an individual subsequently acts 
autonomously. The undue influence could have occurred before this point or be so strong that 
no advice could make the claimant act autonomously. Therefore, regardless of reflecting on 
advice, it is not guaranteed that the advice would show a gift has been independently reasoned.  
 
Additionally, the advice itself could also amount to instance of illegitimate influence under this 
view of autonomy, which prevents donors from effective independent reasoning. Individuals 
do not live in complete isolation from interpersonal or institutional influences. An infinite range 
of sources could influence an individual’s conduct, including legal advisors. It is a weak 
argument to submit that regardless of the content of the advice, a legal advisor is nevertheless 
capable of unduly influencing financial transactions. Intuitively, something more seems 
required. This consideration helps to demonstrate that for an account of autonomy to be 
legitimate in the context of undue influence, it must adopt a temporally nuanced analysis of 
facts, by focusing on wrongdoing to demonstrate the independence of reasons for the actions. 
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This analysis also links to a general criticism of responsiveness-to-reasoning accounts of 
autonomy. It is argued that such accounts of autonomy are incomplete in determining what 
influences have, or have not, prevented an individual from reasoning independently before 
acting.829 On this basis, accounts fail to distinguish between acceptable influences and 
influences that violate autonomy.830 Similar criticism was against Birks and Chin’s rationale 
above.831 The account of autonomy advanced in the rationale did this by giving great weight to 
the dependency of claimants on defendants. As established in my critique of that rationale, 
greater clarity is needed to distinguish religious influence from undue influence.  
 
Ultimately, a responsiveness-to-reasoning account of autonomy does not create greater clarity 
on what the scope of undue influence should be in a way that reduces the risks of unprincipled 
decisions in religious cases. The account fails to provide an adequate framework for developing 
a rationale for presumed undue influence that can take account of the nature of religious beliefs 
and motivations for gift-giving. 
 
 
Incompatibilist accounts of autonomy  
 
Incompatibilist accounts of autonomy consider that autonomy is not exercised where an 
individual’s actions can be explained by reasons independent of them.832 For these accounts, 
 
829 Ibid. 
830 Select responsiveness-to-reasoning accounts of autonomy attempt to address this difficulty, see Paul Benson, 
‘Free Agency and Self-Worth,’ (1994) The Journal of Philosophy, 91(12), on pages 651-668. 
831 See pages 185-189. 
832 For example, Kant’s account of autonomy which requires “a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar 
as they are rational… that… can be efficient independently of foreign causes determining it,” cited in Robert 
Kane, The Significance of Free Will, (OUP 1998), 82. Also, see van Inwagen (n 791), 148. For broader discussions 
on the differences between such accounts see Buss and Westlund (n 792), ss 2. 
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autonomous action requires complete independence of reasons for actions.833 Therefore, even 
if the individual’s beliefs and desires are among the reasons for acting, there is no self-
governance of actions.834 The threshold of autonomy is set so high that any influence from 
another undermines the ability of individuals to act on their own will.835 One theorist goes so 
far as to say that free will is, in reality, a very uncommon phenomenon.836 
 
Incompatibilist accounts do not offer a suitable basis to develop a rationale for presumed undue 
influence.837 The standard set by incompatibilists for autonomous action is simply too high to 
allow for any real distinction between religious influence and religious undue influence. This 
conception would create conceptual clarity as to what constitutes impaired will and thus would 
overcome the main challenge facing Birk’s and Chin’s account.838 However, this clarity is 
achieved at such a great cost that it cannot be construed as a justified conception of autonomy 
for the purposes of this thesis, since any instance of religious influence motivating gifts would 
be deemed unlawful.  
 
A rationale based on this account would also be susceptible to the threshold criticisms of 
Bigwood’s wrongdoing rationale.839 Any indication that a claimant may have been taken 
advantage of, or acting without autonomy, even if it is minimal, would be unlawful. 
 
833 Incompatibilist theorists consistently attempt to show that compatibilist theories (the three other categories of 
autonomy considered in this section), fall short on what is required to autonomous action, ibid, 80. For the 
significance of ultimate responsibility and incompatibilists conception of autonomy see ibid, 81-102. Kane 
proposes the notion of complete ‘sole authorship’ which is necessary for his own Incompatibilist account, 80. 
834 Buss and Westlund (n 792), ss 2. 
835 Ibid. 
836 van Inwagen (n 791), 78. In this account, there are two occasions on which individuals act on their own will: 
“cases of an actual struggle between perceived mora duty or long-term self-interest, on the one hand, and 
immediate desire, on the other; and cases of a conflict of incommensurable values” 77. 
837 For more general, deeply philosophical reasons why such an account should not be accepted as a legitimate 
conception see Tomas Kapitan, ‘A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?’ in Robert Kane, The Oxford 
Handbook of Free Will, (OUP 2001) 127-157. It is submitted that the “Consequence Argument” made against 
compatibilist conceptions of autonomy, can be reduced in force to the point that the argument does not prove 
incompatibilism, 127-128. 
838 See pages 185-190. 
839 See pages 196-200. 
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Accordingly, incompatibilists lack the nuance to engage with the relationships held between 
the parties in any more detail to determine whether a decision is of the claimant’s free will. 
More specifically, incompatibilist accounts would be completely irreconcilable with religious 
relationships. Adherents of many faiths often devote themselves to one moral authority for all 
decisions made,840 including supreme deities or religious figures, for example, Imams.841 The 
account would thus fail to appreciate and give adequate respect to the special nature of religious 
relationships. Instead of treating such beliefs and relationships as a legitimate part of religious 
experiences, the religious dimension of an individual’s life would be seen to undermine their 
self-governance and ability to act on their own free will based on moralistic reasoning.  
 
Incompatibilist conceptions of autonomy fail to appreciate the relational dimension of 
autonomy, which many autonomy theorists engage with.842 Brown argues that most 
conceptions of autonomy consider a liberal subject to move freely in society unencumbered 
with conflicting responsibilities and not dependent on others for survival or protection,843 and 
this ignores conflicting commitments and the reasons why people are dependent on others. 
Consequently, incompatibilists do not capture the real essence of how individuals form and 
maintain relationships with others. 
 
On a similar note, if taken seriously, this conception of autonomy would treat any legal advice 
received before transactions as capable of undermining the ability of a donor’s self-governance. 
The advisor would foreseeably become a source of influence, clouding or taking over the 
 
840 James Rachels, ‘God and Human Attitudes,’ (1971) Religious Studies, 7(4), 334. 
841 As in Khan (n 151) discussed on page 80. 
842 See n 662. 
843 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, (Princeton University Press 1996), 
156-157. These comments are made with a particular focus on distinctions between male and female autonomy, 
but they are also applicable to religious adherents. This is especially pertinent where there is intersectional 
consideration of female adherent’s autonomy.  
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judgement of advisees. Although independent legal advice does not ensure autonomous 
decision-making, it may help donors to consider their own motivations for completing 
transactions more clearly. An incompatibilist conception disregards the relevance of advice 
heard in undue influence cases. This would be an inappropriate development to the doctrine, 
as independent advice should have the potential to play some sort of role in cases, even if it is 
not a determining factor. Where it is relevant to the rebuttal stage of presumed undue influence 
cases, a more nuanced assessment of the facts can be made. In turn, this is more likely to 
provide greater justification for decisions. 
 
There is a final, more general reason which supports the rejection of categories of autonomy 
that focus on external considerations. The adoption of an incompatibilist account of autonomy 
in a rationale for presumed undue influence would create confusion on what motivates a 
claimant’s actions. Cases will generally involve two sorts of motivations that feature in the 
claimant’s decision-making process before gifts are made: the claimant’s own motives are 
present (internal reasons for action), as well as the religious beliefs instilled or manifested by 
defendants (external reasons for action). In practice, it is hard for judges to determine the real 
motivation(s) for gifts. How would a judge seek to separate independently acquired 
motivations from externally imposed motivations? In a rationale for presumed undue influence, 
a greater degree of precision should be aimed for to prevent every case from being successfully 
argued, a possibility which is very likely under this understanding of autonomy. The 
incompatibilist view of autonomy is, therefore, an illegitimate conception of autonomy in this 
context for multiple forceful reasons.  
 
In this section I have explained why three conceptions of autonomy should be rejected in a 
rationale for presumed undue influence. Common themes are identified throughout my analysis 
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to justify this position, including the inappropriateness of externalist accounts of autonomy, 
and why accounts fail to consider why certain sources of influence may enhance an individual’s 
capabilities for self-governance. The most common theme identified was each category’s 
inability to incorporate the potential importance of religious beliefs and relationships for 
adherents in cases. The following section addresses these challenges and reinforces my 
decision to include Dworkin’s coherentist account of autonomy as a fundamental principle in 
the integrative rationale. 
 
 
7.1.2. Gerald Dworkin on autonomy 
 
Dworkin’s account of personal autonomy has proven highly influential to discussions of free 
will and self-governance. His work on autonomy is the focus of several private law theorists 
aiming to set limits to areas of law844 because of the explicit and precisely defined basis of 
Dworkin’s account.845 This account of autonomy has also become popular because it was 
developed with paternalism in mind, and therefore, seeks to guard against strong forms of 
paternalistic reasoning.846 My consideration of Dworkin’s account is consequently in line with 




844 For example, Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract, (Harvard University Press 1993), 150 
& Horatio Spector, ‘A Contractarian Approach to Unconscionability,’ (2006) Chicago-Kent Law Review, 81(1), 
95-118. 
845 Fabrizio Esposito, ‘Conceptual Foundations for a European Consumer Law and Behavioural Sciences 
Scholarship,’ in Hans-W. Micklitz et al, Research Methods in Consumer Law: A Handbook, (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2018), 90. 
846 Ibid, 89. The commentary focuses specifically on Dworkin (n 781) & Dworkin (n 647), 64-84. 
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In this section, I outline a slightly different version of Dworkin’s conception of autonomy 
featured in the private law analysis referred to. My analysis of Dworkin’s views on autonomy 
incorporates his original conception of autonomy, as well as his second effort at setting down 
a justified understanding of autonomy. I first outline the aspects shared by the two conceptions 
of autonomy before setting out the differences between the two accounts, and the reasons why 
Dworkin felt it necessary to amend his original conception. The two-limbed account is a novel 
way of applying Dworkin’s account in private law theory. I argue that this account provides a 
more suitable understanding of autonomy in my integrative rationale. 
 
Dworkin’s more recent conception of autonomy847 is not completely new. It was developed 
from an earlier attempt848 that was subject to much criticism.849 The two accounts of autonomy 
advanced by Dworkin share some similarities. Firstly, both accounts are premised on first-
order and second-order preferences. First-order preferences “have as their object other, second-
order preferences: a desire to desire to do X or Y”850 and consist of wants that reference an 
action.851 For example, a wish to follow a certain religion that results in someone following 
that religion. Second-order preferences “have as their object actual actions of the agent: a desire 
to do X or Y”852 and are references to higher-order preferences.853 For instance, an adherent 
who changes their mind on their religious beliefs and does not want to follow that faith 
subsequently. Second-order preferences provide a means of reflecting on and disciplining first-
order preferences.854 
 
847 Dworkin (n 781). 
848 Dworkin (803), 23-28. 
849 This mainly related to its inability to define what identification meant in the account. For an overview of this 
commentary see Christman (n 781), 113-114. 
850 Ibid, 112. 
851 This categorisation is taken from Harry F. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ (1971) 
The Journal of Philosophy, 38(1), 8. 
852 Ibid. 
853 Ibid, 8-9. 
854 Eposito (n 845), 91. 
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Secondly, both of Dworkin’s accounts accept that procedural independence is an important 
aspect of autonomy and reject substantive independence. Dworkin submits that autonomy is 
achieved through procedural independence, possessed by individuals whose motivations for 
action are not the result of “manipulation, deception, [and] the withholding of relevant 
information...”855 Dworkin states that such conduct violates the norm of autonomy by 
infringing upon the voluntary character of an individuals’ actions.856 The links between action 
and the individual’s character are broken because the action of the individual is involuntary.857 
Where procedural independence is infringed by another, the actions of individuals become the 
combined product of themselves and another.858 For Dworkin, this combination excuses 
individuals completely, or at least partially, from the responsibility of their actions.859  
 
However, not every interference with the voluntariness of an individual’s actions interferes 
with their ability to pursue their conception of a good life;860 interferences are a matter of 
degree. Individuals have preferences about their preferences, such as a desire not to have, or 
act upon the particular desires they hold.861 Dworkin considers that the story of Odysseus is an 
example of this reasoning, “In limiting his liberty, in accordance with his wishes, we promote, 
not hinder, his efforts to define the contours of his life.”862 Accordingly, where autonomy is 
limited by another in a way desired by individuals because they conceive it as good for them 
and their values, the interference with their autonomy is justifiable. 
 
 
855 Dworkin (n 803), 25. 
856 Dworkin (n 781), 14. 
857 Ibid. 
858 Ibid. 
859 Ibid. By focusing on specific types of behaviour that violates procedural independence, Dworkin limits the 
coverage of his account. Accordingly, unlike the accounts of autonomy considered in section 1.2, it is not subject 
to relational autonomy critique. 
860 Ibid. 
861 Ibid, 15. 
862 Ibid. 
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Dworkin rejects the need for substantive independence, 863 characterised as accepting the 
commands of others as final and deferring independent judgment,864 because “…it makes 
autonomy inconsistent with other important values.”865 An individual’s conduct lacks 
substantive independence if they “renounce his[\her] independence of thought or action” before 
completing an action.866 Dworkin proposes that individuals are autonomous even if they are 
guided by particular causes, obligations, or commitments if, and only if, it has been chosen or 
consistently approved of.867 Dworkin cites individuals disciplined by monasteries as an 
example of autonomous conduct868 and rightfully observes, “There is no possible world in 
which one could remain both substantively independent and commit oneself to a cause or a 
person.”869 Understood in this way, autonomy overcomes the potential criticisms of 
incompatibilist theorists that no one acts autonomously by following the moral orders of 
religious institutions or deities. Moreover, an account of autonomy rejecting substantive 
independence has the potential to incorporate moral value pluralism in a broad manner 
depending on additional criteria for self-governance, which I explore below. 
 
In Autonomy and Behavior Control,870 Dworkin describes his first account of autonomy, which 
requires that an individual’s second-order identifications are congruent with their first-order 
motivations.871 The process outlined was termed “authenticity,” a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for autonomous action.872 Authenticity requires an individual who smokes to desire 
 
863 Ibid. 25. 
864 Ibid, 22. 
865 Ibid, 23. 
866 Dworkin (n 803), 25. 
867 Ibid.  
868 Dworkin (n 781), 18 
869 Ibid, 25. 
870 Dworkin (n 803). 
871 Dworkin (n 781), 25. 
872 Ibid. 
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to smoke and if they did not desire to smoke, but then smoked, the individual would not act 
autonomously when smoking. 
 
In Dworkin’s second account of autonomy advanced in The Theory and Practice of 
Autonomy,873 authenticity was considered a mistaken addition of the first account. The 
inclusion of authenticity was seen to “…ignore[s] a crucial feature of persons, their ability to 
reflect upon and adopt attitudes toward their first-order desires, wishes, intentions.”874 Dworkin 
reconfigured his conception of autonomy by defining it as: 
“… a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order 
preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these 
in light of higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define 
their nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of 
person they are.”875  
To put this definition another way, “The idea of autonomy is not merely an evaluative or 
reflective notion, but includes as well some ability both to alter one's preferences and to make 
them effective in one's actions and, indeed, to make them effective because one has reflected 
upon them and adopted them as one's own.”876  For Dworkin, the critical part of autonomous 
action is, therefore, the ability of individuals to question whether they align with their reasons 
for action.877 If an individual is unable to think in this way before acting, or during their actions, 
either because they lack the capacity, or someone prevents them from doing so, they do not 
subsequently act autonomously. 
 
 
873 Ibid. For a more detailed overview of this account in wider moral philosophy see Lawrence Haworth, ‘Dworkin 
on Autonomy,’ (1991) Ethics, 102(1), 129-139. 
874 Ibid. Dworkin lists multiple views that corroborate this view at 15- 20. 
875 Dworkin (n 781), 20. 
876 Ibid, 17. 
877 Ibid. 
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Even though Dworkin disputes the appropriateness of his first account, I consider it is an 
appropriate conception of autonomy for my rationale. The criticisms of scholars made against 
‘identification,’ now examined, have less applicability in this context than in an account of 
moral autonomy. A leading objection to Dworkin’s first account is that it is subject to an infinite 
regress of considerations when determining whether someone acts autonomously. The 
criticism is considered most applicable to individuals living completely subservient lives who 
identify with their first-order preferences living in this way and approve of the lower-order 
preferences of fulfilling the tasks making them subservient.878 It is argued that where this is the 
product of the individual’s education and social experiences throughout their life, they have 
been manipulated, and the values and ideals of that individual are not truly their own. 
Accordingly, it is claimed they do not have authenticity.879 The argument follows: 
“Since the acts of identification must themselves be autonomous, this requires that 
another act of identification takes place at a higher level. And since this act must also be carried 
out in a way that reflects procedural independence, then a fourth level must be postulated there. 
Hence the regress.”880 
 
However, if the first account was situated in a Perfectionist framework, as I do below, a limit 
can be set for what higher-order preferences individuals can hold, which helps to overcome 
objections that individuals can legitimately subject themselves to a completely subservient life. 
When authenticity is applied in a Perfectionist framework, like that adopted by Chen-Wishart, 
the limits of autonomy specified do not allow that choice to be made because it can be 
characterised as a repugnant option. The threshold of the framework is set at a particularly high 
standard and would also cover the complete surrendering of autonomy, as in the willing slave 
 
878 Christman (n 781), 113-114. 
879 Ibid. 
880 Christman quotes Irving Thalberg, ‘Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action,’ (1978) Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 8(2), 219-220 at ibid, 113-114. 
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example discussed in chapter 6.881 Further, this understanding of autonomy would not cover 
similar situations in Allcard, where vows of poverty and obedience were accepted by the 
claimant. Such choices would not be excluded as repugnant options because the nuns, on a 
conventional understanding, were free to leave the convent if they wanted to or later changed 
their religious beliefs.   
 
Furthermore, the force of the infinite regress argument is not always as applicable to all undue 
influence cases. For instance, modern reported cases in England and Australia mainly consist 
of newcomers to religious organisations and communities (notably, Allcard, Azaz, and 
Hartigan). In those cases, the impact of the infinite regress is felt less strongly. The claimants 
were not initially influenced by the defendants to attend the relevant religious place of worship. 
Instead, the claimants visited or joined the religious and spiritual institutions of their own free 
will, an aspect of the cases which is not disputed. Consequently, the regress is less present in 
such cases since there is a baseline of the typical conduct of those claimants by which to assess 
their later actions and motivations to help determine if they were acting autonomously before 
gifting property.  
 
I still include both accounts of autonomy in my rationale, despite demonstrating how the first 
account can still help to produced principled determinations of when a donor acts 
autonomously. My approach helps to more accurately characterise autonomous choices. This 
is necessary to ensure that the rationale provides a detailed account of how autonomy is 
infringed. Autonomy understood in this context is a substantive and evidential concept that can 
be examined by courts to better establish when religious influence becomes undue. A 
claimant’s preferences may seem to have been congruent at the time of a gift, but this may only 
 
881 See pages 201-202. 
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have occurred because they were prevented from reflecting on their preferences by another 
party. Accordingly, the two limbs considered together in this way adds greater evidence that 
an individual’s decisions are based on their own beliefs and preferences.  
 
 
7.1.3. Autonomy and presumed undue influence 
 
My combination of Dworkin’s accounts of autonomy provides the first step in my rationale to 
determine when gifts have been unduly influenced. This part of the rationale identifies when a 
donor’s autonomy has been impaired (the claimant-sided aspect of the rationale). Impairments 
of autonomy are subsequently violated by a donee’s wrongdoing, which breaches the donor’s 
procedural independence (the defendant-sided aspect). I elaborate on what I mean by the 
defendant’s wrongdoing in the following section. I consider that autonomy is impaired when 
donors make gifts but do not agree with their reasons motivating the gifts. Here, the donor’s 
second-order preferences do not match up with their first-order preferences. I define this as an 
‘incongruence between reasons,’ which follows Dworkin’s original account of autonomy. 
Secondly, a donor’s autonomy is infringed when they are unable to question and reflect on the 
reasons for gifts made to donees. I call this second limb ‘reflection thwarting,’ which follows 
Dworkin’s second account of autonomy. If claimants are unable to demonstrate either one of 
the two limbs, their autonomy has not been impaired, and a presumption of influence does not 
arise. (I consider the procedural operation of my rationale claims in more detail below.) 
 
I now explain how my account of autonomy applies to decided hard cases of religious 
influence. I argue that courts have wrongly decided leading religious cases. By applying the 
theory of autonomy in the way described, I demonstrate why this account of autonomy brings 
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greater conceptual clarity to the terms impaired will and autonomy in these settings. 
Additionally, I describe how both limbs of autonomy impose the first set of limits on my 
rationale. Autonomy understood in this way is consequently not subject to the same objections 
made in Chapter 6 about Birks and Chin’s and Chen-Wishart’s understanding of autonomy.882  
 
 
Allcard v Skinner (1887) 
 
Following the understandings of autonomy contained in my rationale, the claimant in Allcard 
was not unduly influenced at all stages when the gifts were made during their relationship with 
the defendant. This is a considerable departure from the orthodox understandings of the 
judgment. In the rationales that focused on impaired will discussed in chapter 6, Allcard is 
viewed as a classic example of undue influence.883 I consider that my opposing conclusion is 
justified under the autonomy framework advanced here because it ensures greater respect for 
the religious relationships held between parties and how this can change over time. 
 
Two facts are significant to this discussion, firstly, during the first six-years of the party’s 
relationship the claimant regularly received written advice about her financial affairs from her 
brother, a barrister. After receiving the letters, the claimant continued to practice the beliefs of 
the order, live with the sisterhood, and make several gifts to the defendant which were used for 
charitable causes. The claimant renounced her beliefs and left the sisterhood in 1879 to join 
the Church of Rome. Additionally, the judgments of the Chancery Court only briefly mention 
changes in the claimant’s religious enthusiasm during these years. When the claimant was a 
 
882 For a summary of my criticisms Birks and Chin see page 190 and for Chen-Wishart see page 213. 
883 A detail overview of the facts was given on pages 131-132. 
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novice in 1886, she expressed a wish to leave the sisterhood but did not, as ultimately, she felt 
bound to it.884 After agreeing to the vows when she became a sister in 1871, the claimant once 
again wanted to leave the sisterhood but was told by the defendant she could not since she was 
still bound to it.885 Another similar effort happened on a later occasion.886 
 
Even if the defendant had not spent all the money and such a long period had not passed before 
the claim was brought, I consider that the gifts had not been unduly influenced. At no point in 
the chain of causation between the claimant’s relationship with the defendant and the gifts 
made is there evidence that the claimant’s autonomy was truly infringed. The claimant’s 
reflections were not thwarted. It appears that the claimant’s first-order preferences (their 
religious beliefs) were in line with their second-order preferences (being willingly committed 
to the religious order and practising the sisterhood’s beliefs) when making each of the gifts; 
the claimant wanted to become an integrated part of the sisterhood and made the gifts to the 
defendant to further her spiritual development. Additionally, the claimant had written 
correspondence with her brother between 1870 about her life at the sisterhood and the amount 
of property she owned. The first instance judgment mentions that just after the claimant agreed 
to the vows of poverty her brother received a letter that made him think she was well-
informed.887 All of the letters received by the brother were positive, written by someone well-
educated, and aware of what they had done.888 There is no suspicion that these letters were 
written by the defendant, nor did the claimant dispute that they had not written the letters. After 
corresponding with her brother, the claimant proceeded to make the subsequent gifts. Both 
judgments of the Chancery Court held that there was no undue pressure on the claimant889 and 
 
884 Ibid, 176. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Ibid. 
887 Ibid, 166 (Kekewich J.). 
888 Ibid, 167. 
889 Ibid, 179 (Lindley L.J.). 
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the gifts were not given because of impropriety.890 The claimant had the opportunity to 
critically reflect on her first-order preferences and see how they could be achieved through her 
second-order preferences on occasions throughout the party’s relationship, and the claimant 
did so on multiple occasions. Consequently, the claimant’s reflections were not thwarted by 
the defendant at any point at which the gifts were made. 
 
Secondly, there does not appear to have been an incongruence between the claimant’s reasons 
for the gifts. There is no indication in the facts, or the separate judgments of the first instance 
or Court of Appeal Chancery judges, that the claimant’s actions were incompatible with her 
motives or desires for action at each point the gifts were made. Additionally, there is no 
mention of whether the claimant’s expression to leave the sisterhood correlated to the times 
the gifts were made. A temporal point, which the judges in Allcard and other commentators 
focusing on the claimant’s impaired will, fail to consider. It is correct to say that when the 
claimant reflects on her first-order preferences and thinks about leaving leave the order, that 
her second-order presences were incompatible. At this point, there was an incongruence 
between the claimant’s reasons for the gifts. Accordingly, the claimant’s autonomy was not 
complete here. However, the impairment does not appear operative at the time the gifts were 
made to the defendant. The claimant’s impaired autonomy was not caused by the defendant 
and therefore, not wrongfully caused. Instead, the impairment was generated by the victim 
when they considered their short-term and long-term preferences, and how they had changed 
since joining the sisterhood. Accordingly, the link between the claimant’s character traits and 
their voluntary behaviour was not broken by the defendant. A change of mind on first-order 
preferences is simply not sufficient to justify relief. For these reasons, causation is essential for 
 
890 Ibid, (Kekewich J.). 
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determining when autonomy is impaired and whether that violation has been produced by 
defendants.891  
 
My analysis also explains the positive role that independent advice received by claimants has 
in my rationale. Advice is most likely to be given by solicitors, as in Azaz,892 or some other 
professional body. But it can extend to religious officials, like in Khan, where the advisor to 
the contractual agreement was an Imam.893 Claimants are safeguarded against abuses of 
position by religious officials acting as advisors in my rationale, particularly by how the 
conception of exploitation explained below applies to third parties.894 Advice received by 
claimants may help them to reflect upon their preferences, values and create congruence 
between their reasons for gifts, depending on the content of the advice. This stands even if the 
advice is dismissed by claimants because it is considered incompatible with their first-order 
and second-order preferences. In my rationale, advice received by claimants does not establish 
that defendants did not unduly influence claimants. The influence may on occasions be so 
strong that no amount of advice enables donors to create congruence between their reasons, for 
example. Courts must be satisfied that defendants have violated a claimant’s autonomy through 
their exploitative conduct in the way described. I discuss the other part of the role of 





891 It was noted in chapter 6 how causation is only considered relevant by Bigwood, see page 191. In Birks and 
Chin’s account, it was not treated as a relevant aspect of claims, see page 186. Chen-Wishart does not explicitly 
advance it the hybrid rationale and seems to relegate it to the role of a background factor. 
892 See page 157. 
893 See page 80. 
894 See pages 263-264. 
895 See page 261-262. 
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Hartigan v International Society for Krishna Consciousness Inc [2002] 
 
Autonomy interpreted in the way I have described also explains my skepticism about the 
judgment in Hartigan.896  Here, the claimant sought to claim back her property worth $87,000 
gifted to a Hare Krishna community after being informed by the defendants that the claimant’s 
understanding of giving, developed from independently interpreting religious scriptures, was 
misplaced and did not require the amount offered. Weeks later the claimant made transferred 
her property to the defendants.  
 
The claimant must have reflected upon the necessity of the gift for some weeks and considered 
whether it matched up to her religious and familial preferences. Before gifting the property, the 
claimant phoned her partner numerous times across a period of weeks to ask whether he 
supported the potential gift and how it would impact their family life. Therefore, the claimant’s 
ability to reflect upon her beliefs and motives for action was not thwarted. The gift was 
motivated by the claimant’s reflections on her first-order preferences (what she believed the 
religion required of her and why it was important to her) and her second-order desires (whether 
she should invest the money for religious causes or use it for another cause).  
 
Furthermore, the facts do not indicate an incongruence between the claimants’ reasons for the 
gift. When it was made the claimant’s first-order preferences and second-order preferences 
seem compatible. Even if there was not complete compatibility, the facts do not demonstrate 
that there was a complete incompatibility between her preferences. Rather, the claimant regrets 
the transaction at a later point because of the severe consequences it has on her life. The 
claimant’s family would lose their home if undue influence was not found. Although it would 
 
896 See pages 72-73, 76-66 & 82-83. 
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have been upsetting and regrettable for the family if undue influence was not established, the 
claimant’s autonomy was not impaired when the gift was made. The gift was simply an 
improvident choice motivated by the claimant’s religious wishes that later impacted her ability 
to live her life as she wished to. Consequently, the court was wrong to order rescission. 
 
This section has applied the two-limbed account of autonomy in my rationale to decided cases 
of undue influence to shed light on how the cases should have been assessed. Impaired 
autonomy and causation are the first considerations in my rationale. Additionally, I have 
explained how advice should be considered by courts in my rationale where it has been received 
by claimants. The next section assesses when hard cases of religious influence become undue 
by determining whether defendants have wrongfully caused the impairment that results in a 
gift being made.  
 
 
7.1.4. Autonomy, exploitation and presumed undue influence 
 
Exploitation is not an unfamiliar concept to understandings of undue influence. English courts 
have described the doctrine as a defence by which “to protect vulnerable members of society 
from oppression or exploitation.”897 I also considered how the concept features in the rationale 
debate, namely by discussing Bigwood’s rationale in chapter 6.898 I now explain how autonomy 
and wrongdoing are combined in my rationale and subsequently, describe how I define 
exploitation in undue influence settings. 
 
 
897 Etridge (No 2) (n 22) [98] (Lord Hobhouse). Lord Nicholls also describes undue influence to includes “cases 
where a vulnerable person has been exploited” at [11]. 
898 See pages 191-200. 
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The combination of autonomy and wrongdoing is critical to my rationale for presumed undue 
influence. Autonomy may be impaired for the reasons just explained, but for intervention to be 
justified, the donor’s autonomy must have been violated by the defendant’s wrongdoing. 
Focusing solely on the donor’s autonomy fails to generate the clarity necessary for a principled 
rationale for undue influence, which I argued was lacking in Birks and Chin’s rationale.899 
Further, by not including a wrongdoing limb, my rationale would be subject to similar 
paternalistic criticisms noted to apply to Birks and Chin’s900 and Chen-Wishart’s rationales.901   
 
Defendant wrongdoing is relevant to the examination of the congruence between reasons 
motivating a donor’s gifts. In many cases, it is foreseeable that two or more first-order 
preferences valued by claimants will feature alongside several second-order preferences. For 
example, religious commitments, as well as the value they attach to family and community life 
(first-order preferences), and their belief that gifts to each of those help both groups to maintain 
current practices (second-order preferences). Donors may gift money to specific religious 
institutions without truly wanting to do so. A donor, similar to the widow in ‘The Widow’s 
Mite,’902 may not want to gift the little money they have in hope of salvation, as they would 
rather leave the money to help their young children but nevertheless gifts what they have, 
fearful of the consequences of not doing so. In such circumstances, there is not a strict 
congruence between the donor’s reasons for the gift. Whereas, in the same scenario, where a 
wealthy donor gifts a large amount of their property for the same reasons and still is able to 
provide for their children at a later stage, their reasons for the gift are congruent. 
 
 
899 See pages 185-190. 
900 See page 189. 
901 See pages 209-210. 
902 A biblical story where a poor widow gives two mites, which is more costly to her than the rich who had 
made gifts found in Luke 21:1-4. 
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The various reasons a donor may have for making and not making gifts demonstrate that there 
will not always be a strict congruence between their reasons. However, the incongruence has 
not necessarily been caused by another party. Instead, in the example similar to The Widow’s 
Mite, the incongruence between reasons is the product of the individual’s competing life-
choices, which creates doubts about their motivations for action and gift-giving. The 
importance of wrongdoing is strongest at this stage in the analysis of undue influence. Where 
the incongruence has been caused by a defendant’s wrongdoing, the donor’s autonomy has 
been violated. Here the procedural independence of the donor’s decision-making was infringed 
by the wrongdoing. On this basis, the rationale more accurately reflects the reality of decision-
making in gift-giving contexts and explains why the justification for intervention is reason-
based. The inclusion of wrongdoing indicates that my understanding of autonomy is not an 
intellectualised one that overestimates the reasoning capabilities and convictions of donors 
making emotionally charged choices.  
 
Defendant wrongdoing is also important to reflection thwarting. If the analysis of the 
defendant’s potential wrongdoing does not follow the determination of whether an individual 
was able to reflect upon their preferences, undue influence would be established where 
claimants omit to do so, which is unjustifiable. Assessing autonomy and wrongdoing together 
helps to guard against the possibility that judgments can give rise to strong forms of moralistic 
and paternalistic reasoning. Accordingly, rash and spontaneous gifts motivated by the 
claimant’s religious enthusiasm are lawful, unless the gifts were induced by another party’s 
wrongdoing. If claimants had the opportunity to assess and reflect on the potential risks of the 
gifts and considered how those gifts may not truly match up with their high-order preferences 
but failed to do so, the claimant has acted autonomously. The claimant’s autonomy is only 
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violated when the wrongful acts of another party break the voluntariness of their actions, as 
this conduct infringes on the donor’s procedural independence to act.  
 
I define wrongdoing by reference to normative understandings of interpersonal exploitation 
examined in legal theory literature. The account of interpersonal financial exploitation I adopt 
is inspired by Feinberg’s analysis of exploitation and the principled limits of the criminal 
law.903 Feinberg’s analysis of exploitation is, however, equally applicable to both civil and 
criminal law. Feinberg argues that exploitation is experienced differently by individuals 
depending on the circumstances of the relationships between exploiters and exploitees. The 
potential range of these experiences is limited in undue influence settings. Exploitation need 
only cover exploitation that causes direct harm to exploitee, since undue influence allows for 
relief only after a financial transaction has been completed. Consequently, claimants will 
always suffer some form of financial harm, even if the claim is brought by third parties.904  
 
Feinberg states that harmful exploitation should be considered alongside coercion,905 “Some 
proposals by A are coercive in their effect on B in that they close or narrow B's options, and 
they are also instances of A exploiting B's vulnerability for A's own advantage.”906 In many 
conceivable religious scenarios, Feinberg’s view on exploitation and coercion applies.907 
 
903 It is commonly endorsed in a variety of contexts for setting limits to the law. For example, theorising s4 FA06 
see Collins (n 521), 167-184. Additionally, it has been considered in relation to determining the moral 
wrongfulness of white-collar crimes, see Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-
Collar Crime, (OUP 2007), 93-97. 
904 My account need not consider the ‘free-floating’ type of exploitation considered by Feinberg, which exists 
where exploitation occurs in some way without harming the exploitee’s interests, which has also been consented 
to by the exploitee. Feinberg considers the prohibition of this type of exploitation can only be justified by strict 
moralism, ibid, 176. Chapter 36 terms this the ‘exploitation principle’ and assesses whether in all instances this is 
not a justifiable limit on liberty, see Feinberg (n 29), chapter 31 ‘Exploitation with and without harm.’ 
905 The understanding of exploitation advanced does not cover actions that are nonexploitative or noncoercive, for 
example “in an ordinary commercial exchange from which both vendor and purchaser expect to gain (but not at 
one another's expense),” ibid, 178. 
906 Ibid, 177. 
907 Ibid, 178. 
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Firstly, “A’s act can be exploitative and coercive, as when his[/her] proposal effectively forces 
B to act in a way that benefits A.”908 In undue influence contexts, this could apply, for example, 
where a religious figure insincerely submits to an adherent that if they do not give them money 
they will not pray for their sins, which will cause them to suffer in the afterlife. Here, 
exploitation is active and has a clear and direct impact on the adherent’s decision-making 
process. The type of coercion described by Feinberg is not the same as someone who threatens 
or forces another to do so something in a strong sense. The exploitee is not subject to conduct 
that gives them no other plausible choice. In this context, coercion and threats are not the 
equivalents of coercion and threats in situations where an individual is forced to commit a 
crime as in criminal contexts criminal,909 or to enter into a contract.910  
 
Highly coercive instances of exploitation are more relevant to claims of actual undue influence. 
I now explain how this conception of exploitation could operate in such claims. My analysis 
demonstrates that my use of exploitation in my rationale has demarcated boundaries on how 
exploitation should operate in both categories of influence, even though my focus is on 
presumed undue influence. Certain factors provide evidence of more active and direct 
exploitation that apply solely to actual undue influence cases. A factor indicating such conduct 
is an intentional abuse of a position of trust caused by lying.911 Lying extends to intentionally 
withholding information pertinent to the reasons for gifts. Additionally, lying applies to 
scenarios where defendants knowingly fail to correct misunderstandings of facts and religious 
 
908 Ibid. 
909 The criminal understanding of duress includes duress by threats and duress of circumstances, meaning an 
individual commits a crime to avoid bad consequences, for example, driving while intoxicated to get an injured 
person to a hospital, see Nathan Tamblyn, The Law of Duress and Necessity: Crime, Tort, Contract, (Routledge 
2017), 166.  
910 Ibid, chapter 3. Contractual understandings of duress include economic duress, see Universe Tankships v 
International Transport Workers Federation, The Universe Sentinel [1983] 1AC 366.  
911 For broader commentary on what is wrongful about lying see Neil MacCormick, ‘What Is Wrong with Deceit?’ 
(1982) Sydney Law Review, 10(1), 14-19. Lies and misrepresentations were discussed concerning understandings 
of actual undue influence see Etridge (No2) (n 22) [32]-[33] & [42] (Lord Nicholls). 
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doctrines or beliefs motivating gifts, or where the money is used for purposes not agreed to by 
both parties. These considerations are all wrongs by themselves and do not require the donor’s 
autonomy to be infringed for intervention to be justified.  
 
A donor’s autonomy is, however, impaired where the lies create incongruence between a 
donor’s reasons for gifts. This would occur when a gift would not have been made to a party 
but for the defendant’s lies. Additionally, defendants thwart a donor’s reflections if donors 
knew what was withheld by defendants and would not have chosen to make the gift as a result 
of complete knowledge. In these circumstances, there is an aggravated wrong caused by 
exploitation. 
 
Manipulative techniques used by defendants to influence donors’ decisions can also constitute 
strong forms of coercive exploitation.912 Manipulation has been described as “directly 
influencing someone’s beliefs, desires, or emotions such that she falls short of ideals for belief, 
desire, or emotion in ways typically not in her self-interest or likely not in her self-interest in 
the present context.”913 This definition has a clear overlap with the internalist conception of 
autonomy advanced in my rationale. Manipulation includes deceptive practices, already 
discussed, and threats of severe punishment.914 Accordingly, a defendant who threatens that a 
donor will experience terrible consequences if they defy their orders to gift them property 
manipulates the donor’s preferences and exploits them. Such techniques are wrongs by 
themselves without the donor’s autonomy being infringed. However, this conduct will also 
typically reveal an incongruence between the donor’s reasons for the gift. The donor’s second-
 
912 For general commentary on how to define manipulative practices and why they are wrong, see Anne Barnhill, 
‘What is Manipulation?’ in Christian Coons and Michael Weber, Manipulation: Theory and Practice, (OUP 
2014), 51-72.  
913 Ibid, 72. 
914 Ibid, 61 ft 15 citing Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp, History and Theory of Informed Consent, (OUP, 1st 
Edition, 1986), 358-364. 
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order preferences will not match their first-order preferences where they make gifts because of 
threats. Where this occurs, there is also an aggravated wrong. 
 
Feinberg describes exploitation in a second way where, “A’s act can be exploitative and 
noncoercive, as when he takes advantage of B's traits or circumstances to make a profit for 
himself either with B's consent or without the mediation of B's choice at all.”915 This type of 
exploitation is characterised by more passive instances of exploitative conduct. Applied to 
undue influence contexts, exploitation is noncoercive in this sense where the conduct alters the 
donor’s decision-making process in a way that causes them to make a gift, rather than 
completely closing the options available to donors. The noncoercive conception of exploitation 
considered here is more likely to feature in hard cases of religious undue influence. Further, 
this understanding of exploitation has a clear link with my analysis of autonomy, as it takes 
account of the donor’s consent and explains why certain choices should not be recognised as 
lawful.  
 
I make two additions to this conception of exploitation. Firstly, I consider that it extends to any 
property-based profit gained by another as a result of a defendant’s exploitative conduct in the 
way described; A, therefore, exploits B even where a profit is made by C. Secondly, I focus on 
religious reasons for conduct that may, depending on the defendant’s actions, excuse the 
defendant’s conduct. I argue that religious reasons can provide legitimate reasons for certain 
actions that help defendants to rebut presumptions of influence.  
 
Before illustrating what factors indicate noncoercive exploitation in presumed undue influence 
cases, it is important to consider a general limit of my understanding of exploitation here. In 
 
915 Feinberg (n 29), 178. 
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claims, there is a key distinction that makes certain examples of exploitation of character traits 
objectionable and wrongful, and others as unobjectionable and lawful. Consider an example 
given by Feinberg where A has given something to B, “A may say afterward to B: “You are 
what you are (generous, loving, insecure, gullible, or fearful, as the case may be). I don't change 
that, or infringe on it, or exert pressure on it. Rather, I use it to my profit. You have no 
complaint. At most you might be envious of my gain. But I didn't force anything on you; I 
simply used you as you are.”916 Here the conduct is not objectionable because the passive 
nature of means it is not exploitative. For it to reach a threshold that should be prohibited some 
other kind of behaviour is required from defendants, namely, evidence of impaired autonomy. 
I do not claim that a defendant exploits a claimant’s if they simply rely on their generosity to 
gain financially. By requiring courts to find this sort of exploitative conduct and an 
infringement of autonomy, my rationale offers principled reasons that justify why gifts made 
in these circumstances are both wrongful and unlawful.917  
 
Defendants need not target and abuse special disabling characteristics of donors. On this basis, 
greater conceptual clarity exists between understandings of undue influence and the doctrine 
of unconscionable dealing.918 However, as is the position in the undue influence case law 
examined in part I, the donor’s general health can make them potentially more vulnerable to 
influence. Accordingly, this factor remains an overarching consideration in my rationale, which 
helps to indicate the claimant’s susceptibility to exploitation. Defendants may not intend to 
exploit the donor but may do so through one of the ways now outlined. 
 
916 Ibid, 179. 
917 It is important to emphasise this point, as in both legal theory and criminal law literature there are 
considerable debates concerning what makes exploitation both unfair and unlawful, see See generally, Robert 
Mayer, ‘What’s Wrong with Exploitation?’ (2007) Journal of Applied Psychology, 24(2), 137-150. For 
comments on both topics in contractual settings see, Bigwood (n 447), 125-162. 
918 For an outline of unconscionable dealing see Mark Pawlowski, ‘Undue Influence: towards a Unifying Concept 
of Unconscionability,’ (2018) Denning Law Journal, 30(1), 117-122. 
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Less severe manipulative techniques used by defendants can influence a donors’ decisions in 
a less coercive and obtrusive way. Such techniques include threats designed to influence the 
donor’s decision-making process that cannot be described as coercive in a strong sense. In 
scenarios involving these sorts of threats, donors may still think that they have a choice in how 
they can respond to the threats. For example, threats of shunning and shaming disobedient 
adherents are often used as means of influencing adherents.919 Here, a donor’s social standing 
amongst congregation members may be used by donees to influence a donor’s motivations, 
which does not always strictly coerce donors. In Allcard, the vows of poverty and obedience 
agreed to by the claimant did not require her to gift her property to the defendant. The appeal 
judgment of the Court of Chancery submitted that the donor would, nevertheless, have felt 
pressure to give all of her property to the defendant,920 even though the defendant did not exert 
any pressure on the claimant to do so.921 However, a different conclusion can be reached on 
slightly different facts. The exploitative conduct conceived of here would be found where the 
claimant felt pressured to make the gifts to the sisterhood because of the defendant’s threats to 
shun, shame, or denounce the claimant if she failed to do so, which changed the claimant’s 
motivations for the gifts because they were fearful of the threats being acted out. As a result of 
such feelings, there is the real possibility that the defendant creates incongruence between the 
donor’s reasons for the gift. 
 
Evidence that defendants have taken steps to isolate donors from the outside world and their 
network of friends and family can also count as exploitation where it violates the donor’s 
autonomy. In religious and spiritual relationships this includes efforts taken by defendants to 
single out adherents from others and subsequently prevent them from contacting family and 
 
919 For general discussions of the possible consequences of defying religious beliefs and duties, see Greenawalt n 
32), 60 & Witte et al (n 441), 219-233. 
920 Allcard (n 6), 177, (Lindley L.J.). 
921 Ibid, 179. 
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friends in a way that is not expected or typical of that religion. The conduct described could 
create incongruence between a donor’s reasons for gifts. In Allcard, all members of the 
sisterhood were required to take vows of obedience and poverty to become a professed 
member. The sisterhood’s religious beliefs required all adherents to consent to those conditions 
to reach that position. The defendant did not target the claimant or other adherents to exploit 
their religious feelings and obtain property. The vows were an inherent part of professed 
member’s religious experiences and had a significant impact on the claimant’s motivations for 
the gifts. Accordingly, the claimant’s reasons for the gifts were congruent at this stage. Through 
making the gifts, the donor was able to reach the position they desired.  
 
A defendant’s attempts to deter donors from seeking independent advice, whether it is legal or 
not, can also constitute exploitation. If advice is actively discouraged by defendants or 
defendants withhold information that would almost inevitably be revealed by advisors because 
of the adverse nature of the gifts, defendants exploit donors. In religious contexts, this could 
occur where defendants prevent donors from accessing independent advice and use their 
position of trust as a substitute for advice, which may or may not be based on religious reasons. 
Similarly, a religious official may also exploit a donor by preventing them from seeking advice 
from other religious figures by undermining their reputation. Courts should consider the nature 
of the religious beliefs motivating those attempts to prevent advice being heard to determine if 
the defendant’s conduct is exploitative and whether it has thwarted their ability to accurately 
reflect upon their preferences. Religious beliefs requiring complete isolation from the outside 
world or rules of obedience to follow the orders of the leader, such as in Allcard, that do not 
count as repugnant options under Raz’s Perfectionist framework, should not by themselves 
amount to instances of exploitation. Only if those beliefs are not a shared practice of a religion 
are the attempts to prevent the donor from receiving advice likely to be exploitative. This would 
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likely occur where defendants think that legal advice will change a donor’s intention to make 
a gift because of the reasons for the gift or the financial value of it, and so acts in a way 
uncommon for the religious circumstances in order to tarnish the donor’s view of the potential 
benefits of advice.  
 
Another factor establishing that defendants have exploited donors is where donors are rushed 
into making gifts and there is no consistency between the donor’s motives for the gifts. For 
example, in Whitmire, a US case considered in chapter 2,922 the court assessed the donor’s 
original intention to make the gift before having contact with the defendant. The court found 
that this evidence helped to show that the initial gift made to the defendant with prior intention 
had not been unduly influenced. However, where there is no prior existing intention to make a 
gift, and the donor’s reflections are thwarted by defendants because they believe the donor will 
change their mind upon reflection, possibly by preventing them from seeking advice, 
defendants may exploit the donor. Evidence of previous intent to make gifts is a relevant factor 
to the rebuttal stage in cases, although, it should not be a determining one. Intention can change 
over time due to the temporal nature of relationships, as demonstrated throughout this thesis. 
Accordingly, this factor is more relevant to gifts made in short-term relationships or in claims 
where only one gift is made to defendants, which feature less regularly in hard cases of religious 
undue influence. Consequently, this is a weaker justification for intervention and should be 
supplemented with additional factors indicating defendant wrongdoing. 
 
Finally, intentional efforts by defendants to use other individuals to influence the donor’s 
motives can amount to exploitation. This factor is significant to religious relationships where 
adherents or religious officials may be told of certain information or proposed gifts that cause 
 
922 See pages 68. 
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them to influence donors. The conduct of congregation members, for example, would not 
necessarily be defined as exploitative or subject to an undue influence claim. In Khan, an 
Australian case discussed in chapter 2,923 the claimant argued that the defendant knew of the 
impact the Imam’s presence would have on the claimant, which was used to buy the house at 
a lower price. The undue influence claim was denied, and no contract was found to have been 
made between the parties.  
 
However, in different circumstances, the influence of third parties to a gift suggested by 
defendants can amount to exploitation by defendants, not third parties. It would occur where 
there is evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of the impact the third party woule have on the 
donor and their motivations for gifts to inspire the execution of gifts. In religious and spiritual 
contexts, this factor is similar to an instance of exploitation where defendants threaten to shun 
or shame donors if they do not follow their requests for gifts. Third parties who are particularly 
enthusiastic adherents may be used by defendants to impress upon donors the potential social 
consequences of not making gifts, which could take place where donors question defendants 
on the purpose of gifts, or why the gifts need to be of such a high value, for example. The third-
party will not, however, necessarily be found to have unduly influenced any gifts made as a 
result of their involvement. Although they may create incongruence between the donor’s 
reasons for gifts or thwart their ability to reflect upon their preferences, the third party will only 
have unduly influenced the gift if they have also exploited the donor when doing so through 
one of the other factors listed. 
 
Each of the factors discussed here establishes when a defendant exploits a donor. Except for 
the prior intention factor, one factor needs to be satisfied alongside a finding that it wrongfully 
 
923 See page 80. 
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violated the donor’s autonomy resulting in a gift. Evidence of additional factors strengthen 
claims that gifts have been unduly influenced and make the analysis of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing conducted by courts easier. 
 
 
7.1.5. The rationale’s procedural operation 
 
My rationale works within the existing doctrinal framework for presumed undue influence with 
slight amendments. I reject the use of automatic presumptions of influence and argue that they 
are not always justified in practice. Automatic presumptions of influence fail to account for 
changes in relationship and influence in long-term relationships, which are typically a common 
aspect of religious undue influence cases.924 Courts do not consider at the presumption stage 
what gifts should be susceptible to a presumption of influence and whether some should be 
severed from it. Consequently, defendants face the difficult task of rebutting the presumption 
as it applies to all gifts, which as discussed in this thesis, has generally proven an 
insurmountable task in hard cases of religious undue influence.  
 
The same conclusion does not apply where presumptions of influence must be proven by 
claimants, which have resulted in gifts being severed from presumptions of influence in 
judgments.925 Where automatic presumptions of influence do not apply, the temporal nature of 
relationships is taken into account by the current approach of English law where relationships 
of sufficient trust and confidence must be established between the parties at the time of each 
 
924 This consideration would also foreseeably apply in relationships between long-term care givers and those 
receiving care. For a general commentary on the concerns of undue influence claims in these settings see Brian 
Sloan 'Due rewards or undue influence? – Property Transfers Benefitting Informal Carers,' (2011) Restitution 
Law Review, Volume 19, 37-48. 
925 See Re Craig, Dec’d [1971] Ch 95. C. 
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gift.926 This arises where the party’s relationship is of the nature that it could give rise to 
influence, for instance, where there is a heightened degree of trust and engagement between 
the parties.927  
 
Courts should still assess whether gifts call for an explanation where they cannot be explained 
by ordinary motives. I consider that gifts call for an explanation where there is evidence of 
reflection thwarting and incongruence between the donor’s reasons for the gifts at the time 
each gift is made. I consider that the size of gifts does not indicate that it calls for an 
explanation, which is the current approach of the test.928 The size of the gift is an unhelpful 
approach for deciding when presumptions of influence should arise.929 Gifting large sums of 
money is far from incompatible with religious and charitable motives, as discussed in chapter 
2.930 Deciding that gifts are too large does not account for the donor’s motives and imposes an 
objective view of legitimate gift-giving that will often be incompatible with the conceptions of 
obdurate believers.931 Accordingly, my rationale extends the coverage of undue influence to 
gifts of any value if evidence was produced of an autonomy impairment. If the gifts do 
subsequently call for an explanation, a presumption of influence arises. This two-stage 
understanding of presumptions of influence applies to each gift made by donors to defendants. 
 
Defendants can rebut presumptions by showing that none of the exploitation factors listed were 
present at the time of the gifts. The defendant exploits the donor’s when one of the factors are 
established. Where this conduct produces a gift, the defendant has unduly influenced the donor. 
 
926 Ibid. 
927 John McGhee, Snell’s Equity, (Sweet & Maxwell, 33rd Edition, 2016), para 8-031. 
928 Allcard (n 6) 185 (Lindley L.J.) adopted by the House of Lords in Etridge (No 2) (n 22) [29] (Lord 
Bingham). See pages 130 for the test for presumed undue influence. 
929 In Evans (n 422) Judge Keysler QC suggested that this reasoning was unprincipled at [63]. 
930 See pages 76-78. 
931 See pages 149-150. 
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If, however, the defendant shows that there is no evidence of the factors, then even though the 
donor’s autonomy was impaired at the time of the gifts, the impairment was not caused by the 
defendant’s wrongdoing. In these circumstances, the defendant can subsequently rebut the 
presumption of influence, and the claim is unsuccessful, regardless of how improvident the gift 





In this section I have described how autonomy and exploitation are understood in my rationale 
and what sort of conduct should be captured in religiously grounded presumed undue influence 
cases. Some may argue that my rationale is underinclusive and fails to offer sufficient 
protection to those who make gifts to religious institutions motivated by religious faith.932 
Admittedly, the threshold of what constitutes undue influence in the rationale is high. However, 
I believe this is justified for three key reasons. Firstly, the threshold is set so high since it is 
fundamentally difficult to determine when religious influence becomes undue. If the 
benchmark of acceptable behaviour was lowered, then cases like Allcard could become more 
common and the doctrine would operate like a generous returns policy.933 Improvident 
decisions should not be treated as a justified basis for legal intervention if positive autonomy 
is truly valued by the law. Secondly, my theory avoids endorsing strong accounts of 
paternalism and moralism that would produce bias judgments against specific religious 
 
932 For example, in contractual contexts, criticisms have made against the understanding of undue influence in 
Hong Kong. It is argued that courts there have set the threshold of proving undue influence too high, which reduces 
the doctrine’s ability to serve its protective function, see Puja Kapai, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability in 
Comparative Common Law: Delivering Contextualized Justice for Minority Sureties,’ (2019) Transnational Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 28(2), 427. 
933 A similar concern is expressed about civil laws regulating mediumship in Edge (n 15). 
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traditions.934 The doctrine should be neutral to the backgrounds of the parties in cases and 
should endorse a pluralistic conception of acceptable motives for gifts. Thirdly, on a more 
practical note, undue influence is not the only claim that can be brought by those seeking to 
reclaim gifted property. Claims of unconscionable dealing, duress, lack of knowledge, and 
misrepresentation can also be pleaded to challenge the legality of gifts. 
 
 
7.2. The integrative rationale and s2 FA06 
 
The chapter has so far focused on the civil context of how conceptions of autonomy and 
exploitation can more appropriately rationalize the presumed category of undue influence. I 
briefly mentioned the rationale’s criminal overlap when discussing Feinberg’s account of 
exploitation. The former sections sought to address how hard cases of religious undue influence 
should be decided by English courts. This section does not engage in an exactly similar 
exercise. Religious fraud cases litigated under s2 FA06 are not in the same way hard cases to 
decide; they are cases where certain issues have not yet been addressed in the context of 
religious fraud because such cases have proven extremely rare. Accordingly, there are no 
conflicting perspectives of judges in domestic reported cases on how these cases should be 
decided in the same way there is for religious undue influence. The challenges facing the 
regulation of religious fraud through the offence have not been directly engaged with yet in 
domestic law. My rationale offers a principled means of theorising the offence and engaging 
with some of the challenges faced by English courts that were identified in part I. In theorising 
s2 FA06, I am part of a recent trend in criminal theory scholarship. Duff has recently advanced 
a normative theory of criminalization that seeks to offer a ‘master principle’ on what counts as 
 
934 Specific attitudes of prejudice faced by religious defendants in claims was considered on pages 99-112. 
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good reasons in principle to criminalise certain actions.935 Further, Collins has put forward a 
considered account of what conduct s4 FA06, fraud by abuse of position, should prohibit.936  
 
In the rest of the chapter, I demonstrate how the integrative rationale can explain how s2 FA06 
should be interpreted in interpersonal cases. In doing so, I establish why the rationale justifiably 
applies to both the civil and criminal wrongs in religious contexts. No attempts have been made 
by commentators to theorise s2 FA06, and so this analysis is a novel contribution to 
understandings of the offence. I argue that this development in the understanding of s2 FA06 
will greatly help to prevent the overcriminalisation of religious representations resulting in 
gains of financial capital. 
 
The possibility of overcriminalisation of religious representations ties into much broader 
concerns raised consistently by criminal law theorists. In recent years, English criminal law 
has been criticised for creating too many criminal offences,937 causing the current state of the 
criminal law to be described as “unprincipled” and “chaotic.”938 The concern about overly 
criminalising conduct is a real and pressing one for many criminal theorists for two leading 
reasons:939 firstly, there are so many offences that individuals are put are risk of being convicted 
and punished for conduct that does not justify that response.940 Additionally, and more relevant 
to the subsequent discussion of s2 FA06, it is alleged that it is impossible to offer precise 
definitions for every criminal offence.941 A lack of definitions of offences provides police and 
prosecutors with an unjustly broad discretion to investigate and convict a wide range of 
 
935 R. A. Duff, The Realm of Criminal Law, (OUP 2018), 3. The master principle is considered to be ‘thin’ and 
leaves a lot of substantive work to be finished at a later date, at 3. 
936 Collins (n 521), 169-186 & Collins (n 600), 354-363. 
937 Duff (2018), 1. 
938 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (2000) Law Quarterly Review, 116, 253. For contrary 
views see Duff (n 935), 1. 
939 Duff (n 935), 1-2. 
940 Ibid, 2. 
941 Ibid. 
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conduct.942 As such, overcriminalisation risks unprincipled enforcement of law at a practical 
and normative level.943 
 
Although the integrative rationale is an important development for setting the principled 
boundaries of how s2 FA06 should apply in interpersonal religious contexts, it does not address 
all of the challenges of regulating religious fraud examined in chapter 3. The rationale is unable 
to address the human rights-based considerations generated by Article 9 ECHR, relating mainly 
to testing the falsity of a defendant’s religious representations where there is no clear evidence 
that a defendant believes their representations are false. 
 
In the following sections, I consider how autonomy and exploitation is understood generally in 
criminal law theory before discussing how my rationale applies to s2 FA06. I justify why my 
rationale establishes a more principled understanding of the offence’s statutory language and 
illustrate how it applies to decided cases. US religious cases and domestic nonreligious cases 
are also considered here due to the unavailability of domestic decisions on religious fraud 
prosecuted for s2 FA06. 
 
 
7.2.1. Autonomy and criminal law 
 
Autonomy is seen as one of the most fundamental concepts in criminal law.944 It is argued to 




944 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law, (OUP 2013), 23. For a broader 
understanding of how it is considered in criminal law see 23-28. 
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and capable of making their own choices.945 Autonomy is considered in a wide range of 
substantive topics in criminal law946 and criminal justice.947 Most commonly, autonomy is seen 
as a normative principle that sets limits to criminal laws.948 But criminal laws can also enhance 
the autonomy of individuals by preventing others from unlawfully violating their autonomy. 
Individuals have a greater ability to control their actions and make their choices based on 
correct understandings of reasons. On the other hand, criminal laws inevitably impose severe 
restrictions on an individual’s ability to exercise their autonomy. Laws prohibit particular acts 
by making them criminal offences which are subject to invasive punishments. Punishments 
include imprisonment, which generally amounts to one of the most severe examples of limiting 
autonomy that can be justified by the law.949  
 
Autonomy is frequently discussed in relation to harm principles and exploitation in criminal 
law. Feinberg’s immense volume of work is arguably the most detailed theoretical elaboration 
on how criminal law can legitimately limit a person’s autonomy. Feinberg defines his 
descriptive sense of autonomy in reference to the harm and exploitation principles.950 However, 
it is not appropriate for determining the rationale of s2 FA06, as it is a descriptive account. 
Consequently, it is subject to the same sorts of criticisms of Birks and Chin’s and Chen-
 
945 Ibid, 24-25. 
946 For example, the boundaries of consent see Tom L. Beauchamp, ‘Autonomy and Consent,’ in Franklin Miller 
and Alan Wertheimer, The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice, (OUP 2009). It has been considered in regard 
to sexual autonomy see Kiran Grewal, ‘The Protection of Sexual Autonomy under International Criminal Law: 
The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Defining Rape,’ (2012) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, 10(2), 373–396. 
947 See Paul Roberts, ‘Privacy, Autonomy and Criminal Justice Rights: Philosophical Preliminaries,’ in Peter 
Alldridge and Chrisje Brants, Personal Autonomy, the Private Sphere and Criminal Law A Comparative Study, 
(Hart Publishing 2001) & Alan Norrie, ‘The Limits of Justice: Finding Fault in the Criminal Law,’ (1996) The 
Modern Law Review, 59(4), 540-556. 
948 Feinberg’s four-volume collection on the moral limits of the criminal law, some of which have been discussed 
throughout this chapter are principled on a Liberalist conception of autonomy, see Feinberg (n 29); Feinberg (n 
521); Also, for discussions on Dworkin’s account of autonomy in this context see Lawrence C. Becker, ‘Crimes 
Against Autonomy: Gerald Dworkin on the Enforcement of Morality,’ (1999) William & Mary Law Review, 
40(3), 959-973. 
949 Raz describes them as “a global and indiscriminate invasion of autonomy,” Raz (n 28), 418. 
950 Four conceptions of self-governance are submitted, Feinberg (n 29), 28-51. 
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Wishart’s accounts of autonomy.951 Below I explain why my interpretation of Dworkinian 
autonomy better explains what conduct should be characterised as lacking autonomy and what 
should be criminalised under s2 FA06 by focusing largely on religious fraud contexts. 
 
Dworkin’s latter conception of autonomy has been adopted in commentary arguing for more 
principled limits to criminal offences.952 However, neither of Dworkin’s accounts has been 
considered in relation to English criminal fraud laws. The most relevant scholarship to fraud 
laws is Eggert’s analysis of regulating financial elder abuse under US consumer law.953 
Dworkin’s latter contribution is employed by Eggert to demonstrate when elderly consumers 
do not autonomously agree to predatory loan arrangements. Eggert suggests how laws should 
be reformed to better protect elders.954 However, Eggert uses autonomy in this context to justify 
why elders should relinquish control over their financial matters to safeguard their overall 
autonomy.955 This is not the aim of my rationale and so my usage of Dworkinian autonomy is 
different. My use of autonomy is limited to how civil and criminal laws can justifiably regulate 
violations of an individual’s autonomy in religious undue influence and religious fraud 
litigation. Regardless of this difference, the account of autonomy included in my rationale is 
compatible with a range of topics in law and it is, therefore, not out of place in contexts 




951 For a summary of these arguments see 191 & 213. 
952 Dworkin has applied it to discuss bans on physician-assisted suicide, see Gerald Dworkin, ‘Should Physician-
Assisted Suicide Be Legalized?’ in Dieter Birnbacher and Edgar Dahl, Giving Death a Helping Hand: Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Public Policy. An International Perspective, (Springer 2008), 3-9.  
953 Kurt Eggert, ‘Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders 
from Predatory Lending,’ (2003) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 36(2), 693-775. 
954 Eggert would introduce Elder Home Equity Loan Instruments, which “…allow the senior homeowners to 
reform any loan documents that contain interest rates or fees above a certain benchmark, or that contain other 
potentially confusing or harsh terms.” Ibid, 696. A detailed explanation of the instruments is given at 758-770. 
955 Ibid, 696. 
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7.2.2. Autonomy and s2 FA06 
 
s2 FA06 prohibits dishonest representations known to be false, misleading, or might be either 
by defendants that are intended to make a gain for themselves or cause a loss to another party.956 
The offence seeks to prevent conduct that would cause individuals to act upon false 
information, which would make them unable to make truly informed choices on their own 
accord. The fraud offences listed in s1 FA06 do not require deception to cause the loss or gain 
because the offences are inchoate in nature.957 Despite this fact, s2 FA06 can be characterised 
as prohibiting individuals from deceiving others or lying to them in order to gain some form of 
property or where they intended to do so. 
 
Autonomy, as I define it above, is highly relevant in fraud offences like fraud by false 
representation, where the fraud is committed on persons.958 The rationale does not seek to 
explain instances of fraud operating on systems or application schemes,959 such as entitlement 
to housing benefits or incorrect submissions of income tax. I consider that a victim of s2 FA06 
experiences autonomy impairment when the actus reus of the offence is satisfied.960 Cases of 
religious fraud involve false inducements made by defendants, which impact the victim’s 
ability to adopt certain reasons for their actions. In religious cases, when falsity can be proven 
because the defendant misrepresents the state of their mind, the actions of the victim are not 
truly the product of their own decision-making process. Instead, victims are influenced by the 
defendant’s false or misleading representations, which can, and will often result in reflection 
thwarting. In these scenarios, victims do not reflect upon their preferences and reasons for 
 
956 s2(1)(a)-(b). 
957 Ormerod (n 12), 196. 
958 Dworkin submits that deception infringes upon the voluntary nature of the individual’s actions, Dworkin (n 
781), 14. Although deception is not required under the offence, it helps to show evidence of impaired autonomy. 
959 This conduct is captured by s2(5) FA06. 
960 See pages 272-278. 
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actions in a strict sense because the reflection process is void of procedural independence. The 
representation makes this process a product of both the victim’s and the defendant’s desires. 
Therefore, victims are unable to reflect upon their first-order preferences and second-order 
preferences organically. Consequently, victims cannot effectively align their different 
preferences with their reasons for action.  
 
This conception of autonomy does not extend to representations that are neither potentially 
false nor misleading.961 Individuals should not be able to claim that they did not appreciate the 
risks of what they were doing where representations are clear and truthful when the defendant 
genuinely believes in the representation and cannot be shown to have misrepresented the state 
of their mind. Additionally, this applies to scenarios when victims are confused by a 
representation at the time it is communicated but fail to seek clarification about it from 
defendants. Therefore, in cases where falsity can be proven because there is evidence of the 
defendant’s state of mind, there is no need to reform the actus reus for my rationale to operate 
in practice until the specific falsity testing challenge is determined by the courts or Parliament.  
 
 
7.2.3. Autonomy in religious 2 FA06 cases 
 
In religious cases where it is not possible to prove that the defendant knew their representations 
were false, prosecutions will be prohibited from establishing the falsity of the representation 
under the current law, and so cannot determine whether the victim’s autonomy was impaired. 
Representations will most likely be shielded from falsity testing by the decision in ex parte 
 
961 s2(2)(a) FA06 requires an objective determination of whether a representation is untrue or misleading. It 
must then be shown that the defendant believes the representation was false, misleading or might be either, 
under s2(2)(b). 
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Williamson and other relevant Article 9 ECHR jurisprudence that was considered by the House 
of Lords in that judgment.962 If the courts or Parliament rules that religious s2 FA06 cases do 
not need to satisfy the falsity element of the actus reus where it is not possible, the subsequent 
analysis of defendant conduct will depend on assessments of their dishonesty. Assessing 
dishonesty will likely include whether defendants sincerely believed in their religious beliefs 
surrounding the representations based on ex parte Williamson and Ivey. Exploitation, therefore, 
plays an even more significant role in these cases because it provides the basis to determine 
defendant liability. I discuss the different applications of my rationale in such cases below. 
 
To date, Phillips is the only case of religious fraud litigated under s2 FA06 in England.963 As 
mentioned in chapter 3, the case was unreported, and the coverage of the case fails to set out 
the facts in any real detail. Moreover, in dismissing the case, Judge Riddle did not engage with 
the statutory wording of s2 FA06 and how it applies to religious representations because the 
case was held nonjusticiable.964 It is, therefore, unhelpful to the current analysis of how my 
two-limbed conception of autonomy applies to religious fraud cases prosecuted for s2 FA06.  
 
I now assess how the conceptions of autonomy operate based on the facts of Ballard to establish 
why intervention is justified in similar cases using the language of s2 FA06, where defendants 
know that their religious representations are untrue or misleading, and this can be evidentially 
proven by prosecutions. In Ballard, the defendant made representations via mail that they had 
miraculous powers to cure ailments and help adherents overcome illnesses. The defendant also 
claimed that they were a descendant of Saint-Germain. A number of defendants paid for the 
healing services performed by the defendant as a result of the representations.965  
 
962 See page 88 
963 See page 85. 
964 Ibid. 
965 For a more detailed of the facts of Ballard see page 39. 
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If the truthfulness of the representations could be tested for falsity because there is clear 
evidence that the defendant does not believe in the representations, the autonomy of victims 
was impaired where their motivations for action were based on the defendant’s false or 
misleading representations. The representations caused reflection thwarting because the 
victim’s higher-order desires (their religious beliefs) and second-order desires (to overcome 
ailments or be healed of a condition completely) cannot have been reflected upon in a real way. 
Reliance on false representations meant that the victim’s reflection process was based on 
incomplete knowledge and lacked procedural independence. Therefore, victims did not make 
a completely autonomous choice to act and pay the defendant. 
 
Secondly, the representations could have also created incongruence between a victim’s reasons 
for acting. The victim’s first-order and second-order preferences would not have strictly 
aligned where they unknowingly relied on false information, in the hope that it cured their 
ailments. Victims may have placed this reason above other reasons that are important to them. 
Typically, an individual’s health is one of their more important interests. Good health helps 
them pursue other options valuable to their interests and relationships. This is not entirely true 
for all long-term interests. Many individuals engage in risky and unhealthy activities and jobs, 
for example, smoking, tree felling and free climbing. However, these options do not reach a 
level where they become repugnant options. In an autonomy framework built on moral value 
pluralism, options like these, and the possibility of being healed by miraculous powers, should 
be tolerated within a state’s margin of appreciation on what constitutes valuable options where 
there is no real evidence of falsity. Considering false representations of miraculous powers, 
victims may have determined that their health and religious beliefs are their most important 
and valuable options (first-order preferences), and thus reluctantly sacrificed other wishes 
(second-order preferences) to pay for the religious services they genuinely believed would 
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benefit them. If their decision to act was motivated by false information, the victim’s decision 
to make that payment was based on incongruence between their reasons. Accordingly, their 
decision to act was not autonomous. 
 
 
7.2.4. Autonomy in nonreligious s2 FA06 cases 
 
I now consider reported s2 FA06 cases to make it clear how my conception of autonomy applies 
in practice. Finding reported cases of s2 FA06 that show how autonomy is impaired in the way 
described is difficult. Most reported cases relate to fraud on systems or companies, for example, 
in respect of insurance claims resulting from road traffic accidents.966 Accordingly, most 
judgments look at how an institution has been subject to false representations and not how false 
representations affect a victim’s autonomy.  
 
False or misleading statements will often cause reflection thwarting, as occurred in R v Stokes 
[2019].967 Here the defendant falsely represented that puppies for sale were from a 
domesticated setting and in good health but knew that they were, in fact, from a puppy farm 
and were suffering horrible illnesses that typically resulted in death. Several people suffered 
the fraud. For one victim, their puppy fell critically ill the day after purchasing it from the 
defendant. In treating the illness, the victim’s incurred vet bills of £4,900. In this scenario, the 
victim’s first-order preference was the desire for a dog and their second-order preference was 
to desire a dog that was not farmed or have a high risk of illness. The false representation, that 
the puppies were from a domestic setting, prevented the victim from truly reflecting and 
 
966 For example, R v Wright [2013] EWCA Crim 820; [2013] 4 WLUK 72. 
967 EWCA Crim 1433 (CA). 
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deciding whether they wanted a farmed dog. The victims were not aware of the high possibility 
that the dog could become critically ill due to the poor conditions the puppies inhabited, or that 
this breading process may lead to physically weaker dogs. The victims, therefore, did not make 
a voluntary choice to accept those risks because they were unaware of them at the time of 
buying a puppy. 
 
False or misleading representations can also create incongruence between the reasons for 
actions adopted by victims. When acting on these sorts of representations, victims accept the 
representations as valid reasons that help them to match up their first-order and second-order 
preferences. Even though victims agree to the reasons that match up to their preferences, they 
are relying on inaccurate or false information provided by a defendant’s false or misleading 
representation, which could be proven. The victim’s autonomy is consequently impaired 
because their decision-making capabilities are tainted by the influence of another. Their 
decision consequently lacks procedural independence. Accordingly, although the victim 
chooses their own reasons to act, that choice is influenced by the defendant’s representation 
and is subsequently not a voluntary one. 
 
An example of this is found in R v McDevitt [2012],968 which involved multiple false and 
misleading representations, including the representation made by the defendant that they would 
hold £75,000 of the victim’s money and return it to them within six months. The money was 
needed for a highly profitable investment that would produce a windfall for the victim. The 
representation was a complete fabrication and the defendant spent all of the money within five 
months of receiving it. At the time the transaction was entered into, there was an incongruence 
between the victim’s reasons for action. If the victim had known that the representation was 
 
968 NICC 16. The case was decided in Northern Ireland, but the judgment examined the FA06.  
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false, they would not have entered into the transaction and given their money to the defendant. 
Accordingly, the representation operated to provide false reasons to create a potential 
congruence between the victim’s reasons for action. Here the victim considered that the 
representation did create congruence between their first order preferences, to make a profit and 
their second-order preferences, to want to use savings to make a profit. As a result, the victim’s 
autonomy was impaired by the defendant’s false representation. 
 
False or misleading representations will inevitably impair a victim’s autonomy in the ways 
described. A victim’s autonomy is only violated if the impairment is wrongfully induced by 
defendants. Accordingly, the other elements of the offence must also be satisfied for 
intervention to be justified; liability for s2 FA06 can only be justified at that this second stage. 
I now elaborate on how wronging understood as exploitation applies to s2 FA06. 
 
 
7.2.5. Exploitation and s2 FA06 
 
Exploitation has a significant role in my rationale. It helps to explain when religious fraud is 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in s2 FA06 cases, which applies both where religious 
representations can and cannot be tested by courts. As mentioned above, when religious 
representations cannot be tested for falsity, exploitation becomes the leading principle for 
determining how s2 FA06 should be interpreted by courts. Therefore, in these cases, the 
defendant’s wrongdoing determines their liability and the victim’s autonomy should not be 
assessed by juries. This is a justified change of position to my approach, despite the fact that I 
argued in the civil context that the defendant’s wrongdoing should not, by itself, determine a 
defendant’s liability for undue influence. The distinction in how the rationale applies in cases 
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where falsity cannot be proven is more justified at this time in Article 9 ECHR jurisprudence 
than testing miraculous religious claims for falsity, and finding a nonjusticiable area of law, 
justiciable.  
 
Feinberg’s first account of exploitation that “Some proposals by A are coercive in their effect 
on B in that they close or narrow B's options, and they are also instances of A exploiting B's 
vulnerability for A's own advantage”969 is inexplicitly prohibited by the statutory language of 
the offence. The mens rea requires that defendants dishonestly intend to cause a loss to the 
victim or make a gain for themselves or another, through their false or misleading 
representations. The language of false representations offers a textual foothold to admit this 
account of exploitation because of the clear links to lying, which amounts to active exploitation 
in Feinberg’s account. 
 
Exploitation is, therefore, experienced by victims in s2 FA06 cases where defendants know 
their representation is false even if they do not pressure the victim into conceding to the 
representation. Defendants use victims as a means to an end to make a gain or cause a loss for 
themselves or another. An example of this occurring in religious contexts is where a defendant 
represents to victims that they will be punished in the afterlife for not donating to a particular 
religious cause without truly believing that this could happen. Here the defendant insincerely 
relies on the religious beliefs of the victim to hide their fraudulent intentions. The victim, 
unaware of the falsity of the representation and the defendant’s insincerity, does not want to 
make the donation, but nevertheless makes it because of the fear of the punishment. In this 
scenario, the defendant’s exploitative conduct creates incongruence between the reasons for 
 
969 Feinberg (n 29), 178. 
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the victim’s actions. Consequently, liability for s2 FA06 would be justified where dishonesty 
and insincerity are also found by juries.  
 
Using Ballard as a case study once more shows how this conception of wrongdoing applies to 
religious s2 FA06 cases that are likely to be litigated in a more concrete way. More active 
exploitation would have been present in Ballard if the representations were slightly more 
forceful and there were clearer signs of insincerity motivating the representations. For instance, 
if the defendant had stated that their powers were the only way the victim’s ailment could be 
healed. If the victims genuinely believed the representation, and the defendant did not and this 
could be proven by prosecutions, the defendant coerced the victims into paying for the healing 
services. The defendant acted insincerely and took advantage of the victim’s religious beliefs 
and trust. In turn, the victims were actively exploited by the defendant who prevented them 
from accurately reflecting on their preferences in order to make a gain based on the false 
representation.  
 
The same conclusion on liability would also apply to the representation that the defendant was 
a descendant of Saint-Germain, which does not relate to unworldly claims, if it could not be 
confirmed as true by the defendant. The defendant made a false representation or one that is at 
least misleading to gain financially if they did not inform those paying for the services that the 
representation could not be proven. By not correcting that impression, the defendant exploited 
victims paying for services based on the perceived prestige of their alleged ancestry, which 
prevented victims from accurately reflecting on their preferences and reasons for the donations. 
 
Similarly, the defendant exploits victims if at a later point they became aware that they did not 
actually have miraculous powers to heal people and did not subsequently inform the victims of 
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this realisation. Here the defendant mispresents the state of their mind about the representation 
communicated at an earlier date. If this occurs, and the victim continues to pay for healing 
treatments, the defendant exploits the victim by not correcting their understanding of the truth 
of the representation. The defendant takes advantage of the victim’s lack of knowledge of the 
representation’s truthfulness and subsequent inability to reflect on the change of facts. The 
defendant in this scenario would also, it seems, likely to be found dishonest by juries. 
 
If courts hold that it is not possible to test the falsity of religious representations in cases 
because there is no clear evidence that the defendant misrepresents the state of their mind, 
exploitation becomes the principal way of determining defendant liability. The prohibition 
against testing the falsity of religious beliefs will mean that the autonomy and active 
exploitation analysis described does not apply. In cases of this nature, unless a religious 
exemption is granted to religious defendants, defendants should still be found guilty if they 
have insincerely coerced victims into gifting property based on a representation by acting 
dishonestly and intentionally, in order to make a gain or cause a loss.  
 
A dishonest and insincere defendant still exploits the victim’s faith and trust by making the 
victim act for the defendant’s own advantage. Facts indicating more passive means of 
exploitation considered above970 are significant to determinations of dishonesty by juries. 
Accordingly, juries should be left to determine whether the defendant’s efforts, for example, 
to isolate victims for other adherents or preventing them from seeking the advice of other 
religious ministers are evidence of dishonesty and insincerity on a case-by-case basis. The other 
factors that indicate more passive forms of exploitation considered in the civil law analysis are 
 
970 See pages 260-264. 
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also relevant to dishonesty assessments but should not be mandated by courts because of the 
concerns expressed about list-based dishonesty directions.971 
 
Exploitation would not be found in circumstances where a victim was not originally convinced 
that the defendant’s representation was true. If a victim holds this sort of view and does not 
seek to explore or question the truthfulness of a representation, but willingly pays for the 
services, the defendant does not exploit the victim in any real way. The defendant has not taken 
advantage of the victim. Instead, the victim knowingly and voluntarily makes the gifts based 
on the representations that may not turn out as promised. Consequently, the victim accepted 





In this chapter, I have explained and justified the application of the integrative rationale in two 
specific areas of law. In doing so, I have fulfilled my revisionist aim of developing a more 
legitimate rationale to explain how both legal wrongs should be interpreted and applied by 
English courts. In relation to undue influence, I have also addressed the challenges facing the 
rationales discussed in chapter 6. I have demonstrated how my rationale better explains when 
influence arises in hard cases of religious influence under the doctrinal test for presumed undue 
influence. I showed how the two limbs of autonomy advanced by Dworkin explains when a 
presumption of influence arises alongside evidence that there is a suitable relationship of trust 
and confidence, and the transactions calls for an explanation. I also demonstrated how 
 
971 See pages 110-111. 
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defendants can effectively rebut the presumption of influence by showing that they did not 
exploit a claimant’s impaired autonomy that caused them to make a gift. 
 
I followed this analysis by examining how the two-limbed theory of autonomy applied to 
reported religious undue influence cases. I argued that that the cases examined contained 
judicial reasoning that was based on unprincipled reasoning and was subsequently wrongly 
decided according to the integrative rationale. In doing so, I submitted that courts generally fail 
to consider the nature and influence that religious relationships have on a donor’s motivations 
for gifts and their generosity, and how it changes over time. Religious relationships that involve 
gifts are not inevitably exploitative ones. Not all cases of religious influence should be 
categorised as undue where decisions to make gifts are later regretted by donors. My rationale 
reduces the risk of such findings by limiting how aggrieved former adherents can seek equitable 
relief after making substantial gifts to religious officials. I have set stricter limitations on how 
presumed undue influence should be interpreted in relationships held between religious 
officials and adherents by considering normative principles. Limits are also set by the 
procedural application of the principles, which adds further safeguards against unprincipled 
decisions. Accordingly, I have argued that it is possible to develop a more complete normative 
account of undue influence by not arguing for, or inexplicitly including, strong forms of 
moralistic and paternalistic reasons to justify intervention. Consequently, my rationale better 
explains when religious influence becomes undue in hard cases of presumed undue influence. 
 
I also established how the integrative rationale applies to my criminal focus on s2 FA06. I 
outlined how the rationale establishes the justified normative boundaries of the offence by 
applying the autonomy and exploitation principles to religious fraud cases such as Ballard, and 
to nonreligious cases of s2 FA06.  As a result, I have formulated a rationale that explains how 
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s2 FA06 should be interpreted and have described how it should be used by English courts to 
regulate fraudulent religious representations. 
 
The integrative rationale is unable to address all of the problems posed by regulating religious 
fraud under s2 FA06. There is one challenge that the rationale cannot appropriately address; 
whether courts should be allowed to test the falsity of certain kinds of religious beliefs. This 
challenge is concerned more specifically with the boundaries of Article 9 ECHR and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Despite stopping my analysis short of suggesting the possible 
means of addressing the challenge, I have nonetheless expanded upon the complexity of the 
challenge and more broadly, demonstrated the doctrinal, procedural, and human rights law 
challenges that will face English courts in religious s2 FA06 cases. Consequently, I have 
provided explanations to corroborate my view that regulation of religious representations under 


















In this concluding chapter, I begin by summarising the issues presented by regulating religious 
fraud and religious undue influence that have been identified in this thesis and briefly reassert 
my suggestions for addressing those challenges through the integrative rationale. I 
subsequently identify the prevalent themes of this thesis and summarise the potential policy 
implications that my analysis could have on the regulation of both legal wrongs in England. 
The chapter then suggests what interrelated issues could subsequently be assessed by other 
researchers interested in the two areas of law that I was unable to engage with in this thesis. I 
explain how research would likely produce even more principled regulation of abuses of 
religious capital resulting in gains of financial capital. Extended analysis of this kind would 
also benefit understandings of a number of other areas within criminal law, private law and law 
and religion, as mentioned.  
 
 
8.1. Outline of thesis 
 
Chapter 2 outlined how religious fraud and religious undue influence is regulated in US and 
Australian legal states. This comparative analysis established that the regulatory approaches 
relating to both areas of law shared common challenges, despite the differences in approaches 
and treatment of religion and religious beliefs. The US was an invaluable source for 
understanding the complex challenges of regulating religious fraud. Ballard, in particular, was 
considered as the basis of any discussion on religious fraud regulation. Subsequent cases in the 
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US have established a consistent approach for regulating religious fraud by requiring that the 
religious beliefs motivating religious representations should not be tested by courts, but that 
the sincerity of the defendant’s religious beliefs should be assessed to determine criminal 
liability. I reviewed a number of views on this approach and considered suggestions on 
alternative ways to regulate alleged fraudulent religious conduct.  
 
My analysis of the primary and secondary Australian sources enriched understandings of how 
religious undue influence is understood in contemporary settings. The Australian experience 
provided a number of cases that contained detailed reasoning on how the test for presumed 
undue influence applies to religious cases. Ridge’s analysis of much of this reasoning was 
significant to understanding the subtle differences between the Australian and English 
understandings of undue influence. More specifically, Ridge’s work examined the main 
challenges experienced by Australian courts that have decided religious undue influence cases 
more frequently. However, I noted that Ridge’s work did not make any real substantive 
suggestions on how to address the challenges identified. 
 
Similarly, the US jurisprudence on undue influence contributed a great deal to understandings 
of undue influence considered in religious cases. The analysis of the US cases signified that 
even when a jurisdiction has affirmed the doctrine’s rationale for a long time, similar 
challenges to those later identified in Australian law, and English law later mentioned in 
chapter 4, were similarly experienced by many US states. Furthermore, this analysis generated 
further questions about the doctrine’s functional operation that have not generally been 
considered in English law. The most notable of these questions concerned what is the explicit 
role of active and passive exploitation?972 Are automatic presumptions of influence justifiable 
 
972 See page 67-68. 
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in long-term religious relationships of gift-giving?973 This temporal question opened up far-
reaching discussions on understandings of temporality in relationships of influence that 
featured regularly in my analysis in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the most pressing challenges of regulating religious fraud using s2 FA06. 
I opened my analysis by discussing Phillips and argued that the decision would potentially 
prove more problematic for victims and fraud prevention,974 than if cases of this nature were 
held to be justiciable. I demonstrated why issues of this nature, restated below, should not 
automatically be deemed nonjusticiable by courts without considering the specific facts of 
cases first.975 I moved on to address the doctrinal and rights-based challenges of religious fraud 
regulation under s2 FA06 and argued that English courts can engage with these issues to 
varying degrees without investigating religious practices in ways that are legally prohibited by 
human rights jurisprudence. Two challenges stood out more than the others mentioned: 
whether religious representations can and should be tested for falsity (the falsity testing 
challenge);976 and, whether the sincerity of the defendant’s religious beliefs, alongside 
dishonesty, should be the leading means of determining their liability (the sincerity testing 
challenge).977 Both challenges were labelled as unique to religious contexts because they arise 
solely in transactions motivated by religious and spiritual beliefs relating to matters of the 
unworldly.  
 
I also examined challenges arising in religious contexts posed by the mens rea of s2 FA06. I 
considered how the change to criminal understandings of dishonesty may detrimentally impact 
 
973 See pages 74-76. 
974 See pages 84-85. 
975 Ibid & 88-89. 
976 See pages 87-91. 
977 See pages 111-117. 
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dishonest assessments of the defendant’s religiously motivated conduct.978 Additionally, I 
examined how knowledge is understood in s2 FA06 settings. I discussed how the traditional 
approach adopted by courts in determining whether a defendant knew something to be untrue, 
misleading, or might be either, would prove problematic to whether defendant satisfy this part 
of the mens rea, where representations relate to religious and supernatural occurrences.979 I 
identified how courts will face significant problems in doing so where the alleged religious fact 
is not capable of being proven false or true by conventional methods used in criminal 
procedure, and it cannot be proven that the defendant misrepresented the state of their mind. I 
explained that the mens rea challenges mix unique religious challenges with general procedural 
challenges arising under the FA06 that are compounded when assessed in religious contexts. 
 
The mens rea challenges are significant to another more practical challenge considered; how 
can laws effectively determine who has committed s2 FA06 in religious structures?980 I 
considered the role of group sincerity in dishonesty assessments.981 This applied most directly 
to religions involving beliefs requiring donations to be made for religious officials to carry out 
the religious wishes of adherents, for example, where religious officials pray for adherents to 
be blessed in the afterlife. If these beliefs are held and communicated by all officials of a 
religious institution, which is likely given their shared beliefs, it will be important for courts to 
be able to effectively determine which officials act fraudulently. 
 
Despite the consistency and pragmatism offered by the US approach to religious fraud 
regulation, I concluded that this approach would prove highly problematic if transplanted 
directly into English fraud laws. Inevitably, human rights constraints imposed by the ECtHR 
 
978 See pages 98-111. 
979 See pages 94-97. 
980 See pages 118-123. 
981 Ibid. 
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on testing the falsity of religious beliefs would conflict with the wording of s2 FA06. As a 
result, Parliament would be required to make statutory amendments to the provision as it cannot 
be interpreted in a way that is compliant with Article 9 ECHR in all cases.982 I argued that a 
rationale must be developed before statutory reform took place so that justified boundaries to 
the offence could be set in religious contexts.  
 
Chapter 4 outlined the most concerning challenges of regulating religious influence through 
the English understanding of presumed undue influence in equitable settings. I defined these 
cases as hard cases of undue influence. The overarching challenge identified was the extent of 
discretion afforded to judges by the doctrinal test for determining when influence becomes 
undue.983 I considered that this challenge was largely explained by the lack of a precise 
definition of the term impaired will and no strict agreement on the doctrine’s rationale.984 I 
argued that even though the doctrine is considered to be based on free will in contemporary 
cases, this understanding of the doctrine’s rationale did not always fit with findings of religious 
influence in both historical and contemporary cases. Certain cases discussed took into account 
the defendant’s wrongdoing to determine whether the defendant could rebut a presumption of 
influence.985 Accordingly, it was established that wrongdoing was sometimes a theme in 
presumed undue influence judgments. However, its exact role was not confirmed with any 
degree of specificity in either religious or general cases. 
 
The specific doctrinal challenges considered in chapter 4 intensified my concern stated at the 
start of this thesis that judicial reasoning found in presumed undue influence cases of religious 
and general nature have largely been unprincipled. In addition to the rationale question, several 
 
982 Required in domestic law under Human Rights Act 1998, s 3. 
983 See pages 134-143. 
984 See pages 136-137. 
985 See 134-142. 
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other questions were identified, that if less unanswered, could negatively impact decisions in 
cases of any nature. I asked: what was the role of independent advice?986 Must defendants 
benefit from unduly influencing conduct?987 Do courts consistently find a suitable relationship 
that should give rise to a presumption of influence?988 Although these questions were discussed 
previously in relation to the Australian and US understandings of undue influence in chapter 
2, the challenges posed by these questions has received less attention in England. As a result 
of this analysis, this thesis has singled out additional doctrinal complexities of the presumed 
test for undue influence that have not been examined in an extended way before by civil law 
scholars. 
 
I concluded the chapter by submitting that the Australian and the US approach to regulating 
religious undue influence exposed similar concerns about over-regulating and under-regulating 
varying religious financing practices discussed in chapter 2.989 Additionally, I considered that 
neither jurisdiction offered an approach that was doctrinally and normatively complete enough 
to principally determine when religious influence becomes undue without further clarification 
of the rationale and doctrinal test for presumed undue influence. Consequently, I argued that it 
was important to develop a rationale specifically aimed at dealing with abuses of religious 
capital resulting in financial gains to explain how presumed undue influence should operate in 
domestic settings. The suggestions made in chapters 6 and 7 were, therefore, a natural next step 
in the equitable and restitution literature on this area of law. 
 
Chapter 5 engaged with the hybrid challenges of regulating religious fraud under s2 FA06 and 
religious influence through the presumed category of undue influence. I considered how the 
 
986 See pages 143-145. 
987 See pages 149-151. 
988 See pages 154-162. 
989 See pages 162-163. 
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grounding principle problem applies to both legal wrongs,990 as well as how courts and juries 
can correctly identify defendants involved in religiously influencing conduct,991 and whether 
courts consistently take account of changes in religious influence and relationships that alter 
how defendant conduct should be examined by courts and juries.992  
 
More broadly, this cross-fertilizing analysis of criminal fraud laws and civil undue influence is 
a novel contribution to the regulation of religious influence and relational influence 
surrounding financial transactions. The combination of the two different legal wrongs, which 
are based in very different areas of law, has offered this thesis a great deal. Most notably, it has 
enabled me to generate an appropriate response to the regulation of both legal wrongs in 
religious contexts involving gift-giving. The criminal and civil law analysis revealed several 
fundamental and interlinked questions concerning effective regulation, namely, what is the 
appropriate rationale for both wrongs? When should defendant conduct be considered 
unlawful? Should both legal wrongs capture direct and indirect instances of exploitative 
conduct? Should exploitative conduct require a gain of some form, even if it is not made by 
defendants? How should courts assess claims of either nature, when donors have left a religion 
for another and seek to have gifts returned to them? How can courts appropriately identify who 
are victims and who are defendants in religious structures?  
 
In part II, chapter 6 engaged with the leading rationales seeking to theorise the doctrine of 
undue influence. At this stage in the thesis, I put the examination of religious fraud on hold. 
Discussions on the appropriate rationale for undue influence have been debated for as long as 
the doctrine has existed for. The same discussions were noted to be most commonly made by 
 
990 See pages 165-168. 
991 See pages 168-171. 
992 See pages 172-175. 
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scholars advancing a rationale for presumed undue influence, which for the main purposes of 
this thesis, was highly beneficial. My critique of the three leading rationales contributes to the 
general understanding of undue influence. I highlighted how the interaction of general doctrinal 
challenges posed by presumed undue influence cases listed in chapters 2 and 4 could not be 
addressed appropriately by the rationales mentioned. Additionally, I established that the 
authors of each rationale had not recognised some of the general challenges found in the 
judgments mentioned in their analysis. For example, what the role of independent advice is 
where it has been received but not followed, the nature of fiduciary duties owed to donors and 
temporal considerations of how influence alters over time in long-term relationships. 
Furthermore, by evaluating the rationales, I discussed the legitimacy of wider discussions on 
the doctrine’s fundamental principles that have been mentioned in other author’s rationales that 
could not be discussed further in this thesis.  
 
Most significantly, my criticisms of the three rationales explained why each rationale could not 
legitimately and consistently establish when religious influence becomes undue. I nevertheless 
submitted that each of the principles featured in the rationales was essential to understandings 
of presumed undue influence. I concluded that normative understandings of free will, 
exploitation and relational autonomy captured much of the inherent meaning of undue 
influence experienced in religious contexts and relationships.  
 
Lastly, the rationales examined were invaluable in creating greater clarity on how my rationale, 
advanced in chapter 7, provided a means of theorising s2 FA06. I have mentioned throughout 
this thesis that criminal law scholars have generally not sought to develop a rationale for the 
FA06 offences. The one main exception to this gap in knowledge is the work of Collins on s4 
 292 
FA06. Collins’ work was, however, unable to make the same contribution to my rationale in 
the same way as the civil law scholars assessed in chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 7 set out my principled approach for addressing many of the issues of regulating 
religious fraud and undue influence listed in part I. I termed this the ‘integrative rationale of 
autonomy and exploitation.’ My rationale requires courts to establish that the defendant’s 
conduct satisfies the doctrinal elements of both legal wrongs, as well as the factors indicating 
that the donor’s autonomy has been violated by the defendant’s exploitative conduct in the 
ways described. My rationale is applied to the current wording of s2 FA06 and the test for 
presumed undue influence with slight amendments, and it relies on particular conceptions of 
autonomy and exploitation set within a Perfectionist framework. I argued that the rationale is 
better able to produce principled decisions in cases in both areas of law. In such a principled 
approach, the religious circumstances of cases are given adequate respect and the doctrinal 
tests for both legal wrongs are considered in a more nuanced way. On this foundation, my 
concerns that strong forms of paternalistic and moralistic reasons can easily permeate existing 
doctrinal tests are heavily reduced. 
 
The civil law analysis conducted in chapters 2, 4 and 6 provided multiple cases to demonstrate 
how my rationale applied in practical contexts in chapter 7.993 In doing so, I offered a 
justification for why I believe some determinations of religious undue influence by English 
and Australian courts were incorrect. The cases reviewed, most notably Allcard994 and 
Hartigan,995 contain reasoning that frequently touches on conceptions of free will, exploitation 
and relational influence. Going against the orthodox views of these case, I argued that courts 
 
993 See pages 246-251. 
994 See pages 246-249. 
995 See pages 250-251. 
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do not typically examine these factors in a nuanced way, or in a way that appeals to reasons 
justifying the usage of particular factors when determining the defendant’s liability. In these 
judgments, the courts did not describe their understandings of these factors in a principled way.  
 
In relation to the rationale of s2 FA06, discussions on what constitutes exploitative conduct, in 
particular, is much less common in the case law. Consequently, the civil law focus offered 
valuable insights into the sorts of reasoning that could be considered by courts in religious 
fraud claims under s2 FA06. Accordingly, this affirms another reason why my analysis of both 
criminal and civil law provides a valuable lesson in helping to develop a rationale for the fraud 
offence that addresses the challenges identified in chapters 2 and 5.  
 
I explained that if falsity testing is prevented for certain religious representations where there 
is no clear evidence that the defendant misrepresents the state of their mind, the analysis of 
autonomy impairment will not be possible.996 In these scenarios, the exploitation limb will 
determine a defendant’s liability, alongside the other mens rea requirements of s2 FA06, that 
includes an assessment of whether the defendant sincerely believes in their representations.997 
The alteration to my rationale’s operation in these sorts of cases means liability can still be 
established and juries can be directed not to make decisions on nonjusticiable matters when 






996 See pages 272-273. 
997 See pages 99-100. 
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8.2. Contributions to knowledge 
 
Theory and practice 
 
In this thesis I have exposed a range of challenges in both areas of law, some of these were 
identified in religious contexts for the first time, and other challenges had been highlighted in 
other jurisdictions that have not yet been experienced by English courts. To address the main 
aim of the thesis, I developed a rationale that I argued better explains how both legal wrongs 
should be understood specifically in religious contexts, which helps to produce more principled 
regulation. Consequently, the thesis can also have a beneficial impact on the regulation of other 
challenging cases of fraud and undue influence that do not occur in religious circumstances. 
The integrative rationale addresses many of the civil law challenges, and some of the criminal 
law challenges are discussed in a principled manner by appealing to normative principles. My 
rationale does not simply offer a rationale that seeks to achieve conceptual completeness. It is 
of practical significance to understandings of undue influence, most directly to presumed undue 
influence cases and s2 FA06 cases 
 
My emphasis on the cross-fertilisation between criminal and civil regulation opens up the 
opportunity for an extended study on the differences and potential lessons that could be 
produced from assessing understandings of fraud in both areas. Further analysis would benefit 
the regulation of how individuals and institutions finance their operations. One key focus area 
where more detailed comparisons would be beneficial is between actual undue influence and 
other FA06 offences. This analysis could help develop understandings of what is meant legally 
by abuse of position;998 explain the universality of fiduciary duties in relationships that involve 
 
998 A criminal fraud offence under s4 FA06. 
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expectations of donations and gift and; how fraudulent conduct, that is not exclusively built on 
false representations, should be assessed in long-term relationships of gift-giving. 
 
More broadly, my rationale has the potential to create wider implications for other vitiating 
factors in private law. The rationale can help to make more effective doctrinal distinctions 
between actual undue influence, unconscionability, misrepresentation and duress. This applies 
most particularly to actual undue influence, as well as unconscionability, which is often 
conflated with undue influence in claims.999 A similar exercise to that conducted in this thesis 
could be attempted to produce legitimate rationales for each of these vitiating doctrines. In turn, 
this study could produce similar consequences to that produced here by providing a more 
principle means of addressing the doctrinal challenges experienced by other vitiating doctrines. 
 
 
Regulation of religious capital resulting in gains of financial capital 
 
A study combining the analysis of criminal and civil laws was ambitious but essential for 
developing a principled response to how English courts should regulate religious fraud and 
undue influence. The combined understanding of regulation offered the potential for cutting 
cross-fertilising legal analysis. Analysis of this kind proved important in producing an effective 
approach to regulate abuses of religious capital resulting in financial gains. The thesis 
demonstrated that both areas of law contain common themes and share some hybrid 
challenges.1000 
 
999 See generally Katy Barnett, ‘Thorne v Kennedy: A Thorn in the Side of 'Binding Financial Agreements'?’ 
(2018) Australian Journal of Family Law, 31, 183-193. 
1000 See chapter 5. 
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My use of exploitation in my rationale is the main reason why I can suggest appropriate 
responses to how to address the challenges of regulating religious influence resulting in 
financial gains. I have identified that prosecutors and courts will face considerable evidential 
difficulties in attempting to prove a defendant’s knowledge of unworldly matters that feature 
in religiously grounded s2 FA06 cases. As a result of this analysis, I questioned whether this 
aspect of the mens rea could ever be satisfied.1001 This is a very difficult challenge because, 
without contrary evidence of the defendant’s state of mind, it is hard to prove what a person is 
or was thinking at a given time. I suggested that the factors considered to indicate wrongful 
exploitation in my rationale help to verify that a defendant knew a belief to be untrue, 
misleading, or might be either. This includes making inferences based on a defendant’s 
exploitative conduct. Inferences based on these considerations seem to be the only way to prove 
knowledge even under my rationale where evidence of the defendant’s knowledge at the time 
of the representation or after it, cannot be produced. For example, where religious officials 
single out one adherent and make representations to them that are not made to other adherents 
and then threatens them not to tell their peers to make a gain or cause a loss, it seems that a 
defendant knows that their representation is untrue, misleading, or might be either. The 
applicability of this sort of reasoning will, however, depend on the facts of each case.  
 
I also considered the potential bias that could be experienced by religious defendants caused 
by the change in how dishonesty is now assessed in the criminal law after the Supreme Court 
decision in Ivey.1002 I believe the understanding of exploitation advanced in this thesis can 
combat the impact of bias that might be experienced by religious defendants in s2 FA06 cases 
to some extent.1003 The exploitation limb of my rationale explains what sort of conduct should 
 
1001 See pages 94-97. 
1002 See pages 101-111. 
1003 See pages 280-281. 
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be captured by the offence. In turn, it helps juries to understand what type of conduct is 
indicative of exploitation and dishonesty. A defendant who actively isolates victims from their 
family and friends but does not isolate other adherents, or that actively prevents victims from 
receiving advice before making a gift, is acting in an exploitative and dishonest way.1004  
 
Moreover, although I raised concerns about the usage of sincerity in religious fraud 
litigation,1005 sincerity testing fits within the dishonest test set by Ivey.1006 Accordingly, when 
juries are asked to determine whether the defendant’s conduct surrounding an untrue or 
misleading representation is dishonest, juries should be able to question whether they believe 
that the defendant sincerely believes in the religious beliefs motivating representations.1007 
 
By addressing some of the mens rea challenges highlighted, my rationale helps to reduce the 
concern that it can be difficult to correctly identify which religious officials of an institution 
have acted fraudulently under s2 FA06.1008 Alongside the wording of s2 FA06, the requirement 
that a victim’s autonomy (where it can be tested) must be violated by the defendant’s 
exploitative conduct helps to reduce the likelihood that all religious officials, sharing the beliefs 
alleged to be fraudulent, will be found guilty of committing the offence.  
 
However, I have not been able to address all challenges listed in chapters 2 and 3 because of 
their complex theological nature. I am referring here to the falsity testing challenges, which is 
largely left unaddressed. Despite stopping my analysis short of suggesting the possible means 
of addressing the challenge, I have nonetheless expanded upon the complexity of the challenge 
 
1004 See pages 260-263. 
1005 See pages 48-51 & 111-118. 
1006 See pages 99-100. 
1007 See pages 111-117. 
1008 See pages 118-123. 
 298 
and demonstrated the doctrinal, procedural and human rights law challenges that English courts 
will face in religious s2 FA06 cases. Consequently, I have provided detailed explanations to 
corroborate my view that regulation of religious representations under the current 
understanding of s2 FA06 will not produce legitimate outcomes in this context. Additionally, 
I have also highlighted an area of law that is fertile ground for future analysis in this context 
and general human rights jurisprudence, as well as alternative approaches to regulation.1009 
 
In the civil context, the efforts of courts and scholars seeking to resolve specific doctrinal 
challenges found in both England and Australian legal states, have not confirmed what are 
appropriate responses to the unique religious challenges or the challenges compounded in 
religious contexts. I examined the nature of specific factors present in case law since Allcard 
and justified my choice of factors that form the basis of my rationale. I consequently argued 
that the rationale is better able to effectively distinguish religious influence from undue 
influence in presumed undue influence cases.  
 
Further analysis of the hybrid kind adopted in this thesis would confirm that there are other 
common issues of regulating religious influence resulting in financial gains through both areas 
of law that have not been described in this thesis. For instance, analysis of fraudulent conduct 
under the existing understanding of actual undue influence would foreseeably give rise to the 
complexities of the falsity and sincerity problems relating to the regulation of religious 
representations discussed in chapter 2. Furthermore, the same problems would be found by 
investigating the understandings of the civil doctrine of fraudulent calumny in religious 
contexts.  
 
1009 See pages 48-51. 
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The universality of strict fiduciary duties is a topic in numerous areas of private law that should 
also be investigated further. My analysis of the undue influence rationales led me to question 
more broadly how other aspects of civil law operate in religious contexts. One such area 
identified was the appropriateness of strict duties of fiduciary duties in religious contexts that 
involve gift-giving motivated by religious faith.1010 I argued that breaches of duties of loyalty 
owed by a fiduciary, who is a religious figure, may only be incidental and expected by both 
parties in advance.1011 This was noted to be a crucial difference between ordinary breaches of 
fiduciary duties and those theoretically examined in religious relationships. This research 
would help develop responses on the foundations of fiduciary duties.1012 Moreover, extending 
the theoretical analysis found in this thesis to this area of law would overlap with existing 
descriptions of fiduciary duties based on Raz’s Perfectionist principles.1013 
 
 
Equitable understandings of presumed undue influence 
 
By developing my rationale, I have contributed to the literature debating the doctrine’s 
rationale. Most specifically, I have added to the range of criticisms made against monist 
accounts and explained why a multifactor account, like mine, produces more principled 
decisions on defendant liability and the remedies awarded to claimants. The integrative 
rationale is also better placed to explain when relational influence of any nature becomes 
undue. 
 
1010 See pages 194-199. 
1011 Ibid. 
1012 See generally Paul B. Miller, ‘The Fiduciary Relationship,’ in Andrew S. Gold and Paul B. Miller, 
Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law, (OUP 2014) & Joshua Getzler, ‘Ascribing and Limiting Fiduciary 
Obligations,’ in the same edited collection. 
1013 Raz’s service conception of authority has been applied to interpersonal fiduciaries by Evan Fox-Decent, 
‘Fiduciary Authority and the Service Conception,’ in Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, Philosophical 
Foundations of Fiduciary Law, (OUP 2014). 
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I anticipate that criticisms will be made against the role of the fundamental principles featured 
in my rationale, and for the reasons why I have dismissed other factors and the approaches of 
the other civil scholars mentioned. Foreseeably, some may argue that a Perfectionist 
justification for limiting why some choices are not valuable to personal autonomy gives rise to 
strong forms of moralistic reasoning. Additionally, it could be said that my rationale sets the 
threshold of influence in religious contexts so high that claims will rarely be successful. 
However, I believe I have adequately defended my rationale by describing the fundamental 
principles of my rationale and their limits by applying the rationale to decided cases. I have 
also explained in detail why alternative civil rationales do not result in more principled 
outcomes by strictly focusing on hard cases of presumed religious influence.  
 
As a consequence of the normative analysis produced in chapter 7, I have also provided some 
responses to the challenges and questions identified in chapters 3 and 5. I have explained that 
independent advice received by donors can help them to act autonomously and not be exploited 
by defendants, but that it does not automatically rebut presumptions of influence.1014 
Additionally, I have submitted that defendants need not benefit from their conduct directly1015 
because unduly influencing conduct produces a wrongful violation of a donor’s autonomy that 
results in financial harm to the donor’s interests, and this justifies legal intervention.1016  
 
Moreover, my rationale establishes that improvident transactions do not ipso facto create a 
suspicion of undue influence, nor does it count as a weighty factor in determining whether a 
presumption of influence has been rebutted. I have shown two things by thinking in this way, 
firstly, if personal autonomy is a significant value in the context of gift-giving improvidence 
 
1014 See pages 260-261. 
1015 See page 257. 
1016 See pages 251-253. 
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must be tolerated, even if donors later deeply regret certain transactions. The doctrine of undue 
influence should not be capable of creating a generous returns policy. Secondly, gifts of any 
value should be susceptible to undue influence claims. A distinction between small and large 
gifts is generally unprincipled for the reasons discussed.1017 
 
I have also sought to clarify what the nature of presumptions found in presumed undue 
influence cases is. Relationships between religious figures and adherents have traditionally 
given rise to presumptions of influence. However, in cases like Azaz, it is unclear why a 
sufficient relationship existed between the parties at all times. I examined understandings of 
automatic presumptions of influence arising in relationships between religious advisors and 
adherents and touched on other specific relationships considered in law to involve heightened 
levels of trust.1018 I argued that religious relationships do not necessarily reach the level of trust 
that other relationships susceptible to automatic presumptions of influence do at all times gifts 
are made. Further, I stated that automatic presumptions of influence fail to take into account 
the temporal nature of relationships and influence.1019 Consequently, changes in both factors 
are not considered at this stage in cases. Therefore, courts are unlikely to sever gifts from 
presumptions of influence unless a gift does not call for an explanation, but this is usually easily 
proven because of the size of gifts made. On this reasoning, I have suggested that automatic 
presumptions be abandoned, at least in religious contexts, and replaced by presumptions of 
trust and confidence that must be proven by claimants. This examination already occurs in 
cases where automatic presumptions do not apply. Accordingly, this recommendation does not 
require a complete rehaul of the understanding of presumptions of influence in English law. 
 
1017 See page 264. 
1018 See pages 154-162. 
1019 Ibid. 
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Finally, I have sought to reduce the burdens faced by religious defendants rebutting 
presumptions of influence.1020 I argued that this was achieved by describing what factors 
indicate that presumptions of influence have been rebutted.1021 The integrative rationale also 
provides courts with a limited amount of discretion to examine autonomy and exploitation 
considerations to determine whether additional factors can also operate in similar ways. The 
discretion afforded by the rationale appeals to reasons that provide strong justifications for 
decisions on whether defendants can rebut a presumption of influence. Accordingly, the same 
concerns expressed about how religious defendants can rebut presumptions of influence that 
arose out of my discussion of reasoning of decided cases and the rationales surveyed in chapter 
6, are not as applicable to my rationale.  
 
More generally, I hope that private law scholars will engage more directly with themes of 
temporality and how it is considered in understandings of other vitiating doctrines. I believe 
that this sort of reasoning would produce considerable benefits for the legitimate operation of 
such doctrines. Studying how time can be understood in private law would touch on a 
considerable number of topics and potentially identify common challenges. A suitable topic of 
study that naturally follows from the conclusions of this thesis is how independent advice can 
absolve liability in long-term relationships involving financial transactions. Advice may not 
apply to all transactions equally due to the nature of the specific transactions. Alternatively, the 
advice may be received before changes to a donee’s or donor’s circumstances, which causes 
the advice to be less applicable because of the nature of transactions.  
 
 
1020 See page 264-265. 
1021 See pages 259-266. 
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Furthermore, commentators could examine the defence of laches considered in long-term 
relationships of influence when individuals end their relationship with another party and do not 
change their minds on the beliefs that initially grounded the party’s mutual connection. 
Religious and spiritual relationships would provide a good starting point for this analysis. 
Foreseeably, this research could also extend to other relationships involving heightened 
degrees of trust based on mutually held ideologies. This sort of temporal analysis could extend 
to the regulation of gifts, testamentary dispositions, and contracts to help ascertain whether 
transactions have been entered into lawfully on each occasion. 
 
 
English criminal fraud laws 
 
In a more limited way this thesis is an important step towards developing rationales for the 
other FA06 offences.1022 Efforts have already been made to theorise s4 FA06, fraud by abuse 
of position by Collins, as mentioned. Accordingly, a natural step in criminal fraud scholarship 
would be to theorise s3 FA06, fraud by failing to disclose information. This offence prohibits 
dishonest failures to disclose to another person information which they are under a legal duty 
to disclose1023 to intentionally make a gain or cause a loss to another.1024 This research would 
involve extensive assessments of fiduciary duties, exploitation and autonomy. Accordingly, 
my rationale may also have some application to that fraud offence.  
 
 





Further, the understanding of exploitation and autonomy contained in my rationale contributes 
to criminal law understandings of interpersonal exploitation aimed at gaining some form of 
property from another individual.  
 
 
8.3. Implications for policy and practice 
 
I have mentioned that this thesis could have a practical impact on how courts regulate both 
legal wrongs. In this way, I have consistently pursued the main aim of this thesis, how should 
English courts regulate religious fraud and religious undue influence? I now outline the specific 
contributions to legal policy and practices. My main contribution to policy relates to how courts 
should read the test for presumed undue influence and interpret s2 FA06. My rationale sets out 
how courts should read the tests for both legal wrongs and describes what conduct should be 
prohibited in religious contexts.  
 
In the civil context, I have now produced a means of deciding hard cases of presumed undue 
influence, which are frequently religiously grounded. The rationale principally establishes 
when relational influence becomes undue in any form of context. It mandates that the specific 
reasons for the gifts and community values should be taken into account in judicial reasoning 
as an explanation of what constitutes ordinary motives at the presumption stage, and whether 
it indicates exploitation at the rebuttal stage, where the conduct is not connected to those 
reasons and values. As a result of my focus on hard cases of presumed undue influence, I have 
also demonstrated how the challenges that arise in easier cases should be addressed by courts. 
I have thus contributed to the understanding of how all types of presumed undue influence 
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claims should be understood and how courts can principally engage with challenges described 
to determine when influence becomes undue. 
 
In the criminal context of s2 FA06, I have established how courts should understand the 
rationale of the offence and its justified boundaries. I also outlined how my rationale could 
incorporate additional considerations such as sincerity, depending on how the falsity problem 
is addressed either by courts or Parliament. Further, I have made some suggestions on how 
courts could seek to address certain categories of beliefs and why this may result in 
discrimination between religions in cases where beliefs are more capable of falsification. 
 
More importantly, I have developed a perspective on religious fraud regulation that will 
hopefully create debate about whether religious exemptions should be granted to s2 FA06 or 
whether legislative reform is necessary to give greater focus to defendant sincerity. Courts and 
Parliament will eventually be required to determine whether certain kinds of religious beliefs 
can be tested for falsity in prosecutions for s2 FA06 where there is no clear evidence that the 
defendant holds false beliefs.1025 As discussed in chapter 3, it seems unlikely that this will be 
answered positively because of the reading of the ECHR jurisprudence in ex parte Williamson, 
which prohibits such testing in favour of sincerity testing. If this decision is followed in the 
criminal context of fraud laws, a religious exception must be created, or legislative reform is 
necessary so that falsity testing is not required of religious beliefs. This debate is crucial to how 
religious fraud can be regulated by criminal laws. Such a debate could discuss the analysis of 
the US approach to religious fraud regulation and the alternative approaches suggested by US 
commentators that are claimed to more effectively protect the defendant’s religious liberty.1026 
 
1025 See pages 86-93. 
1026 See pages 48-51. 
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This thesis has also touched on the negative aspects of sincerity testing of religious beliefs in 
religious fraud claims and those seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws. 
Determining an individual’s sincerity is often a highly complicated matter where there is no 
clear indication of insincerity. In the English cases discussed where exemptions are sought,1027 
the risk of finding someone sincere when they are in reality insincere about their religious 
beliefs is low. Decisions typically relate to religious dress that cannot cause direct harm to 
others. However, the risk is different in religious fraud contexts. A finding of sincerity when a 
person is insincere allows defendants to use religion as a cloak to mask fraudulent conduct. 
Financial harms are caused to those who are subjected to this conduct. Religious institutions 
also suffer because religious categorisation may be abused by racketeers. This is likely to lead 
to reduced confidence in religions and such religions facing stigma, which may result in 
negative treatment by other institutions or by adherents and disbelievers.  
 
However, courts must be realistic about how religious beliefs influence an individual’s conduct 
over time. One way of doing so would be to consider the sincerity of the religious beliefs 
motivating the particular representations deemed fraudulent. Causation should be an essential 
factor to determinations of sincerity, rather than the fact that a religious official believes in 
some beliefs wholeheartedly but not all beliefs manifested. A determination based on the latter 
ground is too marginal and fails to consider the reality that faith in religion can alter over time, 
but this does not make someone insincere at the moment a gift was received.  
 
I believe that sincerity testing as a means of determining religious exemptions to generally 
applicable laws should be evaluated. I do not suggest that it should not be considered in cases 
of this nature. Sincerity plays a significant role in litigation by giving weight to the individual’s 
 
1027 See n 310. 
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subjective viewpoint, which I believe is highly important to religious freedom claims. Instead, 
I argued, like Su,1028 that courts should give greater focus to the risks and consequences of 
determinations in particular cases to reduce the possibility that religious categorisation is 
abused by fraudsters or those seeking to unlawfully profit from their beliefs. Such a task is, 
however, one for future scholarship. 
 
Practically, these policy implications should be of concern for religious organisations funded 
by donations and gifts made by adherents. In particular, the possibility of abuses of religious 
categorisation in fraud contexts, depending on how statutory test for s2 FA06 is applied by 
courts. If courts ban falsity testing in this setting and adopt a sincerity-based approach as the 
US does, religious institutions should think carefully about the ways they raise money through 
religious practices and how they oversee how officials conducting fundraising events. If a s2 
FA06 case were tried and deemed justiciable, I foresee that a significant number of cases would 
be brought against religious institutions in the future. 
 
Religious institutions should be aware of the potential that aggrieved former adherents and 
adherents who have realised the improvidence of their gifts will subsequently want to claim 
back gifted property. As mentioned throughout this thesis, religious influence and beliefs often 
fluctuate greatly over time as a result of social trends and influences, changes in health and 
wealth, and more generally, by growing older and reflecting upon individual preferences. 
Consequently, religious experiences are not consistently rooted in one denomination or even 
one faith.1029 In the US, for instance, adherents commonly switch congregations at least once 
 
1028 Su (n 432), 48. 
1029 See Ben Clements, Religion and Public Opinion in Britain: Continuity and Change, (Palgrave MacMillan 
2015), 12-24 and Office for National Statistics, ‘How Religion has Changed in England and Wales,’ (2015) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/howreligionhaschan
gedinenglandandwales/2015-06-04> Accessed September 2020. 
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in their lifetime.1030 I have explained how claims of this nature are conceivable, especially 
through presumed undue influence if changes are not made to the test. To some extent, this 
also applies to s2 FA06, where adherents argue that a religious official could not possibly 
believe in their representations because they have not come true on multiple occasions. 
 
Religious influence is an inevitable part of the practice of religion and often involves gift-
giving. Legal attention must be directed to take account of this in regulating gifts motivated by 
religious faith. The question of how religious influence becomes unlawful in fraud and undue 
influence contexts needs to be tackled head-on. English law needs to revaluate the two legal 
wrongs examined in this thesis to ensure the law protects adherents against dishonest adherents 
and religious racketeers exploiting religious faith. English law must look to the legislative past 
to realise that regulation of religious influence requires specific focus because of the crucial 
differences between religious and nonreligious cases in this context. This thesis instructs 











1030 David Sikkink and Michael Emerson, 'Congregational Switching in an Age of Great Expectations,' (2020) 
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